قراءة في كتاب الخاتم.... بقلم د. محجوب التجاني

Quote: Book Review - Al-Khatim ‘Adlan’s Ma al-Manfa? Wa Ma howa al-Watan? (6) Mahgoub El-Tigani December 26, 2006 Continued unresolved disputes with Hassan Turabi and the Brotherhood Khatim ‘Adlan held that the Communist Party “respects the religious beliefs of the masses by party constitution. A great many communists were made to account for insults to the peoples’ beliefs. I believe this stipulation is completely positive. We were all committed to it. The political community in which we enjoyed a long age never testified to insults from our part to any religion or belief. My [critique] is true, nonetheless, when al-Turabi, for example, exploits religion to mislead the laymen for worldly gain,” (p. 256). The negligence of rural populations, however, continues to act as an inhibiting factor to the secularist plans to modernize the country. Lately, ‘Adlan addressed the issue of religion in his al-Wasatiya ideas [not included in al-Manfa] that aimed to accommodate religion as a tool of political enlightenment, not an instrument of political power. In another interview with Akhbar al-Yoam, ‘Adlan said, “As a social thinker… I know that I cannot remove the influence of religion or the role that religion plays as a huge moral incentive in the life of people or the life of society. All I am saying is that when people practice worshipping, or social civil transactions, or deal with issues of conscience, honesty, and piety, they would then move on as pious people” (p. 255). “But when the issue [of religious practices] moves from social programs to political programs and to political disputes, people will then become normal social actors who might be inspired by their religious values. This inspiration cannot bestow on them a sacred status… I have been calling on a complete role for religion to play in the matters of consciousness and the elevation of ethics to new levels; empathy, forgiveness, and love. All is required; and all is applicable... To abuse religion, however, as an umbrella to exploit people or to justify suppressing, killing, mutilating, or battering people has nothing to do with religion,” emphasized ‘Adlan (p. 256). Earlier in the 1950s and the aftermath, ‘Abd al-Khaliq Mahgoub paid condensed attention to the Muslim Brotherhood’s dangerous aspirations to uproot the indigenous structures of Sudan and the neighboring nations by anti-democratic religious indoctrinations. The communist leader scrutinized the Brotherhood's ill-planning, and unmasked its terrorist content with deep, decent, and critical thought (see his Afkar hawla al-Akhwan al-Muslimeen). ‘Abd al-Khaliq saw through his critical insights the Brotherhood ideas as a potential evil, a fast-growing cancer to monopolize power and wealth by violent seizure of State powers. The visionary thinker stepped forward in his known “Juraa’ Filriya” to battle the Brotherhood plans in their infancy at the time the Umma, DUP, and other political players watched the avaricious “cancer of the Akhwan" silently or, worst than that, supported the Brotherhood political Islam against all secular and liberal activities. It wasn’t until the occurrence of the 1989’s Turabi/Bashir NIF Jihadist seizure of power in close collaboration with the Sudanese, regional, and international Brotherhoods (followed by the aftermath atrocities of the ruling NIF and its allies in Sudan and other nations) that the Sudanese political communities and the International Community began to realize the validity of ‘Abd al-Khaliq thoughtful predictions since the early 1950s on the disorderly plots of the Brotherhood’s politics. In harmony with his critical thinking and liberal principles, al-Khatim (pp. 139-146) negated the political fatawi of both Sayed Qutb and Hassan al-Turabi that condemned the separation between religion and politics and promised all people rejecting their ideas with a burning hell. Here ‘Adlan affirmed that “Our principal disagreement with Turabi is that he converts the fundamental right of political freedom to a wasteful ideological debate that never will unify people,” (p. 144). Even with religious citations that clearly indicate the wrongful emulation of specific situations in the history of Muslim societies, one wonders who of the Sudanese would ever again trust such fatawi with the injustices they wrongfully generate. The Holy Qur’an orders the believers to think before they act, lest they become "like a donkey, which carries books" without knowing what they are. That is why ‘Abd al-Khaliq stressed in Afkar hawla Al-Akhwan Al-Muslimeen the fact that “God want His servants [believers] to learn, think, and reason what they do before they decide or act.” For the vast majority of a billion or more non-Brotherhood Muslims throughout the world, the crisis of