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Re: ســــــــــري لـلـغـــايـــــة ناس UK ادخل وشوف اسمك مكتوب (Re: عرفات حسين)
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SUDAN DEMOCRACY FIRST GROUP and SAFERWORLD POLICY BRIEFING NOVEMBER 2014 SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE Executive Summary A series of initiatives by the Sudanese government, opposition groups and international mediators over the last ten months have created a glimmer of hope that a comprehensive resolution to Sudan’s conflicts may be possible. These potentially positive steps include: the national dialogue process launched by President alBashir in April; the Paris Declaration signed between the National Umma Party and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) on 8 August; the 4 September Addis Ababa Agreement on National Dialogue and Constitutional Processes between representatives of the government’s dialogue mechanism and the Paris Declaration signatories; and the 16 September 2014 African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) communique, calling for a synchronized mediation of the separate processes for resolving the conflicts in Blue Nile/South Kordofan and Darfur regions. However, bringing about an end to the armed conflicts, and subsequent steps towards a negotiated, national, inclusive and comprehensive dialogue continues to be blocked by the intransigence of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). A comprehensive, inclusive and accountable dialogue is one in where all Sudanese political, social and religious stakeholders can participate. The main aim of any national dialogue must be to address the root cause of conflict in Sudan: the relationship between the centre and the peripheries. The process cannot therefore treat the ‘distinct’ armed conflicts in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan in isolation from one another. Instead, all national political issues (such as power and wealth sharing, and constitution making) must be elevated to a national level. Furthermore, any agreements signed to bring about an end to fighting must not prejudice the national process that will take place after the silencing of the guns. The role of civil society and public participation must be guaranteed from the start, and this guarantee should be coupled with international investment in the capacity of civil society to play a positive role. Any national dialogue process must be underpinned by a conducive environment, which guarantees the constitutional rights and freedoms of all citizens. A credible process is impossible in the current context of widespread armed conflicts marked by atrocities against civilians, systematic violations of human, civil and political rights and the absence of political freedoms. The ongoing detention, arrest and torture of political opponents and activists must also cease. Furthermore, the push to hold elections in the April 2015– prior to an end to the conflicts and agreement on a permanent constitution – will fuel, not alleviate, the causes of conflict. The international community must not be cornered into supporting or legitimizing any sort of electoral process aimed exclusively at extending the life of the current regime, while the Sudanese people continue to suffer the consequences. SDFG and Saferworld Policy Briefing November 2014 SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE Page 2 of 6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY A Comprehensive Approach to the Peace Negotiations and#61623; Publically support and encourage the African Union’s efforts, as called for in 456th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on 12 September 2014, to synchronize the negotiations on Darfur and the Two Areas between the Government and the armed groups of the Sudan Revolutionary Front. Call for renewed efforts, including new security arrangements with the Darfur groups outside of the DDPD. and#61623; Stress that peace negotiations between the parties must not prejudice a national dialogue, and call for the transfer of all national political issues (such as power and wealth sharing, constitution-making, accountability for past rights violations and redress to victims, national reconciliation and other transitional arrangements), to a comprehensive, inclusive and accountable national dialogue. Supporting Elections with Integrity and#61623; Do not lend any political, technical or financial support to the elections scheduled for April 2015, including support for international election monitoring, until a transparent and inclusive national dialogue, constitution-making process, and agreement on transitional governance arrangements have taken place. Supporting a Comprehensive, Inclusive and Accountable National Dialogue and#61623; Publically support steps taken under the Addis Ababa Agreement and the AU PSC Communiqué, towards a comprehensive, inclusive and accountable national dialogue, including the new role of the AUHIP. and#61623; Call for and support a process leading to an agreed dialogue Framework between all stakeholders on the structure, modalities, ti####ble and content of the national dialogue. and#61623; Offer technical and financial support only if a reintroduced alternative national dialogue process meets the criteria of a comprehensive, inclusive and accountable process. This should include: taking place in a conducive environment, which comprises respect for fundamental freedoms – expression, association, and the media – release of political detainees and an end to arbitrary arrests; guarantees the wide participation and trust of key stakeholders; has a realistic ti####ble; is based on consensus building and not majoritarian voting; and addresses the root causes of conflict at the national level. and#61623; Call for and support civil society inclusion at every stage of the national dialogue, as well as effective public participation mechanisms, in particular for those most affected by the conflict, which will ensure the national dialogue process is legitimate and serves the needs and demands of all of Sudan’s citizens. and#61623; Condemn the recent wave of arrests of activists in September and the continuing censorship of the media as undermining the creation of a conducive environment, as well as the faith among key stakeholders and the Sudanese public that a comprehensive, inclusive and accountable national dialogue is possible. Support to Civil Society: and#61623; Invest in the capacity of civil society to work with other change actors to better articulate an alternative, viable vision for a democratic, just and peaceful Sudan. Debt Relief and Sanctions and#61623; Publically state that debt relief and the removal of sanctions, as well as any new economic support package and concessionary loans, will only take place following a nation-wide cessation of hostilities and a comprehensive, inclusive and accountable national dialogue held in a conducive environment. Increasing Humanitarian Assistance and#61623; Increase the vital humanitarian support to conflict-affected populations in Darfur and the Two Areas, as well as refugees from these conflicts, and press for unhindered humanitarian access to areas beyond government control, if necessary through a mechanism similar to UN Security Council Resolution 2165 (2014) on Syria.SDFG and Saferworld Policy Briefing November 2014 SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE Page 3 of 6 Towards a Comprehensive Approach Since January 2014, the Government of Sudan (and the NCP) has been leading a national dialogue process whose stated aims are resolving the armed conflicts, achieving political freedoms, alleviating poverty and the economic crisis, and addressing the national identity crisis. In April, the Government held roundtable meetings with opposition parties, created a “7+7 Committee” with some opposition and government-allied parties to oversee the process, and drew up a “roadmap” and timeframe for the national dialogue. These political shifts by the government and the NCP have been driven by several factors: the economic crisis precipitated by the secession of South Sudan and the loss of oil revenue (compounded by international sanctions); the continuing conflict in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile; increasing public discontent seen in the 2013 September protests; growing divisions within the Party over its future leadership; and the pending deadline of elections in April 2015, which the NCP needs to legitimize its rule. However, since the formal launch of the national dialogue process in April, the government has done everything in its power to undermine its own commitments to respect constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of expression, association and assembly. The imprisonment of opposition politicians, and detention and torture of activists, high levels of press censorship, and constraints on the operating space for political parties, suggest the Government, or at least key elements within it, are not committed to genuine change. Continued violence in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile in the form of the deliberate targeting of civilians by aerial bombardments and government forces, as well as the denial of humanitarian access to war victims in these areas also dent the government’s credibility in leading a genuine national dialogue process. The current national dialogue instead appears to be a means to position the NCP and its allies for the 2015 elections, and to improve its image among international actors to lift sanctions, obtain debt relief and, gain access to new concessionary loans. In parallel, opposition groups have been working to build alliances and coalitions to counter the government’s flawed national dialogue process. The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) signed the “Paris Declaration” with the National Umma Party on 8 August 2014, uniting, at least on paper, the armed opposition from the peripheries with the traditionally most significant opposition party from the centre, around a shared vision for a genuine national dialogue. Their agreement created a new block spanning religious, secular and ethnic divides. Efforts by the Paris Declaration signatories to define an alternative national dialogue process were further strengthened by the endorsement of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) of the 4 September “Addis Ababa Agreement on National Dialogue and Constitutional Process”. This document was signed by both the “Paris Group” and the AUHIP on one side, and the NCP-led “7+7” national dialogue steering committee and the AUHIP on the other. The African Union Peace and Security Council subsequently endorsed the Addis Ababa agreements, thus giving an international recognition of the shared general principles on the way forward for the SRF, NUP and the 7+7 committee. The government of Sudan has not, however, since shown any willingness to abide by the Addis Ababa Agreement. Ending the Armed Conflicts There is an emerging consensus that the first step to a comprehensive, inclusive and accountable national dialogue process is a nationwide cessation of hostilities and guarantees for the participation of the armed groups, alongside the full range of other political actors. On the one hand, the SRF must be included because they represent some of the communities most affected by war, and are fueled by grievances which are key drivers of conflict. On the other hand, if excluded, the SRF will continue to pursue violent means for change. Moreover, without a peaceful environment, it will be impossible for all parts of Sudan’s diverse society, including those most affected by the conflict, to engage in a participatory process of dialogue. The African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué from 17 September urged “all international actors with a mediation mandate to pool their resources together, as well as harmonize their interventions”. It also endorsed negotiations on a cessation for hostilities “under the auspices of the AUHIP and in collaboration and coordination with the Joint Special Representative/Joint Chief Mediator” and requested that negotiations “for the Two Areas and for Darfur should be conducted in a synchronized manner”. Whilst better coordination is progress towards a comprehensive approach, the communiqué does not mandate a unified negotiation process or platform. Furthermore, the Government continues to reject negotiating with the SRF as a single entity, and SDFG and Saferworld Policy Briefing November 2014 SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE Page 4 of 6 has reiterated its commitment to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) as the basis for all negotiations on the Darfur region, despite this agreement having been rejected by the SRF’s three Darfuri armed groups. According to the United Nations, some 6.9 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance across the country, with over half of those in need being in Darfur. 1 The ongoing conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas continue to put millions of civilians at risk, in particular because of the government’s forcible displacement of civilians, limiting their ability to plant and harvest crops. Between September 2011 and September 2014 some 372, 8112 people were forced to flee their homes in Blue Nile, while in South Kordofan, 116, 000 people were newly displaced in SPLM-North controlled areas between January and May 2014, adding to the 436, 000 persons displaced between 2011 and 2013. 3 In Darfur, some 431, 291 persons were displaced between January and 31 October of this year. 4 Moreover, the ongoing civil war in South Sudan has resulted in almost 100, 000 civilians seeking refuge in Sudan. 5
The key challenges to the peace negotiations are therefore: and#61623; Securing arrangements for unhindered humanitarian assistance to all conflictaffected populations; and#61623; Guaranteeing robust security arrangements for all the armed groups, including autonomous armed groups outside the control of government, in order to secure a permanent, nationwide cessation of hostilities and ceasefire agreement; and#61623; Securing commitment, and the necessary guarantees and conditions, from the government and the armed groups on their participation in a comprehensive, inclusive and accountable national dialogue process. National Dialogue for Lasting, Just Peace
1 http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitariandashboard-30-september-2014http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitariandashboard-30-september-2014 2 http://democracyfirstgroup.org/News/BN%20Infographic%20Shttp://democracyfirstgroup.org/News/BN%20Infographic%20S ept%202014.pdf 3 http://democracyfirstgroup.org/News/SK%20Infographic%20Shttp://democracyfirstgroup.org/News/SK%20Infographic%20S ept%202014.pdf 4 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situatiohttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situatio n_update_on_displacements_in_Darfur_31%20October14_A3. pdf 5 http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitariandashboard-30-september-2014http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitariandashboard-30-september-2014 A comprehensive, inclusive and accountable national dialogue process cannot take place until all Sudanese political, social and religious stakeholders – including internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and marginalized populations in the peripheries – are able to participate. It is widely recognized that at the heart of conflict in Sudan is the relationship between the centre and the peripheries. The root causes of the conflict in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur must be solved at the national, and not just the local, level. Previous attempts to bring peace to Sudan, such as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, have all failed to bring lasting peace because they were regionally-focused, without addressing the structural causes of Sudan’s many regional wars. The international community and Sudanese actors must seek an end to this piecemeal approach, and instead support an all-inclusive process. Although a cessation of hostilities and local level security arrangements must be agreed to by the SRF and the government, these negotiations and agreements must not prejudice any sort of political agreements for reforms at the national level. As with a cessation of hostilities and ending the bombing of civilian population, unhindered humanitarian access is a vital confidence building measure and a basic requirement for a conducive environment for a national dialogue. Furthermore, given the significant differences in the humanitarian context in Darfur and that in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, individual arrangements will be needed for operations on the ground. Furthermore, central to any dialogue process is a genuine process for transitional justice and accountability, which must address the grievances of victims of all the armed conflicts in Sudan. While any agreement to end the armed conflicts depends on the political will of the government and the armed groups, mechanisms for civil society and public participation can have a positive impact on the peace negotiations. However, there are no provisions in the current negotiations for this kind of participation. The DDPD did make a number of provisions for public participation in both the process that led to the agreement and in the agreement itself. However, civil society and other stakeholders’ participation in the process become highly politicized, and even then their contributions were largely ignored by the parties. Furthermore, attempts to engage civil SDFG and Saferworld Policy Briefing November 2014 SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE Page 5 of 6 society, IDPs, and other stakeholders in the DDPD’s Darfur-Darfur Dialogue to promote local peacebuilding have made little progress. Although no direct participants in a negotiation process between the belligerents, engaging civil society in an informal way must be incorporated into the peace processes, and be supported by both the AUHIP and the parties. There also needs to be a commitment the inclusion of civil society actors and public participation mechanisms in any future national dialogue process. The international community must therefore continue to invest in building the capacity of civil society to play a positive role in supporting any future inclusive national dialogue process. The process cannot be exclusively focused on elites based in Khartoum – a dialogue between the NCP and other political parties – but must include a representative cross-section of Sudanese society, including traditional/tribal leaders, religious groups, trade unions, IDPs, refugees, women, and youth. Any process taking place must be held in parallel with a grass-roots, bottom-up process that includes local communities, especially in the peripheries. Furthermore, the NCP-run “societal dialogues” meetings have not been genuinely representative of civil society or the grassroots, as the process has been designed and dominated by the NCP. Elections after Peace and Constitution Legitimate elections cannot take place in the current environment of armed conflict and a lack of civil and political freedoms. The operating space for political parties and civil society, especially at the local level, is highly restricted. The press is gagged from covering the conflicts in Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur. There is growing awareness of corruption and economic mismanagement by the regime, which is feeding popular discontent, but corruption is another issue that the media are forbidden to cover. The government has unilaterally amended the electoral law, appointed members of the electoral commission and decided on the calendar of the elections. Voter and national observer registration are underway. The national dialogue is due to conclude within three months in an attempt to lend legitimacy to what will inevitably be deeply flawed elections. Indicative of the NCP’s unwillingness to be subject to genuine democratic process is the government’s recent attempt to amend the constitution in order to presidentially appoint rather than directly elect state governors, and the recent nomination of President alBashir to stand for another term, which appears to contravene the current constitution. For any electoral process to be considered genuine and constructive, it must be undertaken in an environment in which all Sudanese stakeholders can engage and participate. There must be a conducive environment without the current impunity for abuses committed by National Intelligence and the Security Forces, and associated militias, such as the Rapid Support Forces. A process of national reconciliation – through a transitional process – must be in place to insure transparent, free and fair elections are carried out. International Support The role of the AUHIP is to be commended and it should be given more support in order to increase its capacity to fulfill its multiple mandates and to create greater coordination and harmonization among the different processes. To uphold the primacy of the humanitarian imperative, AUHIP Chairman president Thabo Mbeki should visit war victims in government and rebel areas, as well as refugees, to witness the humanitarian crisis exposed and hear their testimonies. Furthermore, the Panel should create a pool of Sudanese and non-Sudanese experts as a resource to the negotiations as a whole, accessible by all the parties. As the negotiations between the belligerents will have a bearing on a wider national dialogue, the Panel should support an informal mechanism for a wider group of stakeholders, such as the unarmed political opposition and key civil society groups, to be able to observe and make contributions to the talks. Furthermore, the Panel must in particular champion the issues of exclusivity and of public participation. The 20 October 2014 conclusions by the European Union’s Foreign Affairs Council are encouraging. They set out five clear benchmarks for the national dialogue: it must be inclusive, comprehensive, held in a conducive environment, accompanied by confidence building measures, and with a transparent process, objectives and time frame. The European Union and other members of the international community must continue to clearly outline the requirements for a genuine process before any support can be provided. Furthermore, the AUHIP must clearly outline the steps needed on the side of the Sudanese Government to create a conducive environment for dialogue.dialogue and Safer world Policy Briefing November 2014 SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE Page 6 of 6 About the Sudan Democracy First Group Launched in mid-2010, the Sudan Democracy First Group (SDFG) (http://http://www.democracyfirstgroup.orgwww.democracyfirstgroup.org) is a coalition of democratic, activist, trade unionist and academic Sudanese representing different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. The organization aims to voice the concerns of voiceless Sudanese from across the country on questions of democratization and its intersection with peace, justice and development. SDFG focuses on providing Sudanese and international audiences with information and analysis by publishing regular updates, policy briefs and position papers on major political and human rights issues. In addition to raising public awareness both inside and outside Sudan, SDFG works to promote civil society dialogue on crucial issues affecting Sudan, by convening meetings and round tables bringing together diverse sectors of Sudanese society— particularly those representing marginalized populations. About Safer world Saferworld is an independent international organization working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with local people affected by conflict to improve their safety and security. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe that everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from violent conflict. Our programmatic work is in fragile and conflict-affected states, while our policy and advocacy work seeks to improve national and international policy and programming on conflict, security and development in such contexts.
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