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 Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: Abobakr Shadad)
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لك الشكر دكتور شداد، وياليت لو كان لنا الوقت لترجمة كل هذه الوثائق ليقرأها رجل الشارع قبل الدبلوماسي أو السياسي على الأقل ليزول الكثير من الغموض وسوأ الفهم وسوء الظن!
هاهنا وثيقة رائعة بحق تفضح استراتيجية وتكتيكات حكومة البشير:
و هي هدية رائعة للحزبين الكبيرين وحركات دارفور وجميعهم فاوضوا السلطة حتى بح صوتهم ثم ضاع، فيها تحليل رائع، تؤكد أن المؤتمر الوطني يعتبر المفاوضات مع أي طرف يفاوضه غاية وليست وسيلة للوصول إلى حل، فالمفاوضات في نظرهم أفضل من القتال فهي تسغرق وقتا طويلا يظلون هم فيه في السلطة، وبعد الوصول لاتفاق بعد ذلك الوقت الطويل لاينفذون ما اتفقوا عليه وحين يصل الأمر لمرحلة حرجة بسبب عدم تطبيق الاتفاق يسعون لفتح باب التفاوض من جديد، أي المماطلة والتسويف!
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000288
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATING FOR ITS OWN SURVIVAL: HOW THE NCP USES
NEGOTIATION TO MAINTAIN ITS HOLD ON POWER
REF: A. KHARTOUM 185
¶B. KHARTOUM 166
¶C. KHARTOUM 150
¶D. KHARTOUM 50
¶E. 08 KHARTOUM 338
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) As the new U.S. Administration considers options on
how best to engage with the Sudanese regime and considers the
possibility of discussing with the regime on our key foreign
policy objectives in Sudan, it is important to keep in mind
that the National Congress Party (NCP) regime never saw a
negotiation it didn't like. A pack of compulsive
negotiators, the regime is in a constant state of negotiation
with friends and foes alike, and has no qualms about making
or breaking agreements if circumstances change, and the
regime can subsequently broker a better deal. It is also
important to remember that the regime often strikes deals it
never intends to implement, purely as a delaying tactic or to
pursue other options even while engaged in the process of
negotiating. Embassy Khartoum submitted a cable about the
regime's tactics in 2008 entitled "The NCP: Sudan's Brutal
Pragmatists" (Ref E).
¶2. (C) What is the NCP's rationale for this approach to
negotiations? It uses them as a means of holding onto power,
to level the playing field against stronger opponents, and to
co-opt and disarm opponents. The NCP also uses negotiation
to assert that it is the principal partner for any and all
deals in Sudan ) thus legitimizing itself and extending its
time in power as the key player. The reason the NCP needs
to rely on negotiations is that it is not powerful enough to
enforce its will on all of Sudan's other factions all the
time, but is strong enough to hold onto political and
economic power at the center. In the end, negotiations are
cheaper than fighting. The NCP also negotiates and makes
deals that can be implemented over time (or partially ones
that are partially implemented, only to be renegotiated,)
because this strategy allows the regime to hedge its bets.
If circumstances change, the regime can always renegotiate
based on the new reality. The NCP's reasons for negotiating
with the U.S. are different from its reasons for negotiating
with the SPLM in that it actually fears the United States
more than any other counterpart and sees "a deal" with the
Americans as its ultimate guarantee for regime survival. It
also negotiates with the U.S. because it wants to tie us into
a process of engagement to avoid additional punitive actions
on our part, and because it doesn't trust that we will do
what we say, given past broken promises by the Bush
Administration. Negotiations on Darfur are a different story
) Darfur has become intractable in many ways, and the regime
is negotiating merely to show a modicum of good will to the
international community, especially in contrast to the
rejectionism of various rebel factions. However, the regime
recognizes that it may not be possible to solve Darfur's
problems even if it truly wanted to do so.
¶3. (C) How does the NCP view negotiations on Darfur? The GOS
is frustrated by the current negotiating process on Darfur
because it doesn't have anyone it can make a deal with.
(Abdelwahid al Nur won't negotiate. Another Zaghawa
minority-based agreement won't solve the problem, but rather
just anger the Arabs and the Fur). The NCP is very
frustrated that from their perspective we won't put more
pressure on Abdelwahid al Nur and other rebels. The regime
believes that, despite its duplicity, it is more ready and
more sincere in seeking a way out on Darfur than anyone else.
They believe that the different Darfuri movements are more
interested in power than in the people of Darfur. They also
believe that America could obtain an agreement with the NCP
that would tangibly improve the situation in Darfur but the
United States Government is a prisoner of an aggressive,
activist community (such as "Save Darfur" and ENOUGH) that
will not allow it to "make a deal with the devil" in Sudan
even if that deal was to lead to improving the lives of the
very people the activists are supposed to be fighting for.
¶4. (C) How does the NCP view the incomplete negotiation of
the CPA and DPA? The NCP would argue that it has delivered a
lot on CPA, but that the SPLM hasn't been up to the task of
being a full partner. They can point to a massive transfer of
cash to the SPLM since 2005 (over $4 billion dollars in oil
revenues) as part of the success of the CPA's wealth-sharing
KHARTOUM 00000288 002 OF 003
provisions and to a GOSS which is independent in all but name
and to power-sharing within the Government of National Unity
and other national institutions in Khartoum. It can also
point to a massive SPLA, which absorbs the bulk of South
Sudan's budget. It would further maintain that the parts of
the agreement that haven't been implemented are too costly
politically or economically (e.g. Abyei, border demarcation,
land rights issues etc.) In their more honest moments, they
would admit that their implementation of the CPA waxes and
wanes according to objective factors such as international
attention and pressure, their own internal stability and
strength and the SPLM's capacity to exact concessions and to
follow up on agreements. The NCP believes, and they are
right, that especially for the first two years of the CPA
(2005-2007), the agreement was largely ignored by the
international community in the furor about Darfur. The NCP
doesn't take the DPA seriously because Minni Minawi doesn't
have much, if any, popular legitimacy in Darfur, and because
the NCP sees that Minni Minawi and SLM don't have the
capacity to implement the agreement on their side. As for
the road ahead, the NCP hopes the international community
will be able to "deliver" Abdelwahid al Nur and others to an
agreement - anyone who can deliver a deal and serve as their
counterpart will be welcomed but why give concessions to
Minni which will be needed in the future for someone else?
The NCP would willingly accept a deal in Darfur that doesn't
strip it of essential power at a national level, and that
doesn't disenfranchise Arab tribes that have supported it.
This is not based on any remorse or sense of guilt for its
many crimes in Darfur but rather on a pragmatic fear that
Darfur could sooner or later drag NCP rule in Sudan down with
it.
¶5. (C) How does the NCP view previous promises and
engagement by the U.S.? The GOS believes the U.S. reneged on
its explicit promises at Naivasha during the negotiation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (removal from the State
Sponsors of Terrorism List, full diplomatic relations and
lifting of economic sanctions.) The GOS believes that the
U.S. will constantly raise the bar for what we will require
the regime to do in order to achieve these goals, because we
never intended to implement the deal anyway. From their
perspective, our goal is to get the regime to do what we
want, offer as little as possible, and if this is not
possible we will pursue a policy of regime-change. The
regime was frustrated by the negotiations with former Special
Envoy Williamson because he presented himself as a practical
negotiator who had been empowered by the U.S. Administration,
but when the Sudanese agreed to all of the short-term
procedural demands outlined by SE Williamson, the Special
Envoy backed away from a formalized agreement. The Sudanese
still talk about their confusion over what caused SE
Williamson to back away from such an agreement with some
believing that he was ordered not to come to a deal and
others thinking that there was never a deal on the table,
only an attempt at personal grandstanding. They also recall a
notorious earlier incident in 2004 when then S/CT and AF
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa personally told VP
Ali Osman Taha that "once Sudan signed the CPA" it would be
removed from the Terrorism List "within days."
¶6. (C) Despite what they view as our broken promises, the
regime is still extremely eager to negotiate with us, and
will likely implement most parts of any bilateral agreement
as long as it allows the regime to hold onto power. Just the
fact of entering into a substantive negotiation with the U.S.
legitimizes the regime, and a deal with the U.S. would cement
the regime's legitimacy, especially if combined with a
probable election victory by the NCP. The appearance of
American goodwill is almost as important to the regime as
that reality. They seek a deal with the Americans that they
can present as a "victory" for the regime which preserves
"Sudan's dignity."
¶7. (C) Embassy Khartoum has advocated a policy of engagement
leading to a roadmap on U.S.-Sudan relations (Ref C), but
cautions that we must be very clear on what our core
objectives are in Darfur, and what we expect Darfur and the
rest of Sudan to look like when this process is over - i.e.
what is the "end game" - so that we will be able to measure
progress toward these objectives. We must do this while
enhancing our focus on the CPA and South Sudan, which are
actually in a much more fragile state than Darfur's miserable
stasis (reftels A and D).
KHARTOUM 00000288 003 OF 003
¶8. (C) The initial hurdle is almost upon us as the regime
will be watching closely to see what sort of message
Washington will be sending in a response to a possible ICC
arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir on March 4. Will this
be a repackaging of past calls for regime change or will
there be enough space and hope in the official American
position for a possible regime soft-landing from a tangled
skein of crises, mostly of its own making (Darfur, CPA
implementation, ICC)? The NCP will certainly be ready to use
diplomacy, politics, concessions and (if needed) violence, to
prevent the emergence of an international/national consensus
that threatens its hold on power. Such a consensus would ally
the West with some coalition of Darfuri rebels, Northern
oppositionists and the SPLM plus regional players. To avoid
such a formidable and potentially fatal lineup, it will do
almost anything -- whether that involves making concessions
or escalating an already volatile and dangerous situation in
Sudan.
FERNANDEZ
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الكاتب |
Date |
 مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:03 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:04 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:09 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:20 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:25 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-03-11, 10:10 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 10:44 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 11:05 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-03-11, 11:05 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | SAIF MUstafa | 09-04-11, 00:04 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-04-11, 00:25 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | motaz ali | 09-04-11, 03:11 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 04:24 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 08:26 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | أحمد أمين | 09-04-11, 12:06 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | أحمد أمين | 09-04-11, 12:12 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 06:21 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 06:40 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 06:48 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 07:48 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 05:28 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 06:00 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | قلقو | 09-05-11, 06:56 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | أحمد أمين | 09-05-11, 11:17 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 03:44 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | بريمة محمد | 09-05-11, 07:24 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 08:41 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 08:54 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:08 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:20 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:42 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:56 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-05-11, 10:49 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 11:31 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 11:45 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-06-11, 00:20 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-06-11, 00:38 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Kostawi | 09-14-11, 09:15 PM |
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