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 Re: تلخيص: From war to peace and reconciliation in Darfur منتدى عماد الأمين (Re: Elmuiz Haggaz)
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In attempting to make use of the Rwandan experience in Darfur, one must pay close attention to similarities and commonalities between the two cases. To begin with, there is clear difference of scale whereby the Rwandan case dwarfs the level of crimes committed in Darfur. While the Rwandan case presents a clear case of genocide, the legal definition of Darfur atrocities as genocide is fraught with controversies and is yet to be legally established as such (ICC Ruling of 4th March).
The Rwandan case involved a massacre of close to one million victims out of population of 10 million. In Darfur, confusion still reigns regarding number of casualties with fatalities falling anywhere between 200,000 and 500,000 out of population of 7.5 million. The government of Sudan reduces this estimate even further to no more than 10,000. Needless to say, few outside government circles take this view with any degree of seriousness (For the Rwandan genocide see Gourevitch, 1998; Dallaire, 2004; Prunier, 1995).
In the Rwandan case, killing and other atrocities were predominantly executed by community members known to their victims. In sharp contrast to that, Darfur war crimes are predominantly perpetuated by the official army, aided by its Janjaweed allies. While many of the Janjaweed are local and hence known to their victims, some are imported from outside Sudan and cannot be easily identified by survivors. Army soldiers implicated in Darfur war crimes are much more difficult to identify as they are imported from outside the region. The government of the Sudan has also used intensive aerial bombardment carried out by pilots who were not in direct contact with their victims.
At a different level, both the Rwandan case and its Darfur counterpart have been driven by the motive of effecting a population reshuffle, involving varying degrees of ethnic cleansing. The Hutu genocidaires of Rwanda, alluding to their so-called Hutu Ten Commandments, declared their Tutsi fellow citizens as “inyenzi (cockroaches) which could only be cured by extermination”. Darfur gangsters declared their victims as slaves, mercenaries and agents of Christian crusaders. Dehumanisation of would be victims has been central to genocides, ethnic cleansing and massacres across the world. In Brazil, street children destined for killing are referred to as vermin. In other countries, those who are destined for annihilation are referred to as Kafirs, infidels, enemies of the nation, nits, garbage, beasts, vagabonds, subhuman etc (see Jones, 2006:334) . These terms are used in an effort to reduce the assailants’ guilt, galvanise support, “humanise” killings of people and deprive victims of any chance for sympathy and humane treatment.
We must therefore readily admit that dealing with Darfur war crimes presents a daunting problem that requires an unconventional response at the post-conflict phase of crisis. The Rwandan case provides a template that can be followed in Darfur in the near future. Like Rwanda, and if the wise option of prosecution is to be pursued, Darfur culprits will far exceed the capacity of Sudan’s official legal system and the International Criminal Court (ICC) put together. The ICC formed for Rwanda came to be known as the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR). In the case of Rwanda, and with nearly one million killed, it was estimated that the country had between 80,000 to 100,000 killers. That number computes at 8 to 9 victims per killer. Of course other crimes like rape, #####ng, injuries, burning of properties also entered into the equation. Thus, when the genocide ended, Rwanda had 130,000 prisoners awaiting trials for alleged serious crimes only, but the options were limited.
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Elmuiz Haggaz
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست