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 Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. (Re: محمد على طه الملك)
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Contemporary State Failure, Collapse, and Weakness
This decade’s failed states are Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the Congo
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan.5 These seven states exemplify the criteria
of failure sketched out above. Somalia is a collapsed state. Together they are
the contemporary classical failed and collapsed states, but others were once
collapsed or failed and many other modern nation-states now approach the brink
of failure, some much more ominously than others. Another group of states
drifts disastrously downward from weak to failing to failed. What is of particular
interest is why and how states slip from weakness toward failure, or not. The
list of weak states is long, but only a few of those weak and poorly governed
states need necessarily edge into failure. Why? Even the categorization of a
state as failing—Colombia and Indonesia, among others—need not doom it
irretrievably to full failure. What does it take to drive a failing state over the
?edge into failure or collapse? Why did Somalia not stop at failure rather than collapsing
These questions are answered in the country chapters that follow this opening
essay. Because separate discussions of five failed and collapsed states are
followed by examinations of seven weak states, two of which were once collapsed
states, there is a wealth of empirical material on which to discriminate
between the several categories of statehood in the developing world. Of the
failed and collapsed cases, not each one fully fills all of the cells of the matrix
of nation-state failure. However, to qualify for failure a state needs to demonstrate
that it has met most of the explicit criteria. How truly minimal are the
roads, the schools, and the hospitals and clinics? How far have GDP and other
economic indicators fallen? How far does the ambit of the central government
reach? Has the state lost legitimacy? Most important, because civil conflict is
decisive for state failure, can the state in question still secure its borders and
?guarantee security to its citizens, urban and rural
Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende ask how Somalia, a nation-state of about
9 million people with a strongly cohesive cultural tradition, a common language
a common religion, and a shared history of nationalism could fail, and
then collapse. Perhaps, they say, it never constituted a single coherent territory
having been part of the colonial empires of two suzerains, with other Somalis
living outside the boundaries of the two colonies. Then, as was often the experience
elsewhere in Africa and Asia, the first elected, proto-democratic, postindependence
civilian governments proved to be “experimental, inefficient
corrupt, and incapable of creating any kind of national political culture.”6 General
Mohammed Siad Barre, commander of the army, decided that the politicians
were ruining the country, so he usurped power in 1969, suspending the
constitution, banning political parties, and promising an end to corruption.
Twenty years and many misadventures later, Siad Barre had succeeded in destroying
any semblance of national governmental legitimacy. Backed first by
the Soviet Union and then by the United States, Siad Barre destroyed institutions
of government and democracy, abused his citizens’ human rights,
neled as many of the resources of the state as possible into his own and his
subclan’s hands, and deprived everyone else at the end of the Cold War of what
was left of the spoils of Somali supreme rule. All of the major clans and subclans
other than Siad Barre’s own, became alienated. His shock troops perpetrated
one outrage after another against fellow Somalis. By the onset of civil war in
1991, the Somali state had long since failed. The civil war destroyed what was
.left, and Somalia collapsed onto itself
The chapters on three failed states offer further exemplifications of the Somali
theme. In each, a series of fateful decisions by rulers and ruling cadres
eviscerated the capabilities of the state, separated the government from its subjects
created opposition movements and civil warfare, and ultimately ended
the Potemkin pretense of international stature. William Reno shows how President
Stevens (1968–1985) systematically reduced human security within Sierra
Leone so as to maximize his own personal power, and how that increase in
personal power permitted a quantum leap in his control over the country’s rents
and riches. Stevens “sold chances to profit from disorder to those who could
pay for it through providing services.”7 He created a private military force to
terrorize his own people and to aggrandize, especially in the diamond fields. As
the official rule of law receded, the law of the jungle, presided over by Stevens
took its place. Institutions of government were broken or corrupted. The state
became illegitimate, and a civil war over spoils, encouraged and assisted from
outside, turned failure into a collapse. In 2002, after hideous atrocities, a brutal
intervention by a West African peace enforcement contingent, much more war
and the arrival of British paratroopers and a large UN peacekeeping force, Sierra
.Leone recovered sufficiently to be considered failed rather than collapsed
.It even held effective elections
Mobutu used analogous tactics in the patrimony of Zaire. As his people’s
self-proclaimed guide, or as the personalist embodiment of national leadership
