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 Re: خطاب السيد الصادق المهدي للرئيس أوبا سانجو بخصوص أزمة دار فور (Re: Deng)
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الحبيب وراق تحياتي .. قد تكون اندفاعية البعض في ردودها نابعة من بغض للغة فبعض الناس عندهم حساسية مع اللغة العربية فاسمح لي ان انزل الخطاب باللغة الانجليزية.
22 August 2004
H.E President Olusegun Obasanjo
Chairman of the AU
My Dear brother
We appreciate your unrelenting efforts to help Sudan.
The Sudan faces Humanitarian and security problems of vast dimensions particularly in its Western Region of Darfur.
The actual situation involves the dangers to the security of a million plus of internally displaced population (IDP) and in external Refugee camps.
Secondly, the situation in the three Western regions is potentially capable of getting out of hand and consequently alien two ethnic Sudanese groups against each other in a completely novel development for the Regions.
Thirdly, given the existence of common tribes in Sudan and its western neighbors, the crisis in Darfur is reflecting itself across Sudan’s Western borders.
Fourthly, because of the prevailing perception of the crisis in Darfur, there is a potential discord between the African Union (AU) and the Arab League (AL).
Fifthly, because of the continuing humanitarian tragedy in Darfur and the UN Security Council responsibility under Chapter 7 (of the UN Charter) and the possibility of a Sudanese Government negative attitude towards the UN resolutions, there is a potential conflict with the Security Council.
Sixthly, the root causes of Darfur crisis exist in other Regions of Sudan ( lack of political participation, lack of economic development, etc) and if the use of force as means of achieving rights prevails, then there is always the risk of the same explosion at those regions.
There is no doubt that the present Regime has mismanaged the affairs of Darfur, accentuated old problems and created new ones. And when the SLA and JEM took up arms, the Sudanese Government (SG) responded the ill-advised policy of arming and abetting militias from some of the opposite ethnic divide. Whatever the SG intentions, some of the militias had farther-reaching Agenda, which culminated in the Human Rights atrocities inflicted upon the civilians, particularly of certain ethnic tribes.
The S.G. has the right to sniff out any armed threat to law and order, but S.G. failed to broaden National participation, resorted to an ill advised military stratagem, and tried to cover up the consequent Humanitarian Tragedy.
The S.G. continues to see the attention of the World public opinion and the consequent Security Council concern in conspiratorial terms.
The S.G. singed a Document with UN Secretary general hoping to whitewash its negative image. The UN eager for results to satisfy public pressure compiled.
Another UN agreement with S.G. on August 5th, 2004 is ill advised, the safe areas envisaged maybe what the IDPs fear most.
Left to themselves, S.G. commitments, and SC expectations will get stuck.
The Sudan has well developed political communities and organizations of Civil Society. They have largely been uninvolved in S.G. policies towards Darfur, this is so absurd in the light of the fact that our party “the Umma Party” (UP) gained 34 of the 39 seats in Darfur in the last freely conducted General Elections in 1986.
In a series of memoranda and National Initiatives, we have throughout the last two years tried to change the tragic policies of S.G. to no avail. Neither the SG nor the Regional Powers, nor the International community can bypass the Sudanese political community.
In order to avoid the six actual and potential dangers herein outlined, we suggest an alternative approach, namely,
1) The implementation of an immediate 3-points program:
(a) Total administrative reform in the three Darfur regions. To replace the current governors with a new set selected on national credentials, they must be qualified and nationally accepted.
(b) Neutral commission of inquiry with powers. It is a necessity to investigate the Human Rights violations, to determine perpetrators and to assess the extent of destruction and to consider the ways and means of compensating the affected population.
(c) National Supreme body for coordination of Relief.
2) Sudanese army should guarantee the protection of civilians and should be enabled to do so.
3) The National Conference:
A national fully authorized conference should be held to find a radical solution for the problem, as follows:
The agenda:
The conference will discuss the root causes of the problem to suggest the possible solutions under the following axes:
1- The political axis
2- The economical development
3- The Social Services.
4- The administrative issues.
5- The tribal and native administration.
6- The security issue.
The Composition
The Sudanese Partners:
• The political parties represented in the last democratic freely elected Parliament 1986.
• SPLM/A
• SLM/A & JEM
• Qualified personnel as statesmen, academicians, and economist intellectuals of Darfur region inside Sudan and abroad.
• Tribal leaders.
The Regional and International Observers:
AU, AL, UN and selected countries for example Chad, Libya Central Africa, Nigeria, Egypt.
Venue: At a neutral accepted country.
Finally, the Sudanese situation is pregnant with internal and external explosions. It calls for a National approach to address it. An approach crystalized in the formation of a National Government capable of creating a new National climate. We have persistently called upon the Sudanese political forces, including the SG to do so. We look up to the African Union and the International Community to help the Peoples of Sudan help themselves.
Yours sincerely
Elected Sudanese PM 1986-1989
Elected President of UMMA Party April 2003
Elected IMAM of ANSAR Dec. 2002
CCT: UN Secretary General
CCT: Sudan Government
CCT: Sudan Political Forces.
(عدل بواسطة نيازي مصطفى on 08-25-2004, 11:40 PM)
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نيازي مصطفى
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست