بحثا عن الحقيقة " المرحوم الاميرالاي عبدالله بك خليل "

Quote: استاذي الكريم يحيى العوض اكون ممتنا لو تكرمت تحويل ادناه للأخ ابوبكر سيد احمد لك مني جزيل الشكر اخي الكريم ابوبكر سيد احمد تحية وبعد كنت قد حاولت الإطلاع اليوم على موقع منبر سودانيز اون لاين لقراة تناول موضوع استاذنا الجليل يحى العوض حول قروض وهبات السودان فوجدت موضوع اخر حقيقة جدير بالاطلاع قد افترعته انت حول الرئيس عبد لله خليل ويبدوا انه توارد في الخواطر فقد كنت بالامس اجمع بعض توثيقات لباحث هنا حول استقلال السودان ومشاركة الجيش السوداني في دحر النازية في الحرب العالمية ودور مصر الخفي منذ ذلك الوقت ومستقبله في ما يخص جنوب السودان ،واستشهدت فيها بخطابات ارشيفية لعبد الله خليل ارسلت الى الحكومة البريطانية حينها استطيع ان اقول في مختصر مفيد مع التشديد انني لا انتمي لأي توجه سياسي انه لو كان هنالك رجل واحد في تاريخ السودان الحديث يمكنني دون تردد ان اقول أنه وطني مخلص غيور لما ترددت في الاشارة الى عبدالله خليل ، واتمنى مخلصا ان يعرف السودانيين قدر هؤلاء الرجال ، ولو كان الامر بيدي لبنيت له تمثال في وسط الديار ليعرف السودانيين ماذا تعني كلمة وطني ومعنى الديمقراطية التي نادى وقاتل من اجلها لتتنفسها اوروبا وغيرها هذا الرجل الذي حاولت ايادي مصر الخفية في ديارنا تشويه سيرته الناصعة الخطاب ادنا يحدث عن نفسه وبين سطوره تجد كثير من الاجابات لتساؤلاتك وهو مذكرة منه للحكومة البريطانية مناديا باستقلال السودان وكاشفا فيه في نفس الوقت الدور المصري الاناني اتجاه السودان على مر التاريخ اجدني مجبر ان اسطر في حقهم بعض الكلمات واردد مقولتك الافريقية "حتي تجد الاسود مؤرخا ستبقي قصص الصيد تمجد الصياديين" مع كامل الود والتقدير memorandum by Abdallah Khalil, 28 Nov 1950 His Excellency the governor general of the Sudan I beg to submit to your Excellency the following memorandum which, in my opinion, expresses the views and aspirations of the Sudanese members of the Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council in regard to the political future of their country. These views may be summarised as follows:— (1) The immediate setting up of a Sudanese Cabinet. (2) The declaration of the next elections on the basis of Self-Government to be established immediately after the end of the 3rd Session of the present Assembly— that is before the end of 1951. How to achieve these two aims will call for a detailed explanation of many points. The following is an attempt to explain briefly these points. The present condominium rule While we admit the useful services which the Condominium Rule has been able to render to this country during the last fifty years, we believe that if it is allowed to continue for any longer period it will seriously affect the political, economic & social development of this country; and the following are a few examples to show how this rule is becoming unsuitable:— (1) The difference of opinion between the two Condominium powers in regard to the future political status of the Sudan. While England believes in and works for the Sudan's ultimate goal of freedom and independence, Egypt is doing all it can to obstruct and check this movement towards freedom, because it looks upon an independent Sudan as nothing but a real danger and threat to her interests as regards the Nile waters; but Egypt conceals her imperialistic aims under the usual claim that the Sudan forms an integral part of her territory and as such has no right to set up a separate constitution. (2) The disapproval of Egypt of the present political set up and her determined attemps [sic] to encourage as many Sudanese as it can and persuade them to boycott the Legislative Assembly and other progressive institutions. (3) The unanimous agreement of all Sudanese political parties that the Condominium Rule is no longer suitable and therefore must be terminated without delay. The examples we have given are sufficient to illustrate the unsuitability of this rule and show the necessity for its termination as quickly as possible so that we can govern our own country as other free peoples do. We cannot tolerate in this age of freedom that we should remain in this anomalous situation and that we should not be self-governing and that the interests of our country should continue to progress slowly merely out of regard for the alleged interests of Egypt. While we can understand Egypt's imperialistic attitude, we can hardly believe that England—with its long democratic traditions—will support it, especially after having recognised and declared the Sudanese right to self-determination and having approved the establishment of the present political institutions. We were and are still asking for the termination of this rule. We were already looking for the first suitable opportunity to get rid of it until the second World War broke out when we voluntarily came to the side of the democracies and contributed as much as we could at a time when Egypt refused to participate in it. Neither her partnership nor her alleged sovereignty could induce her to defend us. On the other hand we, the ruled, never thought of securing her permission to enter the war or appealed to her for any kind of help. We ought to have proclaimed our Independence at that time but unfortunately we missed