ليس الصادق المهدي ولكنها الحركة الشعبية من انتهكت الحقوق /بقلم محمد حسن العمدة

Quote: أول صحيفة سودانية تصدر عبر الإنترنت من الخرطوم - أسسها خالد عز الدين و محمد علي عبد الحليم -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- رئيس التحرير: طارق الجزولي تلفون: 0912201125 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [email protected] Last Update 01 ديسمبر, 2005 10:19:00 AM -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ردا على الأخ قبريال شول ميرور: ليس الصادق المهدي ولكنها الحركة الشعبية من انتهكت الحقوق محمد حسن العمدة [email protected] الأخ قبريال شول وأخي القاري الكريم لا احب الاطالة في كتابة الانشاء خاصة في مجالات انتهاكات حقوق الانسان السوداني ولكني سادع التقارير الدولية تتحدث عن الانتهاكات فهذه منظمات لا تنتمي لحزب الامة ولا هيئة شئون الانصار ولنحتكم الى المحاكم العدلية الدولية بوثائقنا وليس بخطبنا الرنانة التي لا تغني عن الحق شيئا ولتستعد الحركة الشعبية للمثول امام محكمة العدل الدولية المختصة بجرائم الحرب , وخوفا من هذا المصير الحتمي لم تؤيد الحركة الشعبية القرار خمستاشر ثلاثة وتسعون والخاص باحالة المنتهكين لحقوق الانسان بدارفور للمحكمة الدولية وشريكك كان زينو يا قبريال عقب بل راسك كما يقول المثل هذه بعض من تقارير والبقية تاتي من تقرير لمنظمة العفو الدولية - امنستي انترناشيونال- The SPLA, the SSIA and human rights On 30 July 1995 SPLA soldiers and armed Dinka, Agar and Atuot civilians from the Akot and Aluakluak areas combined to attack Nuer villages and cattle camps around the small centre of Ganyliel in southern Upper Nile. Ganyliel is a relatively densely populated area. Its villages are scattered collections of homesteads, each with its own cattle byre known as a luak, and each surrounded by its own fields. By late July 1995 most of the cattle had been brought back to the cattle byres from more distant camps where they had been pastured during the dry season. The attack is reported to have begun in the early hours of the morning. First the raiders attacked villages northwest of Ganyliel. They then split into three parties and over the hours that followed, both before and after dawn, they looted and burned villages around Dhuolmanyang, Gualaguk and Laidit. Over 200 civilians, the majority of them women and children, were reportedly killed. Thousands of cattle, sheep and goats were driven away. Some standing crops were slashed and destroyed. Many of those killed were indiscriminately shot as they fled. Others were captured and then deliberately killed. An eye-witness to the attack on Bongkhal, which took place shortly after first light, has described seeing three women with their babies being caught by SPLA soldiers. Two of the women were shot dead. One woman and the babies were killed with large knives. A woman who survived the attack on the village of Manyal had one child shot and two others hacked to death. Nearby an elderly women was cut to death. An infant was killed by being thrown in the air and left to hit the ground. Another eye-witness described seeing SPLA soldiers capturing Nuer civilians and then handing them over to Dinka civilians to be speared to death. The attack on Ganyliel was in retaliation for an earlier assault by SSIA soldiers and Nuer civilians on Akot and the nearby Tharagep cattle camp. Akot is an important regional centre for both the SPLA and for relief and development assistance. The villages around it are similar to those around Ganyliel, except that cattle are kept all year round in camps containing thousands of animals. In the raid on Akot and Tharagep, on 22 October 1994, more than 100 civilians are reported to have been killed and as many as 2,000 cattle stolen. Civilians were shot indiscriminately as they tried to escape. Adith Malok, a midwife in Akot medical centre, was shot dead minutes after she had delivered a baby when she ran outside. Others were captured and then beaten and speared to death. A survivor of the attack on Tharagep, Macol Mayang, was beaten about the head with an iron bar. He survived because he fell unconscious. SSIA soldiers and Nuer civilians looted Akot during the attack; after the asault SPLA soldiers and local people looted stores belonging to foreign relief and development organizations. These attacks follow the pattern of fighting between the SPLA and SSIA involving deliberate attacks on civilians detailed in previous Amnesty International reports. In the past, the SPLM/A has remained silent on the issue of responsibility for human rights abuses. Recently, however, there have been indications that some senior members of the SPLM/A have recognized the need to take responsibility for human rights abuses committed by SPLA members. These developments stem from a decision by the First National Convention in April 1994 to strengthen civilian involvement in the organization. In 1995 both the SPLM/A and the SSIM/A signed agreements with UN Operation Lifeline Sudan establishing ground rules for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. These include a commitment to respecting basic principles laid down in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. While the ground rules are primarily about humanitarian issues, the international treaties to which the SPLM/A and SSIM/A have committed themselves contain important human rights provisions. The ground rules represent a statement by these organizations about the standards to which they aspire (and which are also expected of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations). Amnesty International welcomed the SPLM/As signature of the agreement as an important act in a report entitled Monitoring human rights published in October 1995. ( In January 1995 Amnesty International called on the SPLM/A to make a public commitment to the humanitarian principles enshrined in the Geneva Conventions.) At that time Amnesty International was not aware that SSIM/A had also signed it. Amnesty International pointed out that the SPLM/A was already bound as a minimum to apply Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions, and went on to say that whether or not these steps are meaningful will be determined by the SPLAs conduct. Since the ground rules were signed the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A, and the Relief Association for the Southern Sudan (RASS), the equivalent wing of the SSIM/A, have cooperated with UN Operation Lifeline Sudan in holding a series of meetings to explain the ground rules. In October Amnesty International representatives attended such a meeting in Chukudum, an SPLM/A-controlled village in southern Sudan. It was attended by over 100 civilians and SPLA officers, as well as by representatives of Sudanese and foreign non-governmental organizations working in Chukudum. The SRRA team explored the links between the principles underlying the ground rules and southern Sudanese socio-cultural traditions. However, the human rights implications of the ground rules agreement were not made clear. The agreement therefore currently represents an opportunity to build human rights awareness rather than a decisive intervention for human rights protection. This was underlined to Amnesty International in a meeting in October 1995 with SSIM/A leader Dr Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon. He and his advisers insisted that the agreement did not commit the SSIM/A to respecting international standards for the protection of human rights. In September 1995 the SPLM/A held a large meeting of its officers, part of which was attended by civilians and Sudanese and foreign non-governmental organizations. Public criticism was encouraged. The opinions that were voiced from within the SPLM/A included criticism of human rights abuse by the SPLA. At the meeting the SPLM/A committed itself to setting up a verification committee to investigate alleged violations of childrens rights and the ground rules. Again, this is a welcome development -- but it is not yet clear that it has been put into practice. In October 1995 Amnesty International representatives met Salva Kiir Mayardit, Chief of Staff of the SPLA and Deputy Chairman of the SPLM, and four Regional Governors and senior commanders. The officers were critical of Amnesty Internationals reporting of alleged abuses by the SPLA. They argued that there had been mistakes in the past, but that, since the First National Convention in 1994, the human rights situation had changed. They questioned Amnesty Internationals objectives in repeatedly raising incidents which had taken place several years before, suggesting that the organization was politically motivated. The Amnesty International representatives raised the killings in Ganyliel. Salva Kiir Mayardit said that the killings had been carried out by cattle raiders, and described cattle raiding as an endemic problem between the Dinka and the Nuer. Although he conceded that SPLA personnel may have taken part in the raid, he denied that the attack was authorized. Cattle raids are part of life in this area of Sudan and civilians in the Akot area undoubtedly wanted revenge for the October 1994 attack. However, information received by Amnesty International indicates that SPLA officers in command in Karic and Akot organized the raid. About half the attacking force was made up of SPLA troops, most from Karic and Akot, some from Mvolo, an SPLA post in Western Equatoria south of Akot, and some, reportedly, from around Tonj. Even if SPLA officers did not organize the attack, the large scale involvement of SPLA personnel makes the organization accountable for their actions. (SPLA detachments in the Yirol area, east of Akot, are reported to have refused to take part. The chiefs of Dinka sections from Yirol were actually in the Ganyliel area holding peace talks with their Nuer counterparts when the raid took place.) The Amnesty International representatives asked what steps the SPLA had taken to investigate the incident. The procedure described involved the Regional Governor contacting the Divisional Commander, who in turn contacted local commanders and local chiefs. The officers pointed out that Ganyliel is in SSIA territory and that therefore an on-the-spot investigation was not possible. It is true that the SPLA could not mount an investigation in Ganyliel itself. However, the inquiry outlined in no way constituted a thorough, systematic investigation. It was not independent and contained no safeguards against the only people being asked for information being the very people responsible for the abuses. It does not appear to have been pursued with any vigour nor to have led to any action against alleged human rights abusers. The killings at Ganyliel were committed within days of the signing of the agreement on ground rules. The SPLM/As failure to take action shows that the pattern of inadequate SPLM/A responses to abuses by its troops has not yet been broken. The inadequacy of the SPLM/A reaction underlines how much work remains to be done if it is to establish genuine human rights protection. Amnesty International representatives also raised the Akot incident with Dr Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon of the SSIM/A. His response was similar to that of the SPLM/A. He said that he had tried to find out the facts of what had happened in Akot but that this had proved difficult. He indicated that he had not transferred the commander from the area, but acknowledged that the incident raised important issues about the control and training of troops. By the time this report is published, the SPLM/A will have held a conference on Civil Society and the Organization of Civil Authority in the New Sudan, currently scheduled for late April 1996. Its aims include developing policies for establishing effective, efficient and accountable structures of civil administration; developing an independent, effective and efficient system for the administration of justice; and developing mechanisms to nurture the growth and effective functioning of civil institutions. Amnesty International urges the SPLM/A to address human rights issues directly. A strong civil administration is no guarantee of respect for human rights. A functioning judicial system is vital, but will not protect human rights if laws are inconsistent with international human rights standards or if procedures do not allow, for example, the right of appeal to an independent body. Strengthening the institutions of civil society (including non-governmental human rights organizations) is a fundamental long-term step towards holding those with power accountable. However, its success depends upon creating the freedom for such institutions to operate without interference. Amnesty Internationals message is simple. The resource constraints and logistical problems which hinder both the SPLM/A and the SSIM/A cannot justify continued failure to take practical measures to improve respect for human rights. It is easy to hide behind such constraints to avoid taking difficult action, but generalizations about the importance of human rights are useless if not backed by action. The SPLM/A and the SSIM/A have to take action on human rights which addresses the real seat of power. For both organizations this remains the military. Soldiers who commit abuses must answer for their actions. Strict control should be kept over all military units and clear orders should be given prohibiting the deliberate and arbitrary killing of civilians. To be effective, action has to be based on a proper assessment of the facts. Mechanisms to establish the facts in cases of human rights abuse are therefore a top priority. Allegations of abuse should be promptly investigated by impartial systems of inquiry which have sufficient independence to be credible and which issue public reports. The leadership should respond publicly to such reports, indicating what steps they are taking in the light of the report's recommendations. Both the SPLM/A and the SSIM/A should explore mechanisms of investigation which can work across the borders of territory controlled by each without hindrance. This would require the politically difficult step of agreeing that human rights issues transcend narrow interests. It could involve the creation of an institution independent of each group but respected by both. المرجع: ِمنظمة العفو الدولية SUDAN Progress or public relations? 29 May 1996 AI INDEX: AFR 54/06/96 DISTR: SC/CC/CO/GR/OUT http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR540061996 SPLA On February 18, 1999, the SPLA captured three government employees said to be "spies" and a Red Crescent tracing officer, and two ICRC expatriates with them, who strayed into SPLA territory. Although the ICRC personnel were released, the SPLA later claimed that all four Sudanese captives were killed during an unsuccessful rescue attempt. It refused to release the bodies, making it likely that the four had been murdered. The Didinga of Chukudum in the Eastern Equatoria region of southern Sudan were deeply dissatisfied for years with the SPLA garrison in their town, claiming mistreatment by the Bor Dinka who dominated the garrison and whose families lived in nearby displaced persons camps. There was a history of summary executions and retaliations by both sides. On January 10, 1999, a personal clash between a Dinka SPLA officer and a Didinga SPLA officer resulted in the death of the Dinka officer. The next day, Didinga fled for the mountains, fearing retaliation. On January 13, fighting broke out, and the SPLA took the town. A peace-making delegation appointed by the SPLA was not heeded; the SPLA claimed the Didinga were in league with a government militia. In April, fighting started again. A cease-fire was finally declared in August and the SPLA agreed to remove landmines it planted in the area. SPLM leaders admitted SPLA responsibility for food diversion at a U.N.-convened May meeting on the 1998 famine. They also sharply criticized international blunders. In Ajiep, a major relief distribution center during the famine, some 800 bags of food (fifty kilos/bag) were stolen from the airstrip, the work of warlord Kerubino's soldiers, police from Wau, and SPLA deserters. The SPLA was blamed for not restoring order after it was notified of this problem. In Ajiep only 41 percent of the food was left for the community after the chiefs, commissioners, and SPLA had taken their cut, and that lay undistributed for weeks. The SPLA took 30 percent, more than they needed to feed their troops, those at the meeting said. This was the area in which the diversion problem was the largest magnitude: Ajiep had the highest mortality rate during the famine. Visitors to SPLA areas continued to see armed SPLA youth who looked younger than eighteen. Although UNICEF had a program for demobilization of child soldiers, the SPLA was not known to have demobilized any of the child soldiers in its ranks. Marial Nuor, an SPLA major in military intelligence, was investigated by the SPLA after he detained elderly foreign nuns and a priest for two weeks in 1996, causing an international uproar. Marial, in charge of SPLA recruitment in Yirol, had allegedly also killed two soldiers, three recruits, and tortured an old man to death. He was convicted by a court martial-for mutiny when he evaded arrest. He was imprisoned briefly, and then was under "open arrest." At the request of the old man's family, Marial was sent back toYirol in 1999 and tried in a civilian court. He was convicted and sentenced to five years in jail and fined. Several months later, however, he was freed when the SPLA ordered him to conduct more recruitment in Yirol. After he threatened his fellow officers and bragged of his untouchability, he was again punished: with a transfer from Yirol. المرجع: راصد حقوق الانسان SUDAN Human Rights Developments http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-11.htm وهذا جزء من تقرير منظمة هيومان رايتس ووتش ؛ لعام 2000-2001؛ انتهاكات الحركة الشعبية لحقوق الانسان الجنوبي ؛ بما تشمل النهب من المواطنيين ؛ التجنيد الاجباري ؛ تجنيد الاطفال المصدر http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/africa/sudan.html ---------- SPLA and Other Rebel Groups Despite church peacemaking efforts between the Didinga of Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria, and the Bor Dinka who dominated the SPLA garrison in Chukudum, hostilities continued. Sometime after the August 1999 cease-fire, the SPLA assigned commanders of local origin to the garrison, but the local population remained reluctant to return to their homes and fields because of the landmines that the SPLA promised to remove but did not. Even though SPLA leaders promised to stop their troops' #####ng, the confiscation of relief food from civilians by SPLA soldiers and officers continued. In March 2000, an SPLA commander in Bahr El Ghazal took the entire contents of a relief warehouse, valued at $500,000, according to an investigation carried out by the SPLA's relief arm and international relief agencies. Several #####ng incidents, at or after relief food distributions, occurred in Eastern Equatoria. When angry civilians on one occasion tried to prevent the SPLA from taking the food, the soldiers fired into the crowd, killing several. In 2000, negotiations on a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the SPLA's Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in SPLA territory-in which the SPLA sought to impose new demands and operating conditions on relief organizations-foundered. Some eleven of forty NGOs operating in SPLA territory refused to sign for fear of compromising their neutrality and safety. They had to withdraw from that territory by the SPLA deadline of March 1, 2000. The SRRA's executive director claimed he did not care if 50,000 or 100,000 southerners died as a result of the NGO pullout. In later months, several nonsignatories signed the MoU or restarted operations in SPLA territory. Some NGOs did not return. Meanwhile the E.U. withheld funding from NGOs who signed the MoU. Visitors to rebel areas continued to see armed youth who looked younger than eighteen. Cooperation with UNICEF's program for demobilization of child soldiers was uneven. One SPLA commander remobilized several hundred boys when UNICEF failed to provide promised school books and other supplies for the boys. On the eastern front, visitors received credible complaints from military and civilian victims that the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), an NDA member, committed abuses against its soldiers accused of spying or defecting to another rebel group, including summary executions, torture, and detention of prisoners in a pit in the ground. The allegations were denied by the SAF وهذا عن دور الحركة الشعبية في تسبيب المجاعة في بحر الغزال في عام 1998؛ والتي قتلت ربع مليون مواطن ..كما عبر عنها تقرير: المجاعة في السودان ؛ وانتهاكات حقوق الانسان التي سببتها .. المصدر تقرير The Famine In Sudan, And The Human Rights Abuses That Caused It http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sudan98/testim/house-03.htm ------- The SPLA also has played a role in the famine. Its policy of putting garrison towns under siege has led to the successful interdiction of almost all overland and river transport, through land mines and ambushes. This means that most relief goods must be delivered by air, which makes this a very costly operation, although there are other reasons the air bridge has been resorted to, such as the absence of all-weather roads. The SPLA has been responsible for #####ng and diversion of relief food from civilians, as mentioned, although the government has been guilty of this as well. For instance, in the garrison town of Wau, Bahr El Ghazal, assorted government forces looted the property of the Dinka who had fled for their lives in January 1998, and of the U.N. and NGOs who evacuated the town before the SPLA attack on it. The government has done its best to encourage south-south fighting, by arming any southern group that will fight against the SPLA as in the case of Kerubino. Southerners are not absolved from all blame, however. There are divisions among them because the SPLA has treated some ethnic groups roughly, forcibly conscripting their youth, raping women, and stealing