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 Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
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وثيقة تبين كيف أن صلاح غوش حاول تخويف الأمريكان من المتطرفين الإسلاميين فيما لو مضت محاولات إدانة البشير أمام المحكمة الجنائية الدولية للأمام، وبعد أن رأينا كيف أن الناتو تحالف مع جماعة جهادية متطرفة لها صلة بالقاعدة هي الجماعة الليبية المقاتلة من أجل إسقاط القذافي، هل لا تزال هذه الفزاعة تعمل؟
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001417
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE INTEL CHIEF WORRIED ABOUT ISLAMIC
RADICALS IF ICC ISSUES ARREST WARRANT AGAINST PRESIDENT
BASHIR
REF: KHARTOUM 1405
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The GOS will be hard-pressed to control the
actions of Islamic radicals in Sudan if the ICC issues an
arrest warrant against President Bashir, NISS Chief Salah
Ghosh told CDA Fernandez September 17. Ghosh clarified that
he did not tell French Presidential Advisor Bruno Joubert
that the GOS would "unleash" radicals against western
interests in Sudan if an arrest warrant is issued, but rather
that it would be increasingly difficult for the GOS to
control them and would even be challenged to protect itself
against extremist groups, who would question why the regime
is cooperating with the West if an arrest warrant is issued
despite such cooperation. On Darfur, Ghosh said that he and
Vice President Taha met with representatives of SLM leader
Minni Minawi September 17 to discuss ways of bringing Minawi
back into the GNU and requested US assistance to encourage
Minawi to return to Khartoum. Regarding UNAMID deployment,
CDA Fernandez encouraged Ghosh to press the regime to allow
Ethiopian and Egyptian peacekeepers to drive overland
directly into Darfur to facilitate their rapid deployment.
End summary.
Controlling Islamic Radicals in Sudan
-------------------------------------
¶2. (C) National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)
Chief Salah Ghosh told CDA Fernandez (accompanied by Station
Chief and polchief) September 17 that the regime will have a
difficult time controlling radical Islamic extremist groups
in Sudan if the ICC issues an arrest warrant against
President Bashir. Ghosh clarified that he did not tell
French Presidential Advisor Bruno Joubert that the regime
would "unleash" radicals against Western interests in Sudan
if an arrest warrant is issued, as the French and some other
diplomats have been saying. He noted that he had explained
this to Joubert in Arabic and Joubert's translator had put it
into French so NISS had no idea that such an alarming
misinterpretation was making the rounds. He asked that the
Americans "correct the record" with any misinformed Europeans
and added that he had told EU Special Representative Torben
Brylle, who speaks English, the accurate account. Ghosh
said the NISS currently keeps close tabs on Islamic radical
"cells" (he avoided using the term "terrorists") and meets
regularly with them. Ghosh said he personally has met with
these extremists in prison as well as others at the mosques
in order to "change their minds."
¶3. (C) Ghosh said that the regime had been successful in
turning many potential jihadists away from violent action
although they still held extreme views without actually
committing any crime. "We told them that real jihad is
organized fighting in defense of the country," so war with
Israel or with Chad would be jihad, but not targeting South
Sudan or diplomats or peacekeepers accepted by Sudan. "The
best way is to convince the cells to change their behavior,"
said Ghosh, but if there is an arrest warrant against
President Bashir "we will lose control" of the situation and
of monitoring these groups and it will be increasingly
"difficult to take care of security since we will be focused
on protecting our own leaders." He noted that two of the
members of a terrorist cell that killed US Embassy staff on
January 1 had roots in the regime's "Islamic Movement" but he
feared that a polarized political situation would turn such a
trickle into a torrent and sweep away the regime.
¶4. (C) Ghosh said that Islamic extremists will become
increasingly radicalized if there is an arrest warrant
against the President and will ask "what has the CIA done for
you? Why are we cooperating? Let's go to Jihad." Ghosh
pointed out that President Bashir, FVP Salva Kiir, and he
himself have already been identified as the top potential
targets by the busted Al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Niles
(AQTN) group of August 2007 due to perceived cooperation with
the West. Ghosh said the regime recognizes that "the ICC is
a political game" and that "the Save Darfur lobby is trying
to mobilize against us. Those are our enemies, we have no
other enemies, certainly not the United States." Ghosh
warned that an ICC indictment against the President "will be
KHARTOUM 00001417 002 OF 003
the start of a direct clash between us and the international
community." To avoid this, Ghosh urged greater engagement
between Sudan and the US and expressed hope for "greater
confidence" between the NCP and the USG. Politicians in the
US are harsh with the NCP and count our faults, never looking
for the positive, while the US is always willing to overlook
the defects of the SPLM in spite of corruption in the GOSS,
complained Ghosh. "We need close engagement if you want to
help us," urged Ghosh. He readily admitted that Sudan has
made many mistakes and needs to accommodate fully American
concerns about UNAMID deployment, a peace process and
American humanitarian concerns in Darfur.
¶5. (C) Ghosh said that he is committed fully to
counter-terrorism cooperation despite the pressure of some
politicians in the regime to stop it. If they end cooperation
with the U.S. "I will leave my position," he noted, as he
believed that both countries benefited from this. He made a
particular point of emphasizing the practical value of this
link as a means of bilateral communication between the GOS
and USG. He added that he understood Washington's suspicion
of the NCP, "you think they have too much power and you would
like to see them cut down to size." "We know that you are
for using the political process to weaken them some, using
your friends like the SPLM and other parties." This is
politics and it is reasonable, "that is the way the political
game is played whether in Sudan or America." He would like
to see monthly meetings with the Charge because "this is very
useful to speak honestly and clearly to each other."
Ghosh and VP Taha Meet with SLM/Minawi Representatives
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶6. (C) Ghosh said that he and VP Ali Osman Taha had just met
with SLM/Minawi representative (and head of DPA
implementation) Mohammed el Tijane to discuss ways of
bringing Minawi back to Khartoum and implement the DPA.
Ghosh requested the help of the US "to convince Minawi to
return to Khartoum" and said that Taha might even travel to
El Fasher to meet with Minawi to discuss DPA implementation.
(Note: Separately, Tijane passed the same information to CDA
and polchief at the CDA's Ramadan Iftar at the Rotana Hotel
in Khartoum September 17 and to AF/SPG TDYoff later that
evening. Tijane complained of continued attacks September 17
by GOS forces in north Darfur outside of Khazan Tunjur but
said that the fighting had stopped by 6:30 pm. Minawi
himself confirmed this information to poloff in Darfur by
satphone late the evening of September 17 and claimed that
SLM forces routed the GOS forces and took 40 of their
vehicles. Minawi confirmed the meetings of his
representatives with Ghosh and Taha and questioned why Nafie
was not involved. He also questioned the sincerity of Ghosh
and Taha given the ongoing GOS attacks even while the regime
was meeting with SLM officials in Khartoum. At noon on
September 18, CDA Fernandez spoke to Minawi by satphone.
Minnawi reported no ground fighting but a "SAF Antonov" had
bombed near Tabit (30 miles SW of El Fasher) killing 5
civilians working in their fields. