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 Re: Articulation of Cultural Discourses and Political Dominance in Sudan (Re: Modic)
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By declaring Islamic Law in 1983, Colonel Nimeri is not a ridiculous black sheep of the cattle. Instead he is a celebrated forerunner, and as such should be deemed by the dominant Arabic-Islamic discourse, and a faithful successor to what his post-independence predecessors fought for: the application of Islamic law. The contention that “ the dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab, and this nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival” 14., was seventeen years later realized by Nimeri declaration of Islamic Law and, and, enchanted by his gut and clarity, was not denounced by post- 1985 Prime Minister Sadig El-Mahadi, though “ it does not equal the stuff by which it was written”. Thanks and due admiration to the distinctive consistency of the last Prime Minister; Nimeri did what he (El-Mahadi) aspired for. Differences of uniform guarantees no variations in political orientation and mentalities, be it military or multiparty system.
Strictly speaking, National Reconciliation is the most important instrumental juncture in the process of Arabic-Islamic cultural dominance in recent Sudan history. The political squabbling among the dominant sectarian political parties, following independence, was an impediment to the application of Islamic Law in Sudan. Apart from rhetoric and political leaders’ speeches and public statements, no departure was made in the direction of Islamic rule application. More that that, is the fact that the political instability, myopia of the dominant religious bigotry and the ravaging war in the South were not conducive of Islamic take-off and resources wee squandered in a political game of playing one against another.
By the beginning of the early 70s the Arab regions started to echoing the ascending strides of Islamic fundamentalist movements. By and large, the Islamic fundamentalist discourse was a ramification and reaction to the complete bankruptcy of liberation movements that dominate post-independent Arab countries. Dominated by “ bourgeois” political parties nurtured by colonial administrative policies, post- independent regimes were completely disabled to satisfy the aspiration of their native people. Economic stagnation, political instability and clientism, ethnic strife, etc., to mention the least, slowly but effectively, erupted to erode post-independent social and political formations. Completely fragile and decayed, the post-independent stated, desperate as they were, resorted to oppressive means and policies to safeguard national consensus and legitimacy. Decalo, in length, argued that “fundamentally unaccountable, purchasing a measure of stability...in the absence of systematic stability...........via the social glue of patronage or external props, assuming ambitious statistic economic policies that rest on myopic assessments of assuming their capability to sustain the requisite costs, both civilian and military regimes have bankrupted themselves, mortgaging their futures to the demands of the day “ 15. Under no conviction we can argue that Sudan is an exception. Nor was it an exception from the fact that of the $143 billion debt repayment loads in Africa is equal to the continent’s entire annual GDP, 37% per cent of total export earnings, and individual payment ratios are in some instances stratospheric ____ 15% per cent for Sudan and Mozambique, 20% per cent for Gambia “ 16. Upon this background of a desperate portrait engulfing, more or less, all African states, May regime and the religious political parties came to conclude a National Reconciliation that put an end to their political “ rivalry”. Upon the abrogation of Dais Ababa Accord, expectedly, if not inevitably, that the factions of the dominant Arabic-Islamic political discourse celebrate their nostalgic gathering. Put differently, the relative political stability and cultural tolerance brought about by the Agreement is a too much dose and unforgivable surrender to non-Arabic entities for which the dominant Arabic- Islamic political discourse reserve no room other than submission and absorption.
Declaration of Islamic Law in Sept. 1983 and the propagation of the Agreement in June 1983 were the gift of May regime to the patriots of 1987 National Reconciliation who, though “ not” dominating the state, were never to lose sight and grip of the ascending Arabic-Islamic ideological discourse. Nimeri’s “gifts” were nothing other than an apostate repenting his apostasy. But it remains to say that, in practical reality, the Agreement of 1972 is a sparkling manifestation of the regime pragmatic policies that were able to forecast and arrive at deductions, based upon the military policies of the previous political regimes regarding the “Southern question leading to the conclusion that: the continuity and political stability of Northern governments depends, exclusively, upon having relative political and cultural stability, if not self-rule in the South. Deductively, the politics of National Reconciliation is a blueprint that orchestrated the dramas of the post-1983 political scene.
It is noteworthy to argue that neither the 1985-86 interim government nor the 1986-89 multi-party system incurred notable departures from the age-old policies of the dominant Arabic-Islamic discourse, as was aforementioned. Nor do the unscholarly and under-read academic and theoretical writings crafted out by some writers would lead the argument to differentiate between politics of the dominant Arabic-Islamic political discourse in a way symmetrical to the periodisation of post-independent state according to whether it is military or “ democratic”. In fact, one of the greatest misachievements of the 1985-89 “democratic” regime is the consolidation and endorsement of tribal militia in the country. Confronted by the army about the existence of tribal militia in 1989, the Prime Minister Sadique El-Mhadi, told the army that those Para-military forces were only to defend democracy 17. Paraphrasing the Prime Minister’s statement would read that: those Para-military forces were articulated in defense of the Arabic-Islamic political discourse in power. The celebrated “ democracy” is nothing, at one manifestation, other than reinforcing the already existing military policies and means regarding the second civil war in Sudan since 1983. The notorious massacre of 1987, carried out by the armed Baggara militia who killed and burned to death hundreds of Dinka and too many into captivity, is a case in point 18.
Clearly, what is novel in this policy is that the stage was set for articulating the dominance of Arabic_Islamic political discourse upon ethnic dimensions threatening the national integration of the country. Consequently, the present Islamic regime could not be, strictly speaking, blamed in its policy of elevating and giving legal status to those militias by the Popular Defense Act of 1989. It is a mere step forward that would have been adopted by Sadique’s regime, had it sill been in power. Furthermore, subjected, as they wee, to military mobilization and emotional enchantment to fight the “ pagan” Southern “ mutineers”, those militia were, more or less, late realization and echoes of Sadique El-Mahadi”s interventions in Sudan Constitution Assembly of October 1966, as was aforementioned. Though through different means and policies, both military and “ democratic” regimes in Sudan were not, consistently enough, ready to forgo the realization of Arabic-Islamic cultural dominance.
The political vigor, on the part of politicians, regarding the dominance of Arabic-Islamic political discourse, is paralleled, if not reinforce, by theoretical and conceptual formulations of some writers and researchers dealing with politico- cultural issues in Sudan. Among the dominant Sudanese scholarly spectrum it is unanimously agreed that a distinction should be devised out, if it does not exist already as a matter-of-fact, between “ popular “ Islam and “orthodox Islam”. Popular Islam is taken to be the corollary of sectarian political parties (Umma and DUP) that dominate the political scene since independence, while, on the other hand “ orthodox Islam” is, by the same token, taken to be the corollary of Muslim Brothers, later National Islamic Front (NIF) that hold power since 1989 military takeover. The former i.e. “ popular Islam” and its political scaffolds (Umma and DUP” is perceived to be tolerant, while the later i.e. “ orthodox Islam” and its political bearer (NIF) is perceived to be fanatic and intolerant. Further attributes were devised out, the political adherents of “ popular Islam” were taken to be representatives, to greater extent, of national capitalism associated with national productive capital, while those adherents of “ orthodox Islam”, on the other hand, were taken to be, exclusively, representative of parasitic capitalism associated with non-productive capital. Equally, as well, we have this dual schema: “ popular Islam” is associated with “ traditional sector” while “ orthodox Islam” is associated with “ modern sector”.
Entrapped in everyday notions - texts and theories - would not be in a position to arrive at analytical fabrics and findings other than descriptive formulas echoing the surface bubbles of the subject dealt with. As well, it could be argued that, being mortgaged to such notions, such texts and theoretical formulations will be, eventually, set on a track that arrive, on a backward journey, to the very point of the outset or departure. In other words, theoretical conceptualizations were mere identification and reproduction of he subject put to scrutiny, for everyday “ notions are so tenacious that all the techniques of objectification have to applied in order to achieve a break that is more often proclaimed than performed” 19.
Embodied, as they were, everyday notions wee the day-to- day representations of the dominant ideological discourse. Deductively, texts and theories unable to disentangle themselves from ordinary utilization, were, in event, reproducing the very dominant ideological discourse that they set out to negate, challenge, or refute. Rather than placing the discourse within an economy of power relations, this view opted to place it within a simplistic epistemological frame that emphasizes fidelity of representations or expressions of a deeper reality, for, as Foucault neatly put it “ to analyze a discourse formation is to weigh the “ value” of statements, a value that is not determined by their truth, that is not gauged by a secret content but which characterizes their place, their capacity or articulation and exchange, their possibility of transformation, not only in the economy of discourse, but more generally in the administration of scarce resources”20.
This mode of thought, or Day-to Day Thought as was dubbed by Mahadi Amel, to greater or lesser extent, uncritically, confer upon “ popular or folkculture” high esteem and, consequently, tend to endorse the prevailing ideological structures by helping to reproduce the beliefs an allegiances necessary for their uncontested functioning. Without going into debates and geological assessments regarding definitions, structures and operationalties of the concept “ popular culture “, suffice it to say that it is an area and space where the operation of power is being continuously disguised and naturalized by the dominant political discourse. As succinctly phrased by Brumnschrig, ordinary notions and language were a “ a legacy of words, a legacy of ideas, passes unnoticed, because it is so ordinary, but it carries in its vocabulary and syntax a petrified philosophy of the social, always ready to spring out of the common words, or complex expressions made up of common words, that the sociologist inevitably uses”21. Descriptive and conceptually poor as it is, this vulgar mode of thought gets stuck regarding differences between the trees and the jungle. Rather than structurally approaching and analyzing Sudan as a socio-economic structure historically determined and, consequently, non-static, it is caught by the politico-cultural and ideological ensembles of the superficial manifestations of the structure, thus losing sight of both the trees and the jungle. “ Modern” versus “ traditional “ thesis and its theoretical correlates and deductions emanated from this marred vision; the point of view, says Saussure, creates object.
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Modic
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست