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Quote: Sudan: Fear of the unknown! By Mohamed Siddig Abdalla A big question mark hangs over the future of Sudan after four months of protests have eventually borne fruit and brought down the curtain on three decades of a ruthless regime. Protests prompted by a rise in living costs broke out in December of last year but soon morphed into a wider call for the removal of the country’s veteran dictator Omer al-Bashir, who has ruled with an iron fist for close to thirty years. His successor, Defence Minister Awad Ibn Auf, was himself forced to step down, and a third leader, Lt Gen Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan, was named as head of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) within forty-eight hours. But, does the downfall of al-Bashir’s brutal regime provide the answer to the chronic governance-related problems of the third-largest country in Africa؟ Sadly, the answer to this question appears to be a big ‘no’, as a lot of work is yet to be done. Possible scenarios There are at least three possible scenarios for what will happen in Sudan in the short and long run. The least likely scenario is that military would at some point reproduce a long-term military government; this option becomes more likely if the transitional period is longer than two years. Many warn that lessons should be learnt from neighbouring Egypt, where the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, had toppled a democratically elected government and restored a Mubarak-style regime. As alluded to previously, this possibility sounds highly unlikely for a variety of reasons. The TMC has very little room for manoeuvre, at least in the short run. Its head, Lt Gen al-Burhan, is still viewed by many as the epitome of the old regime, and members of his council were sympathetic to the old regime. This argument is supported by a generally held assumption that most of the jobs in the public sector in Sudan were offered on the basis of allegiance. Loyalty normally outweighed competence, and only committed Islamists could have climbed the ladder and attained the upper echelons of government. Moreover, the current protests are different in kind and size from previous ones. Women’s participation this time is significantly higher than in the uprisings of October 1964 and April 1985. Thousands of young non-politicised revolutionaries also took everyone by surprise and showed an unprecedented sense of interest, patriotism and defiance. The African Union (AU) has also given the TMC fifteen days to transfer power to a civilian government or risk losing membership in the bloc. Having said all this, some still argue that a heavy-handed military government run by non-affiliated generals is the safest way out at this crucial juncture, based on a belief that the Sudanese society, like any other society in the region, is still not mature enough to practise democracy. It is clear from the ongoing revolutionary drive in Sudan, however, that the rules of the game have changed forever, and from the looks of it Sudan will not be ruled by an autocrat again. The second, and worst-case, scenario is that political parties and forces would fail to reach an agreement with the sitting TMC over the role of the military during the two-year transition. This may involve a route to chaos and eventually lead to a total collapse of the government. The country could then descend into a full-scale civil war that would spare no one. Bear in mind that there are many tribal militias on the ground and that people of the 'marginalised areas' in the Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur will be waiting to see how their historical grievances will be remedied. Failing to address their issues would be a recipe for disaster. The most desirable scenario, however, would be for Lt Gen al-Burhan to navigate the boat towards a safe haven. This requires a frictionless transitional period culminating in a democratic change and leading to a permanent system by which future democratic civilian governments can be installed. Before that, the TMC needs to placate protesters and win their trust by addressing their demands, thereby paving the way for a fully civilian transitional government. The military would take an overall supervisory role as well as direct control over the defence and interior ministries, considering that the security situation is set to remain fragile—at least in the foreseeable future. This—if achieved—would be a great step forward and a golden opportunity for the Sudanese people to reshape the future of their poor and war-ravaged country. Islamists’ comeback TMC's spokesman Maj Gen Shams Ad-din Shanto made it clear in a press conference that al-Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) would not be allowed to take part in the transitional government. But can Islamists re-emerge at a later stage؟ I can say that it is highly probable that this will happen in the short run. Having ruled the country for almost three decades, and with all the public resources completely under their control over this extended period of time, they have the riches and organisational capacity to regroup and make a comeback after the transitional period. They could, in fact, win a significant share in any civilian rule in the future, especially if they opted to forge alliances with other groups. Their old guard would have to stay away at that stage if they were to gain a foothold in post-transition politics. A short-term transitional period—two years—would certainly be a contributory factor to their comeback, as contact with their grassroots would not have been lost and most of their faithfuls would not have changed stripes by then, knowing that it would be hard for them to be accepted by any other group. The shorter the transitional period, the bigger and quicker a comeback Islamists could make. Astonishingly enough and against all reason, no acts of revenge on ‘kizan’, a catch-all term for Sudanese Islamists, have been reported thus far. Loyalists of the former regime, including known figures, are reportedly leading normal lives and roaming the lengths and breadths of the country freely and safely. Their newspapers are still coming out. What is more, NCP representatives were present at a meeting held by the TMC for the political parties and forces. This atmosphere of tolerance—if it is to last—will certainly encourage Islamists to gather strength and remain united. They will see the ban on their political activity in the transitional period as a 'warrior’s rest', as they call any pause in activity in their literature. They will also see this as a chance to ponder and prepare for the prospective fourth period of democracy in the country’s history.