the Brotherhood fatawi, including Ben Laden and al-Zawahri war threats to destroy the West on behalf of their self-imposed Islamic ‘Umma, is indeed horrendous. In Sudan , the fatawi examples included a fatwa by the so-called El-Obied ‘Ulama that supported in the early 1990s the NIF governor Sayed Al-Hussaini to massacre hundreds of the Nuba people in Southern Kordofan because they refused to subscribe to his political Islam. By the ‘Ulama blood-thirsty fatawi, the NIF government-incited and escalated wars in the regions of Sudan, demolishing agricultural crops and destroying the churches of the Nuba Mountains and the South, as well as the al-Khalawi [schools of Islamic learning] of Hamashkoraib in Eastern Sudan. True, the rebel groups committed, on their turn, serious human rights violations in the war zones (see detailed reports by Human Rights Watch). None of these warring groups, however, committed such atrocities as the NIF rulers did by the ‘Ulama war fatawi. Moreover, the SPLM/SPLA responded positively to human rights’ pressures to release many captives of war and to mend up by the churches’ mediation war hostilities among their own peoples. The NIF never did Book Review - Al-Khatim ‘Adlan’s Ma al-Manfa? Wa Ma howa al-Watan? (7) Mahgoub El-Tigani December 26, 2006 Still, continued unresolved disputes with Turabi and the Brotherhood Guided by irrelevant medieval fatawi on the Sudanese society and social life, the NIF indoctrinating racism went as far as killing or torturing citizens in cold blood all over the country in an unprecedented reign of terror. Led by Turabi fatwi, the NIF sought to strengthen Arab Islamist domination with promises of a granted paradise to the killers of the innocent Southerners and the innocent Darfurians. The massacres of peaceful protestors in Port Sudan and the Nile Province comprised a stretch over of the notorious Jihad fatawi. Ironically, the recurring fatawi of the early 2000s by ‘Ulama al-Sudan, a government paid jurist body, would condemn those of Turabi on inter-faith marriages followed by a traumatic ‘Ulama fatwa to murder all Sudanese thinkers, including Turabi, his supporters, and the opposition intellectuals if they ever dare to criticize the al-Bashir ruling Brotherhood! These intra-conflicts, nonetheless, moved no eyebrows: “Beggars cannot be choosers.” And ‘Adlan would firmly distrust the Turabi thought, whether in unison or in divorce from Brotherhoods (see pp. 127-135). The Brotherhood disciples of Turabi, namely al-Bashir and ‘Ali Osman, learned the lessons their “admirable” leader had earlier inculcated unto their souls over long years of treacherous plotting to frustrate the Nation’s yearning to a lasting peace and democratic rule. First, the “insincere disciples” used the aging Sheikh to usurp the political power. Second, they removed him from authority. Subsequently, they implemented effectively his authoritative tactics, abusing as well the so-called ‘Ulama to destroy his political influence and all possible foes. These wicked strategies and others are typical methods of the well-recorded terrorist strivings of the Umayyad-Abbasid middle-ages Caliphates that the Brotherhoods superimposed with extra-violence in the opening decades of the 21st century upon our society and state, as well as struggling with unrelenting armed conflicts to establish similar Taliban Sultanates in the other largely Muslim communities of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Understanding Islam is not solely based on the fatawi or any scholarly opinions by a monopolizing stratum of jurists, as erroneously disseminated in the media by Islamist ideologues in the absence of enlightening thought. The issue is much deeper. It is the knowledgeable, conscientious mind of every single Muslim that finally counts. True, there might be a need for a fatwa on a personal matter in accordance with faith. But all issues of the political life that touch upon the interests of citizens, irrespective of faith, race, or status must be indiscriminately guaranteed. In an eloquent critique of ‘Abdullahi ‘Ali Ibrahim’s claim that ‘Abd al-Khaliq “supported the idea of an Islamic Constitution in Sudan ,” ‘Adlan strongly affirmed: “Mahgoub launched with great intellectual integrity a merciless critique of the al-Akhwan al-Muslimeen [Muslim Brotherhood] ideas… ‘Abd al-Khaliq never was a preacher of the Islamic Constitution in any moment of his life… He was a strong foe, as well as a deeply knowledgeable discussant against that Constitution and its State…” “‘Abd al-Khaliq stands were well-known. His parliamentary interferences from inside the Constituent Assembly were well-documented in the protracted battle against the Islamic Constitution… How could ‘Abd al-Khaliq be a preacher of socialism, justice, secularism, and communism if his dreams would virtually end at the entrance of a religious state?” (pp. 76-79). Book Review - Al-Khatim ‘Adlan’s Ma al-Manfa? Wa Ma howa al-Watan? (8) Mahgoub El-Tigani December 27, 2006 Still, continued unresolved disputes with Turabi and the Brotherhood The Sufi Islam of Sudan, as exercised by a plethora of religious turuq [sects], resembles the popular version of the Islamic religion the bulk of Sudanese Muslims adopted since the advent of Islam in the country. There are a few historical records, however, that documented the origins of Sufi Islam in Sudan , notably the Tabaqat by Mohamed Wad Daif-Allah. Many Sudanist and Islamist scholars believe that the forgiveness and peaceful co-existence of al-Sufiya in the Sudan had been deeply influenced by the flexibility of Islam, which incorporated nice spiritualities of the monotheist religions, especially Christianity, and the African ancient religions and cultural beliefs. Unlike the rigid, dogmatic, and culturally-biased Muslim Brotherhoods’ political Islam, the Sudanese Sufiya antagonized the foreign doctrines of the Brotherhood with everlasting hostilities. Regardless of political collaboration between the NIF, the Umma and the DUP Sufi-based political groups in different periods, the 17-year Brotherhood repressive rule alienated the bulk of Sudanese Muslims and their Sufi groups, including the Khatmiya and the Ansar, by the Jihad wars, State corruption, and almost complete destruction of the country’s sovereignty and international relations via the miscalculated alliances of the NIF rulers with Ben Laden, his Qaeda, and the other sections of the International Brotherhood Movement. Ma al-Manfa contains some of strongest criticisms of the thought and political activities of Hassan al-Turabi and ‘Abd al-Wahab El-Effendi (pp. 125-176), as well as sharp disagreements with the writings of Alex de Wall et al on the Islamic movements of the Nile Valley and the Horn of Africa (pp. 333-342). Since his early political career, al-Khatim ‘Adlan’s humanism, political awareness, and commitment to human rights and civil freedoms motivated him to launch persistent campaigns in hundreds of public forums at the University of Khartoum, public meetings, and political forums in defiance of the Brotherhood ideological and political ills. ‘Adlan critique of al-Turabi and El-Effendi, his close disciple and academic spokesperson, exemplified the irreconcilable position of ‘Adlan with political Islam. ‘Adlan stressed, for example, the fact that “al-Turabi was not able to defend his practices in the [dictatorial] times of Nimeiri, or even after the overthrow of his regime, regardless of the Turabi’s possession of 5 daily papers that almost controlled the available media space with lies and fraudulent allegations against all political parties” (p. 164). Rejecting further El-Effendi’s attempt to justify al-Turabi’s practices, ‘Adlan emphasized al-Turabi atrocities “are indefensible: how can storage of millet, the people’s diet, be justified when the vast majority of people are famine-stricken? How would accumulation of wealth be defended while the vast majority of people are crushed by want? How can suppressive Emergency Laws be applied in the name of the venerated Prophet? How would the Turabi Bayaa’ [political allegiance] of Nimeiri, as Imam of the Muslims, be defended?” (p. 164). In his critique of Alex de Wall and ‘Abd al-Salam Hassan analysis of the Islamic Movements in the Nile Valley and the Horn of Africa, al-Khatim said, “The two writers assumed that al-Turabi is ‘a religious revivalist; possibly a liberal and… a unique Islamic thinker, according to El-Efffendi assertions’” (p. 338). ‘Adlan, however, was unhappy with “the method Alex de Wall and Hassan adopted to evaluate Hassan al-Turabi as a liberal leader because their method was greatly lenient” (p. 340). Moreover, “the testimonies published in de Wall’s book negate at full length al-Turabi’s liberalism… [because] he participated in two military coups; was an indoctrinator of the bloodiest war in the history of Sudan versus the SPLM…; and a supporter of the Shari’a rules of the Nimeiri rule, despite the poverty of their texts and the [extra-judicial] execution of Mahmoud Mohamed Taha” (pp. 338-340). Khatim ‘Adlan resolved in a decisive conclusion: “The contemporary political and ideological literature has already begun to adopt democracy, transparency, integrity, and human rights. [To assure readers], contemporary politics has surpassed the practices that belong to the Ages of the Inhitat [decay], being the political and ideological thought that Turabi supports” (p.165). Book Review - Al-Khatim ‘Adlan’s Ma al-Manfa? Wa Ma howa al-Watan? (9) Mahgoub El-Tigani December 27, 2006 John Garang, National Unity, and a New Sudan : A word on media campaigns Al-Khatim ‘Adlan’s strong support to the SPLM/a determination to fight the NIF offensive regime subjected him to a wave of criticisms and media scandals that aimed to destroy his intellectual image and the political autonomy and moral integrity of his group so much as they aimed to weaken the SPLM/A in political and ideological terms. The Arab-speaking hate groups International Brotherhood media specialists, highly-paid English-speaking Sudanese-European Relations Council media mercenaries, and a flock of NIF “opportunists” and “hypocrites” worked hand in hand to undermine the poor media activities of a Movement forced to busy itself from 1989 up to the early 2000s with the life-or-death tasks of survival in territories daily bombarded by the China oil-financed air force and the other Russian tanks and lethal weaponry of the Government of Sudan (GOS) armies, in addition to workaday defense duties to repulse the savage government militia attacks on the innocent citizens of the South (the same acts of genocide have been largely replicated in Darfur by the Brotherhood ruling regime). By the early 1990s, following the national mourning of the auspicious Sudanese Peace Agreement (1988) that fell short of a final approval by the elected government of Sudan due to the June 89’s military coup, the premeditated Brotherhood’s unprincipled War of Genocide and the GOS treacherous war-aimed “peace” negotiations by the NIF rulers forced the SPLM/A leader to appeal directly in a most touching humanitarian address to the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the International Community to stop the 50 years or so destruction of South Sudan by governments of the North, especially the Brotherhood ruthless dehumanizing war mongering ideologues, army commanders, and their militias’ war lords. It is true that the People of Sudan and the International Community appealed consistently to the warring parties to end the war as a disastrous activity with a lasting just peace. The Brotherhood media campaigns, however, failed to persuade readers to equate the motives and objectives of the two wars, or to beautify the GOS globally condemned War of Genocide versus the SPLM/A indigenous War of Defense. John Garang message was crystal true to the NIF war mongers: “to make peace, you must stop all transgression.” Until they were pressed to make peace by the international treaty-body, the NIF transgressors were used to reply arrogantly: “to make peace, you must first surrender!” Unlike many politically blinded amateur critics of the ongoing war politics, Al-Khatim ‘Adlan, the experienced war and peace critic, would never fail to see the realities of the war-peace relations between the offensive killers of Sudan and the defensive forces of South Sudan: “We will not need to tell you [John Garang] about the deception, tricks, and treachery of your partners in the [peace] agreement; you know them more than we do” (p. 193). There are many journalists (for example, Mahgoub Mohamed Salih and Mahgoub Osman of the Al-Ayyam Journal and Nuraddin Medani of al-Sahaffa Journal), as well as the southerner scholars who criticized firmly the shortcomings of the Movement, including mischievous behavior by SPLA top leaderships or regular soldiers in good understanding of the need to encourage human rights reforms, rather than emphasizing only the negativities of the Movement. Differently from the SPLM/A critics (who pursued every possible campaign in the Press and/or utilized every inch in the Media Space to ridicule the SPLM/SPLA and to destroy the image of its leaderships, in name, with a special emphasis on John Garang de Mabior, compared to a few generalized mention of the NIF genocists), the black-and-white principled ‘Adlan would emphasize in the clearest words possible: “the governments [Garang fought] were not interested in peace; it suffices to mention the present-time government whose top priority, when it assumed political power, was to end the problem of “rebellion” in six months” (p. 351). Focusing on the early 1990s performance of the Movement, Peter Nyaba, himself a SPLM leader, criticized the SPLM/A political and administrative conditions that contributed to the 1991 split in his book The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan : An Insider’s View (1997). In review of this work, Laura Nyantung Beny affirmed Nyaba was “very critical of both the ideological and methodological shortcomings of the Movement. The SPLM/A leadership was virtually unaccountable for its mistakes and abuses of power, a culture of fear having developed around it” (South Sudan Review: vol. 1, Issue 4, March 03). Unlike the media mercenaries or the amateur critics, Beny (2003) affirmed the Nyaba criticisms of the Movement in the early 1990s adding these important policy-oriented questions: “Now that several years have passed since the book’s publication, we should ask… What specific measures have been taken to strengthen civil society and the respect for human rights by the SPLM/A? How successful have such measures been? How can southerners overcome the powerful internal and external forces of disunity for the sake of a common aim? How might southerners as a group hold individual leaders politically accountable to the South for self-centered behavior that continues to impose deep and lasting harm on the entire community?” The CPA regrettably avoided clear stipulation of prosecuting all individuals accused of committing human rights violations in the years of “hostilities.” It is not possible, however, to shut the doors of judicial prosecution at the face of victims in the present time: now governing the Government of National Unity (GONU) and the GOSS, the CPA Interim Constitution allows possible legal prosecution of all violators of human rights by law. The Brotherhood-controlled government of the North, which regrettably gained an upper-hand status over all of the Sudanese democratic political forces by the Naivasha exclusionary negotiations, must be placed under the strongest pressure possible to comply with the CPA Interim Constitution. Equally importantly, the GOSS should be strongly urged to utilize all its political legitimacy and Authority to come to terms with all southerner peoples to advance the Cause of peace and development in the South. Book Review - Al-Khatim ‘Adlan’s Ma al-Manfa? Wa Ma howa al-Watan? (10) Mahgoub El-Tigani December 26, 2006 “My Dear Brother Garang, the political valleys of Sudan are pregnant with mines” John Garang statements to the People of Sudan after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in addition to previous pledges before and after the CPA by Salva Kiir, Pagan Amum, Yasir Arman, and other SPLM leaders testified to the Movement’s serious intention to abide-by the Interim Constitution of Sudan, which confers strong obligations upon the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan to rule in accordance with human rights norms. Up to this point, the actual application of the CPA provisions by the competent authorities indicates that the State commitment to the CPA is very poor. Let us recall, for example, the most recent massacres of innocent citizens by the armed groups of the two governments in Malakal, which reminds us with ‘Adlan’s deep concerns about the NIF post-Naivasha plans in South Sudan . This is a situation for which a principled campaign is persistently needed to press on the CPA governments to implement the constitutional provisions on the civil freedoms and human rights as a top priority, to the maximum degree possible, with a view to expand international human rights norms in all spheres of Authority and the Civil Society. To help the country achieving this goal, a national conference is urgently required for both government and opposition forces to guarantee national participation in the CPA implementation. Responding to another insider’s view on the SPLM/A by Lam Akol, al-Khatim noted that “Lam Akol’s handling [in his book] of the SPLM should be tackled with intensive caution. Akol had not only abandoned the Movement; but he joined the government…, became a minister, a wage-earner, and a friend of the “heartless” rulers, as he depicted in his book” (p. 346). Recalling the strong armed resistance of the Brotherhood terrorist rule by the SPLM/SPLA troops, the HAQ Chairperson expressed his deep respect and admiration to the Leader of the SPLM/SPLA, John Garang de Mabior, in a letter addressed to him after the signing ceremony of the Machekos Protocols in July 2003: “My dear brother, HAQ has continuously expressed unwavering solidarity with the SPLM/SPLA heroic struggles to establish a New Sudan based on equality, democracy, progression, and social justice… With the approval of the Machekos Protocol… the peoples of South Sudan and the marginalized regions have made a historical achievement after which Sudan will never become as it once was, as you eloquently said in the signing of the protocol” (p. 189). “We are certain the signing of the agreements is the first step in the path of peace, justice, and democracy. Although the peace agreement is a partnership between the SPLM/SPLA and the Government of Sudan, the role to be played by the SPLM/SPLA in the sustenance and advancement of the agreements to accomplish their ultimate goals is incomparable with the role and interests of the National Islamic Front” (p. 190). Khatim ‘Adlan then mentioned “some of the challenges that the march [of peace] has to face out with exceptional leadership abilities that you have consistently mastered.” The challenges included: 1) Disseminating the agreements by the indigenous languages of people; and 2) exerting real efforts to gain full support of the non-participant parties by a national conference that shouldn’t be led by the National Democratic Alliance.” This latter statement reminds us with Nyaba resentment of the SPLM/A partnership with the NDA “fragile alliance that southerners should not place too much hope in the sincerity of the northern opposition.” It is indeed important for the South to consolidate its own unity via South-South peaceful and democratic consensus. In the light of the ongoing steeping failures of implementing the SPLM/A peace agreement with the NIF ruling regime, however, this writer contends that the continuity of the agreement hinges on a real strong alliance between the northern opposition, both the NDA and the Umma Party, with the SPLM/A versus the NIF Congress Party rather than any unilateral or bilateral agreements. Addressing himself to the SPLM/A leadership, ‘Adlan stressed furthermore these strategies: “… 3) unifying the New Sudan forces into a national consolidated body, as a top priority; 4) conducting a broad discussion among all Sudanese professionals and intellectuals to support the country and the marginal areas in collaboration with the SPLM; 5) undertaking close cooperation between HAQ and the SPLM; and 6) establishing a unified alliance to frustrate the deception and treachery of the SPLM “estranged partners” (p. 193). Finally, Mohamed al-Khatim asserted to his dear brother John the fact that “Our country entered by your struggles a new era of peace and reconciliation. Democratic rule, social justice, the respect of human rights and the recognition of diversity become possible targets of implementation for the first time… Still, the road is rife with challenges; the political valleys of Sudan are pregnant with mines” (p. 194). ‘Adlan, however, criticized the bilateral partnership of the peace agreements. He was aware “the regional and international powers recognized the fact that who makes war, makes peace. That is why they negotiated with the government and the SPLM. In other words, involving the others in the peace negotiations might complicate the problem or renders impossible the agreement itself…” (p. 266). “The political parties should put the blame on their own inefficiency… They should take advantage of the general democratic climate to mobilize people, deepen democracy, and be prepared for a real democracy based on free national elections… the NDA is gone… What is to be done if we want a real democracy is that each party must disseminate democracy into its own body and reconstruct party programs to renew its life” (p. 266). Would they?! ‘Adlan was gravely opposed to the NDA because he was affirmatively certain that the NDA failed to live up to the public obligations and the fundamentalist commitments of which toppling the NIF dictatorship and restoring democratic rule constituted the top agenda. Moreover, the NDA rejected the membership of HAQ for partisan reasons (pp. 218-19). In his opinion, the al-Merghani-Taha agreement (Jeddah: 4 December 2005) was a real NDA failure “reflected in the disproportionate withdrawals of the NDA’s principles… al-Merghani claimed he had been delegated by the NDA partners to finalize agreements with the ruling regime. This claim was protested by some of the NDA partners who believed al-Merghani representation was delegated only to his DUP… al-Merghani acceptance of the NIF partisan army and security forces, without any reservations, made the heaviest loss” (pp. 208-9). We will return to the NDA in Commentary 13, our concluding notes on the book. Book Review - Al-Khatim ‘Adlan’s Ma al-Manfa? Wa Ma howa al-Watan? (11) Mahgoub El-Tigani December 26, 2006 Why is Sadiq al-Mahdi silent about serious accusations? Al-Manfa included important commentaries by al-Khatim ‘Adlan on the political conflict between Sadiq al-Mahdi, the prominent leader of the Umma Party, and his deputy Mubarak al-Fadil, the former secretary general of the National Democratic Alliance, who - following a party dispute with the Umma leadership - was also dismissed from his own party. Mubarak then announced the establishment of another Umma group with which he became part of the NIF ruling regime. A little while before the dispute, Mubarak El-Fadil accused Sadiq al-Mahdi of “running the Umma affairs by oligarchy and sectarian arrogance over blind loyalties of some laymen” Also, he accused the Umma Leader of “humiliating the opponents and corrupting the party resources by nepotism and briberies” (pp. 287-88). Here, ‘Adlan thought that the silence of al-Mahdi about these serious accusations “would be considered defaulting defense or admission of the alleged allegations” (p. 288). ‘Adlan believed that “the accusations seemed to be true to a great extent: Mubarak, for instance, mentioned that a conflict had earlier erupted in the party with respect to a report prepared [about the party] by ‘Abd al-Rahman Nugd-Alah, a distinguished leader of the party, and signed by 40 party leaders and many cadres. Despite of the fact that al-Mahdi talked many times about the report, he did not approve it” (p. 288). “The political past of Sadiq al-Mahdi testified to the occurrences of personal preferences, instead of party decisions: “In 1988, the Umma-DUP coalition government reached an impasse. Assuming that the NIF had chosen to co-exist with the country’s liberal democracy, al-Mahdi did not hesitate to party with the NIF in a new coalition. Notwithstanding, the NIF was strongly determined to destroy the coalition (p. 132). As alleged, Sadiq established the coalition government notwithstanding the collective rejection of Umma leaders and membership” (p. 289). ‘Adlan informed that “Sadiq al-Mahdi was already aware of the NIF military coup. As a Prime Minister he was expected to fail the coup, which he failed to do. I had personally asked al-Sadiq about his awareness of the coup: He wasn’t able to deny it; nor was he able to negate his inability to foil it. Perhaps he wasn’t sure enough to stay with the sister ideologues, who wanted to overthrow his democratic government, or to carry on with the secular opponents who upheld democracy and were satisfied with his premiership with a view to weaken his political foundation. It was inevitable: the Sadiq’s Hamlet situation produced all those tragedies that hurt the whole country…” (p. 289). In his black-and-white politics and ethical fairness, ‘Adlan concluded in these statements: “We wouldn’t be respectful of ourselves, or leaderships, or Homeland if such heavy allegations would be surpassed in silence. The negligence of such issues while still talking about democracy and institutional activities is nothing but sickness… Sadiq would not be salvaged from this dilemma and his great embarrassment without an honest confrontation…” (p. 290). On the other side, “what Mubarak al-Mahdi reiterated about the attempts to reform the Umma Party, irrespective of al-Sadiq resistance, and the strong appetite to enforce the reforms should’ve moved Mubarak to devote all his time for the process of reformation. This process must be based on the self-critiquing of Mubarak practices in the [third] democracy; such reforms might elevate the Umma to a new secular, non-sectarian horizon” (p. 291). “Mubarak El-Fadil al-Mahdi, however, has not chosen this path. Instead, he made a disastrous mix-up between the party reforms on one hand, and his membership of a totalitarian Authority in both foundation and orientation in the other. The Authority he joined accepts allies only as beggars. It comes closer to the allies only to destroy them. Mubarak political competencies are known to all those who worked with him. But competencies must take party with wisdom; a party that most regrettably hasn’t materialized” (p. 291). Khatim did not mention the popular facts that Mubarak El-Fadil, the former minister of interior in al-Mahdi’s democratically elected government (1986-89) was first entrusted with the ministry of industries. In less than a year, his performance led to a series of wasteful confrontations in the country’s trade with Egypt, in addition to allegations of corruption politically prosecuted against Mubarak but Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi protected his minister from their legal prosecution. Mubarak was then entrusted with the top security tasks of preserving the country’s democracy as a minister of interior and a member of the National Defense Council. He, not only the prime minister, should’ve taken the necessary measures to foil the coup, or at least to resist it. The “competencies” of the former minister of interior, however, enabled him to escape the country in a great hurry, just a few hours before the NIF elements closed the port. In his term of office as minister of interior affairs, Mubarak collaborated with the NIF opposition to mount hostilities against key national democratic activities by the Sudanese intellectuals and democrats that aimed timely to prepare the country for a lasting peace with the SPLM/SPLA. Two politicians, in particular, launched severe attacks in the Constituent Assembly and the Press against the university faculty and the unions’ peace advocates who conducted serious talks with the SPLM/SPLA at the Ambo Forum in Ethiopia . The two aggressive opponents who accused flatly the Ambo decent participants of high treason and urged the Constituent Assembly to put them on trial were Mubarak El-Fadil, the minister of interior, and ‘Ali Osman Taha, then NIF parliamentary leader. There is much to say, however, about the “political in-competency” of both leaders.