|
|
|
 Re: خطيير: محاضر جهاز الامن السودانى قاعدة في الصقيعة.. (Re: Mohamed Suleiman)
|
نظام بكري هنا في المنبر لا يسمح بفتح روابط ال URL
لكن للإطلاع علي مقال أريك ريفز لترجمته لوثيقة جهاز الأمن الي اللغة الإنجليزية .. يمكن نسخ (كوبي copy ) الكلام التالي ثم لصقه (يبست paste) في بحث قوقل ليقودك لموقع أريك ريفز:
looking-directly-into-the-heart-of-darkness-what-the-khartoum-regime-really-thinks
هناك بلاوي و أسرار في ذلك الإجتماع مثل:
- إعتراف جهاز الامن بتدريب و مساعدة المتطرفين في ليبيا و أنهم يتحدون مصر تحدي مفتوح بأنها لا تستطيع عمل شئ ضدهم لأن مصر لن تجرؤ علي فتح جبهنين (ليبيا و السودان).
- إعتراف واضح في الإجتماع بفساد أمبيكي و محمد بن شمباس (يوناميد).
- المظاهرات خط أحمر و سيُقابل بالنار.
التصريح و بسفور أن أي صحفي أو سياسي ينتقد قوات الدعم السريع سيواجه بتهم التجسس و الخيانة العظمي.
- التجهيز و التركيز علي الإنتخابات و تخصيص رشاوي و أموال طائلة للفوز بها (تزويرها).
و
و
لسة بقرأ
| |
  
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: خطيير: محاضر جهاز الامن السودانى قاعدة في الصقيعة.. (Re: Mohamed Suleiman)
|
بكري كان واااضح جداً في الكلام:
- أمريكا زي ما بتغشنا نحن برضو بنغشها .. وعدونا برفع العقوبات و رفع إسمنا من الدول الداعمة للإرهاب ... و غشونا ... نحن كمان بنغشهم في المعلومات عن الجماعات الإسلامية في ليبيا و مالي و الصومال و فلسطين و افغانستان و إيران ..
الأمريكان ما بيقدروا يعتمدوا علي دول الخليج في المعلومات عن هذه الجماعات ... لأنوعلاقتهم ضعيفة ما زي علاقتنا بكل هذه الجماعات ... و نحن لن نضحي بعلاقتنا بإيران من أجل أي أحد.
- ناس التمرد في الجنوب لابد من دعمهم بكل شئ ... بأسلحة ثقيلة و دبابات و تدريب كامل.
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: خطيير: محاضر جهاز الامن السودانى قاعدة في الصقيعة.. (Re: جعفر محي الدين)
|
1. C the UN Security Council’s dialogue with President Mbeki (Wed 17 Sept)
2. Statement from the Troika on the National Dialogue on Sudan (Thurs 18 Sept) – it sets out 6 principles that “provide a basis for meaningful governance reform and lasting resolution of the conflicts in Sudan”
3. Summary and full text of the AU PSC Communique following its dialogue with President Mbeki (Fri 12 Sept) – key provisions in respect of the AUHIP mandate and PSC’s expectations of GoS/IC are highlighted
___________________________________
Confidential readout from Mbeki interactive briefing to UNSC
New York, 17 September 2014
Topline points
· Mbeki’s main message was that the ND is the only viable prospect for achieving democratic transformation in Sudan that we’ve seen in years – very optimistic a genuine ND can happen
· International community must support the ND and provide debt relief/lift sanctions – economic challenges cannot be left to wait until the political challenges are resolved
· Mbeki does not want a detailed, prescriptive mandate – this will constrain him – but he is discussing ToRs (presumably with Khartoum – he was vague on identity of the other party)
· Mbeki presented a clear vision of how the ND process should unfold:
o Get all the parties (including all armed groups) to agree the principles that should frame the ND process before it starts (ie the ND Roadmap will have to be revisited in coming days)
o Two parallel but coordinated CoH negotiations will commence in October: one for Darfur (using DDPD as the framework) and another for the Two Areas
o CoHs must be agreed before ND starts – but Mbeki would not be drawn on a timeline for concluding CoH agreements
o We are in the preparatory phase of the ND – we do not yet have a conducive environment (but no detail of what criteria need to be met in Mbeki’s mind to reach a conducive environ)
o ND must be fully inclusive – this will take time achieve
o ND will need to run for more than 3 months
o Elections are on the agenda for discussion during the ND (implication being the 15 April 2015 timeline might change)
· Outcome of the dialogue: no UNSC statement is planned. UNSC next scheduled to discuss Sudan in November (Australia’s presidency) as it has shifted from monthly to 3-monthly consultations on Sudan/South Sudan.
Parameters of the dialogue
· Mbeki was essentially updating the UNSC on his work on Sudan and the national dialogue (ND) ie not seeking the Council’s approval for next steps
· His opening remarks were lengthy and included a historical overview of how the ND has come about
o Sth Sudan was not discussed
o There was very little mention of N/S relations: Mbeki noted a new strategy is needed on Abyei; there has been no significant progress on unfinished CPA business; of the 27 Sept 2012 Agreements between Sudan and South Sudan, only the oil agreement is being upheld
· A lengthy QandA session followed (not the usual prepared statements from UNSC members). Mbeki provided detailed answers after each question which made for a long meeting
· Mbeki was joined by UN Special Envoy Haile Menkerios and UNAMID JSR/JCM Chambas – however Mbeki did almost all the talking
o Menkerios and Chambas were invited by the US (Chair) to make some remarks at the end and both strongly endorsed the work and leadership of the AUHIP and emphasized the significance of the opportunity presented by the ND
o Mbeki, Chambas and Menkerios presented as a very united and ‘joined up’ team
§ [Yet Chambas has resigned his position with UNAMID and is said to be leaving by the end of Sept. There is no clarity on when the post will be filled or by whom. The S-G/AUC Chair announced the appointment of a new Deputy JSR this week.]
· Russia and China were uncomfortable about the Council discussing the ND:
o Sudan is not on the Council’s agenda – the ND is not our concern – it is a domestic political process
o This view was not expressed by any other UNSC members – they see direct links between UNAMID, SK/BN (res.2046) and the ND
Mbeki’s main messages:
· Very strong that the ND is the only viable prospect for achieving democratic transformation in Sudan that we’ve seen in years – we cannot let this moment pass us by
o He reported that only 8 of the 90 political parties in Sudan are not on board with the ND
· A secondary point (ie not one that he emphasized as much) was that the international community cannot leave Sudan’s economic issues to be dealt with after the political issues are resolved – these need to be dealt with in tandem - ie Sudan needs debt relief and for sanctions to be lifted in the immediate future
o Russia and China amplified the need for debt relief/lifting sanctions in their interventions
o US responded by saying that whilst there is ongoing aerial bombardment, it is not the right time to be making these concessions
· Several states asked him how the UNSC can assist/support him. He had two suggestions:
o Come out publicly and strongly in support of the ND
o Commit to providing Sudan debt relief and lifting economic sanctions
Mbeki on his mandate:
· States asked questions about how he sees his mandate and his role
· Mbeki acknowledged his mandate is not well defined but he does not want to be constrained by something that is prescriptive (he argued it will give others the ability to argue that he does not have the authority to intervene on a range of issues – he needs the flexibility to determine when and where he should intervene)
· However, he presented a very clear picture to the Council of what he wants to achieve, and how he plans to get there
· His overarching goal is achieving democratic transformation in Sudan
· He has been going about this in a strategic fashion:
o He and Chambas went to Doha to get the green light from the Qataris to convene the Darfur CoH negotiations in Addis
o He was successful in getting Ibrahim al-Sheikh released from detention
o He got the Paris Declaration Group and G7+7 to sign the Addis Agreements (5 Sept Agreements)
· There are two draft ToRs under discussion that set out what the AUHIP is to do (it was implied he is negotiating this with Khartoum – which one Council member said is sensible otherwise he won’t get visas or be able to continue to engage directly with Khartoum – the Ch 7 approach does not work with Khartoum – right now the IC has no other interlocutor with Sudan other than Mbeki)
Establishing a conducive environment:
· Mbeki did not provide specific details on this issue – but his responses to questions showed he does not think a conducive environment has been achieved yet
o He acknowledged that that Khtm is yet to deliver on the freedoms Bashir promised, he continues to raise the aerial bombardments and political arrests with Khartoum, and armed groups must have security guarantees before they can be expected to travel to Khtm for a dialogue
o He acknowledged that the security forces are not operating in line with the government, and this needs to change
Process leading up to the start of the ND:
· First step is agreeing CoH agreements in Darfur and Two Areas – two parallel and coordinated negotiations:
o First step is concluding a separate CoH Agreement for Darfur at the same time as a CoH for SK/BN
o These must be two parallel and coordinated processes
o The two CoH negotiations will start on 12 October:
§ Mbeki will bring GoS + SPLM-N together on 12th
§ Chambas/Mbeki will convene the armed rebel groups from Darfur on 15 Oct
o The resulting CoHs will bear similarities – but distinct differences that are specific to the situations in each
§ Eg. Darfur CoH will use the DDPD as the framework for discussions
§ Darfur faces many problems that are beyond the scope of the DDPD – so these will be dealt with in the ND
· Timeline for CoH negotiations:
o It is not practical to put timelines on when the CoH negotiations have to be concluded
o Russia and China welcomed this – essential to respect Sudanese sovereignty – no one should be imposing deadlines on a Sudanese political process
Timeline for the ND and how it fits with elections:
· Mbeki characterized the current situation as the ‘preparatory phase’, which has been ongoing since Bashir’s announcement of the ND in Jan 2014
· For the ND to start, it is essential to first get the CoHs agreed, otherwise the armed groups will not participate in the ND
· Another requirement is that the ND Roadmap that was endorsed by the G7+7 will have to be revisited – as it was concluded before the armed groups (SRF) had agreed to participate in the ND
o In the coming days, the ‘General Assembly of the ND ’ will be convened to mandate the G7+7 Committee to meet with the armed groups to review the Roadmap and Agreement
· ND must be fully inclusive, and this will take time
· ND cannot be conclude in 1 to 3 months time – it will take longer than this
· On elections:
o The Constitution sets the date of 15 April
o It is obvious the ND will have implications for the ND
o The agenda for the ND will include a point on the elections [implying it needs to be a point of discussion, and the timing might need to be rethought and agreed as part of the ND]. END
Joint Troika Statement on National Dialogue in Sudan
18 September 2014
The members of the Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway) welcome recent efforts to reinvigorate a process of genuine national dialogue in Sudan. As the country confronts a new and critical era in its history, we remain conscious of the continuing governance concerns expressed by the Sudanese people, the problems of centre-periphery imbalance, and the articulation of political, economic, and social grievances, particularly in the country’s peripheries. Despite years of peacemaking attempts supported by regional and international actors, deadly conflicts persist. We recognize that the many such attempts to resolve conflict and rectify grievances at a regional level have failed to achieve a sustainable peace. We reiterate our support for a mediation architecture that facilitates both resolution of conflict and a comprehensive process of national dialogue, and thus welcome initial progress with Sudanese stakeholders to this end, under the auspices of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel.
In this regard, we recognize the following Principles as a basis for meaningful governance reform and lasting resolution of the conflicts in Sudan:
· There is no military solution to the conflicts in Sudan;
· A compartmentalized and regional approach to peace-making cannot yield a solution to grievances that are national in character;
· A sustainable peace and genuinely representative political system can best be achieved through a comprehensive national dialogue that addresses fundamental issues of governance, political inclusiveness, resource-sharing, identity, and social equality at a national level;
· A comprehensive dialogue should be broadly inclusive; its exercise and outcomes should recognize and accommodate the country’s unique diversity of peoples, cultures, and religions; and such a dialogue must necessarily include the Government of Sudan, armed and unarmed opposition movements, political parties, a broad range of civil society representatives, and constituents from every region of Sudan;
· A comprehensive dialogue can succeed only in an environment conducive to meaningful participation of all of the country’s diverse constituents, free from any restrictions to the right to assembly or the right to freedom of expression;
· A comprehensive dialogue might best serve Sudan and its people by:
· Upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Sudan;
· Yielding an inclusive and participatory governance arrangement that allows all citizens and regions to participate in institutions that are democratic in nature and to benefit equitably from Sudan’s national resources;
· Agreeing to a timeline and benchmarks for the holding of national elections, so as to ensure elections can be broadly participatory and yield legitimate and widely-recognized outcomes, and thus help to initiate a more democratic political dispensation in Sudan. END
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Summary of key points of the Communiqué of the 456th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council
The AU PSC:
· Expressed satisfaction at the exemplary cooperation between JSR/JCM, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, Haile Menkerios, and the Special Envoy of IGAD, Lissane Yohannes and the AUHIP;
· Welcomed the continued engagement of Qatar in the search for peace in Darfur;
· Expressed full support for the coordinated effort to address national issues, as well as the situations in the “Two Areas” and in Darfur, within a common framework;
· Expressed satisfaction the adoption of the Paris Declaration and the Roadmap of the “7+7” Committee, on 8 and 9 August 2014, respectively, as well as the readiness of the registered Political parties, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Movement-SLM (Minni Minawi) and the Sudan Liberation Movement-SLM (Abdel Wahid al-Nur) to participate in a common process, as expressed in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 5 September 2014 on the principles of the National Dialogue, its objectives and the key steps necessary for the creation of the enabling environment;
· Recognized the importance of the National Dialogue, as an authentic, transparent, inclusive and fair process initiated and owned by the people of Sudan, in order to bring about lasting peace across the entire country;
· Emphasized that the success of the National Dialogue will be greatly enhanced by international measures to alleviate the economic distress facing the country. Noted the country still does not have access to international financial support, including debt relief, concessionary loans and other mechanisms normally available to countries undergoing such hardships;
· Urged all international actors with a mediation mandate to pool their resources together, as well as harmonize their interventions, in a manner that optimizes the window of opportunity presented by the National Dialogue, with a view to finding a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflicts in Sudan;
· Endorsed the following steps to ensure harmonized and focused action by the AUHIP;
o the negotiations on cessation of hostilities, immediately leading to a comprehensive security arrangements agreement, should resume at the earliest opportunity, under the auspices of the AUHIP and in collaboration and coordination with the JSR/JCM;
o the negotiations on the cessation of hostilities for the Two Areas and for Darfur should be conducted in a synchronized manner;
o a meeting of the Sudanese parties to discuss relevant process issues, in order to pave the way for the National Dialogue should be held at the AU Headquarters under the facilitation of the AUHIP, as requested by the Sudanese stakeholders, to ensure that the necessary confidence-building are taken, the key steps of the National Dialogue process are fully agreed upon, and that the process is fair and will result in the mutually-agreed objectives;
· Encouraged the Government of Sudan to expedite efforts towards implementing the agreed confidence-building measures, including:
o the release of all political detainees and prisoners;
o the adoption and implementation of all necessary steps to ensure political freedoms and full guarantee of the freedom of expression and publication, including by enacting the necessary legislation to give effect to these freedoms;
o ensuring that the judiciary will be the only institution to adjudicate matters relating to the exercise of the freedom of expression and publication, with no resort to extraordinary measures; and
o providing the necessary guarantees for the armed groups freely to participate in the National Dialogue, once the comprehensive ceasefire and security arrangements agreements have been concluded, and facilitating humanitarian assistance to all populations in war-affected areas;
· Urged all Sudanese stakeholders participating in the National Dialogue to refrain from hate speech and from conducting negative media campaigns against each other;
· Further urged the international community, especially the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and bilateral partners, to consider providing an economic support package to Sudan, including expediting debt relief and extending concessionary loans, in support of the people of Sudan as they move forward. Council appeals to all States that have imposed sanctions on the financial services sector to lift them, in order to contribute positively towards the creation of enabling conditions for the success of the National Dialogue;
· Reiterated support for the Joint Approach by Sudan, South Sudan and the AUHIP, including comprehensive debt relief and lifting of sanctions for Sudan and development support to South Sudan.
· Requested the AUHIP, in close consultation with the Chair and Secretariat of IGAD, to contribute to the promotion of a regional and holistic approach to the challenges of peace, security, stability and development in the Horn of Africa, in support of IGAD’s efforts.
On South Sudan;
· Commendation for GoS for receiving South Sudanese fleeing the conflict in their country and extending the Four Freedoms to them while in Sudan, as well as for allowing the establishment of a humanitarian corridor to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the affected populations in South Sudan.
Full Communique available here. END
(عدل بواسطة Saifeldin Gibreel on 09-26-2014, 04:34 PM)
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: خطيير: محاضر جهاز الامن السودانى قاعدة في الصقيعة.. (Re: جعفر محي الدين)
|
Quote: فعلا الوثائق المسربة خطيرة جدا
والراجح من تحليل السيد / إريك أن هذه الوثائق صحيحة
وسوف تعمل الاستخبارات في دول الخليج على التأكد من محتوياتها للعمل على ضوء ما ورد فيها |
الأخ جعفر محي الدين
إريك ريفس أفرد جزء مقدر من ترجمته للمقال حول صحة الوثيقة. هذا غير المصدر الذي رفض أن يفصح عنه. وحسب ما كتب فإن المصدر جهة نافذة في الحكومة..
ما يهمنى شخصيا حول صحة الوثيقة هو ما عرضه أريك برفع صورة الصفحة الأولي. السؤال هو هل هذه التقرير يشبه تقرير صادر من جهة أمنية سودانية؟ يعنى هل للجهة التى أصدرت التقرير برفايل حكومى وأمنى معروف؟
أنا بفتكر الدمار الذي أصاب الإدارة في السودان يرجح أن التقرير صحيح. هذا غير ما وضحه إريك حول صحة الوثائق؟
السؤال الثانى لماذا تم تسريب التقرير لإريك؟
بخصوص الترجمة من الأفضل ألا نختلف عليها حتى نري الأصل وأية إجتهاد مقبول...
خالص التحايا...
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
خطيير: محاضر جهاز الامن السودانى قاعدة في الصقيعة.. (Re: سيف اليزل سعد عمر)
|
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Eric Reeves"
Date: 25 Sep 2014 20:18
Subject: Looking Directly into the Heart of Darkness: What the Khartoum Regime Really Thinks (leaked minutes of critical August 2014 meeting of senior military and security official)
To: "Eric Reeves"
Cc:
Looking Directly into the Heart of Darkness: What the Khartoum Regime Really Thinks (leaked minutes of critical August 2014 meeting of senior military and security official)
Eric Reeves, 24 September 2014
I received on 22 September 2014, from a source within Sudan whom I trust implicitly, a truly extraordinary, indeed explosive document, containing the "Minutes of the Military and Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College [Khartoum]"; the meeting referred to took place on August 31, 2014; the date of the minutes for the document is September 1, 2014 (Sunday).
What makes the document so extraordinary is the participation of the regime's most senior military and security officials, expressing themselves freely, and in the process disclosing numerous highly consequential policy decisions, internal and external. We learn, for example, of Sudan's continuing involvement with international terrorism and radical Islamic groups, including an ongoing "strategic" partnership with Iran. There is certainly evidence here that Khartoum has reneged on its putative commitment to provide the U.S. intelligence community with information relevant to counter-terrorism. More explicitly, the document reveals a determination to continue bombing agriculture and food supplies as a means of waging war against the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, with an explicit, declared goal of starvation. Regime officials also emphasize that there will be no lifting of the humanitarian embargo that prevents international relief efforts from reaching the desperate civilians in rebel-held territories of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
There is much in this document making clear that political machinations surrounding the so-called "national dialogue" are nothing but a sham in the eyes of the regime, merely a means of filling time uselessly before the 2015 elections—a constant topic of discussion. We see that Darfur has been largely written off as a military threat, or at least one that requires no more than an expansion of the re-invigorated and openly embraced Janjaweed militias, now known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In addition to encouraging the uncontrolled predations of the RSF, these senior officials speak openly about renewed efforts to empty the camps for Darfuri displaced persons.
We also learn much about the extent to which Khartoum is committed to supporting the rebel groups in South Sudan, promising heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, and other "advanced weapons"—as well as re-supply and security in Khartoum. Riek Machar and his deputy Taban Deng Gai are reported to have expressed their regret at Southern secession.
And there is a great deal more.
[All quotes included here come from a lightly edited version of the English translation of the original Arabic document; edits are for punctuation errors (including apostrophes indicating possession, extra spaces, gratuitous end punctuation, and a great many unnecessary commas; some unidiomatic passages have been made slightly clearer. As they appear in this analysis, some excerpts have been somewhat more heavily edited, but still limited to matters of grammar and idiom. Brackets [ … ] are used where editorial intrusion has been greatest. All comments by me, including interpolations of explanation and identification, as well as extended critical remarks, are in italics.]
Authenticity
Inevitably there will be questions about the authenticity of this document, marked internally as "Secret," "Confidential," and "Restricted." I should say first that I do not know what the full "chain of custody" for the document is (documents rather: for in addition to the English translation of the Arabic, there are photographs of every page of the original Arabic document, as well as of every page of the handwritten translation into English; there are 46 documents in all, most in .JPG format; typically, however, I will refer simply to "the document").
A close linguistic analysis of the English text makes clear that while the prose is of very good quality, and written by someone with considerable intelligence, there are many small typographic and punctuation errors that are typical of even skilled native Arab speakers writing in English; a few idiomatic errors recur with telling familiarity. The person who produced this text is well-educated person, very proficient in English, whose native language is Arabic (I have taught English as a second language, and specifically to native Arabic speakers.)
That I am not able say to say how the document made its way to my source is hardly surprising: the transfer of such a document would have been extremely dangerous at all stages, given its explosive contents and the greatly enhanced intercept capabilities of Khartoum's security services (something discussed and referred to in authoritative detail at various points in the document). Everyone involved in producing and transporting or transmitting the documents was (and is) at risk of arrest and execution for treason. Gratuitous explanatory communications of any kind explaining movement or transmission of the document would increase the risk of exposing all involved. I have concluded after much reading and reflection that the unknown nature of original transmission or physical transfer of the document is not in itself suspicious.
And there are a great many reasons to believe that the document is authentic. Some are small: the transliterative use of "Hisen" rather than "Hussein" (as in Abdel Rahmin Mohamed Hussein, Minister of Defense) seems odd, but transliteration may not be a familiar exercise for the person(s) who undertook the translation. On the other hand, a skilled fabrication would be unlikely to make such a peculiar choice in transliteration; and if this is indeed a fabrication, it is an astonishingly skilled one, even as it serves no obvious purpose for the regime and in several respects seems quite beyond the capacity of the rebel movements.