during the Cold War, he deployed the largesse of his American and other Western
patrons to enhance his personal wealth, to heighten his stature over his
countrymen, and to weave a tightly manipulated web of loyalties across the
army and into all aspects of Zairese society. Every proper political and democratic
institution was an obstacle to the edifice that he created. So was civil
society, politics itself in the broad sense, and economic development. Letting
the country’s Belgian-built infrastructure rot, maintaining a colonial type of
resource extraction (of copper, other ####ls, and diamonds), rebuffing the rise
of a real bourgeoisie, and feeding his people false glories instead of real substance
.and per capita growth accentuated his own power, wealth, and importance
.As with Stevens and Siad Barre, the modernizing state was the enemy
Mobutu had no sense of noblesse oblige. René Lemarchand says that for
Mobutu’s state, patronage was the indispensable lubricant. Ultimately, however
...“the lubricant ran out and the Mobutist machine was brought to a
standstill. . . . The inability of the Mobutist state to generate a volume of rewards
consistent with its clientelistic ambitions is the key . . . [to] . . . its rapid
."loss of legitimacy
The warring divisions of the failed Sudanese state, north and south, reflect
fundamental ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences; Egyptian and British
conquest and colonial administrative flaws and patterns; post-independence
disparities and discriminations (the north dominating the south); and the discovery
of oil in the south. A weak state in the north, providing political goods at
minimal levels for its mostly Muslim constituents, became the nucleus of a
truly failed state when its long war with the south (from 1955 to 1972 and from
1983 through 2002) entered the equation. The Sudanese war has the dubious
distinction of having inflicted the largest number of civilian casualties (over 2
million) in any intrastate war, coupled with the largest internally displaced and
refugee population in the world (about 4 million). Slavery (north against south)
flourishes, as well. Moreover, in the south, the central government’s writ rarely
runs. It provides no political goods to its southern citizens, bombs them, raids
them, and regards black southerners as enemy. As a result, the Sudan has long
been failed. Yet, northerners still regard their state as legitimate, even though the
southern insurgents do not and have sought either secession or autonomy for
decades. As Gérard Prunier and Rachel Gisselquist suggest, however, so long as
oil revenues shore up the north, the Sudan is unlikely to collapse entirely.9 They
.also suggest that contemporary peace processes are unsustainable
The paradigm of failure so well explored in the Somali, Sierra Leonean
Congolese, and Sudanese chapters holds equally well, with similar but differently
detailed material, in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, and Liberia. (Reno’s
chapter contains material on Liberia.) Indeed, Angola’s killing fields and internally
displaced circumstances are almost as intense and certainly as destructive
as the Sudan’s. The wars in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, and Liberia have
been equally traumatic for ordinary combatants and hapless civilians unwittingly
caught up in a vicious and (until 2002 in Angola) interminable battle for
resources and power between determined opponents. Burundi’s majorityminority
war has produced fewer deaths in recent decades, but it continues an
enduring contest for primacy that antedates the modern nation-state itself. From
birth economically weak and geographically limited, Burundi’s capacity to
perform has for a decade been fatally crippled by majority-backed insurgencies
.against autocratic minority-led governments
Weakness and the Possibility of Failure
Collapsed and failed designate the consequences of a process of decay at the
nation-state level. The capacity of those nation-states to perform positively for
their citizens has atrophied. But, as the Lebanese and Tajikistani cases show
that atrophy is neither inevitable nor the result of happenstance. For a state to
fail is not that easy. Crossing from weakness into failure takes will as well as
neglect. Thus, weak nation-states need not tip into failure. Which ones do and
.which ones do not is the focus of the third section of this book
There are several interesting cases that indeed test the precision of the distinction
:between weakness and failure
Sri Lanka has been embroiled in a bitter and destructive civil war for nineteen
years. As much as 15 percent of its total land mass has at times in the last
decade been controlled by the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeelam (LTTE)
a Tamil separatist insurgency. Additionally, the LTTE with relative impunity
has been able to assassinate prime ministers, bomb presidents, kill off rival
Tamils, and in 2001, even destroy the nation’s civil air terminal and main air
force base. But, as incapable as the Sinhala-dominated governments of the island
have been of putting down the LTTE rebellion, so the nation-state has
remained merely weak (or fragmented, as Jenne’s chapter posits), never close
to tipping over into failure. For 80 percent of Sri Lankans, the government
performs reasonably well. The roads are maintained and schools and hospitals
function, to some limited extent even in the war-torn north and east. Since
the early 1990s, too, Sri Lanka has exhibited robust levels of economic
growth. The authority of successive governments extends securely to the Sinhalaspeaking
80 percent of the country, and into the recaptured Tamil areas. For
these reasons, despite a consuming internal conflict founded on intense majority-
minority discrimination and deprivation and on pronounced ethnic and religious
differences, Sri Lanka projects authority throughout much of the country
.has suffered no loss of legitimacy among Sinhala, and has successfully escaped failure
Indonesia is another case of weakness avoiding failure despite widespread
insecurity. As the world’s largest Muslim nation, its far-flung archipelago harbors
separatist wars in Aceh in the west and in Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) in
the east, plus large pockets of Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon and the
Maluku islands, Muslim-Christian hostility in northern Sulawesi, and ethnic
xenophobic outbursts in Kalimantan. Given all of these conflictual situations
none of which has become less bitter since the end of the Soeharto dictatorship
it would be easy to conclude that Indonesia was approaching failure. Yet, as
Michael Malley’s chapter argues forcefully, only the insurgents in Aceh and
Papua want to secede and are contesting the state. The several other battles take
place within the state, not against it. They do not threaten the integrity and
resources of the state in the way that the enduring, but low-level, war in Aceh
does. In Aceh and Papua, the government retains the upper hand. Overall, most
of Indonesia is still secure. In most of the country the government projects
power and authority. It manages to provide most other necessary political goods
.to most of Indonesia despite dangerous economic and other developments in the post-Soeharto era
What about Colombia? An otherwise well-endowed, prosperous, and ostensibly
.stable state controls only two-thirds of its territory, a clear hint of failure
Three private armies project their own power across large zones carved out of
the very body of the state. The official defense and political establishment has
.renounced or lost authority in those zones to insurgent groups and drug traffickers
Moreover, Colombia is tense and disturbed. It boasts the second highest
annual per capita murder rate in the world. Its politicians and businessmen
routinely wear armored vests and travel with well-armed guards, a clear indicator
of the state’s inability to ensure personal security. Even so, as Harvey Kline’s
chapter argues, the rest of Colombia as a state still delivers schooling and medical
care, organizes a physical and communications infrastructure, provides economic
opportunity, and remains legitimate. Colombia is weak because of its
multiple insurgencies, but is comparatively strong and well-performing in the
areas over which it maintains control. When and if the government of Colombia
can re-insert itself into the disputed zones and further reduce the power of
drug traffickers, the state’s reach will expand. Then, a weak, endangered state
.will be able to move farther away from possible failure toward strength
Zimbabwe is an example of a once unquestionably strong African state that
has fallen rapidly through weakness to the very edge of the abyss of failure. All
Zimbabwe lacks in order to join the ranks of failed states is a widespread internal
insurgent movement directed against the government. That could come
particularly if the political and economic deterioration of the country continues
unchecked. In 2000 and 2001, GDP per capita slid backward by 10 percent a
year. Inflation galloped from 30 percent to 116 percent. The local currency fell
against the U.S. dollar from 38:1 to 500:1. Foreign and domestic investment
ceased. Unemployment rose to 60 percent in a country of 12 million. Health
and educational services vanished. HIV infection rates climbed to 30 percent
with about 2000 Zimbabweans dying every week. Respect for the rule of law
was badly battered and then subverted. Political institutions ceased to function
fully. Agents of the state preyed on its real and its supposed opponents, chilling
free expression and shamelessly stealing a presidential election. The
government’s legitimacy vanished. Corruption, meanwhile, flourished, with
the ruling elite pocketing their local and Congolese war gains and letting most
Zimbabweans go hungry. Real starvation appeared in mid-2002, despite food
aid from abroad. All of this misery, and the tendency to fail, resulted (as it had
earlier in the Congo and Sierra Leone) from the ruthless designs and vengeance
.of an omnipotent ruler
Indonesia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe are but four among a large
number of early twenty-first century nation-states at risk of failing. They each
escape the category failed, but only for the time being, and only if they each
manage to arrest their descent toward economic and political failure, accommodate
their insurgency or insurgencies, and strengthen their delivery of political
goods to all, or almost all, of their citizens. Tajikistan, examined in Nasrin
Dadmehr’s chapter, is a fifth state that harbors the possibility of failure, in this
case, renewed failure. From 1992 to 1997, the government of Tajikistan projected
power only in selected parts of the ramshackle nation; across vast areas
there was no government, war raged, and “the state lost its meaning.”10 Then
Russia exerted itself in its former colony, claiming that its own security remained
at risk because of lawlessness there. From 1999, Russia reinforced its
major base in Tajikistan and increasingly became a force for stability against
internal dissidence, as well as a buffer for the Tajikistan government against
Taliban- and Uzbek-inspired adventurism. In this century, Russia has become
.the guarantor of Tajikistan’s integrity
A number of other nation-states belong in the category of weak states that
show a high potential to fail. Nepal has been a clear case since its Maoist insurgency
.began again roiling the mountains and plains of the monarchist country
Already hindered by geography and poverty, Nepal has never been a robust
provider of political goods to its inhabitants. The palace massacre of 2001 undermined
.the legitimacy of the monarchy, and thus of the ruling government
With the flare-up of a determined rural rebellion in 2002, and Nepal’s demonstrated
inability to cope effectively, security of persons and of regions became
harder and harder to achieve, absent military assistance from India. Under these
circumstances, Nepal can hardly project power or credibility. Failure becomes
.a distinct possibility
So the potential for failure exists in those highly regimented states, such as
Iraq and North Korea, that could implode as soon as a dictator or a dictatorial
regime is toppled. Because, as Jenne suggests, such states are held together
entirely by repression and not by performance, an end to or an easing of repression
could create destabilizing battles for succession, resulting anarchy, and the
rapid rise of non-state actors. In nation-states made secure by punishment and
.secret intelligence networks, legitimacy is likely to vanish whenever the curtain of control lifts
Kyrgyzstan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Nigeria all fit near Nepal on the continuum
of weakness tending toward failure. Kyrgyzstan, with limited resources
and arbitrary rule, has contended with a sharply contracted economy, poverty
and two forms of militant insurgency. Those militant rivals for power remain
respect for human rights and democratic processes has slipped, and Kyrgyzstan’s
ability to emerge from inherited weakness is questionable, even given the creation
of a U.S. airbase and the arrival of free-spending Americans. Kenya is
about to come to the alleged end of twenty-five years of single-man rule. Although
Kenya is intrinsically wealthy, its fortunes have been badly managed
corruption is rampant, and a gang of ethnically specific thugs has distorted the
rule of law, limited the supply of political goods, battered civil society and
human rights, and privileged related ethnic minorities against larger, more central,
but now marginalized ethnicities. Battles royal for spoils in the post-Moi
era could lead to clashes between ethnic groups. A righting of scores could
.readily plunge Kenya into failure
Nigeria is a democracy under President Olusegun Obasanjo, but the historic
rivalries between east and west, south and north, oil-states and non-oil provinces,
Christian and Muslim communities, democrats and autocrats, and soldiers
and citizens that have bedeviled Africa’s most populous state since independence
in 1960 (and before) are still there, seething below a surface calmed
or smoothed by the presence of Obasanjo. Military dictators could reemerge
intercommunal conflict could readily reoccur, and the north-south divide could
once again become an obstacle to strengthening a state already softened by
economic confusion, continued corruption, and mismanagement. Nigeria also
performs poorly as a state, and provides political goods adequately at best across
the vast mélange of poor and rich provinces that make up its little-unified and
very unglued whole. Competition during the national election in 2003 could
.readily loosen the already tattered ties that keep Nigeria whole
Other weak states that contain the incubus of failure because of serious intercommunal
antagonisms but have managed effectively to come to terms with
or to bridge their divisions include Fiji, as described fully in Stephanie Lawson’s
chapter; New Guinea; the Solomon Islands; Lebanon, as discussed in Barak’s
.chapter; the Philippines; Bolivia; Ecuador; and Paraguay
Lebanon had disintegrated almost entirely before Syria’s intervention enabled
the geographical expression that Lebanon had always represented to become
.a state once again, and to begin to function internally and internationally
Syria gave a sense of governmental legitimacy to what had been a bombed out
shell of a polity. Lebanon today qualifies as weak rather than failed, because its
state is credible, civil war is absent, and political goods are being provided in
significant quantities and quality. Syria provides the security blanket, denies
fractious warlords the freedom to aggrandize, and mandates cooperation between
the usually antagonistic Muslim and Christian communities and between
the battling groups within the Muslim community. The fear of being attacked
preemptively by rivals, or losing control of critical resources, is alleviated by
Syria’s imposed hegemony. Within that framework of supplied security
.Lebanon’s traditional entrepreneurial spirit has transformed a failed state into a much stronger one
Unlike many of the weak states discussed herein, Fiji is palpably a strong
state. Yet it has become weak, being acutely “vulnerable to more serious failure
in terms of its capacity to provide a secure social, political, and economic
environment” for its two main antagonistic constituent peoples. Despite seventeen
years of relatively stable post-colonial rule, Fiji experienced two coups in
1987 and another in 2000. Fiji, once considered a bastion of the rule of law in
the Pacific, became a state with worrying centrifugal tendencies. Its weakness
stemmed from ethnic rivalries, and the realization that democratic politics and
constitutional processes were insufficient to bridge existing cleavages. Conflict
and coups were propelled by unresolved fears among ethnic elites. Until
those fears can be reduced, Fiji remains weak as a state and potentially prone
.(like the Solomon Islands) to renewed challenges to the state’s authority and legitimacy
A third variety of weak state includes the enduringly weak. As the chapter
by Marlye Gélin-Adams and David Malone suggests, Haiti has always been on
.the edge of failure, particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
But its entrenched weaknesses include no ethnic, religious, or other communal
cleavages. There are no insurgent movements. Nor has Haiti experienced radical
or rapid deflation in standards of living and national expectations, like Argentina
.in 2002 and Russia in the 1990s. Haiti has always been the poorest polity in the Western hemispher
Haiti’s national capacity to provide political goods has always been compromised
by autocratic and corrupt leadership, weak institutions, an intimidated
civil society, high levels of crime, low GDP levels per capita, high rates
of infant mortality, suspicion or outright hostility from its neighbors, and many
other deficiencies. Narcotics trafficking has been a serious problem since the
1980s. The Haitian government has been unable or unwilling to interdict smugglers
in general, and drugs transshippers in particular. Haiti, even under President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1990–1991, 1994–1995, 2000–), is gripped in a
vise of weakness. Yet, given very limited organized internal dissidence, almost
no internal ethnic, religious, or linguistic cleavages within Haitian society except
a deep distrust by the majority of the upper classes, and of mulattos because
of their historic class affiliations, the ingredients of major civil strife are
absent. Failure demands communal differences capable of being transformed
.into consuming cross-group violence. Haiti seems condemned to remain weak but without failing
Nation-states that, given their geographical and physical legacy (and future
peril, in several cases, because of global warming and cataclysmic climatic
change), can be considered inherently weak include (not a full list) Burkina
Faso, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, and Niger, in Africa; Georgia and Moldova in the
former Soviet Union, and Cambodia, East Timor, and Laos in Asia.12 Each has
its own distinguishing features, and Georgia and Moldova battle their own so
far successful separatist movements. Chad at one time harbored a vicious civil
war, and Burkina Faso, Niger, Cambodia, and Laos are all ruled by autocrats
unfriendly to civil society and to participatory governance. East Timor is a very
new state, having been rescued and resuscitated by the United Nations after
two bitter and unrewarding colonial interludes and a brutal final Indonesian
spree of destruction and death. East Timor, even with UN help, enters its full
majority without a cadre of experienced professionals and bureaucrats and without
much in the way of physical resources. The willingness of these weak states
to provide political goods in quantity and quality is severely limited at the best
.of times. Almost any external shock or internal emergency could push them over the brink
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| العنوان |
الكاتب |
Date |
 لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-16-12, 04:45 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-16-12, 05:10 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-16-12, 05:37 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-16-12, 05:53 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | jini | 02-16-12, 05:44 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | hamid brgo | 02-16-12, 06:50 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-16-12, 08:13 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | الشفيع وراق عبد الرحمن | 02-16-12, 06:52 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | hamid brgo | 02-16-12, 07:39 PM |
 Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-16-12, 08:43 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-16-12, 07:55 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | ماجد حسون | 02-16-12, 08:03 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-16-12, 09:35 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-16-12, 09:43 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-17-12, 00:49 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-16-12, 09:45 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Salah Abdulla | 02-16-12, 10:49 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | غالب شريف | 02-17-12, 01:38 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-17-12, 04:56 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-17-12, 04:30 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | hamid brgo | 02-17-12, 05:34 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | الشفيع وراق عبد الرحمن | 02-17-12, 05:43 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Salah Abdulla | 02-17-12, 08:14 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | ماجد حسون | 02-17-12, 08:21 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 10:10 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Abdalla aidros | 02-17-12, 10:20 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | حاتم محمد حاج المهدي | 02-17-12, 11:08 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | jini | 02-17-12, 11:16 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد على حسن | 02-17-12, 11:30 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Abdel Aati | 02-17-12, 11:55 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-17-12, 04:19 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-17-12, 03:48 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | hamid brgo | 02-17-12, 11:48 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | abubakr salih | 02-17-12, 01:35 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | ماجد حسون | 02-17-12, 02:07 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-17-12, 02:54 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | abubakr salih | 02-17-12, 05:27 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | غالب شريف | 02-17-12, 06:44 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 06:48 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | تاج الدين عبدالله آدم | 02-17-12, 08:31 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Abdel Aati | 02-18-12, 09:14 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-17-12, 08:02 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | تاج الدين عبدالله آدم | 02-17-12, 10:47 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | تاج الدين عبدالله آدم | 02-17-12, 10:51 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | غالب شريف | 02-17-12, 08:36 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 08:56 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | هيثم طه | 02-17-12, 09:12 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | تاج الدين عبدالله آدم | 02-17-12, 10:11 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Abdel Aati | 02-18-12, 09:52 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 09:20 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 09:33 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | هيثم طه | 02-17-12, 09:54 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 10:05 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-17-12, 10:00 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 10:14 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 10:30 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 10:53 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 11:04 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 11:11 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-17-12, 11:13 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | عمر دفع الله | 02-17-12, 11:50 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-18-12, 02:38 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | غالب شريف | 02-18-12, 00:01 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | MAHJOOP ALI | 02-18-12, 00:23 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | ibrahim alnimma | 02-17-12, 11:35 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Tragie Mustafa | 02-18-12, 01:33 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | الشفيع وراق عبد الرحمن | 02-18-12, 04:46 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | هيثم طه | 02-18-12, 05:18 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Abdlaziz Eisa | 02-18-12, 06:05 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Abdel Aati | 02-18-12, 10:49 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Abdel Aati | 02-18-12, 09:31 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Abdel Aati | 02-18-12, 08:42 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | عبدالله محمد أحمد | 02-18-12, 05:29 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | hamid brgo | 02-18-12, 06:14 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-18-12, 07:33 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-18-12, 07:45 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-18-12, 08:35 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | عمر دفع الله | 02-18-12, 08:42 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | تاج الدين عبدالله آدم | 02-18-12, 05:44 PM |
 Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-18-12, 08:32 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-18-12, 08:45 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-18-12, 08:50 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | هيثم طه | 02-18-12, 11:39 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | MAHJOOP ALI | 02-19-12, 02:58 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-19-12, 06:57 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-19-12, 07:17 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-19-12, 07:24 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | هيثم طه | 02-19-12, 07:29 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Abdalla aidros | 02-19-12, 09:45 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | abubakr salih | 02-19-12, 02:09 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-19-12, 03:06 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | MAHJOOP ALI | 02-19-12, 05:08 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | عمر دفع الله | 02-19-12, 05:15 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | abubakr salih | 02-19-12, 07:40 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | hafiz Issue | 02-19-12, 09:54 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | محمد حيدر المشرف | 02-19-12, 11:21 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | MAHJOOP ALI | 02-21-12, 02:16 AM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | طلعت الطيب | 02-22-12, 12:53 PM |
| Re: لا فرق بين عقلية البشير .. و عقلية نخب الشمال ... يمين و يسار .. | Mohamed Suleiman | 02-22-12, 06:09 PM |
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