food وهذا من احد التقارير لمنظمة العفو الدولية (امنستي انترناشيونال ) يتحدث عن آلية الحركة الشعبية ورؤيتها في تحرير الطفل الجنوبي والمراة الجنوبية المصدر تقرير منظمةالعفو عن عام 2001 http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webafrcountries/SUDAN?OpenDocument ------ Children continued to be forcibly recruited by the SPLA, despite the fact that the SPLA had informed UNICEF that it would demobilize all child soldiers in its forces and end the recruitment of children. ----- Rape and other violence against women Violence against women by combatants on all sides, long a feature of the conflict in Sudan, intensified during the year. There were widespread reports of sexual abuse, including sexual slavery, rape and forced pregnancies. Rape was used as a tactic of war by both government and opposition forces to dehumanize and humiliate civilians in the conflict zone. However, because of the taboos and stigma attached to rape, reports were rare and impunity for the rapist was the rule. There were frequent reports of women being abducted while collecting firewood or water and being forced to carry heavy loads of goods looted from ransacked villages. They were also used as bonded labour and forced to clean, cook and provide domestic services to soldiers in barracks and camps. هذه شهادة نساء كن مقاتلات في الحركة الشعبية ؛ حيث ظنن انها جائت لتحريرهن ؛ وهربن منها نتيجة لانتهاك حقوقهن فيها ؛ وقد رصد الخبر نهيال بول ؛ وهو صحفي من جنوب السودان المصدر موقع العالم الواحد http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/apr/sudan.html ========= SUDAN-HUMAN RIGHTS: Women Ex-Rebels Speak of Neglect and Abuse By Nhial Bol KHARTOUM, Apr 3 (IPS) -- Until recently, Aroghu Radolfa was a lieutenant in Sudan's main rebel group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), but she was unable to move further. The reason, she said, was that she was a woman. Aroghu was one of five female ex-rebels who recounted their experiences to the press here last week after defecting from the rebel movement. They are part of a group of 27 women who have decided to leave the main faction of the SPLA and one of its splinter groups, the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM). The five women recounted their life in the bush which was characterised by discrimination and abuse. ''During fighting, we fight side by side, on equal footing with men, but when it comes to promotions, women are less considered. We really faced difficulties to get promotions,'' Aroghu said. ''Some of my (male) colleagues have little education, but still they become commanders.'' The SPLA main faction is estimated at 800,000, and according to Aroghu there are some 354 women officers below the rank of commander. But lack of promotion was not the only problem faced by women rebels, said Aroghu. They were also forced to put up with human rights abuses. ''I remember during our training in 1986 in the bushes of the Equatoria region (in the south), some of us were sexually abused not only by Sudanese trainers, but also by Ugandan soldiers who were training us,'' recalled Aroghu who has come home to help her family, find work and go back to school. She joined the SPLA in 1986. Some women were married to male rebels without prior knowledge, she charged, adding that compulsory marriages were common in rebel territory. ''You were told to sleep with a man you had never talked to and if you disobeyed, you violated the orders of the movement and you were punished for it,'' she added. ''(SPLA leader John) Garang himself told us during (one of) his lectures near Chukudum in Equatoria State that he favoured marriages among fighters, because the movement needs children for this war,'' Aroghu said. ''Garang wants us to produce more children in order to support his forces in the future.'' According to Aroghu, the international community has made no effort to investigate the serious human rights violations perpetrated against women behind rebel lines. Women and young boys were also given the most distasteful tasks, such as burying people who died in fights between the SPLA and the regular army, the former rebel complained. On one occasion, she said, ''I was given some women and young boys to bury people killed on both sides. The dead bodies were allowed to remain in the open air for some days so the birds had been consuming them and later we were told to bury them. That particular job was very unsanitary and made us sick.'' Another former fighter, who gave only her first name as Aliza, said she too had been a lieutenant, but her rank meant little to her male fighters. Aliza, who has lost her hair and carries the scars of war on her legs and in the face, said she had been detained and tortured in the town of Wau (Southern Sudan), when she refused to go to bed with her local commander. ''I tell you, women in the eyes of the rebels, are nothing...,'' she said. According to Aliza, because women fighters were poorly trained, they often constituted a high number of the fatalities on the battlefield. More than 200 women and girls died last year in factional fighting between the SPLA and the SSIM's army in the Southern Sudanese towns of Watt, Aiod and Bor, and some 25 women died during the siege of Jekau in the Upper Nile region this year, she added. Aliza said that women must begin to fight their oppressor on all fronts. ''Women should prepare the ground for demanding equality and justice even through the use of armed struggle,'' she said. ''For how long are we going to face this oppression?'' (end/ips/nb/pm97