Most of the reasons for believing the document to be authentic, on my reading, have to do with the extremely close resemblance of much of what is said by officials in this meeting and what has been said and done publicly by the National Congress Party/National Islamic Front regime, but in the minutes with more detail, specificity, and nuance of expression. To be sure, not all of what is said in the confidence of this meeting would be uttered by regime officials so bluntly when communicating with the international community—within the various worlds in which Khartoum understands itself to be speaking. It uses many "dialects," as these exchanges make clear: to the Saudis and Arab Emirates, to Iran, to the U.S., to the UN and its various representatives in Sudan, to the European Union, and to the African Union.
But why fabricate a document only to persuade an audience of the fact that the NCP/NIF speaks bluntly in private meetings? What could be the motive for the regime to fabricate a document that contains so much of what we know to be the case, if cast in brutally unvarnished and contemptuous fashion?
I believe the congruence between what is in the document and what has long been known, but little discussed publicly by the regime, is itself telling at various points. It has long been known, for example, that many within the regime opposed the Naivasha peace talks that yielded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan (January 2005)—that there were a number, especially in the military, who felt too much had been given away, and that this was humiliating to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), since they had not been defeated in many areas they were obliged to leave.
But there is still some shock in reading the current Defense Minister and former Minister of the Interior during the most violent years of the Darfur genocide, Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein, declare baldy: "If it were not for Naivasha, all the rebellion[s] should have finished" (page 22). Lt. General Bakri Hassan Saleh, current Vice President of the regime, speaks contemptuously of his interlocutors at the time of Naivasha in the context of current efforts to understand Khartoum's multiple and highly secretive security services: "They are targeting the security organs, but they don’t know how these organs work. Even those who came during the days of Naivasha went [away] without knowing how we think or work" (page 19). Notably, of the fourteen participants listed in the documents, twelve have military titles—all generals of some rank, primarily Lt. General. Some wear two hats: Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh also has the specified rank of "First Lieutenant General."
Further Observations on Authenticity
In compiling these documents, someone/some group took an extraordinary risk even in assembling the photographs and written translation records, as well as the final time-consuming translation, and then transmitting them, unless we make the unlikely assumption that the documents were created abroad, smuggled back into Sudan, and then passed on to my source. Certainly one thing we hear again and again in the minutes—nothing really new—is how effective the regime's intercept capabilities are. Perhaps the documents were smuggled out of the country by "flash drive," which might be very small and still contain all these data. But this, it must be emphasized, would entail extreme risk on departing Sudan. Indeed, mere possession of even fabricated minutes for such a meeting as is reported would be considered as treasonous as actually transcribing and translating the contents of a real meeting.
Moreover, the documents reveal considerable disagreement, especially about the strategic relationship with Iran, and how to finesse the problems this has created with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates. In closing the meeting Vice President Bakri declares that: "In this meeting it is not necessary that we agree on every point we discuss"—this to the most hardline elements within the current regime.
In his concluding remarks at the meeting, Vice President and First Lt. General Bakri Hassan Saleh also declares:
"A number of policy options and emphases are considered, not all compatible—what we would expect of a real meeting of the most powerful men in Khartoum, not a fabrication of such a meeting." [The irony here is almost too rich—ER.]
Iran is always referred to as a "strategic issue," a "strategic partner," what again is widely known but not in the nuanced, often urgent terms of policy debate reflected in these documents. It is particularly difficult to imagine the fabrication of this extensive part of the discussion, including the highly detailed accounts of what leverage Khartoum has with neighboring countries, how the regime plans to deal with the issue of ####e proselytizing in Sudan, the extent of Iranian military assistance and help in providing military production capacity, and other very specific topics. Collectively, the details suggest a range of compelling knowledge that would in fact be available only to these men.
To the extent we know anything of the character of the men in this meeting, this knowledge seems to be consistent with what can be discerned of character in various passages—especially the thuggish and clumsy Hussein (who refers at once contemptuously and confusingly to his arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court for multiple crimes against humanity). And there is a fearsome bluntness to the comments of Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh, who has long been known for his brutality and cruelty, his willingness to suppress political dissent by any means necessary, and his loyalty to President al-Bashir. This translates into ruthless political judgments and actions, partially captured in this passage (page 27):
"The negotiations, national dialogue, Paris Declaration and all their statements are needed to take us to the elections." [In other word, Bakri is admitting that all this diplomatic activity is merely a useful distraction from the relentlessly pursued goal of retaining the presidency—ER]
"Those who are interested to join the Ingaz and co-exist with us are welcome. But we are not ready to respond or work under pressure. Nobody is paying us and we are not indebted to anybody." [This seems a spectacularly bizarre view of the US$47 billion that Sudan owes many creditors around the world—ER]
"America deceived us in regards to the separation of the South. They did not lift our name from the list of the States sponsoring terrorism or relieve our debts. So the Envoy should not come." [Nobody is better at the most cynical Realpolitik than Bakri, who might have added his view that American "reneging" justifies what is clearly reneging on the part of the regime in its commitment to provide the U.S. with counter-terrorism intelligence, especially about North Africa and the Gulf States—ER]
A great deal more could be said about what is revealed by a close, detailed examination of the contents and verbal habits of those who speak in this document. From the point of view of such analysis, I believe all evidence points to authenticity.
My source is regarded by all who know him as a man of the greatest integrity; one frequent and highly knowledgeable traveler to Sudan says of him, "he is the most honest, trustworthy and highly principled man" I have met in Sudan. My source is intelligent, highly resourceful, and extremely well-informed; he would not knowingly put my reputation for accuracy at risk gratuitously. I have never, in fifteen years of writing extensively about Sudan, been accused of relying on a fabricated document or source; my source on this occasion is well aware of this, and how destructive to my reputation it would be were the document a fabrication. At the same time, my source sees no point in speaking openly to me in Northampton, Massachusetts about the details of how he came to possess the document in Sudan. He would be particularly vulnerable to Khartoum's enhanced intercept capacity.
The Burden of Proof
It would seem to me that the burden of proof is on those who would argue that the documents are fabrications, that there was no meeting such as described. Moreover, while the motives for fabrication by the regime are murky and implausible at best, there is certainly there is no difficulty at all in imagining the motives of someone who knew of the August 31, 2014 meeting and had access to these highly confidential and equally authoritative minutes. There are a great many Sudanese desperate to bring down the regime; and they know that it will require extraordinary and courageous actions, and that these are likely to be directed against exceptionally well-protected "targets." But given those in attendance and the agenda items of the August 31 meeting, this would be the moment to take the ultimate risk.
The English translation is 30 pages in length (a length that again argues against fabrication, given the continual potency and specificity of the revelations); it will require several thematic analyses to present what stands as consensus within the regime on a range of topics, to parse sometimes partially opaque pronouncements (or translations), and to provide a clear overall view of the regime's thinking at this crucial moment in the political history of Sudan. Additional portions of all documents will be released with these new analyses; eventually all will be released.
Some of the topics to be addressed individually:
[Again, all quotes included here come from a lightly edited version of the English translation of the original Arabic document; edits are for punctuation errors (including apostrophes indicating possession, extra spaces, gratuitous end punctuation, and a great many unnecessary commas; some unidiomatic passages have been made slightly clearer. In the context of this analysis, some excerpts have been somewhat more heavily edited, but still limited to matters of grammar and idiom. Brackets [ … ] are used where editorial intrusion has been greatest; these edits are occasionally the work of the translator, not mine; I've attempted to put all the former in different brackets { ... }. All comments by me, including interpolations of explanation and identification as well as extended critical remarks are in italics; all emphases have been added by me.]
§§§ Reneging on commitment to provide the United States with the intelligence acquired by the regime concerning terrorist groups, including in North Africa:
"The Gulf States have only very weak information about the terrorist groups that are based in Libya, Somali, Nigeria, Mali, North Africa Arab countries and Afghanistan because they have bad relations with these radical groups. They want us to cooperate with them in the war against terrorism because the radical groups constitute [a] direct threat to them. Their relation with ISIS, Nusra Front, Muslim Brothers, and Palestine Islamic Movement is even weaker. We will not sacrifice our relations with the Islamists and Iran for a relation with the Saudis and the Gulf States. What is possible is a relation that serves our economic interests in terms of investments, employment market, etc…," Lt. General Yahya Mohammed Kher, State Minister of Defense (page 12). [Can any reasonable person imagine that Khartoum is sharing with the Obama administration the intelligence bragged about here? – ER]
"Currently, there are twenty thousand (20,000) Jihadists and fifteen (15) newly formed Jihadist Movements who are scattered all over from Morocco to Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, all Gulf States, [a w]ide presence in Africa and Europe and nobody else owns a data-base on that [such] as the one we have. We release only limited information to the Americans according to the request and the price is the armed movements file. The coming days carry a lot of surprises," First Lt. General and Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein (page 24). This clearly suggests reneging on any counter-terrorism effort promised to the U.S.—that if the U.S. doesn't ask the right question, make the right "request," they won't get the information they most want. Moreover, the claim that the price the U.S. is willing to pay is to provide he regime with intelligence on Sudan's rebel movements suggests an unscrupulous betrayal—ER]
[On Sudan's future relationship with international terrorism—ER]:
"We can create them a problem with the Islamic radicals, but we are not going to use this card now," First Lt. Gen. Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 17). [The clear implication is that "creating problems" with Islamic terrorists is one of the tools in the NCP/NIF bag of tools—one of their "cards" (a repeated, and telling, ####phor)—ER]
§§§ The strength of the commitment to Islamism and political Islam, too often played down in current characterizations of the regime:
[Throughout the document the centrality of Islamism and Islamic rule is clear, and the corresponding fear that opposition movements are bent on … "remov[ing] the Islamic movement from power" (page 3).
"[Iran is] our biggest ally [because of] our web-like relations with all the Islamic Movements, world-wide," Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security" (page 9).
[The great rubric for all regime opponents is "supporters of the New Sudan Project," referring to the principle, most forcefully articulated by the late Southern leader John Garang, that neither race nor ethnicity nor religion should be the basis for citizenship in a truly multi-party, democratic Sudan—ER]
The phrase "New Sudan Project" is used incessantly, a sign of what the regime most fears—ER]:
"In order to foil the New Sudan Project we are watching closely all political party activities. When we discover that a politician is going abroad to meet the rebels we usually prevent him not to travel," Lt. General Abdalla Al-Jaili, Popular Defense Forces General Coordinator (page 9).
"We can bring all the Islamic movements to fight [the rebels], just we tell them that these rebels are collaborators and agents of America," First Lt. Gen. Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 17).
[Most notably, comments by the Vice President in his "recommendations" section—ER]:
"We consider the New Sudan Project as [the] top internal and regional challenge that endeavours to expand the foreign intervention and division of Sudan [understandably so—ER]. All the political, security, military, and diplomatic organs should change the approach in dealing with it" (page 28).
§§§ Support for Iran as a means of supporting Islamist movements worldwide and gaining important regional support:
"Are you sure Saudi Arabia can change its mind [concerning our relationship] after [the Saudis] classified the Muslim Brothers as terrorists? On the other hand you know that our relation with Iran is part and parcel of our relation with the Muslim Brotherhood International Islamic Organization. Accordingly, we must consult with Iran and our Islamist group, before taking any step in this regard. This is because the Kingdom cannot be trusted despite their knowledge that we are in a position to threaten their rule," Lt. General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator (page 6).
"We are the only state that will not be affected by the conflicts taking place between Sunni Islamic groups and the ####e’. This is, because we succeeded to manage good relations with all Islamic groups, through the cover of social organizations, and not through the state apparatus. The secret of the strength of the Ingaz (NCP) government lies in the smooth management of the alliance with ####e’ Iran on one side and the alliance with the Sunni Islamic groups on the other side," question and statement from Lt. General Siddiig Aamir, Director General of M.I. [Military Intelligence] and Security (pages 10 – 11).
[Virtually every speaker invokes the "strategic relationship with Iran"; it is a constant in the discussion. In the past this "relationship" has dictated that Khartoum allow for the transfer of Iranian weapons destined for Hamas in Gaza to pass through Sudanese territory—ER]:
"The relation with Iran is one of the best relations in the history of the Sudan. The assistance we received from Iran is immeasurable. Accordingly, the management of this relation requires wisdom and knowledge with all its details. The commonalities between us are many," 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 26).
"Our relation with Iran is strategic one and unchangeable. {They} who wants to assist us can do that without conditions."
"Maintenance of relations with Iran [are] to be protected from any threats. Should be managed by military and security organs," (1st Lt. General Bakri Hasan Salih, 1st Vice President of the Republic of Sudan (page 28).
"In the open let us maintain good relations with the Gulf States, but strategically with Iran and to be managed secretly by the M.I. [Military Intelligence] and security organs," Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP (page 4).
"There is no state other than Iran who has the courage to say no to the whole West. Iran is a real partner to the Ingaz revolution…. It was Iran who provided unlimited support to us…," Lt. General Abdalla Al-Jaili, PDF General Coordinator (page 7).
[Perhaps most tellingly]:
"[The Gulf States] also fear from our relation with Iran. Our relation with Iran is beneficial to us, because Iran is our biggest ally in the region, in terms of the cooperation in the areas of intelligence and military industrial production. This is due to our web-like relations with all the Islamic Movements World Wide. The importance of this relation comes from the fact that we constitute for Iran [access?] to all the Islamic groups, Lt. Gen. Siddiig Aamir, Director General of [Military Intelligence] and Security (page 9).
§§§ The willingness to destroy agriculture and food supplies as a means of attacking the rebel movements of South Kordofan and Blue Nile (the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement-North, SPLA/M-N); a concomitant commitment not to lift the humanitarian blockade put up around these regions and all civilians caught within them:
"This year the Sudan People’s Army (SPLA-N) managed to cultivate large areas in South Kordofan State. We must not allow them to harvest these crops. We should prevent them. Good harvest means supplies to the war effort. We must starve them, so that, commanders and civilians desert them and we recruit the deserters to use them in the war to defeat the rebels," Lt. General Siddiig Aamir, Director of M.I. and Security (page 10).
[This savage, ruthless assessment neglects to point out that the vast majority of agricultural production is a civilian undertaking, and that it will be civilians—primarily children, women, and the elderly—who will suffer most from this destruction of food supplies—ER]
[Declaring that negotiations with the rebels in South Kordofan and Blue Nile are a "waste of time," a senior general, Chief of Joint Operations, indicates that the military option is the only one to be considered—ER]:
"We should attack them before the harvest and bombard their food stores and block them completely," Lt. General Imadadiin Adaw, Chief of Joint Operations (page 14).
§§§ The determination to complete the destruction of African tribal groups in Darfur:
Vice President Bakri recommends that the regime: "Support the mechanism intended to disperse or empty the IDP camps. Create differences and security strike[s] in the IDP camps" (page 29).
"We must continue the military operations. We shall continue bombarding the rebel concentration areas [in Darfur, as well as South Kordofan and Blue Nile] by air force. In the coming dry season we need any fighter from any country that can fight under our command in addition to the sons of the war-affected areas to act as guides to the rebel defenses," 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 22).
[Less is said about Darfur than one might expect; the general tenor of comments suggests that Khartoum believes Darfuri rebels by themselves are no longer a serious threat to the regime—only insofar as they assist the efforts of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (if the U.S. is indeed providing intelligence to Khartoum on the Darfuri rebel groups, this military weakness on their part becomes less surprising). Darfur is a strategic afterthought at this point, no matter how great the violence, displacement, and deprivation of Darfuri people—ER]
§§§ Plans for weakening South Sudan through support of the rebel forces (the Sudan People's Liberation Army-in Opposition):
[Vice President Bakri recommends that the regime]: "Recognize Dr. Riak [Machar] Liaison office and all organs are required to provide protection and security to them."
"I met Riak [Machar], Dhieu and Taban [Deng Gai] and they are regretting the decision to separate the South and we decided to return his house to him. [Riek Machar lived in Khartoum for a number of years during the long civil war (1983 – 2005)—ER.] He [Riek Machar] requested us to assist him and that he, has shortage in the M.I. personnel, operations command and tank technicians. We must use the many cards we have against the South in order to give them unforgettable lesson. [Yet again the "card" ####phor—ER]
The operational military commanders have particularly strong views—ER]:
"[Juba is] still supporting the two divisions of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. Accordingly, we must provide Riak forces with big support in order to wage the war against Juba and clean the whole of Greater Upper Nile area. Riak and Taban during their visit to Khartoum disclosed to us everything about the logistical support from Juba to the rebels, the route of supply and who transport it to them" Lt. General (PSC) Imadadiin Adawi, Chief of Joint Operations (page 14). [The verb "clean" here has extremely ominous implications, given the history of the regime's engaging in what many call "ethnic cleansing"—ER]
"We must change the balance of forces in South Sudan. Riak, Taban and Dhieu Mathok came and requested support in the areas of training in M.I. and especially in tanks and artillery. They requested armament also. They want to be given advanced weapons. Our reply was that we have no objection, provided that we agree on a common objective. Then we train and supply with the required weapons," 1st Lt. General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 16).
§§§ The militarization of foreign policy:
[Vice President Bakri recommends that]: "Foreign policy management departments should work under the supervision of the military and security organs responsible for the national security affairs to cope with the new internal and external changes," (page 28).
"We intensified the work to train and graduate Libyan M.I. [Military Intelligence] cadres. Currently, they are undergoing an advanced course in in Internet operation, de-ciphering of codes, interception of telephones and wire-less radios. Their leadership requested us to train and establish for them a strong M.I. apparatus," Lt. General Siddiig Aamir, Director General of M.I. and Security (page 11).
"In the open let us maintain good relations with the Gulf States, but strategically with Iran and to be managed secretly by the M.I. [Military Intelligence] and security organs," Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP (page 4).
§§§ The determination to hold the 2015 national elections, including the all-important Presidential election, on time; this entails wholesale bribing of potential opposition parties and individuals, and threatening protestors:
"Demonstrations or uprising is a red line and will be confronted with fire and those who are interested in the New Sudan Project should go to the South," Lt. General Abdalla Al-Jaili, Popular Defense Forces General Coordinator (page 7). [Presumably "fire" means a reprise of the shooting of last September, which occurred under "shoot to kill" orders—ER]
"We still remember [the] September 2013 experience, and that after we fired at them [fired with "shoot to kill" orders, according to Amnesty International—ER] they stopped issuing any statement or movement or talk about the then on-going military operations. The coming demonstrations they are planning to conduct during the elections constitute a crime and we will deal with it firmly and timely [again, presumably on the basis of "shoot to kill" orders]," First Lt. General and Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein (page 23).
[In preparation for the coming elections]:
"… this year we have already trained suicidal teams and strategic battalions to protect the elections and assist the police to suppress any such activities that may be carried out by the rebellion or the supporters of the New Sudan Project," Lt. General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator (page 7).
"Any journalist or politician who criticizes the RSF (Rapid Support Forces, the most recent incarnation of the Janjaweed militias that became notorious for their savagery and brutal destructiveness in the Darfur conflict—ER] must be arrested and charged with spying [i.e., treason—ER] and collaboration [with the enemy]," 1st Lt. General Mohammed Atta Al-Mowla, Director General N.I.S.S. (page 19).
"The elections must take place on time. Holding the elections constitutes a psychological war against the armed movements and may frustrate them and lead to the end of the project of the New Sudan Project," Lt. Gen. Salah Al-Tayib, DDR [Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration] Commissioner (page 6).
"There must be strict control over the freedom of the press, political statements of the party leaders, and the national security should remain a red line. Any political or press statement should not violate the rule of law…, 1st Lt. General Hashim Osman Al-Hisen, Director General of Police. (page 15). [Those crossing the regime's various "red lines" risk imprisonment, torture, rape, and execution, as well as a dramatic loss of educational and employment opportunities—ER]
§§§ Skill with which the regime plays off regional actors against one another:
[This should be read in light of recently strained relations between Khartoum and Cairo—ER]:
"The Egyptians have no choice, but to establish especial relations with us, given the victory of the Islamists in the battle for Tripoli, despite Egyptian support to Gen. Haftar. They will not dare to open two fronts, one against Libya and the other against us. These are useful cards at hand and we should use them properly," Lt. General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator (page 6 – 7). [And yet again the "card" ####phor appears—the regime is making clear that it knows exactly how to deploy its various assets, and that it will do so in strategic fashion—ER]
"We managed to secure the borders with Ethiopia and have already signed an agreement to form a joint force covering the whole border between the two countries, exchange of information, prevention of any insurgency that can start from one country against the other, and our contribution or role in the protection of Nahda Dam (Renaissance Dam). This agreement is beneficiary to us because we can use it to cross into the Ethiopian side of the boarder in the name of visiting the refugees, which can allow us to recruit Ethiopian soldiers who can collect and supply us with the necessary information about SPLA-N camps in Yabus and other areas to be bombarded by air force," Lt. General Imadadiin Adaw, Chief of Joint Operations (page 13).
§§§ Skill in co-opting and disrupting international and regional diplomatic efforts; UNAMID head Mohamed bin Chambas and AUHIP chair Thabo Mbeki seem the most fully corrupted by contact with the regime;
"No dialogue to take place abroad." "Mbeke meeting with the armed forces in Addis Ababa is just a public relations exercise." "The AUHIP representative Abdul Mohammed told me that the armed movements do not trust Mbeke on one side and that, Malik [Agar] and Yasir [Arman] complained against him to the Ethiopian Prime Minister and the American envoy," Lt. General Salah Al-Tayib, DDR Commissioner (page 6).
"I [1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense] told him [Thabo] Mbeki, [chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel] that we trust [Mohamed] Bin [C]hambas [who recently resigned as head of UNAMID amid a growing scandal over the performance of the peacekeeping force in Darfur—ER], who will bring to you all the Darfur movements in Addis Ababa and the aim of the Addis meeting with them is for consultation only and not for negotiation."
"In case one of them is interested in negotiation let him go to Doha [now regarded by all international actors of consequences as a "diplomatic dead letter—ER]. He is going to bring all of them to Addis and seek their opinion on the proposal; if [they] reject the [national] dialogue, then the position of Sudan will be correct, and we will be able to defend it in front of the international community. In that case Sudan would be seen to have done its best by the international community. Mbeke will participate in the dialogue from within as an observer. Also I met Ali Al-Zaatari (UN) and he is pro us. And met Salah Halima (Arab League) and he is also supporting us, and Hailey Menkariuos and he is also pro us. We did a big job for Mohammed Bin [C]hambas." [This would seem a very considerable understatement, but it does much to explain the following—ER]:
"When I met him [bin Chambas], he said the UN is going to investigate into the reports of the UNAMID Mission and [bin Chambas] advised me to correct things on the ground to conform to their reports about our performance. He told me that Darfur has no case or problem and their remaining movements should join Doha agreement, and if they want to join the internal national initiative it is up to them and let them come," 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 21).
[The attraction of Mbeki as a biased negotiator is unmistakable—ER]: "[The rebels'] plan is to see that the elections do not take place. Accordingly, we must support all the efforts carried by Mbeke," Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP" (page 3).
[The final word, in all matters of consequence, clearly rests with the military leaders in the regime—ER]:
"SAF [the Sudan Armed Forces] is against any dialogue that is supervised by foreigners, because it will end up dismantling SAF. We support separate forums for negotiation with the rebels, no unification of forums or negotiation with them as a group… [Today the rebels say that the] SAF is not a national force, or SAF is using foreign militias and mounted their campaign against SAF. Permit SAF and the RSF [Rapid Support Forces—the reconfigured Janjaweed militias—ER] plus the sons of those areas to attack and clean these areas from the rebellion. We are ready for military operations," 1st Lt. General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 15)
§§§ Cynical view of the much-touted "national dialogue":
"The only option in front of us now is the [national] dialogue that is leading to the holding of elections on time. No postponement of the elections, whatsoever the case. I met with the EU ambassadors and all of the are supporting the dialogue initiative that [they believe] can lead to political reforms…." Lt. General Salah Al-Tayab, DDR Commissioner (page 5).
"Let us go and prepare a force to protect the elections. Secondly, if the peace talks are necessary let them take place after the elections, and the internal national dialogue can continue after we hold the elections. We will continue recruiting and splitting the field commanders, and win them to our side since we have all the information about the rebels. We have to sign more agreements and never sit with the rebels as a group or collectively," 1st Lt. Gen. Hashim Osman Al-Hisen, Director General of Police (page 15).
§§§ Sophistication of surveillance and intercept capabilities; the security services provide massive amounts of detailed intelligence on political enemies or potential enemies:
"We intercepted all the telephone calls coming from Saudi, Emirates and Egyptian intelligence, and some people from the political parties of the Sudan [in September 2013]. They were instructing people to go for demonstrations. They brought experts to administer the demonstrations. Since we were following the telephones we managed to arrest the real players and they confessed and disclosed all the details about the conspiracy and the name of officers assigned to supervise the demonstrations and the leadership in each country was receiving daily reports. That is why the Egyptians, Saudis and Emirates will fear when they discovered that, all the elements they sent were arrested by the security. On our side we did not disclose anything up to now, instead we want to use this file to blackmail them," 1st Lt. General Mohammed Atta Al-Mowlem, Director General N.I.S.S. (page 17).
"All the Embassies and Chanceries in Khartoum are infiltrated and our elements report to us who visited the Embassy and who went out from the Embassy staff and to where," Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security (page 8).
"Regarding the rebels, I, can say that we have managed to infiltrate their rank and file. We are following all their movements, chats, private affairs with women, the type of alcohol preferred or taken by each one, the imaginary talks when they get drank. We have ladies who are always in contact with them. The ladies managed to send to us their e-mails, telephone numbers, skypes, "whats-up's" and all their means of communications. By that, we are now able to infiltrate them electronically. We are following all their activities and contacts with people inside the country," Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security (page 8).
§§§ The skill of which they boast in their "divide and conquer" tactics of the past 25 years:
"We are working to cause differences and divisions within the SRF [Sudan Revolutionary Front—ER] to weaken and destroy it. The same policy of divide and weaken will be applied to all the political forces in the north, like DUP [Democratic Unionist Party], Eastern Sudan, Umma party after we see Sadik [el-Mahdi] comes back. We bring him back using his own sons Abdal-Rahman and Bushra to convince him. We collected all the information about the SPLM-N cadres and working now to launch a psychological warfare campaign on them to see that they got divided like the SPLM in the South," Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security (page 7).
§§§ Racist attitudes towards the West, Western humanitarian efforts, and democratic ideals:
Mustapha Osman Ismail speaks of the uprising of all 2013 as "a political crisis created by the racist and tribal project of the New Sudan" (page 3).
"Let [the rebel forces] come to the battlefield. They are dreaming to rule Sudan. It is just a fuss that will fade away. The White People will never give you enough support or fight along with them. The greatest liars are White People; they are concerned about their own interest only," 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 22).
[This is a conspicuous echo of a comment by President Omar al-Bashir made a year ago—ER]:
“If a white man brings you relief, don’t take it and whip him on his back." (Sudan Tribune, October 25, 2013).
§§§ And perhaps most tellingly, the failure to understand the economic disaster that these policies have created (see my recent analysis at the Enough Forum | http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/enough-forum-watching-bubble-bursthttp://www.enoughproject.org/reports/enough-forum-watching-bubble-burst:
"We are currently facing an acute economic crisis that need to be addressed in order to alleviate the suffering of our people, and look for alternatives that can enable us to control the market forces," Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP (page 3).
While acknowledging the extent of the economic crisis, "Dr. Smile" hardly understands the difficulty of controlling market forces in a highly inflationary economy with no significant foreign exchange reserves (and thus very limited ability to import foods and other commodities), growing debt—already a staggering US$47 billion in external debt—and a rapidly depreciating currency. Even less comprehending, however, is the brutal and intellectually limited First Lt. General and Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein—ER]:
"The economic situation can be addressed and will improve due to the fact that our country have all the requirements needed for industrialization, Agriculture, basic infrastructure, oil and there is no hungry person. This is temporary; just days and they will pass. The military industries will cover all our needs in the armed forces." (page 23)
[Fantastically, Hussein claims there is not a single hungry person in Sudan despite reports from various UN and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations that Global Acute Malnutrition rates and Chronic Malnutrition rates are, especially for children under five, at crisis levels—ER]
One of the most remarkable features of the document is that these powerful men nowhere discuss in any detail the economic crisis that has already taken a terrible toll on Sudan's people, and certainly make no proposals to deal with the inevitable consequences of ongoing crisis. Instead, there is a constant discussion of who has been paid off, which of the many small parties have received enough money to ensure their support in the elections, money for bribes, money for infiltrators, money for recruits into the armed forces—a constant patter of references to significant expenditures that are at once the political mainstay of the NCP/NIF regime, but also an enormous drain on national resources and one reason the fiscal budget gap cannot be closed. For of course none of these expenditures appear in the data the regime reports to the IMF—and the IMF asks no questions.
Looking forward
In-depth analyses of these various topics will for forthcoming, seriatim. The document is thirty pages and all the issues they raise deserve careful, detailed, analytic attention.
Below I have included the first two pages of the translation (one text is in exactly the format received, with no modification of any kind; the second has been slightly reformatted for clarity). I have also included .JPG files showing these first two pages of the Arabic original since they were photographed for purposes of confirmation (see below and http://wp.me/p45rOG-1sqhttp://wp.me/p45rOG-1sq. All documents, in all formats, will be published in the coming days and weeks.
*******
[Original formatting of translation:
In the name of God most gracious and most merciful
Restricted and Confidential
Date: 01/09/2014 Republic of Sudan
National Intelligence and Security Service
Central Security Corporation
Management of Military Activities
To: Lt. Gen. Osman Tajasir
The Managing Director of Central Security Corporation
Peace be on you,
Find enclosed:
1/ Joint Military and Security Committee Meeting held in National Defense College on 31/08/2014.
2/ Support Hamas Meeting held in Sudan Scientific Corporation Premises on 31/08/2014.
Maj. Gen. (Security): Abdal-Wahab Al-Rashiid
-1-
Secret
In the name of God most gracious and most merciful
Minutes of the Military and Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College
Sunday 31/08/ 2014
# 1st. Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih welcomed the attendance.
# Reading and analysis of the SRF. Statement 20 - 25/08/2014.
# Study of Paris Declaration signed by the SRF and Sadik Al-Mahdi on 18/08/2014.
# Activities report covering Sadik Al-Mahdi visits and meetings in Cairo, Arab Emirates and Addis-Ababa.
# Reports on Rebel Leaders activities, contacts and meetings.
The Agenda of the meeting:
1- Paris Declaration and SRF statement impact.
