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 Re: Articulation of Cultural Discourses and Political Dominance in Sudan (Re: Modic)
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The “ modern sector” is gauged by the level of advanced technology used in the production process, which, in turn, entails a parallel level of specific political and ideological setup. Being as such,” modern sector” could not be perceived or “created” without the “ traditional sector” which, as well, is gauged by the non- advanced technology used in the production process, which, in turn, entails a “popular or folk ideology” i.e. the non-sophistication of the sector, due to the easiness of its address ability, is by no means in need of sophisticated conceptual structures and “ ideologies”. Symmetrical as it is, this conceptual apparatus conceived of the “orthodox Islam”, now known as the “ political Islam”, to be the ideological counterpart of the “ modern sector”, while, on the other hand, “popular Islam”, derivative of Sufi orders, to be the ideological counterpart of the “ traditional sector”. Differently read, the “modern sector” is nothing but capitalist sector i.e. the capitalist mode of production, while the “ traditional sector” represents the pre-capitalist mode of production. In other words, and by deductions, the Sudan, as socio-economic structures comprises and manifests a co-existence of both pre-capitalist and capitalist relations of productions.
The tolerance of “popular Islam” articulated with the pre-capitalist structures, according to this school of thought is, by necessity, relational antagonistic to the intolerance of “ political Islam” articulated with the capitalist structures. If adopted as an analytical conceptual tools, the above mentioned conceptual apparatus, would, concerning the theme of the paper, twist the argument to endorse an approach arguing that, according to the distinction made above, the age-old pursued policies regarding the dominance of Arabic-Islamic political discourse were, conceptually and practically, split between two Arabic-Islamic ideologies. To the contrary, of course, we argue. We will start by underlining the misleading theoretical underpinnings of that school of thought.
Among political economy scholars, it is now a commonplace to argue that colonialism had led to drastic uprooting of the previously existing socio-economic structures in the colonized peripheries. Equally important, is the fact that in nowhere did the colonialization replaced the pre-capitalist structures with capitalist ones. In actual terms, it is a historical impossibility for the simple reason that colonized peripheries should be kept as secured sources for pumping natural and mineral resources to the industrialized capitalist metropolis. As such, the colonized peripheries should be kept in a state of arrested development, not to be viable competitors of the industrialized capitalist centers. It is a truism to argue that this was the basic mission of the colonial centers when confronted with the continuous rate of profit deterioration, a tendency structurally inherent in the capitalist economies. However, the peripheries were endowed with a mid-way mode of production, belonging neither to the encroaching capitalist relations of production nor the formerly exiting relations of production.
Mahdi Amal 22. devised out the concept of “ colonial mode of production’ to coin the socio-economic structure of the colonized peripheries. According to his theoretical arguments, the colonial mode of production dominant in the peripheries is a form of a capitalist mode of production that, structurally, impeded to develop into a full-fledged capitalist mode of production. Structurally articulated with the capitalist mode of production, reproduction mechanisms of the colonial mode of production were externally oriented and articulated with those of the capitalist mode of production. Without going into debates regarding such area of theoretical controversy, the “modern” “ traditional “ sectors thesis, tested upon such theoretical backgrounds, rendered infertile.
Dichotomization based on the level of technology used in the production process as an indicator and distinction between pre-capitalist and capitalist structures provides no theoretical instruments regarding the internal dynamics and the reproduction theoretical instruments regarding the internal dynamics and the reproduction logic of the dominant socio-economic structure. Allotment of, advanced or not, technologies for the production processes is a technical option decreed by decision-makers and economic planners in pursue of specific goals of the full capitalization, in a way identical to that of the capitalist centers, is, alas, by no means neither of their targets nor pertaining to their capacities. Addressing itself to and reproducing everyday notions rather than going into structural grass-root analysis of the phenomena, that school of thought is crippled to provide theoretical strategies that could hold together that fascinating series of parallels modern\traditional, political Islam\popular Islam. Moreover, the theoretical and interminable jargons addressing the parasitic capitalism overpowering the economy of Sudan and, unanimously, associated with political Islam movement presently holding power in Sudan, are also unable to explain the country’s economic and political problems. What is interesting, though by no means taken by surprise, is the is the fact that, that school of thought in its theoretical endeavors tend to blur the significant\signifier distinction, that is to say, according to one’s identification with either political Islam or popular Islam discourse, the epithet “parasitic” or “productive” is, respectively, labeled.
Ideological contentions, rather than the other way round, were clues to the existence capitalist whether “parasitic” or “productive”. According to our contentions, which by no means inert, the paper proposes the thesis that: the one differences could be sketched out between the political ideologies of the sectarian political parties (Umber and DUP) associated with popular Islam; and that of the NIF associated with political Islam, as both of them feeding upon Islamic ideology, is procedural rather than a rule. Difference has to be sought for in areas regarding variations and interpretative capabilities of the discourses of both versions of religious political parties. Basing ourselves upon the following of a “ discourse” which “ is a linguistic practice that puts into play sets of rules and procedures for the formation of objects, speakers, and thematics” 23. We could assume that this “ putting into play” is a viable factor in the difference between the two versions o the religious political parties.
According to NIF’s leader, Al-Turabi’s own contentions, the movement in its inaugural phases was limited to students and recent graduates “ in order to retain the intellectual quality of the movement” 24. Figuring out with a unique political discourse within a milieu pigmented by the political discourse of the dominant sectarian parties, both the stage and actors should be warily approached in a way that they perceived it “undesirable to dilute the intellectual content of the movement by a large scale absorption the masses” 25.
To this social class of petty bourgeois, rather than the masses, the movement was faithful ever since and appealing. Their incontestable dominance over the Graduates Constituency in 1986 election is a case in point. The fact that the NIF is a non-mass oriented movement put it in a position whereby the intellectual satisfaction of its members, among other things is a relentless prerequisite. Accordingly, it developed into a more “modern” movement in the sense of institutional structuration, i.e. having well-established organizational setup articulated with a centralized political and decision-making center, stable financial resources, hierarchical political bureau, and, most important, stable institution of research and publication centers responsible for providing studies concerning different issues of the country’ socio- economic and political problems as well as political rivalries. Well-read and first hand information were always and instantly at hands, if not, a head. The movement is, in a sense, “revolutionary” regarding its tactics and the way they problematise and make us use of the drastic tactical and political defects of both the preceding and contemporary sectarian parties and the communist movement. As such, it is vested with monumental capacities of political and emotional mobilization unprecedented and unmatchable in the political history of the Sudan.
“ Acquiring the confidence of the people by being thoroughly in touch with the better class of native” 26. Indicated a well-known fact, though consciously or unconsciously oblivious, that the genesis of he sectarian political parties in Sudan were cultivated by British colonialism along traditional sectarian dimensions and under the banners of Umma and Khatimiyya turug. The Khatimiyya as “ better class of native” were able, under the British patronage “ to consolidate its economic powers in the urban areas of the northern and eastern regions, where the control of retail trade was the basis for the formation of local petty traders and a commercial bourgeoisie”. By the same token, the British colonialists went about “ reestablishing the Mahadia (Umma) family’s status as the premier landlord, agricultural capitalist class by returning to them previously confiscated agricultural lands and by supplying them with the capital necessary to develop large-scale pump and mechanized agricultural schemes” 27.
With their economic and political interests, coined as they were, to the British colonizers, and, contrary to the political Islam movement, the sectarian political parties, taking advantage of the dominance of Sufi religiosity in the country, appeal, rather, to masses particularly in rural areas. As well, and contrary to political Islam movement, intellectual satisfaction of the masses is not a prerequisite or burden on the sectarian political parties. Illiteracy, dominance of Sufi religiosity, etc., were instrumental for the ideological articulation, on patrimonial basis, of the rural masses with the sectarian political parties. Unencumbered as such, by intellectual ideological clarity, the sectarian political parties remained so ever since. The masses were hold as disciples and followers bound by blind faith rather than enlighten political and ideological cadres. Suffice it that the political leaders remain, at the same time, the theoretical and ideological thinkers, if ever exist.
Unlike their contemporaneous “ modern” “revolutionary “ political Islam movement, the sectarian political parties were dwarf. The absence of clear organizational set up, coupled with family-dominated decision-making center, provides no room for the inevitable necessity, as political parties, of having whatever informative institutions regarding socio-economic and political issues of Sudan.
They lack the process of “ mediation”; the country’s different historical realities were taken the way they present themselves and were, consequently, represented. Truisms, axioms, incidence, everyday notion, etc. were given ideological and theoretical leverage declutched of the slightest and theoretical abstraction necessary for its comprehension and representation.
As such, the sectarian political parties account upon the abilities of “ popular culture” and its assumed far-reaching capacities, though in the case of Sudan, and might be because of this, the dominant and highly elevated “popular culture” is that of Arabic-Islamic origins which contains an immense body of literature and predilection that biased against other non-Arabic and non-Islamic cultures. Intellectuality and non-intellectuality of political discourse, though both spoon-fed by ISLAM, is what differentiate the sectarian political parties and the political Islam movement. But, however, whether intellectual or not, holding power or ousted, the dominant political ideologies in Sudan, since pre-colonial times, are of Arabic and Islamic nature that perceive the issues of national integration and national unity as, merely, attainable through full Islamization and Arabicisation. No difference, concerning this, could be perceived between the “ Awakening Islam” of Sadique El-Mahadi and “NECESSITY Jurisprudence “ of Hassan Al-Turabi”.
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Modic
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست