سناريوهات تغيير نظام البشير

Second Scenario:
The current National deadlock in Sudan can be broken by a popular uprising, similar to the two previous Sudanese uprisings which occurred in October 1964 and April 1985. Furthermore, the Sudanese people in the North are also looking with admiration and hope to the two successful uprisings which took place recently in Tunisia and Egypt. The revolutionary atmosphere in the Middle East could inspire and provide the necessary momentum for the youth, pro-democracy activists and masses in Sudan, to repeat history and launch their own model of revolution against the regime in Khartoum. It is true that the hardliners of the regime have been threatening; to crush any move dares to challenge them. Such threats will never halt the struggle and the march for democracy, peace and freedom.
One of the main concerns, however, in this respect is the nature of the possible position of the Sudanese Army. In the previous uprisings in particular, during the April uprising in 1985, the army sided with the people against former President Nimeri. Today, however, the army is no longer what it used to be, “a traditional and national army”.
The current top ranks of the Army are based on one or two tribal and ethnic affiliation. It has been evident that, since the 1989 Coup, there have been more than 42 groups of the Islamist and predominantly northern officers who were graduated from the Military College. These officers managed to transform the national military institution to become unprofessional and racist to its core. It is worth stating that, hundreds of officers and thousands of soldiers from the marginalised regions were dismissed from the army recently. The aim of the regime has been to maintain the domination of the ruling racial group from the North. Hence, to whom this army resets its loyalty and support in a time of change is unclear. Is it going to side with Al Bashir? Or is the army going to stand up for its’ own interests and the interests of the people? It is also important to differentiate between the high ranking officers of the army who are for many reasons closer to the political leadership, and the mid and low ranking officers who are not necessarily supporting the regime’s political leadership.