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 Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور (Re: خالد الحاج)
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1. Introduction
"There are too many people killed for no reason.". Refugee man from Darfur interviewed by Amnesty International delegates in Adré, eastern Chad, in November 2003.
While news about a forthcoming peace deal to end the 20 year-long civil war in southern Sudan fill the columns of international media, an invisible, vicious conflict is unfolding in Darfur, western Sudan. Little information comes out of Darfur, isolated, prone to drought and marginalised, not only because the eyes of the international community are turned on the Sudan peace talks in Kenya, but also because insecurity and government restrictions have prevented those seeking information about the extent of an escalating tragedy access to the region
In February 2003, a new armed political group, calling itself the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and composed mainly of members of settled ethnic groups emerged and attacked government troops. While at first the local authorities in Darfur seemed to look for a peaceful solution, at the end of March 2003, the Sudanese government decided to respond to the new armed group by force. On 25 April, the SLA attacked the airport of the city of Al-Fasher, capital of North Darfur state(1), reportedly killing some 70 government soldiers and destroying planes. The SLA declared the attacks were in protest at the perceived failure of the government to protect villagers from attacks by nomadic groups and the underdevelopment and marginalisation of the region. Since then, fighting has plagued the region and another armed political group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), has appeared in Darfur, with demands broadly similar to those of the SLA.
The majority of the casualties in the Darfur war are civilians. The extent of the destruction of lives and livelihoods in Darfur since the conflict started is alarming: within a few months, hundreds, if not thousands of civilians have been killed in deliberate or indiscriminate attacks. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced within the region by the attacks, and some hundred thousand people have taken refuge into Chad.(2) This has resulted in a dire humanitarian situation, which, if meaningful measures are not taken now, can turn into a major disaster. On 9 December, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that he was "alarmed at the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan, and by reports of widespread abuses against civilians, including killings, rape and the burning and #####ng of entire villages". He expressed concern that insecurity was "also severely hampering humanitarian assistance efforts as many of the 1 million civilians affected by the conflict remain[ed] beyond the reach of relief workers". Fighting has intensified since December 2003, creating a new wave of refugees in January 2004. On 23 January, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said that 18,000 more people had reportedly crossed the border into Chad.
In November 2003, Amnesty International delegates travelled to eastern Chad to meet the Sudanese victims of the Darfur conflict who had sought refuge across the border. This document contains some of the findings of Amnesty International's mission to Chad as well as information collected over the pas few months on the conflict. It describes the grave abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law which have been committed against civilians with impunity throughout 2003, by government forces and government-aligned militias in Darfur and the failure of the Sudanese government in protecting the lives of its own civilians.
According to the information available to Amnesty International, the prime responsibility for the grave human rights abuses committed against civilians lies with the Sudanese government and militia aligned to it. The government has bombed indiscriminately civilian towns and villages suspected of harbouring or sympathizing with members of the armed opposition, unlawfully killing many non-combatants. But the main perpetrators of violence against civilians and destruction of civilian objects in Darfur appear to be a militia aligned with and supported by the government army, known as "Arab militia" or the "Janjawid" (armed men on horses). The Janjawid have killed, tortured, arbitrarily arrested or detained civilians while they have burnt to the ground homes and even entire villages, burnt, stolen or destroyed crops and looted cattle. Meanwhile, the armed political groups seem to have failed to take measures to protect civilians such as ensuring that military objectives are not located close to densely populated areas. Civilians have become hostages to the situation in Darfur.
This report makes recommendations which can improve the situation in Darfur and spare further unlawful killings of civilians. In particular, Amnesty International is calling for an immediate and unrestricted humanitarian access to the region and an immediate end to the targeting of civilians by all parties to the conflict in Darfur. It further calls on the Sudanese government to either cease all support and supplies to the Janjawid, or establish a clear chain of command and control over them and make them accountable to international humanitarian law. Amnesty International repeats its calls for human rights monitors to investigate the numerous and large-scale attacks on civilians in Darfur and for the establishment of an international, independent and impartial Commission of Inquiry into the deteriorating human rights situation in Darfur.
Background:
Raids by nomad groups against villages in the rural areas of Darfur are not new. Settled communities of Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa(3) have complained for years about being attacked by nomadic groups, such as the Abala, Zeilat, or Mahamid, which they alleged were supported by the central government. While some attacks may appear to have been triggered by "revenge" motives or competition for grazing areas, the level of killings and destruction in single attacks has been extremely alarming(4).
In Darfur, nomads, semi-nomadic groups and farmers have coexisted for a long time and have had interdependent relations. Nomads are accustomed to moving south in the dry season so as to graze their herds on farmers' lands after crops have been harvested. Local, customary agreements and exchanges between different groups reinforced generally peaceful relationships. Some of the earlier skirmishes over land and travel routes between nomads and farmers seemed to be rooted in the problems of desertification and consequent reduction in grazing areas and increased farming of land.
Broadly-speaking, cultural and ethnic differences between communities, which seem to be more and more manipulated in the current conflict, are fluid. The vast majority of the people in Darfur, nomads or sedentary, are Sunni Muslims. Nomadic groups consist mainly of the Abala, Mahamid, Zeilat, Mahariya, Beni Hussein and the Rizeiqat and Ma'alia further south in Darfur. However many Zaghawa who are now the target of attacks by nomads also have a nomadic lifestyle. At the same time, farming communities other than the Fur and the Masalit, such as the Dajo, Tunjur and Tama, are becoming the target of attacks. Another division often referred to is between those labelled or seeing themselves as "Arabs" and those who are "Black" or "indigenous African". The "Arabs" are composed mainly of nomad groups, who would claim "Arab" descent and speak Arabic and the "Blacks" or "Africans", those who are not of Arab descent and speak their own local language. However, Amnesty International was told several times that the Beni Hussein, seen as "Arabs" are not taking part in the current conflict. The organization also met in Chad members of the Dorok community who said they were attacked by the Arab militia after they refused to join them and refer to themselves as "Black Arabs". In short, differences between groups are becoming more manipulated and entrenched as the conflict worsens.
In Darfur, disputes have traditionally been solved by "tribal" conferences and reconciliation agreements between groups. But disputes and clashes have become more large-scale over the years. In 1989, after violent and large-scale clashes between the Fur and Arab groups, there was a peace conference organised by leaders of the groups involved which temporarily settled the conflict. It received the approval of the new central government of Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who took power following a coup d'état in Khartoum. However further clashes occurred, including large-scale attacks against the Masalit in West Darfur between 1998 and 2001 which led many of them to take refuge across the border into Chad. A local peace agreement was made through the Sultan of the Masalit, and some Masalit returned to Sudan while others stayed in Chad. In 2002, a reconciliation conference was organised by the Sudanese authorities between Arab and non-Arab groups, but it was criticised as flawed and did not lead to a sustainable settlement.
The Darfur region has also been deeply affected by the proliferation of small arms. According to the local authorities in Darfur, small arms have been smuggled from war-torn southern Sudan, Chad, Libya and Central Africa. The presence of arms such as Kalashnikovs, G3 rifles and other guns are reported in Darfur.
There is no doubt that the arming of militia from the Miseriya and Rizeiqat groups, since 1986 by the former Sudanese government of Sadiq al-Mahdi and pursued by the government of Omar Hassan al-Bashir since 1989, to counter the rebellion in southern Sudan has also contributed to the increasing insecurity in Darfur. These militia, called murahilin, appeared to have been given a free rein to raid villages suspected of supporting the southern rebellion, abducting people and #####ng cattle and goods as a reward. Many of those abducted in the region of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal have subsequently been used as domestic workers, field labourers or cattle herders, often for no pay and in slavery-like conditions(5).
Darfur, like other regions in Sudan outside of the centre Khartoum and the rich Al-Gezira region has a history of marginalisation and underdevelopment. Lack of infrastructure and lack of investment into human and physical resources have led many to migrate in search of better prospects in other countries or to Khartoum or the Gezira. The lack of employment opportunities, the proliferation of small arms and the example of militia raiding and #####ng in Kordofan and the south, have encouraged banditry, acts of armed robbery and general insecurity.
In 2001, the Darfur state governors issued a decree establishing a state of emergency in the region, instituting Special Courts to try people convicted of illegal possession or smuggling of weapons, murder and armed robbery. The security forces have, like elsewhere in northern Sudan, sweeping powers of indefinite and arbitrary detention of people and anyone suspected of criticising the government can be jailed without charge for months(6).
Darfur and Amnesty International's work
In January 2003, Amnesty International delegates visited Sudan, including Al-Fasher and Mellit in North Darfur. They discussed the insecurity and attacks against civilians in the region both with representatives of the Fur community and the local authorities. The Fur people claimed that the government was not bringing the perpetrators of killings to justice and, by not doing so, was complicit in what they called "ethnic cleansing" or even "genocide" against their people. When AI delegates put these concerns to local authorities no comments were forthcoming about the perceived failure to bring perpetrators of killings to justice. Instead officials pointed out that dozens of members of the security forces had also been killed in the region. They insisted that the conflict was of tribal nature and the result of desertification and competition for scarce resources and grazing areas by different ethnic groups. They defended the establishment of the Special Courts as a deterrent against those committing murder and armed robbery in the region and said that they were collecting weapons from people in the region. However, the Fur and other settled communities claimed that while the authorities collected their weapons, leaving them with no means of self-defence, the nomadic groups were allowed to keep them.
The so-called deterrent effect of the Special Courts in Darfur did not prevent further armed attacks from occurring. In 2003, attacks and armed robbery against civilian villages increased dramatically. While a few groups of people were brought to trial in Special Courts on charges of murder and armed robbery, these courts, which completely disregard international standards of fairness, failed to establish the truth, justice or redress for the victims of the attacks. On the contrary, reports of torture on those accused of attacks and the lack of proper defence in the trials show the lack of commitment on behalf of the authorities to seriously address the problems in Darfur. On 17 March 2003, 26 members of a nomadic group, including a boy aged 15, were sentenced to death after being convicted of attacking and killing villagers in Singita in Darfur. Their defence lawyers were reportedly allowed to ask no more than four questions to witnesses and some eyewitnesses allegedly said that the real attackers came from another ethnic group. Decision on their appeal is still reportedly pending.
In January 2003, Amnesty International called on the government to resolve the deteriorating situation by respecting human rights and by bringing leaders of different ethnic groups into discussions. In February, it also called on the Sudanese government to establish an independent and impartial Commission of Inquiry into the complex causes for the violence and human rights abuses in Darfur. Such a commission should have free access to all areas, victims and groups in the region and could make recommendations to improve the human rights situation, which should be implemented immediately. The Sudanese government did not respond to this call and in February, the SLA and then the JEM took up arms. In April, Amnesty International called for an international Commission of Inquiry to be set up into the Darfur situation. It also asked for the mandate of the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, an international monitoring force set up to investigate attacks against civilians in southern Sudan, to be extended to Darfur. Independent and impartial investigations into human rights abuses, or the deployment of international observers in Darfur, still have not taken place.
Between June and August 2003, attacks against civilians and displacement increased as well as harassment and arrests of internally displaced persons. Tina(7), which was taken by the SLA at the end of March 2003, was repeatedly and indiscriminately bombed, civilians were killed and others took refuge to Chad. On 5 and 6 August, Kutum was attacked by the Janjawid and civilians were killed in what appeared to be targeted executions. Many inhabitants of Kutum tried to flee to Al-Fasher, some were stopped mid-way in Kafut by the Sudanese army. Villages around Kabkabia town were indiscriminately attacked and burnt, including Shoba again. Those displaced by the attacks arrived en masse in Kabkabia but were harassed by Sudanese soldiers and received no help. Amnesty International called on the Sudanese government to take immediate steps to protect civilians from attacks in Darfur and to allow humanitarian agencies free and secure access to the displaced. Small steps were made by the local authorities and humanitarian agencies were able to access some displaced in some areas. Their assessments revealed a tragic humanitarian situation. However, efforts by relief agencies to reach the displaced, in government or armed political groups-controlled areas or in remote areas such as mountains, were seriously hampered by insecurity and government restrictions on their travel permits.
In September 2003, the Chadian government, neighbour to Sudan and recipient of a huge number of Sudanese refugees from Darfur, announced that they brokered a ceasefire agreement between the SLA and the Sudanese government. The agreement set up a Tripartite Commission with five members of both parties and five Chadian military officials to monitor ceasefire violations. The agreement resulted in an exchange of prisoners between the SLA and the Sudanese government. However, both sides accused each other of violating the cease-fire. The Tripartite Commission was reportedly flying from place to place after reports of fighting or bombings but had wide areas to cover and did not monitor nor report publicly on human rights abuses. Amnesty International continued to receive reports of indiscriminate bombings by the government on civilians, reports of attacks by the JEM forces, which were not part of the cease-fire agreement, and continuous attacks by the Janjawid on civilian villages. The cease-fire was extended until December.
In December, the talks between the Sudan government and the SLA in N'Djamena, Chad, broke down. The Sudanese government rejected the demands of the SLA as too high while the SLA claimed that they were asked to leave N'Djamena by the Chadian mediators before exposing their demands.
Since the collapse of the talks, fighting between government troops and the armed opposition has intensified, reportedly in Abu Gamra and Kulbus between December and January. So have further reports of deliberate and deadly attacks on civilians, including in West Darfur, around Al-Jeneina and around Zalingei. Meanwhile, a further 30,000 refugees are reported to have crossed the border into Chad in December and another 18,000 in January 2004.
Responses by the Sudanese government to the deteriorating situation in Darfur have been ambiguous. The Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir was reported to have said that he would crush the rebellion militarily( . Other representatives of the Sudanese government have recognized the political nature of the conflict in Darfur(9) and by this indicated that repression was not a solution.
At first, the SLA professed it would only fight government targets and not the very nomad groups said to be responsible for attacking farmers, in order to avoid a "tribalization" of the conflict. The armed opposition, and in particular the JEM, seems to have now resolved to engage directly in battles with the Janjawid. The rhetoric used by the Janjawid as reported by refugees to Amnesty International shows that the conflict is rapidly taking on a racial note. The attackers portray themselves as "Arabs", the civilians being attacked are called "Blacks" or even "slaves". At the same time, the Zaghawa and the Fur claim that these are attempts to drive all "Africans" away from Darfur.
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| العنوان |
الكاتب |
Date |
| تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 12:56 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 01:00 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 01:07 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 01:15 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 01:28 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 01:50 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 01:58 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 02:41 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 03:07 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 03:16 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-04-04, 05:04 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | خالد الحاج | 02-04-04, 05:17 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | خالد الحاج | 02-04-04, 10:19 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | خالد الحاج | 02-04-04, 10:21 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | خالد الحاج | 02-04-04, 10:24 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | خالد الحاج | 02-04-04, 10:26 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | خالد الحاج | 02-04-04, 10:33 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | خالد الحاج | 02-04-04, 10:37 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | خالد الحاج | 02-04-04, 10:39 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-05-04, 09:48 AM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-05-04, 01:13 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-05-04, 01:23 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-05-04, 03:01 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | nahar osman nahar | 02-05-04, 05:22 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-05-04, 07:00 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | خالد الحاج | 02-05-04, 07:05 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-05-04, 07:17 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | خالد الحاج | 02-05-04, 08:05 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-05-04, 08:44 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-06-04, 03:18 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-06-04, 04:07 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-06-04, 04:13 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-06-04, 04:34 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-06-04, 04:35 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-07-04, 12:17 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-07-04, 12:21 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-09-04, 03:43 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-09-04, 03:50 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-27-04, 02:03 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-27-04, 02:11 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 02-29-04, 03:07 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-06-04, 11:59 AM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-06-04, 12:15 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-06-04, 05:09 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-06-04, 05:16 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-06-04, 05:26 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-06-04, 05:45 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-06-04, 06:15 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-06-04, 06:25 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-07-04, 02:34 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-07-04, 02:37 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-07-04, 02:51 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-07-04, 02:55 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-07-04, 02:57 PM |
| Re: تحرير الكتاب التوثيقي لثورة دارفور | فتحي البحيري | 03-07-04, 03:00 PM |
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