|
|
 Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود (Re: Haydar Badawi Sadig)
|
DEAR MR HYDAR,,,
WHY YOU DON'T ASK US TO HELP SUDAN ON THE FOLLOWING CRISIS,, WE SAID THE SAME ABOUT NOMAIRI,, AND THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT,, WE GOING TO KEEP GOING ON,,,
STATEMENT BY CARE INTERNATIONAL
ON THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SUDAN
A. INTRODUCTION
The primary causes of Sudan's long-running humanitarian crisis are civil war and a predominantly subsistence-level economy that is vulnerable—even in the best of times— to drought, floods, and other natural shocks. The death toll of 15 years of civil war is estimated by some at 1.5 million people—more than the combined casualties of this decade’s conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, and Liberia—and many more people have suffered disease, injury, displacement and loss of assets and livelihoods.
Despite a number of efforts to bring peace to Sudan, the logic of war continues to prevail--among both the parties to the conflict and their international backers. There is a long history of failed negotiations and broken cease-fires since the early 1980s.
This paper sets out the principles that guide CARE's work for improving the livelihoods of poor communities in many parts of the country. It also makes several recommendations for addressing the root causes of the current humanitarian crisis and for improving the effectiveness and the efficiency of international relief. Above all, CARE calls upon governments to redouble their efforts to address the political causes of the current crisis, and to support lasting solutions to the critical problems of conflict and poverty.
CARE International has worked in Sudan since the late 1970s, providing emergency relief assistance in some years and also supporting a wide range of rehabilitation and development programs. CARE currently works in Bahr el Ghazal, Khartoum, Kordofan, Western Equatoria, Jonglei, and Western Upper Nile (Unity State).
CARE is committed to improving the livelihood security of vulnerable people in Sudan regardless of ethnic origins, political associations, religious beliefs, or gender. We are committed to providing assistance so long as humanitarian needs exist and so long as CARE is able to operate effectively and have a positive impact.
B. RATIONALE FOR CARE'S PRESENCE IN SUDAN AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Complex emergencies like Sudan give rise to the most basic sort of questions. Why are we working in a country where civil war is so longstanding and human rights abuses are endemic? Does our very presence give credibility to governments or rebel groups who are party to the conflict and who are abusing the civilian population? Does our presence (and resources) influence and add to the conflict? Is it possible or appropriate to engage in rehabilitation, development and local capacity-building efforts in such a context? This section tries to answer these questions.
Why is CARE in Sudan? The answer is, at heart, quite simple. The people of Sudan—north and south—are very poor. (Sudan ranks 144th out of 174 in terms of the Human Development Index.) The long-running conflict has rendered the poor even more vulnerable, with large numbers of displaced at acute risk. Current UN estimates are that 2.6 million people in all of Sudan are currently at risk and in need of assistance. Responding to such need goes to the very core of CARE’s mission to “affirm human dignity”, “relieve human suffering” and “promote economic opportunity.” Moreover, CARE is a signatory to the Red Cross Code of Conduct, the first principle of which is that the right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental right which should be enjoyed by all citizens of every country.
Given that the criterion of need is not in question in the case of Sudan, the real question then is whether or not the prevailing conditions in the country allow CARE to operate effectively and whether NGOs such as CARE contribute to the conflict. In this context, CARE has developed seven broad principles that govern our program response to the crisis. These principles will provide the basis for designing and implementing CARE projects, in addition to shaping our policy recommendations.
1. Respond to humanitarian needs. CARE’s mandate is to respond to the humanitarian needs of vulnerable and disenfranchised people. CARE intends to work in Sudan so long as such needs exist and so long as CARE is able to operate effectively.
2. Assess benefits and risks of interventions. CARE will undertake regular “benefit-harm” assessments to weigh the expected benefits and potential harm or negative effects of any CARE program in Sudan. Negative effects could include the diversion of goods or manipulation of services to only favored parties. CARE will conduct assessments prior to entry to a new operational area, during design of new interventions, and through periodic review of ongoing programs. CARE will consider some of the larger questions and only undertake or continue programs that are achieving significantly more benefits than any negative effects.
3. Maintain effectiveness and independence. CARE must be able to maintain the effectiveness and independence of its operations in the Sudan. CARE will establish and regularly monitor appropriate indicators of effectiveness and independence. If operating conditions, including unacceptable levels of control, obstruction or interference by authorities, excessively inhibit CARE’s effectiveness and independence, CARE will take appropriate decisions including reduction or suspension of activities.
4. Maintain neutrality. In the Sudan context, the United Nations has defined neutrality as “the refusal to take sides in the conflict or to use the provision of assistance to promote any political or religious agenda.” CARE International has implicitly adopted such a definition and operates as much as possible without favoring any particular religious, political, and ethnic group. CARE will continue working in certain geographic areas subject to remaining within our own policy of neutrality. In general, continued activity on one side of a contested area is only justified if rigorous advocacy is conducted for NGO access to areas controlled by the other side.
5. Undertake longer-term rehabilitation and local capacity-building activities. In addition to relief activities, CARE intends to undertake appropriate rehabilitation, development and local capacity-strengthening activities in both north and south Sudan. Such assistance is essential in order to build healthy civil societies. It is also a means to limit the likelihood and extent of emergencies. However, given the nature of the civil war, CARE will carefully apply selection criteria for any interventions. We will choose opportunities in relatively stable areas with favorable conditions for sustainable activities. We will not invest in infrastructure or programs that are at immediate risk from the war, unless not doing so puts significant numbers of people at risk. Also we will not build capacities of groups or entities involved in the conflict or who are otherwise promoting the conflict.
6. Provide food aid only if need exists and if adequate assessment and monitoring are possible. CARE will consider establishing new food programs if the need is not being effectively met by traditional coping strategies or by other agencies and where adequate (in the circumstances) monitoring or other controls can be established.
7. Adhere to fundamental programming principles. CARE projects will have significant scope, reach the neediest, make sustainable improvements in the lives of poor families, serve as models, respect and build local capacities, and seek the participation of Sudanese men and women in the design and implementation of its projects. In implementing programs, CARE seeks to minimize the exacerbation of conflict and, where possible, consider conflict mitigation and peace-building elements.
C. CARE PERSPECTIVES ON THE PEACE PROCESS
Many observers believe that the present time represents the best opportunity for peace that Sudan has seen in quite some time. A temporary and imperfect cease-fire is in place for three months (July-October) and some progress has been made over the last year in the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) negotiations.
While we should not naively overestimate the prospects for extending the cease-fire in southern Sudan, we need to consider the alternative--a resumption of large-scale military operations in the coming dry season and many more years of civilian casualties and social and economic crisis.
Humanitarian action such as food distribution and provision of basic services to victims of conflict may be essential but is no substitute for a regional political solution.
CARE International believes the following:
1. The war in the Sudan continues to inflict untold suffering on the Sudanese people. The people of Sudan desperately need peace. Furthermore, we believe that a peaceful resolution to the war in Sudan is the only option that can stop human suffering and that further pursuing military strategy by either side is unlikely to lead to a resolution in the foreseeable future. All concerned parties should support an effective peace process. CARE supports the IGAD-sponsored peace process and will do what it can to promote its prospects for success.
2. The most pressing need is for the parties to agree to extend the cease-fire for a further period beyond its current expiry in October. Also the peace process and cease-fire should be expanded to ensure that other factions are included in the process and all geographic areas are covered.
3. The recent embassy bombings, missile attacks, and anti-American backlash have created a significant risk of disruption to humanitarian efforts. Special efforts must be made by the governments of the US, the UK, Sudan and the EU to avoid negative repercussions on the humanitarian relief effort.
4. The Secretary General of the United Nations should raise the involvement of the United Nations to a higher level. Concrete steps might include appointing a Special Representative for Sudan, to help focus international attention on the civil war and mobilize appropriate international support for the peace process.
5. Based on its public pronouncements, current U.S. Government policy is quite inconsistent. At times it sounds like a war strategy, favoring the rebels in the south, while at other times there are steps being made to promote peace. We intend to dialogue with US policymakers over the next few months in order to better understand their policy objectives vis-a-vis Sudan. We are likely to seek ways to change US policy toward Sudan to one of constructive engagement, putting its full weight behind the peace process. We will encourage the US Government not to portray the civil war in simplistic terms, and also to focus more directly on the root causes of the humanitarian crisis, while not making exaggerated claims against the Sudanese Government. Given its existing relationships, the US Government should urge the SPLA and its regional allies, namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, to increase their commitment to the peace process.
D. CARE PERSPECTIVES ON OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN AND CHALLENGES TO THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
In response to the current crisis, the United Nations has organized the largest airlift in its history. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) has broken new ground by bringing state and non-state actors into agreements covering the provision of humanitarian assistance. OLS has also developed ground rules explicitly linking humanitarian assistance and human rights and humanitarian law. At the same time, OLS has come under increasing criticism in recent months, and some international NGOs have decided to work outside the OLS umbrella.
In general, the international relief effort has been faced with at least three major problems: restrictions on access to people in need; inadequate capacity to deliver emergency relief; and the diversion of emergency aid by combatants and local authorities.
Restrictions on access. Under the current system, the United Nations negotiates access to specific areas of the country with the Government of Sudan and the armed opposition movements. There are some locations that are off-limits to international relief agencies.
CARE International believes there should be reasonable and appropriate access to all areas in the Sudan for the purpose of providing humanitarian assistance. All parties should work towards this goal. The current restrictions placed on international NGOs, especially in the northern sector and the Nuba mountains, are a violation of the rights of poor communities to humanitarian assistance.
Limited delivery capacity. OLS (in the southern sector) has steadily increased the amount of food delivered by air from 2,000 to more than 10,000 metric tons per month. Yet existing capacity of OLS is struggling to cope with the levels of demand. There is considerable donor interest in supporting surface routes that will improve overland access.
CARE International believes Operation Lifeline Sudan deserves the continued support of international NGOs. At the same time, we should seek to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the relief operation. For example, UNICEF as a lead member should focus its energies more on coordination and policy, and not be too involved in implementation.
Diversion of aid. Different sides in the civil war are helping to divert aid from its intended beneficiaries, although how much diversion is taking place is unclear. Some aid is redistributed with the consent of the original Sudanese recipients. Other times there is no such consent. Food diversion can be one of the most difficult issues to address in crises such as this one.
CARE International believes the international community needs to deliver food aid more efficiently and at lower cost to needy areas in southern Sudan, and we will look to support the United Nations in this regard. In recent months, CARE seconded five staff to help WFP improve its airlift capacity. CARE also began to look at rehabilitating feeder roads, as well as roads that link food surplus and deficit areas of southern Sudan. However CARE is not prepared to help rehabilitate trunk roads or railways, where the risk of military abuse is high. CARE will conduct a thorough analysis before deciding on its involvement in any activities in this area.
CARE believes the United Nations and international NGOs need to pursue a wide range of strategies in order to minimize the diversion of its humanitarian assistance. If CARE decides to get further involved in distributing food, for example, it needs to conduct reasonable benefit-harm assessments to determine the actual population in need, carefully weigh different distribution options, ensure adequate on-the-ground presence for monitoring, and avoid maintaining significant stocks of food in insecure locations.
In general, the crisis in Sudan is not going to go away quickly. The combination of famine and conflict requires donors to provide support on a significant scale to the entire humanitarian relief effort, including WFP/OLS operations, at least until the harvest of September, 1999. This would be the case even if the cease-fire is extended and all hostilities ended today, given this year’s poor harvest in many parts of the crisis zone.
E. CARE PERSPECTIVES ON REHABILITATION AND LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING
While many governments provide humanitarian assistance to Sudan, many donors are reluctant or unwilling to provide funding for rehabilitation and long-term development programs, particularly in northern Sudan and in government-controlled areas in the south.
We urge a more nuanced and less categorical approach to building local capacities. At least in the context of Sudan, traditional distinctions between emergency and rehabilitation phases lose their meaning, and rehabilitation activities today can help to mitigate an emergency situation tomorrow.
All Sudanese people should have equal access to appropriate rehabilitation, development and local capacity-strengthening assistance, in addition to emergency relief. We offer the following rules of thumb for consideration:
· Investments in physical infrastructure and capital equipment should be limited, particularly in those areas most affected by conflict. Conversely, investments in human capital, e.g. education, are appropriate.
· Efforts at capacity-building should be focused at a local level and on individuals and groups whose mandate is purely humanitarian or technical.
· Investments in productive activity need to have a short-term horizon.
CARE will actively advocate with donors to consider supporting rehabilitation, development and capacity-strengthening activities in both the north and the south of Sudan, in addition to supporting humanitarian assistance.
|
|
 
|
|
|
|
|
| العنوان |
الكاتب |
Date |
| إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السودان | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 03-07-03, 06:58 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | intehazy | 03-07-03, 08:04 AM |
 Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | يحي ابن عوف | 03-07-03, 08:24 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 03-07-03, 03:50 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 03-07-03, 03:55 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Alsawi | 03-07-03, 04:27 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 03-07-03, 04:49 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | حسن الجزولي | 03-07-03, 05:02 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Elmosley | 03-07-03, 05:06 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 03-07-03, 05:34 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | SAMIR IBRAHIM | 03-07-03, 05:40 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 03-07-03, 11:31 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | فتحي البحيري | 03-08-03, 05:20 PM |
 Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | abdel abayazid | 03-08-03, 05:38 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Tumadir | 03-09-03, 00:56 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 03-09-03, 07:57 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | فتحي البحيري | 06-19-03, 05:04 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Elmosley | 06-19-03, 07:05 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | خضر حسين | 06-19-03, 11:59 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Elmosley | 06-20-03, 00:33 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 06-20-03, 00:39 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Elmosley | 06-20-03, 01:31 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 06-20-03, 02:34 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | bayan | 06-20-03, 04:20 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Elmosley | 06-20-03, 05:20 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | عبدالأله زمراوي | 06-20-03, 06:06 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Elmosley | 06-20-03, 12:18 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | elsharief | 06-20-03, 10:49 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Elmosley | 06-20-03, 12:19 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | خالد | 06-20-03, 12:30 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Elmosley | 06-20-03, 12:46 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | فتحي البحيري | 06-20-03, 01:49 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 06-20-03, 03:05 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | فتحي البحيري | 06-20-03, 03:25 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 06-20-03, 04:09 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | فتحي البحيري | 06-20-03, 04:23 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | فتحي البحيري | 06-20-03, 05:39 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | خضر حسين | 06-20-03, 10:44 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 06-20-03, 11:07 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | فتحي البحيري | 06-21-03, 07:17 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | خضر حسين | 06-21-03, 10:04 PM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | Haydar Badawi Sadig | 06-22-03, 00:36 AM |
| Re: إقتراح لموصلي وتماضر وكافة ألعضاء: حملة قانونية وثقافية ضد حكومة السود | فتحي البحيري | 06-22-03, 09:23 AM |
|
| |
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست