انت تكذب يا استاذ/ ابو الريش .. مع وافر الاحترام.

Quote: مُحاكمة الشيوعيين محاكمة قانونية سياسية مُفترضة " إن الفرد الذي يخالف قانونًا يخبره ضميره أنه غير عادل، ويقبل عن طيب خاطر عقوبة السجن من أجل إثارة ضمير المجتمع بشأن ظلمه، هو في الواقع يعبر عن أعلى درجات الاحترام للقانون " مارتن لوثر كينغ " ليس على المرء مسؤولية قانونية فحسب، بل مسؤولية أخلاقية لإطاعة القوانين العادلة. بالمقابل، على المرء مسؤولية أخلاقية لعصيان القوانين الجائرة " مارتن لوثر كينغ " القانون الجائر هو في حد ذاته نوع من العنف. الاعتقال لخرقه هو أكثر من ذلك. الآن ينص قانون اللاعنف على أنه لا ينبغي مقاومة العنف بالعنف المضاد بل باللا عنف. أفعل هذا من خلال خرق القانون والخضوع سلميا للاعتقال والسجن " المهاتما غاندي " إذا كان الظلم جزءًا من الاحتكاك الضروري بآلة الحكومة، فلتدعه يمضي، فمن المحتمل أن تتآكل الآلة بشكل سلس وتعطب، ولكن إذا كان ذا طبيعة تتطلب منك أن تكون وكيلاً لظلم آخر، فأقول خالف القانون. دع حياتك تكون احتكاكًا مضادًا لإيقاف الآلة. ما يجب عليّ فعله هو أن أرى، على أي حال، أنني لا أعرض نفسي للخطأ الذي أدينه " هنري ديفيد ثورو " تشبه القوانين نسيج العنكبوت، تقع فيه الطيور الصغيرة و تعصف به الطيور الكبيرة " مثل أمريكي | " ما يريده الملك يريده القانون " مثل فرنسي " القانون الذي لا يطبق على الجميع ويستثني منه أحد يجب ألا يُحترم " تشي جيفارا " ما أشد براءتنا حين نظن أن القانون وعاء للعدل والحق. القانون هنا وعاء لرغبة الحاكم، أو بدلة يفصلها على قياسه " محمود درويش " إن القوانين التي تلجم الأفواه وتحطم الأقلام تهدم نفسها بنفسها " باروخ سبينوزا " الرحمة جوهر القانون، ولا يستخدم القانون بقسوة الا الطغاة " وليم شكسبير " القانون يجب أن يكون مثل الموت الذي لا يستثني أحد " مونتسكيو " غاية القانون ليس منع أو تقييد الحرية، بل حفظها وتوسيعها " جون لوك " لو أردنا احترام القانون فعلينا أن نجعل القانون محترماً " لويس برانديز " ليس القانون هو الذي يملي ما هو عادل، بل العدالة هي التي تفرض ما هو قانوني، فحين يكون الصراع بين القانون والعدالة، فعلينا أن نختار العدالة وأن نعصي الشرعية، لأن ما يجب ما يلهم الإنسان في سلوكه ليس ما هو شرعي بل ما هو مشروع " جان ماري مولر " في البداية إنه القانون .. وفي النهاية إنها الاستثناءات " جون درايدن " أولئك الذين يقمعون الحرية يفعلون ذلك دائما باسم القانون والنظام " جون ليندساي لقد اتضح منذ البداية الضعف القانوني الواضح لخصوم الشيوعيين، كما اتضح ضعفهم السياسي، وظهرت بشكل سافر دوافعهم السياسية والإيديولوجية المعادية للشيوعية كفكر، والحزب الشيوعي كحزب، حتى أكثر من بعض الكيزان، كسبب أساسي في إثارة هذه القضية، وكشف جهلهم التام بالقانون، حيث رأيناهم يعلنون دون أن يرف لهم جفن، أن التعديل الخامس لا ينطبق على هذه القضية، لأن السؤال في فورم الهجرة يتطلب إجابه، وطبعاً الإجابة موجودة وهي إما نعم أنا عضو حزب شيوعي وعليه يتم فحص الحالة قبل اتخاذ القرار، أو الإجابة بلا استناداً إلى التعديل الخامس، وقال آخر، أنه بما معناه، إذا كان التعديل الخامس من الدستور الأمريكي يتيح للشخص عدم تجريم نفسه، فإن هناك ما زال قانون آخر يمكن تطبيقه على هذا الشخص، وهو لعمري أمر عجيب وغريب سيضحك العالم، إذ أن من المعروف لكل من لديه حد أدنى من المعرفة بالقانون، أن الدستور هو السلطة الأعلى في الدولة، وأن أي قانون يخالف أي فقرة من نصوص الدستور، فإنه يُعتبر غير دستوري وبالتالي لا يمكن تطبيقه، لأن أي قضية يتم رفعها بموجب هذا القانون المعيب ستكون عُرضة للإسقاط المؤكد في أي مرحلة من مراحل التقاضي. بيان القضية (1) لقد روّجوا أولاً لمعلومة كاذبة وهي أن هناك قانون حتى اليوم في الولايات المتحدة يعاقب من ينتمي إلى الحزب الشيوعي بالغرامة أو السجن " أن في أمريكا، وفي القرن الواحد والعشرين، فإن الانتماء للحزب الشيوعي الأمريكي جريمة جنائية ( حتى اليوم ) يعاقب عليها بالغرامة 10000 دولار أو السجن 5 سنوات أو العقوبتين معاً ". تعليق: هذا كذب صراح، فالقانون لم يشر من قريب أو بعيد إلى عقوبة الانتماء إلى الحزب الشيوعي بالسجن والغرامة، وإنما يتعلق الأمر بأعضاء الحزب إذا فشلوا أو رفضوا التسجيل كشيوعيين عند السلطات المختصة، أي أن العقوبة لا تتعلق بالانتماء أو عضوية الحزب الشيوعي في حد ذاتها إنما في رفض التسجيل. (2) وجهوا تهمة للشيوعيين السودانيين بأنهم كذبوا في فورم الهجرة، بأن أخفوا عضويتهم المفترضة في الحزب الشيوعي، وبالتالي حصلوا على الجنسية بناء على معلومات كاذبة. تعليق: هذه التهمة لا أساس لها من الناحية القانونية، إذ تقوم على مجرد تكهنات وتخمينات وظنون، ولا يملكون أي دليل مادي عليها، وهذا الاتهام يمكن تكييفه كنوع من الترهيب. يوجد احتمالين للإجابة على سؤال الانتماء لحزب شيوعي: (أ) نعم، وعندها يمضي الطلب في مساره الطبيعي، ويتم اتخاذ القرار بشأنه بعد الفحص والتدقيق اللازم، وبناء على كل حالة على حده. (ب) لا، ويمكن أن يكون ذلك حقيقي أو غير حقيقي، وفي الحالة الثانية فإن مقدم الطلب يكون في وضعية قانونية محمية بنص عدم تجريم الذات الدستوري، وبالسوابق القضائية. القانون: رغم أن المدعي هو من يقع على عاتقه عبء الإثبات، وقد فشل في ذلك حتى الآن، فإني من جانبي قد قرر نفي ودحض التهمة والمعلومات المُضللة أعلاه بناء على التالي: (1) التعديل الخامس من الدستور الأمريكي: " لا يجوز اعتقال أي شخص لاستجوابه بشأن جناية أو جريمة شائنة أخرى، إلا تبعاً لصدور قرار اتهامي أو مضبطة اتهام عن هيئة محلفين كبرى، باستثناء القضايا الحاصلة في القوات البرية أو البحرية، أو في المليشيا، عندما تكون هذه القوات في الخدمة الفعلية في وقت الحرب أو الخطر العام، ولا يجوز اتهام أي شخص بنفس الجرم مرتين فتتعرض حياته أو أعضاء جسده للخطر، كما لا يجوز إكراه أي شخص في أية دعوى جنائية على أن يكون شاهداً ضد نفسه، ولا أن يحرم من الحياة أو الحرية أو الممتلكات دون اتباع الإجراءات القانونية الأصولية كما لا يجوز نزع أية ملكية خاصة لاستخدامها في سبيل المنفعة العامة بدون تعويض عادل ". (2) الغت المحكمة العليا قرار محكمة الاستئناف في نيويورك القاضي باستبعاد الملتمسين من نظام تعويض البطالة في نيويورك الذي استندت فيه إلى قانون 1954. الحزب الشيوعي ، الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية ضد كاثروود ، 367 الولايات المتحدة 389 (1961) الحزب الشيوعي ، الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية ضد كاثروود رقم 495 تم في 4 مايو 1961 تقرر في 12 يونيو 1961 367 الولايات المتحدة 389 Communist Party, U.S.A. v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389 (1961) U.S. Supreme Court Communist Party, U.S.A. v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389 (1961) Communist Party, U.S.A. v. Catherwood No. 495 Argued May 4, 1961 Decided June 12, 1961 367 U.S. 389 Syllabus The New York State Industrial Commissioner terminated petitioners' registrations and liability for state taxation as employers under the New York State Unemployment Insurance Law, and the New York Court of Appeals sustained such action, on the ground that it was required by the Communist Control Act of 1954, which declares that the Communist Party of the United States is an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence, and that it and any of its successors "are not entitled to any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof." This termination of state registration had the indirect effect of increasing petitioners' tax rate under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act from about 1% to 3%. The Internal Revenue Service continued to treat petitioners as covered by the latter Act, and to collect taxes from them thereunder. Held: the Communist Control Act of 1954 does not require exclusion of petitioners from New York's unemployment compensation system; the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Pp. 367 U. S. 389-395. 8 N.Y.2d 77, 168 N.E.2d 242, reversed and case remanded. (3) لقد قضت المحكمة الجزئية في ولاية أريزونا بعدم دستورية قانون 1954 المناهض للشيوعية. بلاويس ضد بولين 358 ف. 349 (D. Ariz. 1973) المحكمة الجزئية الأمريكية لمنطقة أريزونا - 358 F. Supp. 349 (D. Ariz. 1973) 8 مايو 1973 358 ملحق ف. 349 (1973) باتريشيا بيل بلاويس وآخرون ، المدعون ، ضد. ويسلي بولين ، وزير خارجية ولاية أريزونا وآخرون ، المتهمون. رقم Civ. 72-402 Phx. محكمة مقاطعة الولايات المتحدة ، دي أريزونا. Blawis v. Bolin, 358 F. Supp. 349 (D. Ariz. 1973) U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona - 358 F. Supp. 349 (D. Ariz. 1973) May 8, 1973 358 F. Supp. 349 (1973) Patricia Bell BLAWIS et al., Plaintiffs, v. Wesley BOLIN, Secretary of State of State of Arizona, et al., Defendants. No. Civ. 72-402 Phx. United States District Court, D. Arizona. May 8, 1973. *350 Treon, Warnicke and Dann, by B. Michael Dann; Jay Dushoff, John Hay, Alan M. Kyman, Phoenix, Ariz., W. Edward Morgan, S. Leonard Scheff, and Risner, Wolfe and Raven, Tucson, Ariz., for plaintiffs. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. of Ariz., by James G. Bond, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant. William Smitherman, U. S. Atty., D. Ariz. by Fred C. Mather, Asst. U. S. Atty., amicus curiae. OPINION AND ORDER COPPLE, District Judge. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, mandating the Secretary of State of Arizona to certify the candidates and electors for President and Vice President, and the name of the Communist Party U.S. A., on the 1972 general election ballots. The individual plaintiffs Blawis, Mac-Koviak and Renteria are candidates for Presidential Elector and are pledged to vote for plaintiffs Hall and Tyner. Defendant Bolin is the Arizona Secretary of State, and Marston and Turley are the Recorders of Maricopa and Navajo Counties, respectively. There are no facts in dispute. Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3, 4); 42 U. S.C. § 1983 (1970). A three-judge court was convened, which denied injunctive relief on the ground that the party had obtained insufficient signatures to qualify for the 1972 ballot, and the issue was moot. Due to the allegation of continuing harm in the amended complaint, the case was remanded to this Court, sitting alone, for a determination of the prayer for declaratory relief. See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S. Ct. 206, 208, 24 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1969). The case is submitted on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and all the pleadings and briefs filed. I. Facts Plaintiffs gathered signatures on petitions to create a new political party within Arizona and in Summer 1972 presented them to the various county recorders for certification of the signatures pursuant to the Arizona election laws.[1] Marston and Turley refused *351 to certify the petitions on the authority of Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 16-206 (Supp. 1972-73), which disenfranchises the Communist Party U.S.A. and its affiliates. The similar federal statute, 50 U. S.C. §§ 841-842 (1970), is also in issue.[2] Subsequently, a petition consisting of all the signatures and the required verifications, including those refused by Marston and Turley, were submitted to Bolin, who refused on July 14 to accept it for the same reason. On July 22 plaintiffs instituted this action, in which they allege continuing irreparable harm beyond the current elections. Plaintiffs challenge the proscriptions, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 16-205, 16-206 (Supp.1972-73), and the federal counterpart, 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-842 (1970), on the grounds that they are a bill of attainder, and violate the privileges and immunities clause, the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the first amendment freedoms. The state statute is also attacked under the supremacy clause, and the federal statute is attacked as beyond the power of Congress. II. Arizona Election Statutes A number of issues briefed and argued related to the method by which the Party and candidates could qualify for placement on the ballot under state law.[3] Many of those issues are moot or are subsumed in the opinion of the three-judge court denying injunctive relief. The central issue remaining is the validity of the proscription statutes, which plaintiffs maintain are a continuing barpractically and legallyto the creation of their party in this state. The Arizona election statutes will be discussed only as necessary to reaching a decision on that issue. *352 A political party may qualify for a ballot position in Arizona only by having previously been on the ballot and having obtained five percent of the votes cast for the various offices for which it ran candidates, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 16-201 (1956), or by filing a new-party petition with the Arizona Secretary of State. There is no provision for candidates of new parties to qualify for the ballot. See id. §§ 16-301, 16-303, 16-305 (Supp.1972-73). Other gaps in the statutory scheme exist. The plan for enfranchising new parties and their candidates is sufficiently incomplete that the Court could not safely adapt other sections to fill those gaps, even if it were inclined to indulge in legislating a solution. The plaintiff candidates for presidential elector allege they have been nominated "in convention or committee duly convened or held," and intend to run in future elections. The Court finds that the method of selection of these candidates does not contravene the Arizona selection procedure for new-party candidates, and that they have standing to sue. See note 1 supra. The impediment to organizing a party that the statutory bar creates, and the practical impossibility of challenging the statute within the 30-day period allowed biennially has not been seriously rebutted by the state. The latter difficulty makes this case one of recurring harm yet possibly evading review, and therefore appropriate for declaratory relief. III. Statutory History The Arizona statutes challenged, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 16-205, 16-206 (Supp.1972-73), are part of the Arizona Communist Control Act, ch. 108, [1961] Ariz.Sess.Laws 220, a portion of which has been held unconstitutional.[4] Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 86 S. Ct. 1238, 16 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1966), rev'g 94 Ariz. 1, 381 P.2d 554 (1963), noted, 5 Ariz.L.Rev. 254 (1964). Subsection 16-205(B) of the Arizona Act is drawn verbatim from 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1970); other subsections are drawn from other congressional acts, or are newly written. Section 16-206 of the Arizona Act is an almost verbatim adoption of 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1970) (outlawing Communist Party) which in turn is part of a federal series of enactments aimed at suppression of communist political organizations. Communist Control Act of 1954, ch. 886, 68 Stat. 775 (codified at 50 U. S.C. §§ 841-844 and amending other sections of Title 50); Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987, amended, Pub.L. No. 90-237, 81 Stat. 765 (1968), Pub.L. No. 87-474, 76 Stat. 91 (1962) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-798, 811-826, and scattered sections of Titles 8, 18 and 22 U.S.C.); Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385. Substantial portions of those acts are no longer in force.[5] *353 While the federal version of the proscription statute has been considered before, Communist Party U. S. A. v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389, 81 S. Ct. 1465, 6 L. Ed. 2d 919 (1961), the central issue presented here appears to have arisen in only one other case. In Mitchell v. Donovan, 290 F. Supp. 642 (D.Minn.1968), the court granted an injunction under facts identical to those here, but did so on a balancing of the hardships due to the extreme proximity of the election. The merits were not reached. A later attempt to raise the merits failed for mootness. Mitchell v. Donovan, 300 F. Supp. 1145 (D.Minn.1969), vacated, 398 U.S. 427, 90 S. Ct. 1763, 26 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1970), dismissed on remand, No. 3-68-Civ-256 (D.Minn. Jul. 28, 1970). The court did indicate its "grave doubts" as to the constitutionality of the statute, however. 290 F. Supp. at 645. As was done in Mitchell, the Court has invited the United States to submit a brief on its position. Emphasizing that the Department of Justice believes 50 U.S.C. § 842 inapplicable to the case, and that it appears as amicus curiae only, the government submitted the same brief it prepared for the Mitchell court and declined to participate further. A reading of that brief leaves one with the unavoidable conclusion that the Department of Justice, itself, entertains serious doubts on a number of grounds as to the constitutionality of section 3 of the Federal Communist Control Act of 1954 if applied as in this case. IV. Attainder Plaintiffs' first argument is that the statutes are an attainder. Bills of Attainder are prohibited by Const. art. I, § 9. These legislative acts are bills of attainder if they are "aimed particularly at the Communist Party as an identifiable entity, intending to punish it." Communist Party U. S. A. v. Subversive Act. Cont. Bd. (SACB), 367 U.S. 1, 82, 81 S. Ct. 1357, 1403, 6 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1961). In that case, the Supreme Court examined the Internal Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1970), to determine whether it was subject to constitutional attack. The crucial difference between that statute and the two Communist Control Acts is that the former does not designate the Communist Party by name, but instead provides a procedure for identifying organizations as "communist-action" bodies, and requires their registration and certain other consequences.[6] The Control Acts, on the other hand, have as their stated purpose the proscription of the Party from the political process. 50 U.S.C. § 842; Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 16-206 (Supp.1972-73). While findings are made by the legislature, id. § 16-205, they are in conclusory terms as to the particular organization, not as to the general danger to be protected against. The Arizona Attorney General attempts to meet this challenge by positing that such an enactment is not an attainder where based on lengthy and detailed congressional fact-finding. He misunderstands Communist Party U. S. A. v. SACB, supra, upon which he relies for this argument, and the statute it interprets. The court did not there sanction a "legislative finding of guilt." Rather, it held the statute constitutional precisely because any findings under it were made by an administrative quasi-judicial body whose determination was appealable to the courts. The state's argument "ignores the crucial constitutional significance of what Congress did when it rejected [in the Internal Security Act] the approach of outlawing the Party by name and accepted instead a statutory program regulating not enumerated organizations but designated activities." 367 U.S. at 84-85, 81 S. Ct. at 1404. Congress proscribed entities found under stated criteria to be "communist action organizations." It did not *354 proscribe named entities. Defendants defeat their very argument by a quotation from United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461, 85 S. Ct. 1707, 1722, 14 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1965): "Under our Constitution, Congress possesses full legislative authority, but the task of adjudication must be left to other tribunals." The court there held 29 U.S.C. § 504, prohibiting members of the Party from holding office in a labor union, unconstitutional because it was a bill of attainder. See note 5 supra. It is true that "only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on [this] ground." Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S. Ct. 1367, 1376, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1435 (1960). That proof is found in the plain words of the statute: "The Communist Party . . . shall not be entitled to any of the privileges, rights or immunities attendant upon legal political bodies . . . ." Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 16-206 (Supp.1972-73). Fundamental political rights of a stated class are terminated; this interest is not comparable to the rational-basis cases cited by defendants.[7] The suggestion that the elimination without recourse of these rights is not punishment, but is regulatory, is frivolous. There is no attempt here to regulate political activity based on adjudication in an appropriate forum. See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 92 S. Ct. 582, 30 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1972). The statute is a punishment of a named group upon a legislative finding of guilt. United States v. Brown, supra; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1964); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 (1867). The legislature may make findings and pass legislation to correct the ills and dangers it discovers. The respective sections outlawing the Party, however, must fall as bills of attainder, for "whatever the source from which the legislative experience and instruction derived, the Act [must apply] to a class of activity only, not to the Communist Party as such." Communist Party U. S. A. v. SACB, supra, 367 U.S. at 88, 81 S. Ct. at 1406. V. Due Process Plaintiffs challenge the statutes as denying the Party due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Defendants contend that the individual plaintiffs are not harmed in any constitutionally cognizable way by the disenfranchisement, and the Party, as an unincorporated association, has no due process rights that are infringed by the statutes. The argument is made by analogy from corporation cases. There is no doubt that "a corporation is a `person' within the meaning of the equal protection and due process clauses."[8] Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 56 S. Ct. 444, 446, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) (protectable due process and first amendment rights invaded by tax). Weighing the rights of an association often depends on the impact of the complained conduct on its members, however. E. g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S. Ct. 1361, 31 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1972). There the court denied standing to sue in the absence of a showing that the organization or its members would be harmed by the contested action. So too, constitutional guarantees ordinarily unavailable to an organization because they are "personal" rights may be invoked by it where fundamental rights of its members are involved. Communist Party U. S. A. v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 389, 384 F.2d *355 957 (1967).[9] This is not to say that the Party has no due process rights qua Party in this case. To suggest that the disenfranchisement of the Party does not effectively destroy the purpose of its existence and therefore raise a protectable right of the Party is to ignore the clear meaning of the due process clause. Regulation of organizations may only be done by reasonable means. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934); cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 92 S. Ct. 2338, 33 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1972); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S. Ct. 734, 13 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1965); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931). The due process clause of course governs any infringement of the individual plaintiffs' rights under the first, fifth and fourteenth amendments in their effort to form a political party. The statutes violate the due process clause for the same reasons they are a bill of attainder. Healy v. James, supra; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S. Ct. 5, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1968); see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958). VI. Equal Protection and the First Amendment This Court has previously observed that equal protection standards enunciated in the current cases are not designed to lend a sense of permanence to district court decisions. Compare San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973) (Powell, J., for the Court), with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1971) (The Chief Justice for the Court). Compare also Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 93 S. Ct. 1245, 36 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 93 S. Ct. 1211, 35 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1973); with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972). See generally San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 70, 93 S. Ct. at 1315-1348 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases: Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14 Ariz.L.Rev. 88, 105-113 (1972). Suffice it to say that the franchise is a sufficiently fundamental right[10] to require that the state show a *356 compelling interest in curtailing it. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 59, 93 S. Ct. at 1310 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring). It may be assumed that the protection of the government from violent overthrow is such an interest. But see Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S. Ct. 477, 100 L. Ed. 640 (1956). The issue is thus joined, and the test is to see whether the least drastic means to accomplish that purpose have been used.[11] Defendants do not meet this argument squarely. Rather, their argument is aimed at the rational basis standard and, having shown a compelling interest, they rest the case. Eliminating the association for political purposes of an entire group of people is an action surpassing even that in Williams v. Rhodes, supra, where access to the ballot by an organization was merely proscribed by unconstitutional requirements. The reliance on previous legislative findings to show that its action is not too broad is useless, as indicated in the attainder section, supra. The state might attempt to rely upon the findings of the SACB, but that would seem to fail for two reasons. First, those findings are now very old and there is no assurance that they remain true. See American Comm. for Prot. of Foreign Born v. SACB, 380 U.S. 503, 85 S. Ct. 1148, 14 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1965); Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 380 U.S. 513, 85 S. Ct. 1153, 14 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1965). Second, the orders of the Board have not yet been validated, over 10 years after the Supreme Court upheld the findings. Communist Party U. S. A. v. United States, supra; Albertson v. SACB, supra. Moreover, there are less drastic alternatives to outlawry. The conspiracy and individual advocacy prohibitions have been upheld (over strong dissents), furnishing a method of attacking directly the feared conduct. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 81 S. Ct. 1469, 6 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S. Ct. 857, 95 L. Ed. 1137 (1951). Even those sanctions "border so closely upon constitutionally protected rights" as to place a heavy burden on the government. Scales v. United States, supra, 367 U.S. at 230, 81 S. Ct. at 1487; see Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S. Ct. 1064, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1356 (1957). In infringing the fundamental political rights of plaintiffs, the state has failed to use the least drastic means to enforce its compelling interest,[12] and has denied equal protection of the laws to plaintiffs. VII. The Federal Statute The United States argues that the federal statute, 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-842, may not control the present case because it does not purport to disenfranchise the individual plaintiffs, nor need it necessarily prevent their names appearing on the ballot under some such designation as "communist." See Mitchell v. Donovan, supra, 290 F. Supp. at 644-645. Not only is it doubtful that those arguments, based on Minnesota *357 election law, are apt under Arizona law, but they are based on the proposition that the Court should hesitate to construe the statute so as to require resolution of its constitutional impact. See Communist Party U. S. A. v. Catherwood, supra, 367 U.S. at 394, 81 S. Ct. at 1469. This case is not Catherwood; the validity of the federal statute is squarely in issue. Because of the resolution of the other challenges, it is unnecessary to consider the cross-arguments that the Arizona statute is void under the supremacy clause, see Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra, or that the federal statute is beyond the power of Congress, see McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 13 S. Ct. 3, 36 L. Ed. 869 (1902). See note 2 supra. VIII. Conclusion This is an area which lends itself too easily to conclusory, if not emotional statements. Moreover, the extent to which political activity may be circumscribed under the relevant tests may depend to some degree on one's philosophy of the fragility of the democratic process. There cannot be much doubt, however, that the tests will not support a statute of the type now before the Court. To peremptorily eliminate a large group of minority voters and their party from the political scene not only sweeps too broadly as a protection against subversion, but it also sets up in the current law constitutional conflicts not otherwise present. "Congress's very success with its direct assault upon the Communist Party through the sterner medium of the criminal law could only have had the effect of undermining the constitutional foundations of its disclosure approach. . . . If Congress would do the one, it may have to forego the other." Communist Party U. S. A. v. United States, supra, 384 F.2d at 961-962. Finally, in the absence of a showing that these people, forming this party in Arizona or the United States, are guilty of the forbidden advocacy, the statutes are merely the suppression of a hated minority. "All political ideas cannot and should not be channeled into the programs of our two major parties. History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups, who innumerable times have been in the vanguard of democratic thought and whose programs were ultimately accepted. . . . The absence of such voices would be a symptom of grave illness in our society." Sweezy v. New Hampshire ex rel. Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 250-251, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1212, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (1957). It should not be forgotten that the "radical trade-unionists" of our earlier history did not "overthrow the free enterprise system," but are now charged in some quarters with being staunch members of its Establishment. The right to participation in the political process through groups of their own choosing cannot be proscribed or limited without some semblance of due process. The challenged statutes, as bills of attainder, do not meet this criterion. Furthermore, adjudicatory procedures reaching this result may still be such a broad invasion of the protected rights as to violate due process or equal protection. So long as the government has available criminal sanctions, it does not appear to require more drastic measures. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 16-205, 16-206 (Supp.1972-73), and 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-842 (1970), are unconstitutional on their face and as applied. It is ordered that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted as to non-injunctive relief, and counsel shall submit a form of judgment for approval by the Court. NOTES [1] Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 16-202 to 16-204 (1956), amended, (Supp. 1972-1973). The petitions must bear the signature of at least two percent of the votes cast for governor at the preceding general election, be so certified by the respective county recorders, be verified by ten electors, and be presented to the Secretary of State between 60 and 90 days preceding the primary election. The state early argued that as the party had not qualified for placement on the primary election ballot, neither it nor its candidates could qualify for the general election, under id. § 16-601 (Supp. 1972-1973). The Arizona election laws are not always clear as to the interrelationship of different sections, see Board of Supervisors v. Harrington, 85 Ariz. 163, 333 P.2d 971 (1959), and this is especially true of the impact on new parties of the various provisions. There is no doubt that section 16-601 is designed for the use of persons without party designation who were thereby unrepresented in the primary election, in order to allow them access to the general ballot. Were the Communist Party to be on the primary ballot, and fail to nominate anyone for a particular office, no person could be placed on the general ballot under the Party's name through this section. Board of Supervisors v. Harrington, supra; Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 16-502, 16-503, 16-506 (1956). The Arizona law clearly contemplates that parties and their candidates shall be elected first through the primary system, but that doors are left open for single individuals to qualify as nonpartisan candidates. This conforms to the apparent intent of the constitutional drafters. Ariz.Const. art. VII, § 10. But see Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 16-601(A) (Supp. 1972-73): "Candidates . . . may be nominated otherwise than by primary election or by party committee in the manner set forth in this section." (Emphasis added.) The committee procedure referred to is probably limited to that for withdrawal of candidates after the primary election. See Id. § 16-604. Whatever the merits of this challenge to plaintiffs' standing by the state, which had prevented in the first place the Party's appearance on the primary ballot, the issue is foreclosed by the opinion of the three-judge court. [2] The complaint challenges the federal statute in the event the state statute is found void under the supremacy clause, or the state otherwise relies on it. The state stipulated that the federal statute is in issue, and therefore relies on it. [3] See note 1 supra. Total votes cast for governor in 1970 were 411,409. The parties stipulated that 8200 signatures were required. As Arizona now elects its governor to a four-year term, Ariz.Const. art. V, § 1, the relevant figure presumably is that from the last election at which a governor was elected. Cf. State ex rel. Nelson v. Jordan, 104 Ariz. 193, 450 P.2d 383, appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 5, 90 S. Ct. 24, 24 L. Ed. 2d 4 (1969). [4] Elfbrandt struck down the public employees' loyalty oath, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 38-231(E) (Supp. 1972). The act also forbids members of the Party to hold political office. Id. §§ 13-707(C), 13-707.01 (Supp. 1972-73). That provision has not been brought into this case. See Socialist Workers Party v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D.Tex.1972). [5] Congress repealed 50 U.S.C. §§ 811-826 in 1971. Pub.L. No. 92-128, § 2(a), 85 Stat. 348 (1971). Other sections have been found unconstitutional. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S. Ct. 419, 19 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1967) (50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (D), prohibiting members of the Party from employment at a defense facility); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S. Ct. 1707, 14 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1965) (29 U.S.C. § 504, prohibiting members from holding office in a labor union); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1964) (50 U.S.C. § 785, prohibiting members from obtaining passports); see Communist Party U.S.A. v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389, 81 S. Ct. 1465, 6 L. Ed. 2d 919 (1961), rev'g In re Albertson, 8 N.Y.2d 77, 202 N.Y.S.2d 5, 168 N.E.2d 242 (1960) (50 U.S.C. §§ 841-844 held not to prohibit benefits of state unemployment laws). But see Communist Party U.S.A. v. Subversive Act. Cont. Bd. (SACB), 367 U.S. 1, 81 S. Ct. 1357, 6 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1961) (registration procedures, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-783, 786-788, held not a bill of attainder). See also id. at 84 and nn. 30-32, 81 S. Ct. at 1404 and nn. 30-32. [6] A detailed analysis of the effect of the Internal Security Act may be found at Communist Party U.S.A. v. Subversive Act. Cont. Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 15-19, 81 S. Ct. 1357, 1368-1370, 6 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1961). [7] See the equal protection discussion, infra. [8] Corporations do not of course have all the rights of individuals. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1868) (privileges and immunities clause); Hyster Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1964) (self-incrimination clause). [9] The court there reversed the conviction of the Party, qua Party, for failing to register and to file its organizational statements, as a violation of its officers' and members' fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The dictum to the contrary in Communist Party U.S.A. v. SACB, supra, on this point had already been overruled in Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 86 S. Ct. 194, 15 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1965), which invalidated on the same ground orders of the Board requiring registration of individual Party members. Thus the registration portions of the Internal Security Act (Subversive Activities Control Act) were finally rendered useless, adding another chapter to a long line of cases invalidating anticommunist measures on constitutional grounds. See Communist Party U.S.A. v. United States, supra, 384 F.2d at 959 n.3; note 5 supra. [10] Since the enunciation of this standard, it has become commonplace to assert in every lawsuit seeking to strike down a state law that a fundamental right is involved. It may be that what is required is one test which balances on a sliding scale the depth of the state interest against the extent to which the circle of rights around an individual is invaded. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1013, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting). See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 42-48, 89 S. Ct. 5, 16-19, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the rights involved here are fundamental. "In the present situation the state laws place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rightsthe rights of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank among our most precious freedoms. . . . Similarly we have said with reference to the right to vote: `No right is more precious in a free country. . . . Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.'" Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 30-31, 89 S. Ct. at 10, quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S. Ct. 526, 535, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1964). [11] Some have suggested that the plaintiff must allege both a fundamental right and a suspect category to bring the doctrine into play. See Note, supra, 14 Ariz.L. Rev. at 110. Clearly only one or the other is required. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 17, 93 S. Ct. at 1288; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1344, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). [12] Even if a registration procedure based on fact-finding were used as a prerequisite, it might not meet the test. That question is not analyzed here, but considering the nature of the political process and the need for fluidity, perhaps criminal convictions for direct advocacy are in all cases the superior means to outlawry. (4) المحكمة العليا الأمريكية تنغض دعوى رفعتها الحكومة الأمريكية بموجب المادة 338 (أ) من قانون الجنسية لعام 1940 لإلغاء مرسوم التجنس الذي مُنح بموجبه السيد نوفاك الجنسية الأمريكية، تم إحضار مقدم الالتماس إلى الولايات المتحدة من بولندا في عام 1913 وهو في العاشرة من عمره، بدعوى أنه تم الحصول عليها بطريقة احتيالية وغير قانونية، رغم أن الحكومة أثبتت أن مقدم الالتماس كان عضوا في الحزب الشيوعي لمدة خمس سنوات قبل حصوله على الجنسية، فقد فشلت في إثبات أنه "لم يكن ملتزمًا بمبادئ الدستور. وهذه السابقة القانونية هي الأقرب للقضية المطروحة هنا، وهي تكذب بشكل قاطع ادعاءات المعادين للحزب الشيوعي وللشيوعيين السودانيين. المحكمة العليا الأمريكية نوفاك ضد الولايات المتحدة، 356 الولايات المتحدة 660 (1958) نوفاك ضد الولايات المتحدة رقم 72 تم في 28 يناير 1958 تقرر في 26 مايو 1958 356 الولايات المتحدة 660 Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958) Supreme Court Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958) Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958) Nowak v. United States No. 72 Argued January 28, 1958 Decided May 26, 1958 356 U.S. 660 Syllabus Petitioner was brought to the United States from Poland in 1913 at the age of 10 years and was admitted to citizenship in 1938. In 1952, the Government sued under § 338(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940 to set aside the naturalization decree on the ground that it had been obtained fraudulently and illegally. The District Court granted the relief sought, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: the judgment is reversed, because the Government has failed to prove its charges by the "clear, un#####ocal, and convincing evidence" which is required in denaturalization cases. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118. Pp. 356 U. S. 661-668. 1. An affidavit showing "good cause," filed with the complaint by a responsible official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, who swore that the allegations were based upon facts disclosed by official records of the Service to which he had had access, satisfied the purpose of § 338(a) to protect those proceeded against from ill-considered action. P. 356 U. S. 662. 2. The finding of fraudulent procurement of citizenship, based on petitioner's answers to a question in a preliminary naturalization form filed in 1937, could not be sustained. The Government claimed that the question required petitioner to disclose that he was a member of the Communist Party; but the question was so ambiguous that it may have been understood by him as relating solely to membership in anarchistic organizations. Pp. 356 U. S. 663-665. 3. Though the Government proved that petitioner was a member of the Communist Party for five years preceding his naturalization, it failed to prove sufficiently that he was not "attached to the principles of the Constitution," because it did not prove by "clear, un#####ocal, and convincing" evidence that he knew that the Party advocated the violent overthrow of the Government. Pp. 356 U. S. 665-668. 238 F.2d 282, reversed, and cause remanded. (5) المحكمة العليا الأمريكية تعلن عدم قانونية اعتقال السيد بريدجز توطئة لترحيله، الصادر بموجب قانون 28 حزيران / يونيو 1940، والذي ينص على إبعاد أي أجنبي كان وقت دخوله إلى الولايات المتحدة، أو كان في أي وقت بعد ذلك، عضو أو منتسب إلى منظمة تؤمن بالإطاحة بالحكومة الأمريكية، أو تنصح بها أو تدعو إليها أو تعلمها بالقوة أو بالعنف، حيث أشارت المحكمة إلى سوء تفسير مصطلح "الانتماء" كما هو مستخدم في القانون، وعلى جلسة استماع غير عادلة حول مسألة عضويته في الحزب الشيوعي، حيث شددت على أن حرية التعبير والصحافة تمنح أيضاً للأجانب المقيمين في هذا البلد. المحكمة العليا الأمريكية Bridges v. Wixon، 326 US 135 (1945) بريدجز ضد ويكسون رقم 788 تم في 2 أبريل 1945 تقرر في 18 يونيو 1945 326 الولايات المتحدة 135 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) U.S. Supreme Court Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) Bridges v. Wixon No. 788 Argued April 2, 3, 1945 Decided June 18, 1945 326 U.S. 135 Syllabus 1. The order for the deportation of the petitioner -- issued under the Act of June 28, 1940, providing for the deportation of any alien who was at the time of his entry into the United States, or has been at any time thereafter, a member of or affiliated with an organization that believes in, advises, advocates, or teaches the overthrow of this Government by force or violence -- rests upon a misconstruction of the term "affiliation" as used in the Act, and upon an unfair hearing on the question of his membership in the Communist Party, wherefore Page 326 U. S. 136 his detention under the warrant of deportation is unlawful. Pp. 326 U. S. 140, 326 U. S. 156. 2. The act or acts tending to prove "affiliation" within the meaning of the deportation statute must be of that quality which indicates an adherence to or a furtherance of the purposes or objectives of the proscribed organization, as distinguished from mere cooperation with it in lawful activities. The act or acts must evidence a working alliance to bring the program to fruition. P. 326 U. S. 143. 3. Freedom of speech and of the press is accorded aliens residing in this country. P. 326 U. S. 148. 4. So far as the record shows the literature published by the petitioner, the utterances made by him were entitled to the protection of the freedom of speech and of the press. They revealed a militant advocacy of the cause of trade unionism, but did not teach or advocate or advise the subversive conduct condemned by the statute. P. 326 U. S. 148. 5. Detention under an invalid order of deportation is established where an alien is ordered deported for reasons not specified by Congress. P. 326 U. S. 149. 6. Upon the record in this case, the finding of "affiliation" was based on too loose a meaning of that term. P. 326 U. S. 149. 7. A person under investigation with a view to deportation is legally entitled to insist upon the observance of rules promulgated pursuant to law by the agency entrusted with the power to deport. P. 326 U. S. 153. 8. Objection to evidence on the ground that it violates the governing regulations is timely where made before both the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Attorney General, though not at the hearing before the inspector. P. 326 U. S. 151. 9. Since it was error to admit into evidence against the petitioner certain unsworn statements in violation of Rules 150.1(c) and 150.6(i) of the Regulations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service -- construed as meaning (1) that an investigating officer, in obtaining a "recorded statement," must obtain the statement by interrogation under oath, and seek to obtain it over the signature of the maker, and (2) that only such a "recorded statement," so safeguarded, may be used as evidence when the maker of the statement gives contradictory evidence on the stand -- since the statements in question were so crucial to the findings of membership, and since that issue was so close, this Court is unable to say that the order of deportation may be sustained without them. Pp. 326 U. S. 151, 326 U. S. 156. 10. In habeas corpus proceedings challenging the legality of detention upon a warrant of deportation, the petitioner does not prove he had Page 326 U. S. 137 an unfair hearing merely by proving the decision to be wrong or by showing that incompetent evidence was admitted or considered; but the case is different where evidence as improperly received and where, but for that evidence, it is wholly speculative whether the requisite finding would have been made. P. 326 U. S. 156. 144 F.2d 927, reversed. Certiorari, 323 U. S. 708, to review the affirmance of a judgment denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (6) في قضية السيد شنايدرمان، رفعت الحكومة دعوى في عام 1939 لإلغاء شهادة الجنسية ، والتي مُنحت في عام 1927، بدعوى أنها "تم شراؤها بطريقة غير مشروعة"، وأن المدعى عليه، وقت التجنس ولمدة خمس سنوات سابقة، لم يكن مرتبطًا بمبادئ الدستور، ولكنه كان، في الواقع، عضوًا ومنتسبًا إلى، وآمن ودعم مبادئ، بعض المنظمات الشيوعية في الولايات المتحدة التي عارضت مبادئ الدستور ودعت إلى الإطاحة بـ حكومة الولايات المتحدة بالقوة والعنف، حيث شددت المحكمة العليا على أن عبء الإثبات يقع على عاتق الحكومة، بصورة لا تقبل الخطأ، وبأدلة واضحة لا لبس فيها ومقنعة؛ وإن مجرد رجحان الأدلة الذي يترك المسألة موضع شك لن يكون كافياً، فعند تفسير قوانين الكونغرس التي تحكم التجنيس وإلغاء الجنسية، لا ينبغي تفسير التعبيرات العامة بحيث تحد من حرية الفكر السياسي، وخلصت إلى الآتي: (1) أن الأدلة، التي تمت مراجعتها في الرأي، لا تظهر بالدرجة المطلوبة من اليقين أنه خلال الفترة المعنية لم يكن المدعى عليه مرتبطًا بمبادئ الدستور. (2) إن الارتباط بمبادئ الدستور لا يتعارض بالضرورة مع الرغبة في تعديله. (3) أقوال بعض قادة المنظمات الحزبية المعنية، والتي تدعو إلى القوة والعنف لا يمكن عزوها للمدعى عليه. (4) بموجب الأدلة المتضاربة في هذه القضية، لا يمكن للمحكمة أن تقول إن الحكومة أثبتت باليقين المطلوب أن موقف الحزب الشيوعي في الولايات المتحدة عام 1927 من القوة والعنف كان في فئة التحريض على الفعل العنيف الآني، الذي يخلق خطرًا واضحًا وقائمًا على الفوضى العامة، أو شر جوهري آخر، بدلاً من مجرد تبرير عقائدي أو توقع لاستخدام القوة في ظل ظروف افتراضية في وقت ما غير محدد في المستقبل، غير محسوب أو يُقصد التصرف بناءً عليه في الوقت الحالي. المحكمة العليا الأمريكية شنايدرمان ضد الولايات المتحدة ، 320 US 118 (1943) شنايدرمان ضد الولايات المتحدة رقم 2 تم في 9 نوفمبر 1942 أعيد منحها في 12 مارس 1943 تقرر في 21 يونيو 1943 320 الولايات المتحدة 118 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) U.S. Supreme Court Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) Schneiderman v. United States No. 2 Argued November 9, 1942 Reargued March 12, 1943 Decided June 21, 1943 320 U.S. 118 Syllabus 1. Assuming that, in the absence of fraud, a certificate of citizenship can be set aside under §15 of the Naturalization Act of 1906 as "illegally procured" because the finding by the naturalization court that the applicant was attached to the principles of the Constitution was erroneous, the burden is upon the Government to prove the error by clear, un#####ocal and convincing evidence; a mere preponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt will not suffice. P. 320 U. S. 124. 2. In construing the Acts of Congress governing naturalization and denaturalization, general expressions should not be so construed as to circumscribe liberty of political thought. P. 320 U. S. 132. 3. The Government sued in 1939 to cancel a certificate of citizenship, granted in 1927, charging that it had been "illegally procured," in that the defendant, at the time of the naturalization and for five years preceding, was not attached to the principles of the Constitution, but was, in fact ,a member of, and affiliated with, and believed in and supported the principles of, certain communistic organizations in the United States which were opposed to the principles of the Constitution and advocated the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence. Held: (1) That the evidence, which is reviewed in the opinion, fails to show with the requisite degree of certainty that during the period in question the defendant was not attached to the principles of the Constitution. P. 320 U. S. 135. (2) Attachment to the principles of the Constitution is not necessarily incompatible with a desire to have it amended. P. 320 U. S. 137. (3) Utterances of certain leaders of the party organizations in question, advocating force and violence, are not imputable to the defendant. P. 320 U. S. 146. (4) Under the conflicting evidence in this case, the Court can not say that the Government proved with the requisite certainty that the attitude of the Communist party in the United States in 1927 towards force and violence was in the category of agitation and exhortation calling for present violent action which creates a clear Page 320 U. S. 119 and present danger of public disorder or other substantive evil, rather than a mere doctrinal justification or prediction of the use of force under hypothetical conditions at some indefinite future time, not calculated or intended to be presently acted upon, but leaving opportunity for general discussion and calm reason. P. 320 U. S. 157. 4. The Court does not consider findings made by the District Court in this case upon issues outside of the scope of the complaint; in a denaturalization case, as in a criminal case, the Government is limited to the matters charged in the complaint. P. 320 U. S. 159. 119 F.2d 500 reversed. (7) نقضت المحكمة العليا الأمريكية أحكام محكمة فيدرالية محلية في ولاية كاليفورنيا، حيث تم توجيه اتهام إلى 14 من قادة الحزب الشيوعي في كاليفورنيا في عام 1951، بموجب المادة 3 من قانون سميث والمادة 18 من قانون الولايات المتحدة. § 371 للتآمر (1) للدعوة وتعليم واجب وضرورة الإطاحة بحكومة الولايات المتحدة بالقوة والعنف، و (2) قيامه كحزب لشيوعي للولايات المتحدة بتنظيم مجتمعًا من الأشخاص وذلك للدعوة والتعليم، وذلك بقصد التسبب في الإطاحة بالحكومة بالقوة والعنف وبالسرعة التي تسمح بها الظروف. اتهمت لائحة الاتهام بأن المؤامرة نشأت في عام 1940 واستمرت حتى تاريخ لائحة الاتهام، وأنه عند تنفيذها، سيصبح مقدمو الالتماس والمتعاونون معهم (أ) أعضاء وضباطًا في الحزب الشيوعي، مع العلم بأغراضه غير المشروعة، وتولي القيادة في تنفيذ سياساته وأنشطته، (ب) التسبب في أن تكون وحدات الحزب منظمة في كاليفورنيا وأماكن أخرى، (ج) كتابة ونشر مقالات حول مثل هذه المناصرة والتعليم، (د) إدارة المدارس لتلقين عقيدة أعضاء الحزب في مثل هذه المناصرة والتعليم، و (هـ) يجندون أعضاء الحزب الجدد، لا سيما من بين الأشخاص العاملين في الصناعات الرئيسية للأمة. كما ادعت بوجود 23 عملاً علنيًا لتعزيز المؤامرة. أُدين مقدمو الالتماس بعد محاكمة أمام هيئة محلفين، وأيدت محكمة الاستئناف إدانتهم. أصدرت المحكمة العليا الأمريكية حكمها بنقض الإدانات ويعاد السبب إلى محكمة المقاطعة مع توجيهات للدخول في أحكام تبرئة خمسة من الملتمسين ومنح محاكمة جديدة للآخرين، وأصدرت الموجهات التالية: 1ـ نشأ الحزب الشيوعي في عام 1945 (تأسس عام 1919 في الواقع )، ولم تُرد لائحة الاتهام حتى عام 1951، كانت فترة التقادم التي مدتها ثلاث سنوات قد سرت على تهمة "التنظيم"، وتطلبت سحب هذا الجزء من لائحة الاتهام من هيئة المحلفين. 225. تطبيق القاعدة التي تنص على أن القوانين الجنائية يجب أن تفسر بدقة، فإن كلمة "تنظيم"، كما هي مستخدمة في قانون سميث، تُفسر على أنها تشير فقط إلى الأفعال التي تدخل في إنشاء منظمة جديدة، وليس إلى الأفعال التي تمت بعد ذلك في ممارسة أنشطتها، على الرغم من أن الأخيرة قد توصف على نحو فضفاض بأنها " تنظيمية ". (ب) لم يكن خطأ المحكمة الابتدائية في تفسير كلمة "تنظيم" خطأ غير مبرر؛ حيث تكون الظروف مثل الدعوة إلى تطبيق القاعدة التي تتطلب وضع حكم جانباً حيث يكون قابلاً للتأييد على أساس ما دون الآخر ، ومن المستحيل تحديد الأساس الذي اختارته هيئة المحلفين. 2. لا يحظر قانون سميث الدعوة إلى إطاحة الحكومة بالقوة وتعليمها كمبدأ مجرد، بعيدًا عن أي جهد للتحريض على العمل لتحقيق هذه الغاية؛ حيث قدمت المحكمة الابتدائية إلى هيئة المحلفين توجيهات غير كافية على الإطلاق بشأن هذه النقطة المركزية في القضية، ولا يمكن السماح بالإدانة. دينيس ضد الولايات، 341. U. S. 494ص. 354 الولايات المتحدة 312-32 3. من الواضح أن الأدلة ضد خمسة من مقدمي الالتماس غير كافية بحيث يجب الأمر ببراءتهم، وبالنسبة للآخرين لا يجب عدم إغلاق الطريق أمام إعادة محاكمتهم. 4. القرارات المؤيدة لمقدم الالتماس شنايدرمان التي أصدرتها هذه المحكمة في قضية شنايدرمان ضد الولايات المتحدة، 320 US 118 ، وهي إجراء لسحب الجنسية كان هو الطرف السائد فيها، ليست قاطعة في هذه الدعوى بموجب مبدأ الإغلاق الجانبي، وهو ليس كذلك يحق له الحكم بالبراءة على هذا الأساس. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute، 333 U. S. 683. Pp. 354 الولايات المتحدة 335-338. المحكمة العليا الأمريكية ييتس ضد الولايات المتحدة 354 US 298 (1957) ييتس ضد الولايات المتحدة رقم 6 تمت المناقشة في 8-9 أكتوبر 1956 تقرر في 17 يونيو 1957 * 354 الولايات المتحدة 298 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) U.S. Supreme Court Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) Yates v. United States No. 6 Argued October 8-9, 1956 Decided June 17, 1957* 354 U.S. 298 Syllabus The 14 petitioners, leaders of the Communist Party in California, were indicted in 1951 in a Federal District Court under § 3 of the Smith Act and 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring (1) to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing the Government of the United States by force and violence, and (2) to organize, as the Communist Party of the United States, a society of persons who so advocate and teach, all with the intent of causing the overthrow of the Government by force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit. The indictment charged that the conspiracy originated in 1940 and continued down to the date of the indictment, and that, in carrying it out, petitioners and their coconspirators would (a) become members and officers of the Communist Party, with knowledge of its unlawful purposes, and assume leadership in carrying out its policies and activities, (b) cause to be organized units of the Party in California and elsewhere, (c) write and publish articles on such advocacy and teaching, (d) conduct schools for the indoctrination of Party members in such advocacy and teaching, and € recruit new Party members, particularly from among persons employed in the key industries of the Nation. It also alleged 23 overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Petitioners were convicted after a jury trial, and their convictions were sustained by the Court of Appeals. Held: The convictions are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to enter judgments of acquittal as to five of the petitioners and to grant a new trial as to the others. Pp. 354 U. S. 300-338. 226. Since the Communist Party came into being in 1945, and the indictment was not returned until 1951, the three-year statute of limitations had run on the “organizing” charge, and required the withdrawal of that part of the indictment from the jury’s consideration. Pp. 354 U. S. 303-312. Page 354 U. S. 299 (a) Applying the rule that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly, the word “organize,” as used in the Smith Act, is construed as referring only to acts entering into the creation of a new organization, and not to acts thereafter performed in carrying on its activities, even though the latter may loosely be termed “organizational.” Pp. 303-311. (b) The trial court’s mistaken construction of the word “organize” was not harmless error; the circumstances are such as to call for application of the rule which requires a verdict to be set aside where it is supportable on one ground, but not another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected. Pp. 354 U. S. 311-312. 2. The Smith Act does not prohibit advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow of the Government as an abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end; the trial court’s charge to the jury furnished wholly inadequate guidance on this central point in the case, and the conviction cannot be allowed to stand. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, distinguished. Pp. 354 U. S. 312-327. 3. The evidence against five of the petitioners is so clearly insufficient that their acquittal should be ordered, but that as to the others is such as not to justify closing the way to their retrial. Pp. 354 U. S. 327-334. 4. Determinations favorable to petitioner Schneiderman made by this Court in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, a denaturalization proceeding in which he was the prevailing party, are not conclusive in this proceeding under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and he is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal on that ground. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683. Pp. 354 U. S. 335-338. 225 F.2d 146, reversed and remanded. (8) المحكمة العليا تعيد قضية رولدت إلى محكمة الموضوع، وتتلخص القضية في أن السيد رولدت قد ذكر أمام مفتش الهجرة في عام 1947 بأنه انضم إلى الحزب الشيوعي في عام 1935، ودفع المستحقات، حضر اجتماعات، وعمل في مكتبة شيوعية، وأنهى عضويته بعد عام، وبناء على هذه المعلومات فقد قررت الحكومة ترحيله بموجب الفقرة 22 من قانون الأمن الداخلي لعام 1950 بصيغته المعدلة، لكن المحكمة العليا أن انتماء مقدم الالتماس إلى الحزب خاليًا تمامًا من أي آثار سياسية، وأن السجل غير جوهري للغاية لإثبات أن عضوية الملتمس كانت نوعًا من الارتباط الهادف المطلوب بموجب الفقرة 22، وأعادت القضية إلى المحكمة الأدنى. المحكمة العليا الأمريكية رولدت ضد بيرفيتو 355 US 115 (1957) رولدت ضد بيرفيتو رقم 5 تم 13-14 نوفمبر 1956 تمت إعادة التقويم إلى التقويم الخاص بإعادة التعيين في 24 يونيو 1957 أعيد ترتيبها في 14 أكتوبر 1957 تقرر 9 ديسمبر 1957 355 الولايات المتحدة 115 Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957) U.S. Supreme Court Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957) Rowoldt v. Perfetto No. 5 Argued November 13-14, 1956 Restored to the calendar for reargument June 24, 1957 Reargued October 14, 1957 Decided December 9, 1957 355 U.S. 115 Syllabus In this case, the only evidentiary support for the order for petitioner's deportation under § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended, was his own testimony before an immigration inspector in 1947 that he joined the Communist Party in 1935, paid dues, attended meetings, worked in a Communist bookstore, and terminated his membership after a year. Held: 1. From his testimony, the dominating impulse of petitioner's "affiliation" with the Party may well have been wholly devoid of any "political" implications. Pp. 355 U. S. 116-121. 2. The record is too insubstantial to establish that petitioner's membership was the kind of meaningful association required by § 22, as amended by the Act of March 28, 1951, to support an order of deportation. Pp. 355 U. S. 116-121. 228 F.2d 109 reversed. (9) رفضت المحكمة العليا دعوى الحكومة الأميركية ضد روبيل وهو عضو الحزب الشيوعي الأمريكي، وموظف في حوض بناء السفن، الذي أُعلن مرفق دفاعي من قبل وزير الدفاع، وقد ظل روبيل يعمل في حوض بناء السفن حتى بعد أن طُلب منه التسجيل كمنظمة عمل شيوعي، بموجب قانون التحكم الشيوعي. وهذا يعني أن عضو الحزب يمكن أن يعمل موظف حتى في مرفق دفاعي حساس مثل حوض بناء السفن، حسب المحكمة العليا. المحكمة العليا الأمريكية الولايات المتحدة ضد روبيل 389 US 258 (1967) الولايات المتحدة ضد روبيل رقم 8 تم 14 نوفمبر 1966 أعيد تسجيلها في 9 أكتوبر 1967 تقرر 11 ديسمبر 1967 389 الولايات المتحدة 258 U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) United States v. Robel No. 8 Argued November 14, 1966 Reargued October 9, 1967 Decided December 11, 1967 389 U.S. 258 Syllabus Appellee, a member of the Communist Party (which had been ordered to register as a Communist-action organization under the Subversive Activities Control Act) remained an employee at a shipyard after the Secretary of Defense had designated it a "defense facility" under the Act. Petitioner was thereafter indicted under § 5(a)(1)(D) of the Act for having "unlawfully and willfully engage[d]" in employment at the shipyard with knowledge of the outstanding order against the Party and of the notice of the Secretary's designation. The District Court, relying on Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, dismissed the indictment for failure to allege that appellee was an active Party member with knowledge of and a specific intent to advance its unlawful purposes. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals and then certified to this Court as a direct appeal. Held: Section 5(a)(1)(D) is invalid since, by its overbreadth, it unconstitutionally abridges the right of association protected by the First Amendment. Pp. 389 U. S. 262-268. (a) The indiscriminate application of § 5(a)(1)(D) to all types of association with Communist-action groups, regardless of the quality and degree of membership, makes it impossible by limiting construction to save the provision from constitutional infirmity. Cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500. P. 389 U. S. 262. (b) An individual's associational rights under the First Amendment are no less basic than the right to travel involved in Aptheker. Pp. 389 U. S. 262-263. (c) The fact that the Act was passed pursuant to Congress' "war power" to further the "national defense" cannot "remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties," Home Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 290 U. S. 426. Pp. 389 U. S. 263-264. (d) The statute literally establishes guilt by association alone, without any need to show that an individual's association poses the threat of sabotage and espionage in defense plants at which the legislation is directed. P. 389 U. S. 265. Page 389 U. S. 259 (e) Section 5(a)(1)(D) includes within its coverage not only association which may be proscribed consistently with the First Amendment, but also association (such as that of passive members of a designated organization, those unaware of or disagreeing with its unlawful aims, and those in nonsensitive jobs at defense facilities) which cannot be so proscribed. Pp. 389 U. S. 265-266. (f) Congress, in exercising its ample power to safeguard the national defense, cannot exceed constitutional bounds, particularly where First Amendment rights are at stake. Pp. 389 U. S. 266-268. Affirmed. (10) المحكمة العليا الأمريكية تعلن بطلان المادة 6 من قانون مراقبة الأنشطة التخريبية " الشيوعية " لعام 1950، واعتبارها غير دستورية، لأنها تتعدى بشكل واسع للغاية وعشوائي على الحرية التي يضمنها التعديل الخامس من الدستور الأمريكي، في القضية الخاصة بكبار المسؤولين في الحزب الشيوعي للولايات المتحدة ومنهم أبثيكر، ضد وزير الخارجية، بخصوص إصدار جوازات سفر لهم. المحكمة العليا الأمريكية أبثيكر ضد وزير الخارجية ، 378 US 500 (1964) أبثيكر ضد وزير الخارجية رقم 461 تم في 21 أبريل 1964 تقرر في 22 يونيو 1964 378 الولايات المتحدة 500 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) U.S. Supreme Court Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) Aptheker v. Secretary of State No. 461 Argued April 21, 1964 Decided June 22, 1964 378 U.S. 500 Syllabus Appellants, native-born citizens and residents of the United States, are ranking officials of the Communist Party of the United States. After hearings under State Department regulations, appellants' passports were revoked under § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which provides that, when a Communist organization is registered, or under final order to register, it shall be unlawful for any member with knowledge or notice thereof to apply for or use a passport. Appellants filed suit asking that § 6 be declared unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that the Secretary of State be ordered to issue passports to them. A three-judge District Court denied relief. Held: 1. Section 6 is unconstitutional on its face, for it too broadly and indiscriminately transgresses the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 378 U. S. 505-514. (a) The right to travel at home and abroad is an important aspect of liberty of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, followed. P. 378 U. S. 505. (b) Under existing laws, denial of a passport effectively prohibits travel anywhere in the world outside the Western Hemisphere. P. 378 U. S. 507. (c) Though the underlying purpose of § 6 is the protection of national security, the attainment of that end cannot be realized by unduly infringing upon constitutional freedoms. Pp. 378 U. S. 508-509. (d) Section 6 applies to every member of a "Communist action" or "Communist front" organization whether or not he believes or knows that he is associated with such an organization or that the organization seeks to further the aims of world Communism. Pp. 378 U. S. 509-510. (e) Also irrelevant under § 6 is the member's degree of activity and his commitment to the organization's purposes. P. 378 U. S. 510. (f) Section 6 creates an irrebuttable presumption that all members of Communist organizations will engage in activities endangering our security if given passports. P. 378 U. S. 511. Page 378 U. S. 501 (g) The proscription of § 6 applies regardless of the traveler's purpose or destination. Pp. 378 U. S. 511-512. (h) Congress could have chosen less drastic means of achieving the national security objective without such sweeping abridgment of liberty. Pp. 378 U. S. 512-514. 2. Section 6 cannot be held constitutional as applied to these appellants, for such a "construction" would require substantial rewriting of the statute and would inject an element of vagueness into its scope. Since freedom of travel is closely akin to freedom of speech and association, appellants should not be required to demonstrate that Congress could not have written a statute constitutionally prohibiting their travel. Pp. 378 U. S. 515-517. 219 F. Supp. 709, reversed and remanded. خاتمــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــة: لقد أثبت بنصوص القانون وبالسوابق القضائية كذب إثنين في هذا البوست يعادون الحزب الشيوعي والشيوعيين عداءاً مرضياً، أكثر حتى من بعض الكيزان، ويمارسون التنمر عليهم، ويقومون بأقبح الأفعال هنا، ويقومون بالتحريض العلني غير المباشر على الشيوعيين في الولايات المتحدة، في سابقة هي الأقبح من نوعها، لم يقم بها حتى معارضي الكيزان رغم جرائهم ضد الشعب السوداني. ونخلص من نص هذه المُرافعة الدفاعية إلى الحقائق القانونية والسياسية المتينة الصلدة الآتية: (1) كذبة أن القانون في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية يعاقب المنتمي إليه الحزب الشيوعي الأمريكي بـ 10000 دولار غرامة أو 5 سنوات سجن أو العقوبتين معاً، والصحيح هو أن هذه العقوبة لمن يرفضون التسجيل من أعضاء الحزب عند السلطات المختصة، وقد رفض الحزب الشيوعي الأمريكي ورفض أعضائه التسجيل متمسكين بحقوق المواطنة وحقوق الإنسان، مستندين إلى التعديل الخامس من الدستور الذي يمنع تجريم الذات، وذلك رغم إرهاب القانون وإرهاب الغوغائية المكارثية، مما وضع السلطات الأمريكية في مأزق وورطة كبرى، فتجاهلت تطبيق هذا القانون الغبي. (2) السوابق القضائية أعلاه تنطبق تماماً على حالة الشيوعيين السودانيين في الولايات المتحدة الذين يدعون أنهم كذبوا في فورمات الهجرة بدون أي دليل مادي، وأنها مجرد تخمينات وتكهنات وظنون، نابعة من عقول وقلوب كارهة للآخرين، وأن إثبات ذلك دونه خرط القتاد وصعود جبال شاهقة تناطح عنان السماء. (3) توجد سابقة قضائية من المحكمة العليا الأمريكية قضت بأن من حق المواطن الأمريكي عضو الحزب الشيوعي الأمريكي العمل في منشآت حساسة من الناحية الأمنية مثل منشآت الدفاع. (4) عبء الإثبات يقوم الطرف المدعي وهو الحكومة الأمريكية، وهو أمر صعب جداً. (5) أن مجرد الدعوة كتابة أو شفاهة إلى الإطاحة بالحكومة الأمريكية بالقوة والعنف لا يكفي وحده لنزع الجنسية أو عدم منحها، فلابد أن يكون ذلك مصحوباً بأفعال محسوسة على الأرض، بمعنى أني إذا ذهبت إلى الولايات المتحدة ودعوت إلى إسقاط الحكومة بالقوة دون أن أحمل سلاح وأدوات عنف وعمل محسوس وآني ووشيك على الأرض، فإن ذلك لا يحرمني من نيل الجنسية الأمريكية أو نزعها مني. (6) حتى إذا كان الفرد عضو في الحزب الشيوعي الأمريكي أو أي حزب شيوعي، ودعا قادة هذا الحزب إلى إسقاط الحكومة بالقوة وممارسة العنف وعدم الاعتراف بالدستور، فإن الفرد يحاسب على أفعاله وأقواله هو وليس الآخرين، إلا إذا ثبت بدون أدنى شك أنه متورط مع هؤلاء القادة. (7) رفض الحزب الشيوعي الأمريكي وأعضائه الإذعان لقانون التسجيل، وواقعياً سقط القانون، لأنه من المستحيل أن يتم سجن عشرات الآلاف من أعضاء الحزب، وهذا وحده يكشف مدى غباء المشرع الذي وضع القانون، وغباء الكونغرس الذي أجازه، والرئيس الذي وقع عليه. (8) أن مثل هذا القانون الغبي يلاحق أفذاذ عباقرة اشتراكيين وشيوعيين مثل ألبرت آنشتاين وشارلي شابلن ودي بويز وغيرهم، ويترك أغبياء يمينيين مثل واضع هذا القانون، وآخرين ممن يكرهون ويعادون الشيوعيين بدون أي إنجازات. (9) كثير من السوابق القضائية أشارت إلى التعديل الخامس والحق في عدم تجريم الذات. (10) أن أمريكا ليست ملك لهؤلاء المعادين للوجود الشيوعي فيها، فهم مجرد ضيوف مهاجرين مثلهم مثل غير، وبالتالي الشيوعيين عامة والشيوعيين السودانيين خاصة من حقهم الهجرة إليها، فمن المخزي أن يعادي مثل هؤلاء المناضلين الذي شهدت على بسالاتهم السجون وبيوت الأشباح، من لم يدفع ضريبة النضال.