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 Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future (Re: abubakr)
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السيناريو (1) ...
حيث ان التقرير صدر قبل الانتخابات فالمعايير والتوقعات التي بني علي اساسها افتراض هذا السيناريو تغيرت لدرجة ما ,,,
السيناريو : العودة الي احرب ( بني التقرير علي احتمال اكتساح للمؤتمر الوطني لللانتخابات وفشل للحركة في الانتخابات وانقسامات في الجنوب واعلان الجنوب انفصالا من طرف واحد لم يقبله المؤتم وهكذا العودة الي الحرب )
The Last War Revisited? (War – United)
A Sudanese future history 2009–2012
Relations between the NCP and the SPLM started to further deteriorate in 2009 over, among other issues, the results of the census and the ruling of the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal. President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), Salva Kiir Mayardit, at the time ruled out a return to war, but warned that some were seeking the demise of the CPA agreement. He stated repeatedly that the South was ready for war. At the same time, tribal conflicts in the South flared up further. According to the SPLM, these were instigated by the North. In addition to this insecure situation, foreign investment was deterred by rampant corruption and a lack of the rule of law. The response to the Abyei question, other contested areas and the election strategy divided the SPLM internally between separatists and unionists. Salva Kiir only just managed to keep the party together by not publicly making a choice between either of them. The SPLM also struggled to explain to the general public that economic development could not happen at once. Many argued that the SPLM government was incapable and corrupt, and said that in the future it would not be able to provide the population with services. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) became increasingly disorganised.
The elections in the North were won by the National Congress Party (NCP). In the South, internal divisions meant the SPLM did not win the landslide victory it expected. Parties radically in favour of independence gained ground. This further deteriorated relations between the North and the South and both sides began to make more and more threats to return to war. The border demarcation between the North and the South remained a bone of contention. In May 2010, Southern militias claimed the Heglig oil field as part of Abyei and therefore Southern territory, and insisted it would remain so forever. They clashed with nearby Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Although these clashes were initially small-scale, due to the tense situation they sparked wider clashes. The SPLA came to support the Southern militias and crossed over into what the North considered its own territory. SAF units stationed further away intervened in what they said was a clear violation of the CPA and the Tribunal ruling.
Within less than two weeks, the Abyei situation deteriorated into open clashes between the SAF and SPLA. This in turn further escalated the political and tribal power struggle in the South. Salva Kiir was forced to step down as he was deemed too weak and not outspoken enough in favour of independence. A faction of the SPLM came into power which was in favour of a clear and open policy for immediate independence. The new leadership in the
South argued that the CPA was dead and declared Southern Sudan unilaterally independent. According to them, the North had proven it could not be trusted and would never be willing to let the South secede peacefully. In operation ‘Square One’, all forces representing the North in the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) in the South were attacked in an attempt to force them to leave. In addition, the SPLA tried to obtain better positions in the disputed areas and around the border, arguing that the South knew where the border was and was only taking land that belongs to the South.
The strategy of operation ‘Square One’ did not, however, go according to plan. The SPLA met fierce military resistance from the North. Also, the ‘Northern’ forces in the JIUs managed to get away and became some of the many ‘other armed groups’ in the South. In the international arena there was little support for the Southern decision. Only the United States accepted and supported the SPLM, although Washington said it regretted the use of violence. It argued that the CPA gave the South its right to self-determination, and that in the present situation a proper referendum was not possible. Washington argued that Khartoum had lost its right to have a say in the internal affairs of Southern Sudan.
On the other hand, Khartoum’s argument was that, because a proper referendum was not possible, the South could not secede. The UN Security Council was divided over the issue. Russia and China called the unilateral Southern declaration of independence an illegal act and called for an arms embargo of the South. France was also opposed, but the United Kingdom was more willing to side with the United States. The African Union unanimously deplored the Southern actions, arguing that they were in contravention of both international law and the Charter of the African Union. None of its member states would recognise the new state. Egypt fiercely opposed Southern independence, seeing it as a potential obstacle to the free flow of the Nile. Even Kenya and Uganda did not support Juba. In addition, a number of Southern politicians took up arms against Juba, as they had a lot to lose in Khartoum.
Sudan in this scenario in 2012
In 2012, the war between the North and the South is both similar to and different from the previous war. This time the SAF has no strongholds or garrison towns in the South but, as before, the North fights the war through proxies and local militias. The NCP attempts to use the lack of unity in the South and divisions in the SPLM/A to divide and rule. The SAF has close ties with the militia that were once part of the JIUs. Moreover, it supports other militias – the former ‘other armed groups’ and renegade SPLA groups. These groups control a number of areas throughout the South, receive aerial support, and are supplied at the border and by air as they control some local airstrips. These locations are some of the conflict hotbeds. Also, the Northern air force manages to bombard Juba every once in a while. The SPLA has collapsed and reduced to its pre-CPA size as some of the militias that were integrated into it have decided to go their own separate ways. However, parts of it are better equipped and trained due to the recent modernisation process, so it is better able to take on smaller conventional battles. In addition, Khartoum aids the Lords Resistance Army to terrorise Equatoria. The SPLM follows a similar strategy in the North by supporting the Darfuri rebels, and movements in the far north and east.
In the North, the NCP government remains firmly in power in Khartoum. The 1,500 SPLA soldiers of the Khartoum Brigade, which were stationed in Khartoum as a result of the CPA, are violently disarmed in what comes to be known as the Khartoum massacre. Conflicts in the
far north and east have resumed and Khartoum harshly represses all social unrest and struggles in the marginalised areas. The war in Darfur has escalated and, as a result, tensions with Chad have increased. A renewed offensive on Khartoum by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) might be possible, and the SPLA plans an attempt to combine forces and capture Khartoum simultaneously from the South.
The situation with regard to civil liberties and human rights has deteriorated in both the North and the South. For example, press freedom has decreased as a result of tightened censorship. The economy is negatively affected, as are services such as education and health, because resources are allocated to the war. The South suffers as a result of weak, overarching nationalism and power struggles that coincide with tribal conflicts. Many in the South blame the North for their own discord, accusing it of bribing Southerners to take their side. Governance by the GoSS disintegrates and falls back to the SPLA, leaving the population without any voice and ending any attempts at democratisation. Insecurity and lawlessness prevail, leaving bandits and cattle raiders to thrive. The food situation becomes deplorable. Oil continues to flow – except when the SPLA carries out armed raids. As most of the oil fields are under the control of Northern forces, most of the oil revenues are again channelled to Khartoum, and the Southern economy crumbles. As the insecurity and humanitarian problems in Southern Sudan worsen, refugees pour into Uganda and Kenya.
Suggestions and policy options for the international community in this scenario in 2012
The unstable situation in the South no longer allows development assistance to be effective in that region. The international community can do little more than react, try to restart a political process and provide humanitarian relief. The best anyone can do is try to manage the conflict and prevent it becoming worse. The main policy options are:
• providing training to leadership so that decision-making is better informed and better substantiated
• conflict management and resolution between the different southern tribes, to prevent and manage conflicts and to stimulate southern unity
• mediation between the North and South
• establishment of a humanitarian corridor from the North to the South
• providing humanitarian assistance to meet basic needs, including food, medicine and
shelter
• providing a limited peacekeeping presence to protect civilians and humanitarian
assistance under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter
• supporting civil society to strengthen Southern unity
• supporting civil society and political opposition to ensure good and accountable
governance in both the North and South.
(عدل بواسطة abubakr on 06-02-2010, 05:46 PM)
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الكاتب |
Date |
| السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:33 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:34 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:35 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:45 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:50 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:54 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:58 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 06:03 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 06:06 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 06:15 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 08:03 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | مهيرة | 06-02-10, 08:28 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 08:47 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | محمد على طه الملك | 06-03-10, 00:30 AM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-03-10, 05:03 AM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-04-10, 09:57 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | الطيب شيقوق | 06-06-10, 06:20 AM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | ابراهيم عدلان | 06-17-10, 11:54 PM |
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abubakr
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