the opportunity through a belief that England after having tried both of us during that decisive war would not hesitate to grant us our independence after the end of the war. But instead of coming out of the war as an independent nation the sovereignty of Egypt was about to be imposed on the Sudan as a result of the 1946 Anglo-Egyptian negotiations had it not been for the firm stand of the Independence Front, the great efforts of the late Sir Hubert Huddleston and the personal contact made by Sayed Abdel Rahman el Mahdi with the British Government. We are sure that your Excellency is fully aware of the details of these transactions and of the advice which Mr. Attlee gave to Sayed Abdel Rahman to return to the Sudan and work in full cooperation with the Governor General towards the realisation of the Sudanese national aspirations.' The Independence Front proceeded to cooperate with His Excellency until the first steps towards Independence were realised by the setting up of the Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council. Egypt resorted to the Security Council after the breakdown of the negotiations with Great Britain and after her failure to impose her Sovereignty over the Sudan. At Lake Success she tried to make a case but failed. She gained nothing from her denunciation of British policy in the Sudan, nor from abandoning her earlier claim based on the right of conquest and introducing a new formula that the Sudan was part of Egypt. She came back from America with one result—the recognition by the Security Council of the right of the Sudanese to self-determination. Your Excellency is fully aware of Egypt's attitude towards these two institutions— she repudiated them and circulated false rumours about them. She incited her supporters to boycott the election for the Assembly and to stage demonstrations in protest against its creation; she undertook to give money to any one who would work against the Independence movement. Nevertheless the majority of the Sudanese who were and are still firm believers in their rights to self-determination, accepted the two institutions as a first practical step towards independence. The Independence Front stood for the elections and succeeded in winning them. Subsequently the Assembly was formed from the majority party and continued to work for the well- being and progress of the Sudan in a manner which was commended by Your Excellency early this year. It was gratifying to see that as a result of Your Excellency's satisfaction with the achievements of the Assembly the Sudanese obtained a majority in the Executive Council. But we are anxious that a big and decisive step forward should be taken as soon as possible. There are factors which urge us to request that such a step should take place without delay. The following are some of them:— (1) It is right that we ask for freedom in order to Govern our country like other free peoples—this is a universally accepted principle. (2) We see around us peoples who are smaller in numbers and less well prepared for freedom in many respects and yet they have enjoyed or are about to enjoy their right to self-determination. (3) That if we adopt in our progress the policy of caution and slowness, we shall expose the country to dangers, the consequences of which cannot be contemplated by any true citizen of the Sudan. In the hope of increasing the number of its supporters in the Sudan, Egypt has intensified its propaganda using all visible and invisible means—offering attractive educational facilities, building mosques, attempting to open schools and start hospitals etc. etc. As a partner, Egypt refuses to see the Sudan represented in any international organization or any World conference so that the Sudan should not have a separate voice. She is determined to spend considerable sums of money on propaganda in the Sudan—a former prime minister of Egypt is alleged to have made a declaration to this effect. The objective behind this intention as he put it was to release the Egyptian piastre so that it reaches every house in the Sudan as a result of which Egypt's name will be on every tongue—but the real objective is obvious. From the above it will appear that slowness is obviously in the interest of Egypt because the time factor will help her to achieve her ambitions through increasing her supporters in the Sudan and the country's future will be exposed to grave dangers if we follow the policy of caution and slowness. A continuation of this Egyptian propa- ganda will lead to moral chaos, internal dissension and corruption in social life. Egypt's continued and varied methods of propaganda are bound to have their effect on the masses and are also bound to weaken the morale of the at present cooperating major- ity which in order to prove that it is a majority, is calling for a plebisite [sic]. But the danger to the Sudan comes not only from Egyptian propaganda but from the potential struggle of World Powers for the control of strategic points. Such a state of affairs if it arises—as it may well do—may force statesmen to ignore, even temporarily, the rights of small nations on the assumption that World peace is at stake. Although we are confident of England's promises and do not believe for a moment that she will betray the Sudan or bargain with Egypt at our expense in case of a third World War, yet we believe at the same time that such a war will at least expose our claim to independence to the danger of postponement. We therefore request that our problem be solved without any further delay and recommend that it be solved on the following basis:— Anyone who reads this note and anyone who sees the plight of the Sudan as a result of this exceptional status would not hesitate to ask for complete Independence; but we realise that such a recommendation must be preceded by other steps which will enable your Excellency to approach the Co-domini and recommend to them the termination of the present situation. We, therefore, venture to put before your Excellency the following recommendations:— (1) The immediate setting up of a Sudanese Cabinet, (2) The declaration of the next elections on the basis of Self-Government to be established immediately after the end of the 3rd Session of the present Assembly— that is before the end of 1951. We realise that Your Excellency as a representative of the Co-Domini must refer to them the question of Self-Government, but we also realise that the setting up of a Sudanese Cabinet is within your powers. We therefore consider that the immediate setting up of a Sudanese Cabinet will have two advantages, namely, (a) it will strengthen the recommendation for Self-Government, and (b) it will allow your Excellency ample time for necessary correspondence and perhaps personal contact. Your Excellency is well aware of the benefits that will acrue [sic] to this country from declaraing [sic] the next elections on the basis of Self-Government. Such declaration will, in our opinion, lessen Egyptian propaganda, will bring the Sudanese together and will consolidate the position of all men of good will. In submitting these recommendations we feel we must explain briefly such points (1) the composition of the Sudanese Cabinet. (2) what is meant by Self-Government. (3) the future as we see it. Here is an attempt to do so:— Composition of a Sudanese Cabinet Your Excellency will probably agree with us that most departments could be converted straight away to Ministries with Sudanese Ministers, but the following points in regard to the composition of the cabinet should be made clear:— (a) British Directors of Departments should have the status of advisers. (b) that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry responsible for Foreign Affairs should have Sudanese Ministers only when technically qualified Sudanese are available for appointment. (c) that this cabinet should have on it representatives for the South and for tribal areas—perhaps without portfolio at the present time. What is meant by self-government We realise that the declaration of Self-Government would neither terminate the present condominium rule, nor would it cause a change in the position of the head of the state but it will no doubt bring the country nearer its final goal—that is self- determination and decision on the form of Government which the citizens of this country may like to choose for themselves. But here we must answer a question which will be in the minds of all who read this document, namely, what would be the fate of the present admirable adminis- tration while the Sudan is achieving Self-Government and later complete indepen- dence? It is unquestionable that the Sudan enjoys at present a very high standard of administration which every wise Sudanese is determined to maintain. We therefore feel it imperative that all British executive officers should remain in their posts until such posts are Sudanised in accordance with the principles laid down in the Sudanisation Scheme and in accordance with existing obligations as regards contracts and pensions. The future The immediate setting up of a Sudanese Cabinet on the lines suggested elsewhere in this notice will, without any shadow of doubt, be backed and supported by almost all the Sudanese and will thus enable both the internal and external affairs of this country to be established on a sound basis. It is this Cabinet which will be able to see the urgent need for the Sudan to make treaties with a powerful nation which will come to its aid in time of peace or war. Conclusion These, in our belief are the minimum recommendations which we can put forward to your Excellency. They have been dictated by our anxiety about the future of our country, by the present anomalous situation and by Egypt's determined efforts to deprive us of a universally accepted right to Self-determination—a fact which has been closely defined in the recent crown speech. We sincerely hope that the realisation of these recommendations will be met by a quick response from Great Britain which has for so long inherited the ideals of freedom, fraternity and equality.