2- Radical and moderate trends in regards to ####e Belief activities in Sudan.
3- President Mbeke role and Sudanese issues.
4- Elections, National Dialogue and Peace Negotiations- The Priority.
5- New Sudan Project and its impact on the national security and economic activity.
Attendance:
1- 1st. Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih – 1st. Vice President of the Republic of Sudan
2- 1st. Lt. Gen. Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen- Minister of Defence.
3- ,, ,, ,, . Mohammed Atta- Al- Mowla – Director General N.I.S.S.
4- ,, ,, ,, . Hashim Osman Al-Hisen- Director General of Police.
5- ,, ,, ,, . Hashim Abdalla Mohammed- Chief of Joint General Staff.
6- Lt. Gen. . Imadadiin Adawi - Chief of Joint Operations.
7- Professor. Ibrahim Ghandur - D/ Chairman of the N.C.P.
8- Lt. Gen. . Yahya Mohammed Kher - State Minister of Defense.
9- ,, ,, . Siddiig Aamir - Director General of M.I. and Security.
10- ,, ,, . Al-Rashiid Fagiri - Director of Popular Security.
11- ,, ,, . Abdalla Al-Jaili - PDF. General Co-ordinator.
12- ,, ,, . Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen- National Service Co-ordinator.
13- ,, ,, . Salah Al- Tayib - DDR. Commissioner.
14- Dr. . Mustafa Osman Ismail - Political Secretary- NCP.
***************
[Text reformatted for clarity:
In the name of God most gracious and most merciful
Restricted and Confidential
Date: 01/09/2014
Republic of Sudan
National Intelligence and Security Service
Central Security Corporation
Management of Military Activities
To: Lt. Gen. Osman Tajasir, Managing Director of Central Security Corporation
Peace be on you,
Find enclosed:
[1] Joint Military and Security Committee Meeting held in National Defense College on 31/08/2014.
[2] Support Hamas Meeting held in Sudan Scientific Corporation Premises on 31/08/2014 (This document did not accompany the first—ER]
Signed, Maj. Gen. (Security): Abdal-Wahab Al-Rashiid
Secret
In the name of God most gracious and most merciful
Minutes of the Military and Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College
Sunday 31/08/ 2014
• 1st Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih welcomed the attendance.
• Reading and analysis of the SRF Statement 20 – 25/08/2014 .
• Study of Paris Declaration signed by the SRF and Sadik Al-Mahdi on 18/08/2014.
• Activities report covering Sadik Al-Mahdi visits and meetings in Cairo, Arab Emirates and
Addis-Ababa.
• Reports on Rebel Leaders activities, contacts and meetings.
The Agenda of the meeting:
[1] Paris Declaration and SRF statement impact.
[2] Radical and moderate trends in regards to ####e Belief activities in Sudan.
[3] President Mbeke role and Sudanese issues.
[4] Elections, National Dialogue and Peace Negotiations- The Priority.
[5] New Sudan Project and its impact on the national security and economic activity.
Attendance:
[1] 1st Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih – 1st Vice President of the Republic of Sudan
[2] 1st Lt. Gen. Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen – Minister of Defence.
[3] 1st Lt. Gen. Mohammed Atta Al-Mowla – Director General N.I.S.S.
[4] 1st Lt. Gen. Hashim Osman Al-Hisen – Director General of Police.
[5] 1st Lt. Gen. Hashim Abdalla Mohammed – Chief of Joint General Staff.
[6] Lt. Gen. Imadadiin Adaw – Chief of Joint Operations.
[7] Professor Ibrahim Ghandur – D/ Chairman of the N.C.P.
[8] Lt. Gen.Yahya Mohammed Kher – State Minister of Defense.
[9] Lt. Gen. Siddiig Aamir – Director General of M.I. and Security.
[10] Lt. Gen. Al-Rashiid Fagiri – Director of Popular Security.
[11] Lt. Gen. Abdalla Al-Jaili – PDF General Co-ordinator.
[12] Lt. Gen. Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen – National Service Co-ordinator.
[13] Lt. Gen. Salah Al- Tayib – DDR Commissioner.
[14] Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail – Political Secretary-NCP.
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
===== ===
Website: http://http://www.sudanreeves.orgwww.sudanreeves.org
Eric Reeves' book-length study of greater Sudan (Compromising With Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 - 2012; http://http://www.CompromisingWithEvil.orgwww.CompromisingWithEvil.org; review commentary at: http://wp.me/p45rOG-15Shttp://wp.me/p45rOG-15S)
--
To post to this group, send email to mailto:[email protected]@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to mailto:[email protected][email protected]
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/d/forum/southsudankob
View this message at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/southsudankob/topic-id/message-id
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "South Sudan Info - The Kob" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to mailto:[email protected][email protected].
To post to this group, send email to mailto:[email protected]@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/SouthSudanKobhttp://groups.google.com/group/SouthSudanKob.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/SouthSudanKob/CAJb14oqjLbM%3DFn1koxAKVmDpF1nqFzioF3BnxbGdJQ7xTrb5vQ%40mail.gmail.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: خطيير: محاضر جهاز الامن السودانى قاعدة في الصقيعة. (Re: جعفر محي الدين)
|
هذا الرابط جمعت فيه الصفحات من الأصل العربي التي قام بتحميلها السيد إريك حتى الآن
https://http://http://www.dropbox.com/s/z96mxi803ec3d6t/National%20Intellegence%20%26%20Security%20Committee%20.pdf?dl=0www.dropbox.com/s/z96mxi803ec3d6t/National%20Intellegence%20...ommittee%20.pdf?dl=0
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: خطيير: محاضر جهاز الامن السودانى قاعدة في الصقيعة. (Re: جعفر محي الدين)
|
| Quote: هذا الرابط جمعت فيه الصفحات من الأصل العربي التي قام بتحميلها السيد إريك حتى الآن |
الأخ جعفر محي الدين
لك الشكر مرة أخري لجلب الصفحات التى رفعها الخواجة علي صفحته..
نقدنا ليه بعدم نشر الوثيقة كاملة جاب نتيجة. وعلي الرغم من أن بعض الوثائق لم يتم تصويرها بصورة جيدة إلا إنه يمكن قرأتها بصعوبة.
عندي ملاحظتين:
الأولي: لم يصدر أية تعليق من ناس الإنقاذ عن تسريب الوثيقة وصحف الإنقاذ تم إسكاتها بالقوة ولم يقع في يدي خبر عن الوثيقة.
الثانية:
إن أخطر ما جاء في هذه الوثيقة يتعلق بالقوات المسلحة وقوات الدعم السريع. مسألة التأكيد علي قومية القوات المسلحة لا يتم بالقول بل بالفعل.
وأن إعادة صياغة قوات الدعم السريع يشير لمأزق حكومة الانقاذ في قوات الجنجويد. وأخير أن حكومة الإنقاذ تعانى من هروب الشباب من الإلتحاق بالقوات المسلحة.
هناك إشارات عديدة هنا وهناك حول إنضمام بعض قوات الحركات المسلحة مما يعنى تشوهات جديدة في تركيبة قوات الجنجويد والمليشيات الحكومية.
هذا يعنى أن القوة العسكرية للإنقاذ تمر بظروف صعبة قد تنفجر في أية وقت من الأوقات. مسألة إنخراط الجبهة الثورية في قصة الحوار تعنى نهاية العمل المسلح. النقطة الاخيرة دي دايرة توضيح أكتر. لكن أقيف هنا.
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
سيف اليزل سعد عمر
جعفر محي الدين
Mohamed Suleiman
nour tawir
Saifeldin Gibreel
azhary taha
ناصر حسين محمد
بريمة محمد
مبارك عبدالرحمن احمد
جمعة هري بوش
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست