كتب الكاتب الفاتح جبرا المتوفرة بمعرض الدوحة
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 Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول (Re: ابراهيم عدلان)
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4.8.3 The First Impact Point:
Latitude: 04º 04′ 38.95″
Longitude: 33º 55′ 53.36″
Height: 1647 meters.
4.8 4 The distance of the first impact Area “FIA” from New Site is 20861 meters.
4.8.5 The distance of the first impact Area “FIA” from New Site airstrip is 29872
meters.
4.8.6 The distance of the first impact Area “FIA” from Entebbe is 475401 meters.
4.8.7 The First Impact Area “FIA” was at a height of 5350 feet on a very steep
vertical side of the mountain.
4.8.8 The main Altimeter was reading that the last helicopter altitude was 5320 feet
from sea level.
4.8.9 The radio altimeter reading was 30 feet.
4.8.10 The Gyro-indicator showing a helicopter bank of 5 to 7 degrees.
4.8 11 The helicopter hit some trees at the edge of the mountain by one of its main
rotor blades and then by its undercarriage.
4.8.12 The helicopter main parts jumped by the engine force to the last of wreckage
distribution path.
4.8.13 Even if the helicopter was equipped with an Enhanced Ground Proximity
Warning System “EGPWS” , this system cannot detect and give warning to the pilot
of the ground proximity because the area before the FIA is very steep, nearly vertical,
that would make a sudden change of radio altitude, that is to say from a radio altitude
reading to a very low one.
4.8.14 The area was under the control of the SPLA troops. The Ugandan Wildlife
Rangers was at 15 kilometers from the crash site. The Ugandan Forces or troops were
at 35 kilometers from the crash site. The Guard of Dr. John Garang was armed with
A.k. 47 and pistols.
4.8.15 Fire light was observed during the period from 19:45 pm up to 23:00 pm.
4.8.16 No sounds of explosions, machine guns or bullets were heard at the site during
that period.
4.8.17 The wreckage of the helicopter was distributed along the path of destruction
over an area of 115 meters long and 66 meters wide.
4.8.18 No fragments of explosives were found on the wreckage of the helicopter and
the surrounding trees.
4.8.19 The helicopter was flying at a cruising speed of 220 kilometers per hour.
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Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.8.20 The time taken from Entebbe airport to the crash site was 2 hours and 20
minutes.
4.8.21 The sun sets at New Cush at 06:50 – 07:00 pm meaning that the helicopter
crashed after sunset.
4.8.22 The engines temperature gauges and the artificial horizon found at the crash
site indicate that the helicopter was steadily maintaining its altitude and no technical
malfunctions up to the time of the crash were experienced.
4.8.23 The sound of the helicopter was heard at 18:30 pm on Saturday 30 July 2005
coming from the direction of Uganda and then diverted to the west. There was no
information about the First Vice President flight to the SPLA Command at New
Cush.
4.9 The Sudan Commission concludes from the document titled “ CVR/FDR Examination at
Russia” the following:
4.9.1 The examination was conducted in the presence of representative from Sudan,
Uganda, Kenya, USA, and Russia at the Inter State Aviation Committee in Moscow.
4.9.2 The CVR P-507 case exhibited thermal damage.
4.9.3 The CVR P-507 internal cassettes was serviceable during the accidental flight
and recorded all the acoustic information during the last three minutes of the flight.
4.9.4 The CVR information was of good quality and could be used for the
investigative purposes.
4.9.5 The FDR SARPP-12-DIM case exhibited thermal damage.
4.9.6 The photo tape media that was found inside the FDR was melted on the
receiving spool.
4.9.7 The reading of the FDR information was not possible.
4.10 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report titled “Information Obtained from
Kazan Factory about the Helicopter” the following:
4.10.1 The Ugandan Chief Pilot late Mr. Peter Nyakairu and the Ugandan Flight
Engineer, late Mr. Patrick Kigundu both attended full training courses for M I- 72 in
the period from 8 October 1997 to 20 November 1997.
4.10.2 The co-pilot, late Mr. Paul Kiyimbe did take a similar course to that of the
Chief Pilot.
4.10.3 The three of the crew attended at Russia a training course on raising the level
of pilot’s skill for M I – 72 Helicopter for a period of three weeks in the years 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 and the last one was at the period from 17 January 2005 to 11
February 2005.
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Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.10.4 The helicopter M I – 72 bearing the serial number 627CO1, registration AF
615 Uganda was subjected during the period February-July 2005 to an overhauling
and modernization at Kazan Factory in Russia. After air, Colonel Pilot Turyagynda
signed tests preliminary acceptance certificate on 5 July 2005 at total flown time of 2
hours and 05 minutes after the overhaul. Then the helicopter was packed and sent to
Uganda and the Chief Pilot late Nyakairu signed the final acceptance test on 21 July
2005. The helicopter was since then put into operation under the Ugandan Air Force
authorities until the date of the crash with 20 total flown hours.
4.11 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Meeting of the Sudan Commission with
the Medical Team in Nairobi” the following:
4.11.1 The number of those who died in the crash was 13 persons including the late
Dr. John Garang.
4.11.2 The bodies of the victims were identified by experts from Kenya, USA,
SPLM/A, Uganda and relatives and those others who knew the victims
4.12 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report “ the Weather Report” the following:
4.12.1 Sun set at New Site was at 18:59 pm Uganda Local Time.
4.12.2 Sun set at the crash site was at 19:00 pm Uganda Local Time.
4.12.3 Poor visibility due to darkness, dense low clouds and light rains were present
in the accident area.
4.13 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report titled “Air Traffic Control Report”
the following:
4.13.1 There was no flight plan and the Pilot did not ask for information on the
weather forecast at the destination.
4.13.2 There was no ATC radar at Entebbe Airport.
4.13.3 The helicopter took off with destination Gulu at 17:02 pm.
4.13.4 There was no ATC in Gulu.
4.13.5 The flight was very normal up to the time it was transferred to general aviation
frequency of 118.2 MHZ at 65 nautical miles from Entebbe Airport.
4.13.6 Knowledge by Entebbe’s Air Traffic Tower of the fact that the helicopter did
not land at New Site was only at 1049 U.T.C on Sunday 31 July 2005.
4.13.7 Khartoum Air traffic Control Tower at 1806 U.T.C. on 31 July 2005 inquired
from Entebbe Air Traffic Control if there was any information about the First Vice
President’s helicopter. Entebbe Air Traffic Control replied no news.
4.14 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “interview with the Norwegian Ambassador
to Uganda” the following:
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Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.14.1 The Ambassadors of USA, UK, Netherlands and Norway requested to meet
with President Museveni in their capacity as the support group for the Betty Bigombi
Peace Initiative for peace in Northern Uganda. That was 14 days prior to the crash
day.
4.14.2 The meeting with President Museveni was on Saturday 30 July 2005 at
Rwakitura. After the meeting of the said Ambassadors with president Museveni, the
President introduced to them late Dr. John Garang as a distinguished guest.
4.14.3 They met with late Dr. John Garang and exchanged views on the CPA for a
period of ten minutes. The Ambassador of the Netherlands stayed for five minutes
more since they had known each other before.
4.15 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Interview with the Ambassador of the
Netherlands to Uganda Mrs. Yoka Brandt” the following:
4.15.1 She knew the First Vice President since the time she was accredited to Eritrea,
and for that reason their discussion focused on improvement of bilateral ties between
the Sudan and Eritrea.
4.15.2 She provided Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid with the last photograph taken for
late Dr. John Garang with the four envoys at Rwakitura.
4.16 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Interview with the US Ambassador to
Uganda” the following:
4.16.1 The Us Ambassador stated that their earlier preliminary reports they made on
most aspects of the crash indicate that there was no foul play or explosives, but this
needed to be backed up by a thorough technical investigation.
4.16.2 The Us ambassador confirmed the purpose of the meeting at Rwakitura with
President Museveni on 30 July 2005.
4.16.3 He asked late Dr. John Garang about the implementation of the CPA and what
was the opinion of the SPLM and the Government of Southern Sudan. He said he was
touched by the reply of Dr. Garang who told him that as of now he represented the
whole of the SUDAN.
4.16.4 The US Ambassador stressed the importance of the involvement of the United
States provided that Mr. Dennis Jones acted as investigator-in-charge. The Sudan
Commission Chairman welcomed the contribution of the US representative but
without prior conditions and that, the Joint International Technical Committee would
choose in a democratic way who would lead the investigation.
4.17 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “ Interview with Mr. Agar Didi” the
following:
4.17.1 He confirmed that he saw off late Dr. John Garang at Entebbe Airport when he
was heading for New Site.
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Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.17.2 He said that late Dr. John Garang was anxious to leave quickly and for that
reason, he preferred to stand by the helicopter during refueling rather than wait in the
VIP Lounge.
4.17.3 He stated that late Dr. John Garang told him hat the National Unity
Government in Sudan would be formed within two weeks.
4.18 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Interview with Lieutenant Frank Kato ”
the following:
4.18.1 He stated that the number of persons on board the helicopter from Rwakitura
to Entebbe airport was 14 persons. By instructions from the pilot in Entebbe due to
the heavy weight of the helicopter, he was asked not to get into the plane to keep the
number of all the persons on board from Entebbe to New site at thirteen (13) persons.
4.18.2 He stated that the destination of the helicopter was New Site because late Dr.
John Garang had asked the pilot whether he knew the coordinates of New Site.
4.19 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “ Interview with the Ugandan Chief of
Protocol ambassador Ahmed Ssenyomo” the following:
4.19.1 That all the arrangements for the reception and travel of the First Vice
President Dr. John Garang were the responsibility of the State House of Uganda and
his role was only ceremonial. He was only informed of the arrival of Dr. John Garang
to Uganda at 8:00 am of Friday 29 July 2005. Ambassador Ahmed said the First vice
president of the Sudan arrived at 11:00 am that day. State House of Uganda did not
provide him with the details of the visit.
4.19.2 He did not participate in seeing off the First Vice President at Entebbe airport.
He was involved at the ceremony arranged for the new UK High Commissioner to
present his credentials to President Museveni at Mbarara on Saturday 30 July 2005.
4.20 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Interview with the Protocol Chief
SPLM/A in Uganda, Mr. Riak Machuor” the following:
4.20.1 He was first notified of the visit of Dr. John Garang through the Internal
Security Organization of Uganda on the morning of the day of the visit. He later
confirmed the information of the visit by direct contact with Lokichokio.
4.20.2 He confirmed that three suitcases and one plastic bag “kavera” of the luggage
that came on board the First Vice President’s aircraft was taken and kept in Entebbe
Imperial Resort Hotel, under the guards of the State House, and were later on
collected by soldiers from State House.
4.20.3 The plane that brought the First Vice President to Entebbe was hired from a
private company.
4.20.4 There was no body from SPLM/A to see the First Vice President off at
Entebbe Airport when he was leaving for New Site.
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Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.21 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Statement of Preliminary Investigation of
the crash of M I -72 helicopter near New Cush on 30 July 2005” the following:
4.21.1 The work reflected in that statement was performed by about 26 persons and
finally confirmed and signed by Major General Gier Chuang from SPLM/A, Dr.
Ruhakana Rugunda from Uganda and Dennis Jones from the United States.
4.21.2 Forensic experts from Uganda, Kenya, the SPLM/A, and the United States
examined all remains of the victims. These were recovered from the crash site.
4.21.3 The medical experts, families and those familiar with them determined that six
of the bodies were Sudanese, including that of Dr. Garang which had already been
identified and buried.
4.21.4 Seven bodies were determined to be Ugandan, including one female. The
bodies of the Ugandan victims were returned to Uganda on the morning of August 9,
2005.
4.22 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report titled “List of Victims” the
following:
4.22.1 The Sudanese victims who were on board helicopter M I – 72, flight AF 605 that
crashed on Saturday 30 July 2005 en route from Entebbe Airport to New Site, were:
- First Vice President, Dr. John Garang de Mabior.
- Lt. Col. Ali Mayen, Director of Communications.
- Lt. Col. Amat Malual, Communications Officer.
- Lt. Col. Mayen Mabior, Guard.
- Lt. Col. Majok Kuany, Guard.
- Lt. Col. Oboki Obur, Guard.
4.22.2 The Ugandan victims who were on board helicopter M I – 72, flight AF 605 that
crashed on Saturday 30 July 2005 en route from Entebbe Airport to New Site, were:
- Col. Peter Nyakairu, Pilot.
- Capt. Paul Kiyimbe, Co-pilot.
- Major Patrick Kigundu, Flight Engineer.
- Lt. Johnson Munanura, Jet Officer.
- Ms. Lillian Kabajji, Cabin Attendant.
- Col. Hassan Kizza, Signaler.
- Mr. Sam Bakowa, State House Protocol.
4.23 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “The CVR Transcription” the following:
The helicopter AF605 took-off from Entebbe Airport to New Site at 17:00 ULT.
Total persons on board were (14) ???.
Fuel endurance 05:30 hours = 4420 Lit = 3536 Kg.
The distance from Entebbe Airport to New Site 508 Km.
The direction from Entebbe Airport to New Site is 019.
The crew expected to arrive New Site at 19:21 ULT.
The Captain reported to the tower “we shall maintain 5,500 ft above mean sea
level”.
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Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
At Entebbe Airport the wind was 140/ 05 knots = CAVOK. It means that the wind
was crossing from the right side at a speed of 5 knots, which was almost calm.
Advanced Moving Map System and Flood Light equipped the helicopter.
The Crew was using two GPSs, [AMMS and GPS].
The helicopter had installed two auxiliary tanks.
The quantity of fuel in the auxiliary tanks was 915 X 2 = 1830Lit.
The crew had decided to return to Entebbe after dropping Dr. John at New Site.
The helicopter had enough fuel to come back to Entebbe.
At 65 NM the helicopter AF605 reported to the ACC and the ACC advised them to
change the frequency to 118.2 [long-range frequency for Entebbe VHF], for
contact.
The crew changed to frequency 118.2 but they did not contact the Tower through
this frequency, through out the journey.
The crew talked about New Site strip. They said that the place was dusty; dust and
night were two evils, which should not be combined. The crew knew that they
would land at night in a dusty area.
At New Site, there are neither navigation equipments nor radio station.
The crew had no information about New Site.
After 49 minutes 13 seconds from departure time, an helicopter flew over the
helicopter AF605 [Papa India Gulf] “this is last one. This one is for a lady”.
The crew showed the flight engineer how to use the microphone.
After 01:10:00
1) The ground speed was 120 NM.
2) There were rainy clouds.
After 01:10:00, the remaining fuel was 3200 Liters = 4 hours.
The fuel endurance was (5:30). 3200 + 1000 = 4200 Lit.
At take-off time, the pilot reported to the tower that the fuel endurance was 4:00
hours but the actual fuel endurance was 5:30 hours. The pilot gave the tower wrong
information.
After 1:22:00, the crew talked about a mountain ahead of them. The helicopter lost
height. The copilot asked the pilot to stop losing height and to climb higher because
of the range of mountains. Here the helicopter descended [losing height], climbed
and flew over a mountain area.
The helicopter was unstable.
The mountain was about 2000 meters.
Dr. John asked the pilot whether he could land at Soroti or Moroto, and when Dr.
John felt the Pilot appeared to express surprise “ooh” he asked the Pilot “will you
be able to make it?” The Pilot replied, “I will try, Sir. If we are not able we will let
you know.” This suggestion came after 1:35:31 from take-off time.
The captain assured Dr. John that he would try and if he could not make it, he
would let him know “I will tell you when we are not able to make it”.
The distance of Soroti from the point where the First Vice President made his
suggestion is 135 km.
Moroto is 130 km.
The site of the crash is 164 km; Entebbe is 334 km.
At 60 NM before New Site and 50 miles before the crash point the helicopter
maintained direction 019. It means that the helicopter was in the right direction to
destination. However, there was a difference of 2 miles between the two GPSs; one
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Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
read 65 NM while the other 63 NM. [ I think the difference was due to the different
coordinates put in the GPS]
At 65 miles, the crew talked about High Mountain in the route of the helicopter.
Before 21 minutes from the crash moment, the crew compared between this journey
and Nairobi journey and they said that the difference was just 10 minutes.
Before 18 minutes from the crash moment, the crew talked about bad thing coming
[some rain where they were going and the tall hills were still ahead of them near the
border].
The helicopter flew over Kidepo Valley.
The crew reduced the map scale to look at the terrain.
The copilot talked about the ground “I can see the ground so near”. He suggested
climbing higher because he can see the ground so near.
He looked down and suggested to descend when they cross the border.
The copilot talked about the flood light “that floodlight of ours, does it have time
limit?
The cabin attendant talked to the captain about the boiler.
The crew talked about a mountain in front of Kidepo Valley.
Before 9 minutes from the crash time, the bearing was 019, it means that the
helicopter was still following the flight route.
Before 8 minutes, the ground speed was 137 NM 246 Km/h, which was very fast.
At this point, the maximum limitation of the speed at the height of 1000 meter is
230 Km/h permissible speed. At 2000 meter, the maximum speed is 195 Km/h. The
helicopter was out of limit.
8 minutes before the crash:
- The copilot talked about very thick, thick, thick clouds
- The crew talked about rain and raise. The cloud was still ok we can see the
ground. This is the corridor for entering Kidepo valley.
Before 7 minutes, the copilot screamed: “we have passed so near it. It is a tall one;
it is 2000 or 1500 meters”. The pilot had nearly crashed into a mountain: This was
about 20 miles from New Site.
Before 7 minutes, the crew said “we can even go through these clouds here”.
Before 6 minutes the direction of the helicopter was still 019.
Before 5 minutes, the copilot suggested to fly through one of the clouds because
under it was clear and he was telling the pilot that there were no mountains. The
mountains were at the end of the valley. He talked about leaving the valley behind.
“we can descend just under it (cloud)”.
Before 4 minutes from the crash time the ADC Amat talked with the pilot about the
location of the helicopter and the remaining distance to New Site. He talked from
the microphone of the cabin attendant.
The pilot asked Amat to enter the cockpit; he said “you come in front (to look at the
coordinates)”.
Before 3 minutes the copilot remarked to the pilot about some low clouds and
inquire from the pilot in command whether to change the direction a bit to avoid the
low clouds.
Before 3 minutes, the bearing read 019 at the same direction the helicopter exactly
on track, 15 miles from New Site.
Before 2 minutes 22 seconds, Amat entered the crew cabin and asked the captain
about arrival time. The pilot told him 15 miles.
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Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
The pilot asked Amat about New Site ground surface “do you have high ground
where we land?” “Very high ground” Amat answered. Actually, New Site is a flat
area; maybe Amat saw the mountain under him when he was talking.
Amat stopped talking exactly 2 minutes before the crash time but he was standing
behind the crew. The pilot reminded Amat not to forget to show him New Site.
“Alright thank you”.
Within I minute 53 seconds the pilot asked the copilot 7 questions about :
1. G.P.S?
2. Miles remaining?
3. Look and tell me how many?
4. How many more until now?
5. How high are we?
6. Check, my friend, the altimeter?.
7. Distance.?
The copilot within the 2 last minutes answered the pilot
- exactly on track sir;
- we are remaining 14 miles sir;
- bearing now 018;
- height 5500 ft sir;
- Altimeter still above 300 where it stopped;
- Distance 11 miles bearing 018;
Screaming Voice (DANGER).
The last conversation took 1 minute 53 seconds before crash.
The helicopter was piloted by the pilot in command.
The copilot at that time was just a navigator.
The copilot was concerned with G.P.S.
The captain in command was panicking at that time.
The helicopter entered the clouds; that mean the visibility was nil.
The helicopter was flying through valley because the radio Altimeter read above
300 m; that means the helicopter before the moments of crash was flying in altitude
more than 300 meters above the ground. That was before 19 seconds from the crash
time.
The helicopter descended to cross under the clouds.
The speed increased to 246 Km/h.
The crew did not see the mountain in front of them.
The crew did not use the AMMS caution red – yellow.
Orange colour to avoid the mountain.
The helicopter took-off at 5:00 PM.
The time from take-off till the crash is 2:08 hours.
The crash occurred at 07:08.
4.24 The Sudan commission concludes from chapter five of this report titled “interviews by
the commission” the following:
4.24.1 That all the relevant departments within the Presidential Palace were not involved in
the travel arrangements of the First Vice President late Dr. John Garang de Mabior from
Khartoum to Rumbek and thereafter to East Africa.
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Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.24.2 That the arrangement of the trip of the First Vice President late Dr. John Garang de
Mabior from Khartoum to Rumbek and thereafter to east Africa, was made by the personal
aides who traveled with him. The former Minister for Presidential Affairs stated when
interviewed, that he wanted to make the usual official arrangements but Nhial Deng Nhial
and Paul Mayom did not accommodate what he wanted on the basis that the trip is especially
private. Nhial Deng Nhial and Paul Mayom denied that.
4.24.3 That the relevant Protocol Departments within the Presidential Palace did not apply
the minimum level of conditions or constraints for security and safety purposes on the travel
plans of the top political and executive personnel in the Republic of the Sudan. There is no
law, or administrative regulation providing for inherent powers for the Protocol Department
at the Presidential Palace to stop, change or amend travel arrangements of the country’s top
officials. The protocol system within the Presidential Palace requires substantial review.
4.24.4 That given the circumstances in which the trip of the late First Vice President took
place, there was little room for follow up and contact by Minister for Presidential Affairs,
who was then Minister of Defence, of the movements of the late First Vice president.
4.24.5 That on hearing the news of the loss of the helicopter of the First Vice President most
of the top officials, led by the President of the Republic himself, were fully engaged in
following up the developments since the loss of contact with the helicopter until discovery of
the wreckage.
4.24.6 That, the capabilities of the relevant organs and institutions within the State in terms
of search and rescue are weak and not up to the standard. The situation in this respect calls
for remedy.
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| العنوان |
الكاتب |
Date |
| اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 02:57 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 02:58 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 02:59 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 03:00 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 03:01 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 03:02 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 03:17 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 03:22 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-30-07, 03:23 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 03:29 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 03:39 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 03:41 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 03:47 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | Elsheikh Mohd Aboidris | 07-30-07, 04:04 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | عزالدين محمد عثمان | 07-30-07, 04:16 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-30-07, 04:43 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 06:35 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | خضر حسين خليل | 07-30-07, 07:30 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 08:00 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | سلمى الشيخ سلامة | 07-30-07, 08:02 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-30-07, 09:54 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:11 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:13 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:18 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:19 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:21 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:22 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:23 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:25 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:26 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:27 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:37 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:38 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:39 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:42 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:47 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:48 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:49 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:51 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:52 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:53 AM |
 Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | Halema2 | 07-31-07, 11:53 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 11:58 AM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 12:06 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 12:08 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | محمد مكى محمد | 07-31-07, 12:15 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-31-07, 03:57 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | ابراهيم عدلان | 07-31-07, 04:06 PM |
| Re: اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول | عزالدين محمد عثمان | 08-01-07, 01:42 AM |
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