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 Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. (Re: Khalid Kodi)
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The International Herald Tribune
It's worth bringing tyrants to justice
By Ken Roth International Herald Tribune
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 10, 2005
NEW YORK Bringing to justice those who commit atrocities has obvious
appeal. It provides redress for victims and their families, punishes
perpetrators, and deters others from replicating their crimes. But is
the price too high? Critics argue that the threat of prosecution compels
dictators to cling to power rather than step down, or that it encourages
abusive combatants to fight on rather than sue for peace. Yet a decade
of experience with international tribunals suggests these fears are
overblown.
The example of Charles Taylor, Liberia's brutal former president who on
Thursday begins his third year in comfortable exile in Nigeria, shows
that the costs of ignoring justice can be high. Taylor is one of only
two sitting ######### of state to have been charged by an international
tribunal.
In June 2003, a United Nations-backed court unsealed an indictment of
Taylor for his role in supporting Revolutionary United Front rebels
known for murder, rape and hacking off the limbs of many of its victims
during Sierra Leone's civil war.
Two months later, as rebels were poised to take Monrovia, the Liberian
capital, Taylor's days as president were clearly numbered. Yet rather
than arrest and deliver him for trial, Nigeria, with the tacit consent
of the United States and Britain, gave him sanctuary.
This sweetheart deal has so far deprived Taylor's many victims and
Sierra Leone's people of the opportunity to see one of their prime
persecutors brought to justice. It also risks emboldening other would-be
tyrants to carry out similar atrocities, since they might calculate
that, if their crimes catch up with them, they, too, can opt for exile
over imprisonment.
It need not have been that way. The case of former President Slobodan
Milosevic of Yugoslavia, who in May 1999 became the first sitting head
of state to be indicted by an international tribunal, illustrates an
alternative approach. When Serbs took to the streets en masse in October
2000 to challenge his rule - defiance fueled in part by international
reaction to his indictment - the threat of prosecution did not delay his
ouster. Lacking power to shield himself from prosecution, he was soon
shipped to The Hague, where he is now standing trial.
That a risk of prosecution does not impede the toppling of dictators is
suggested as well by many of Milosevic's predecessors. Before the era of
international tribunals, tyrants whose regimes were crumbling typically
fled abroad. Among them were Marcos of the Philippines, Duvalier of
Haiti, Mengistu of Ethiopia, Amin of Uganda, Stroessner of Paraguay,
Mobutu of Zaire, and the Shah of Iran. But as their reigns came to an
end, all shared Milosevic's powerlessness to insist on formal protection
from prosecution, despite the possibility of being forced back home to
stand trial. As is typical, all clung to power until the last possible
moment, by which point they had no capacity to prolong their rule in
quest of official amnesty.
Even when the aim is ending armed conflict, when warring parties may be
more willing to compromise before the bitter end, the advantages of not
prosecuting are often exaggerated. The issue is not amnesty for merely
taking up arms - a reasonable part of many peace agreements - but
amnesty for atrocities committed during the conflict.
Once more, the situation in the former Yugoslavia is instructive.
Milosevic accepted the Dayton Peace Accord ending the Bosnian conflict
without obtaining an amnesty, even though an international criminal
tribunal for the region had been established, and he was an obvious
target.
Moreover, the threat of prosecution helped Bosnia by forcing some of its
most vicious leaders to lie low, removing them from the political scene.
A deterrent effect can also be found today in Darfur and eastern Congo,
where the involvement of the International Criminal Court has
contributed to a reduction in violence by forcing murderous commanders
to adopt the mantle of reform to avoid the prosecutor's attention.
By contrast, the cost of impunity from prosecution can be high. During
the Sierra Leone civil war, an attempt to placate the Revolutionary
United Front by giving it amnesty in July 1999 allowed the rebels to
regroup and resume their atrocities. Similarly, the impunity so far
allowed Indonesia's military for its September 1999 slaughter in East
Timor has emboldened the military to continue its brutality in Aceh;
some abusive military leaders were even transferred from one conflict to
the other.
Allowing murderous forces not only to escape justice but also to remain
intact is a particularly dangerous recipe for renewed atrocities.
President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia seems poised to repeat that mistake
today by giving his country's deadly paramilitaries a slap on the wrist
without insisting on genuine demobilization.
Even when circumstances delay prosecution, they should never evolve into
formal amnesty. The possibility of prosecution when abusive forces no
longer pose a threat should always be left open. The experience of
Sierra Leone, where the United Nations' refusal to endorse a national
amnesty for the RUF did not keep it from signing a peace accord,
suggests that the threat of international prosecution need not undermine
a peace process.
Shielding an abusive leader from justice is particularly inappropriate
once he no longer commands troops. Whatever the reasons for granting
Taylor temporary refuge in Nigeria, it is wrong for President Olusegun
Obasanjo of Nigeria, two years later, still to refuse to surrender him
for trial.
No one claims that justice is easy or painless. Competing priorities
must sometimes be weighed. But experience suggests that the benefits of
prosecuting those responsible for atrocities can be secured without the
prolonged wars and extended dictatorships that critics often claim.
(Kenneth Roth is executive director of Human Rights Watch.)
IHT Copyright © 2005 The International Herald
Tribune | www.iht.com[/B]
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| العنوان |
الكاتب |
Date |
| استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Khalid Kodi | 08-25-05, 06:47 AM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Kostawi | 08-25-05, 08:33 AM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Biraima M Adam | 08-25-05, 06:03 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Kostawi | 08-25-05, 06:24 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Marouf Sanad | 08-25-05, 06:24 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Biraima M Adam | 08-25-05, 06:51 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Kostawi | 08-25-05, 06:57 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Biraima M Adam | 08-25-05, 07:14 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Kostawi | 08-25-05, 07:21 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Biraima M Adam | 08-25-05, 08:24 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Kostawi | 08-25-05, 09:19 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Biraima M Adam | 08-25-05, 10:53 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Kostawi | 08-25-05, 11:11 PM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | hala alahmadi | 08-26-05, 05:00 AM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Khalid Kodi | 08-26-05, 05:55 AM |
| Re: استفسار من الاخ بكرى ابوبكر. | Khalid Kodi | 08-26-05, 05:59 AM |
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Khalid Kodi
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست