كابتن/ عبد القادر عبد الغفار سعيد؛ يرد على الطاهر ساتي

Quote: A technical report compiled by the Sudanese CAA, which The Aviation Herald received on May 30th 2010, states that the left hand thrust reverser had been locked stowed according to Minimum Equipment List requirements. The landing in Port Sudan following the diversion from Khartoum was uneventful, all spoilers operated normally according to data off the flight data recorder. The airplane was on the ground in Port Sudan for about 75 minutes and departed again for Khartoum. According to FDR spoiler number 5 indicated faulty during approach to Khartoum. The tower at Khartoum reported winds from 320 degrees at 7 knots, the runway was wet and it was raining. Slats and flaps were in full landing configuration for the landing, the autopilot was turned off at 800 feet, autothrust remained engaged, the autobrakes were selected off by captain's decision, the first officer had recommended the use of autobrakes. Touchdown occured 850 meters (accuracy +/- 50 meters) past the runway threshold of runway 36 at a ground speed of 155 knots and a calibrated airspeed of 140 knots suggesting a tail wind component of 15 knots and a vertical acceleration of 1.1G. Both thrust levers were selected into maximum reverse position 5 seconds after nose gear touchdown, longitudinal deceleration was about 0.1G. 13 seconds after nose gear touchdown ground speed had reduced to 124 knots still decreasing, the thrust levers were selected into idle position with thrust reversers deselected, longitudinal deceleration was between 0.1 and 0.14G. 14 seconds after nose gear touch down the crew selected the anti-skid system to ALTN/OFF position. 19 seconds after touch down the ground proximity warning system sounded a "TERRAIN! TERRAIN!" warning for 2 seconds, ground speed was 114 knots and deceleration 0.14G. 20 seconds after nose gear touchdown deceleration reduced to 0.08G. 21 seconds after nose gear touch down the GPWS sounded a "PULL UP" warning, ground speed was 106 knots, deceleration 0.08G. 22 seconds after nose gear touch down deceleration reduced to 0.02G and increased again to 0.08G. 29 seconds after nose gear touch down the right hand thrust lever was selected into reverse and moved into high reverse thrust. 32 seconds after nose gear touch down both thrust levers were selected into maximum reverse positions. Deceleration was about 0.1G, ground speed 93 knots. The airplane overran the end of the runway shortly afterwards at a ground speed of 76 knots, vertical acceleration increased to up to 2.41G and deceleration increased to 0.41G. The report does not specify when the fire started, except that the fire started after the airplane had already stopped. There was no evidence of fire between the runway and the final position. The main fire occured between the right hand engine and the right hand wing root. Neither engine core showed any traces of an engine fire. All three left hand doors were opened, all their slides deployed for the evacuation. The left rear slide however could not be used because being too high above ground. Right engine nacelle drain (Photo: CAA Sudan) The main wreckage was located 215 meters past the runway end on hard ground. There were no marks on the ground in the overrun area, that suggested any part of the airplane except for the tyres contacted the surface. However, 110 meters past the runway end, following a small ditch of 0.9 meters width and 0.5 meters depth the drain of the right hand engine nacelle was found showing scrape marks suggesting, the engine nacelle may have contacted the ground. No other aircraft parts were found outside the wreckage perimeter. Several approach lights as well as antennas were found damaged on the ground, the right hand engine showed evidence of foreign object ingestion during the overrun. All brakes were recovered and later were tested working within all required operational limits despite long unprotected storage (10 month) and the accident damage. The tyres showed no evidence of hydroplaning, however 7 of the 8 main gear tyres had burst showing flat spots consistent with the wheels locking. Only tyre #1 (left hand forward outboard) remained inflated but also showed a flat spot, indicating that all 8 wheels had locked up. Marks on the tyres also indicated, that their rims did not contact the runway. Tyre marks on the ground suggest, that neither of the left hand main tyres was deflated at the time, when the airplane overran the runway end and exited the paved surface onto hard ground. The wheels locked after the captain had selected the anti-skid off and applied full brakes pressure on both pedals. The right hand main gear was intact at the time when the airplane came to a stand still and the crew exited the aircraft. Consequently, the right hand main gear collapsed at some later time. The report goes on to analyse, that following the selection of reverse thrust the airplane began skidding to the right. The reverser was therefore deactivated. Left hand rudder was applied, about 4 degrees, but was aerodynamically insufficient to correct the drift. The airplane however corrected back to the center line hence asymmetric braking must have been applied. When the deceleration was still poor, the captain deactivated the anti-skid system and applied full braking on both pedals, later applied reverse thrust again which however was ineffective already due to low speed. The loads in the overrun recorded by the DFDR were not sufficient to cause any structural damage. The impact with lights and antennas may have punctured the right hand wing and created a fuel leak, also tyre debris may have impacted the right hand wing. Some debris may have gone through the right hand engine and its deployed thrust reverser and impacted the wing. The fuel off the leak may have contacted the right hand engine and ignited. Due to the high temperature of the fire the right hand wing broke and the right hand main gear collapsed. Graphical representation of DFDR (Graphics: CAA Sudan/BEA): By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Feb 19th 2009 11:55Z, last updated Thursday, Feb 19th 2009 11:55Z According to leaked documents a preliminary report by the CAA Sudan states, that the airplane overran runway 36 by about 200 meters as the result of landing with tailwind, one locked out thrust reverser and the failure of spoilers. The airplane came to a safe stop, but the fire started in the moment, the airplane came to a standstill. 30 people died in the blaze, 178 people escaped and survived. According to the report the left hand engine thrust reverser of the Airbus A310 had been locked stowed by maintenance. The airplane was dispatched with the thrust reverser inoperative according to minimum equipment list. After the diversion to Port Sudan the airplane returned to Khartoum and approached runway 36 in rain and winds from 320 degrees at 7 knots. The runway was wet. The autopilot had been disconnected at 800 feet AGL, minimum landing flaps had been deployed. The airplane touched down before the touch down zone at 134 knots indicated airspeed, however a ground speed of 155 knots. Spoiler number 5 malfunctioned. The crew applied reverse thrust using the right hand thrust reverser, which worked normal. 10 seconds after touchdown the speed had reduced to 98 KIAS (122 knots ground speed), 20 seconds after touchdown the speed had dropped to 90 KIAS (107 knots ground speed). At that point a ground proximity warning "terrain, terrain" activated and the "Pull Up" light illuminated. The crew stowed the thrust reverser 28 seconds after touchdown at 79 KIAS (93 knots ground speed). 7 seconds later the airplane went past the runway end at a speed of 76 knots (this speed was not specified as ground or indicated speed). The airplane came to a stop 200 meters past the runway end. Tracks indicate, that the fire on the right side started after the airplane stopped. The continuing investigation focusses on the reasons why the deceleration of the airplane deteriorated, the reasons of the GPWS alert and the source and cause of the fire. By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Jun 25th 2008 10:47Z, last updated Wednesday, Jun 25th 2008 10:47Z In a meeting between Sudan Airways and the Sudanese Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) the CAA agreed to suspend the suspension of Sudan Airways' Air Operator Certificate (AOC) for a month allowing the airline to fly again with immediate effect. Within the month granted the airline must meet technical requirements and has to tighten administration meeting the goals set forth by the CAA. By Simon Hradecky, created Sunday, Jun 22nd 2008 05:42Z, last updated Sunday, Jun 22nd 2008 05:42Z The Sudanese Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has suspended the Air Operator Certificate (AOC) of Sudan Airways starting tomorrow (June 23rd), effectively grounding the airline. The CAA stated, that the step is not directly related to the crash, however the CAA had demanded urgent improvments in May after a safety audit, that the airline was not able to comply with being busy to deal with the aftermath of the disaster of flight 109. "It is high time to stop this non-compliance with international standards", the CAA director for safety and flight operations said. Sudan Airways now have one month to appeal the decision or comply with the required improvements. The airline has complained frequently in the past, that it has great difficulties acquiring spare parts and pilot training because of sanctions imposed by the USA against Sudan, which affects not only Boeing aircraft, but even European Airbus airplanes. By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Jun 13th 2008 13:12Z, last updated Monday, Jun 16th 2008 22:06Z According to NOTAM A088/08 issued by Khartoum Airport Authority on Apr 26th 2008 the airport has no secondary surveillance radar (SSR) until July 31st 2008. NOTAM A089/08, also issued Apr 26th 2008 and also valid until July 31st 2008 reports the ILS 18/36 uncalibrated. Following the accident NOTAM A0127/08 created on June 12th reports the ILS's LLZ (localizer transmitter) unserviceable until June 15th. It is unknown at this point, which approach procdure flight SD109 actually performed to land at Khartoum, pilots assume it was not the ILS, but the VOR36 procedure. A ramp manager observing the landing said, that the airplane landed long touching down about half way down the 3000 meter long runway. Authorities in Sudan confirmed Saturday (June 14th), that Flight Data and Cockpit Voice Recorders have been recovered. The recorders were sent to France for analysis by the French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA) responsible for airplane accident investigations on Monday (June 16th). Passenger Hanan Abdel Rahman reported, that everything was normal after landing within the airplane. The flight attendant was just about doing the regular after landing announcements, when screams from the right side prompted the flight attendant to interrupt the announcement and rush away. Passengers on the right hand side then yelled "fire" and all passengers started to rush towards the airplane doors. He continued, that he didn't know how he and his family escaped the airplane, but once on the ground found a car had driven over, which took him and his family to the dark airport terminal. Instrument Approach Plates (IAPs): Airport Diagram: http://avherald.com/files/hsss_airport.pdf VOR36: http://avherald.com/files/hsss_vor36.pdf ILS36: http://avherald.com/files/hsss_ils36.pdf