|
|
 وثيقة استخباراتية اسرائيلية عن حركة 19 يوليو 71
|
BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 141-7-62
TITLE: Sudan: Aftermath of the Coup
BY:
DATE: 1972-8-25
COUNTRY: Israel
ORIGINAL SUBJECT: CAA/X
--- Begin ---
M/E -- SUDAN: AFTERMATH OF THE COUP
MUNICH 25 August 1972 (CAA/X) F-39
Although the abortive, Communist-backed coup of July, 1971,
deprived President Nimeri of power for only three days, its aftermath
appears to have wrought major changes in Sudan's foreign and domestic
policies. At home, Nimeri - much strengthened by his success in ending
the 17-year-old rebellion in Southern Sudan - has formed his Sudanese
Socialist Union (SSU) unhindered by opposition from the Sudan Communist
Party (SCP), which was destroyed as an effective political force following
the failure of the coup. In his foreign policy, he has denounced the
Soviet Union and most of its European allies for their attitude to the
attempt and has turned both to China and to the West for economic and
trade alternatives.
Moscow has long been ambivalent in its dealings with the Nimeri
regime. Prior to July, 1971, it had largely ignored his efforts to curb
the powerful SCP, preferring, as in Egypt, to cultivate the party in
power. But when the coup appeared to have succeeded, Soviet sources gave
a cautious welcome to the insurgents; and this turned to bitter protest
when Mimeri, restored to power, executed SCP leaders. The Soviet party
organ Pravda, on July 31, 1973, denounced "the mass-scale bloody reign
of terror... in particular against the leaders and members of the Sudanese
Communist Party", while a meeting of Communist Party leaders In the Crimea
on August 2, 1971, attended by Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Mongolia,
Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, condemned "the anarchy and
acts of repression committed by the Sudanese authorities" {Moscow Radio
August 3, 1971).
For his part, President Nimeri expelled the Bulgarian Ambassador
and the Soviet. Counsellor. Egyptian sources reported that he did not seek
a deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union, "but if this hostile
attitude continues we will counter it with a similar attitude. We cannot
keep quiet about any country trying to interfere in our internal affairs".
The Sudanese Government also closed the East German cultural centre as
from April 23 "for reasons, connected with the security of the country",
in the words of Omar al-Haj Musa, then Acting Foreign Minister. On
February 2, 1972, in an interview with the Beirut Al-Anwar the President
described relations with Moscow as "extremely bad", adding that "the Soviet:
Union encouraged the Sudanese Communist Party to oppose the Sudanese
revolution". The President developed the theme of Communist subversion at
[page 2]
M/E (1) -- SUDAN: AFTERMATH OF THE COUP F-40
a Khartoum rally, reported by Omdurman Radio on August 10, 1972, when
he was speaking of the value of scholarships abroad. He said:
"I caution you against sending your sons to East Europe...
because, the children there have slipped from the government's and your
hands. There is very strong pressure to push them into becoming
Communists... I advise not only the Sudanese, but every State friendly to
me, and particularly the Arab-African States, not to send their children
there. The Communists infiltrate all activities: they sabotage and do not
work".
The Russians, however, have apparently been trying to improve
relations with Sudan. Soviet diplomatic staff in Khartoum have been
changed and in May, Major Awad Abu Zeid, Secretary-General of the SSU,
claimed that Sudan was beginning to respond to Soviet efforts. He did
not go into detail, but evidently spoke out of turn, for on May 29,
Omdurman Radio announced his dismissal from the SSU post. On the same day,
Moscow Radio reported that President Podgorny had congratulated Nimeri on
the occasion of the third anniversary of the May 25 revolution. In an
interview with the Beirut magazine Al-Hawadith reprinted in the Sudanese
newspaper Nile Mirror on June 22, Nimeri commented: "Astonishingly enough,
he did not congratulate me on my safety following the July abortive coup
nor on the occasion of Sudan Independence Day".
But the most surprising evidence of Moscow's Volte-face was
broadcast by Omdurman Radio on February 15, 1.972, when it quoted the
Sudanese newspaper As-Sahafa for a report that Vasil Bilak, a Presidium
member and Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party with special
responsibility for relations with fraternal parties, had strongly
criticised Sudanese Communists for the attempted coup. Bilak was certainly
speaking for Moscow; as Soviet forces still occupy Czechoslovakia, a man
in his position could hardly do otherwise, His remarks were also reported
by the independent French newspaper he Monde of February 12, 1972, which
said that he had made them as early as October 21, 1971, in a closed
session of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak party, and they had
only since come to light. Bilak claimed that the then Secretary-General
of the SCP, Abd al-Khaliq Mahgoub, had "begun to prepare a military coup
of which neither we nor the other fraternal parties knew anything". The
coup, he said, had been badly planned, had lacked the support of the masses
and had been directed against "the progressive officers of Nimeri" who had
themselves overthrown a government representing feudalist and big bourgeois
interests. Bilak added: "it would not have been wise willingly to abandon
positions acquired with difficulty in Sudan or elsewhere.. We would only
have played into imperialism's hands..." This view contrasted sharply with
that of the Czechoslovak party newspaper Rude. Pravo on July 29, 1971, which
in an obituary to Mahgoub expressed "resolute condemnation" of the measurer.
taken against: the Sudanese Communists.
It is in economic: relations that Nimeri's distrust of Moscow is
most obvious. The barter basis of much of the trade between the two
countries has made it difficult to estimate the exact value of trade and
aid agreements, but according to Moscow Radio in February, 1970, an
agreement for 1971-75 stipulated that the Sudan would pay for Soviet goods
by traditional exports, which the USSR would buy at a fair price. The
[page 3]
M/E (2) -- SUDAN; AFTERMATH OF THE COUP F-41
report added that in the preceding three years, Sudan had exported goods
worth some 30 million roubles ($33,300,000 at: the official exchange, rate)
to the Soviet Union, including 30,000 tons of cotton. Reports in March,
1970, foresaw an increase in the volume of trade to over $48 million.
Cotton plays a major role in Sudan's economy, constituting some 60 per
cent of her foreign earnings: at the time of the coup, the Soviet Union
was dominating cotton exports, sending in exchange some $36 million worth
of arms, tractors and consumer goods and $3 million in cash. This led to
Sudanese criticism that, while it is easy to value cotton at world prices,
it is not easy to value Russian helicopters. There have also been
complaints about the quality of Russian goods, particularly of the tractors,
which were felt to be overpriced and inefficient.
Economic tension emerged publicly in the wake of the coup. Press
reports in mid-August, 1971, quoted Mohnned Idris Mahmud, the Sudanese
Economic Minister, as saying that imports from the Soviet Union had been
suspended after Moscow had violated a trade agreement. He accused the
Russians of charging 30 per cent more than international rates on its sales
to Sudan under the bi-lateral trading agreement, and also of selling Sudanese
cotton at discounts of ten per cent in Sudan's traditonal markets. His
Ministry said that Moscow had bought almost 60 per cent of Sudan's cotton,
paying for it one quarter in hard currency and three quarters in mi1itary
equipment. It bad then sold it to India and other countries. Sudan has
taken action to prevent Soviet re-sales (a problem which has also embarrassed
Egypt intermittently since the 1950s) and Mahmud promised revisions of all
the. violated agreements. However, he praised China and Yugoslavia for
respecting their trade agreements to the letter.
Increased cooperation
Mahmud's reference to China was an indication of future Sudanese
policy. Cooperation with China has gathered impetus since July, 1971,
although it was already extensive following Nimeri's visit there in
August, 1970, when detailed economic, technical, cultural and scientific
agreements were concluded. China offered a loan of $42 million, interest
free and repayable over ten years, and agreed to build a fertiliser plant,
textile, sugar and paper factories and other small industries, and to
supply consumer goods. In March, 1971, a trade protocol aimed to secure
trade exchanges of 1S12 million each way (or nearly $63.5 million, double
the recorded 1969 turnover). On June 10, Omdurman Radio reported that
China had agreed to finance and. implement the Wad Medani-Gedaref road
project and in the same month Beirut Press reports quoted Japanese sources
as saying that China had promised $42 million worth of aid to Sudan.
Economic, contacts increased greatly after the coup: on August 24
1971 , the two countries signed a $42 million economic agreement in Khartoum.
In December, a Sudanese delegation led by the former Vice-President,
Maj.-Gen. Khalid Hassan Abbas, visited China and obtained a loan of
$40 million on easy terms. Omdurman Radio, reporting the agreement: on
December 24, added that loans from China to Sudan since August, 1970,
amounted to some $80 million. On January 10, 1972, the radio said that
Sudan was to import $14 million worth of building materials and on May 27
it reported that under an agreement signed that day, trade exchanges
between the two countries would amount to $80 million, equally shared.
[page 4]
SUDAN:
M/E (3) -- AFTERMATH OF THE COUP F-42
These developments have caused an influx of Chinese personnel
and there has long been speculation that the Chinese were replacing
Soviet experts. New China News Agency (NCNA) reported on March 1, 1972,
the "warm hospitality" accorded to Chinese technicians by the Sudanese
people. Omdurman Radio said on June 20 that 77 Chinese engineers and
technicians had begun surveying the Wad Medani-Gedaref road, and some
sources claim that up to 1,000 Chinese are now working in the Sudan.
It is, however, in military assistance that the Chinese have made
their most spectacular contribution. On April 16, 1972, Omdurman Radio
reported that they had agreed to help in training the Sudanese armed forces;
but the appearance of ten Chinese-made tanks and some MiG aircraft at the
revolution anniversary parade in Khartoum, on May 25, indicated that Sudan
had become the first Arab country to receive heavy Russian-type, though
Chinese-made, military equipment. On June 1, Beirut's Al-Hawadith carried
an interview with the Sudanese Chief of Staff, Maj.-Gen. Khalafallah, and
with Nimeri. Khalafallah said the Chinese had delivered the arms promptly
and had supplied every tank and aircraft with a complete set of. spare, parts,,
"unlike the Russians who used the spare parts as a pressuring tool and
sold these parts at several times the price of the weapons themselves".
Nimeri said that the weapons were a gift and that Peking had "supplied us
with a complete brigade of tanks and eight MiG-17 aircraft", He added:
"We could have saved a lot of the hard currency we had paid to the Russians"
for arms. At the Khartoum rally he said of: Moscow and its allies; "We do
not need them... With your permission 1 shall even offer them their weapons
at. half price" {Omdurman Radio, August 10).
Soviet delays
Nimeri told Al Hawadith that the Chinese discharged their commitments
conscientiously, "the reverse of the Soviets who are. slow in implementing
agreements and who delay the delivery of machinery". A chest hospital
being built by the Russians at Suba was useless, according to the "President,
"because it is below the standard of progress that has been made in dealing,
with such diseases. We have to re-build it at our own expense in accordance
with the modern standards of science and progress. Although the loan had
been agreed ten years ago, execution of the project did not begin until
recently". He added that the Chinese rejected the idea of "planting
military experts and technicians in nationalist armies"; when their
training mission was accomplished "they immediately left the country.
Russian experts are quite the opposite. They are still with us now, but 1
will not renew any of their contracts". The President said he did not fear
that any "strings" would be attached to Chinese aid, Chairman Mao having
explained to him that China herself was "a developing country of the Third
World". However, Sudan's experience with the Russians "suggests that they
dictate their terms and arc reluctant to listen to our point of view".
They also charged the living expenses of their experts to the. offered loan,
unlike the Chinese, and required seven per cent interest on loans, whereas
Chinese offers were interest free.
[page 5]
M/E (4) -- SUDAN: AFTERMATH OF THE COUP F-43
Substantial though its aid is, Peking is unable to offer assistance
on the scale that Moscow can afford and that Sudan needs. For that, Nimeri
is turning to the West, and it is likely that Western aid will increase.
In a speech at Juba on July 1, Nimeri thanked the United States for aid
amounting to $13 million towards the relief, and resettlement of refugees
in Southern Sudan. He said that this was the largest sum received from
abroad and had led him to consider seriously the question of diplomatic
relations with Washington. These were duly resumed on July 25 after a
break of five years. (Sudan also resumed diplomatic relations with Federal
Germany on December 23, 1971.) At the Khartoum rally (Omdurman Radio
August 10) the President announced that he had recently reached agreement
with a British-American company to set up an investment organisation worth
$600 million; he expected this to improve Sudan's possibilities in
industrialisation "for tens of years".
On ideological considerations, Nimeri made his attitude clear in n
Press statement on May 25, 1972. According to a Libyan Radio report,
"President Nimeri asked why economic and trade dealings with Western
countries were called deviation and doalings with the. Soviet Union
progressiveness". Sudan dealt with all who did not interfere in her
domestic affairs; "We respected all principles and scientific theories of
the world. We took from them what suited us and rejected what did not suit"
us. tie had chosen China, North Korea, Romania and Yugoslavia - Communist
countries - as countries friendly to Sudan because we felt that their
dealings with us were not followed by intervention in our domestic affairs.
We dealt with other countries on the same principle. We did not: care about.
the regimes or systems of these countries whether they were capitalist.
Socialist or royalist. Every people was free to choose its regime and
determine its future. We did not decide what regimes others should have".
المصدر
http://www.osaarchivum.org/guide/rip/4/searchBR.html
|
|
 
|
|
|
|
ابراهيم عدلان
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست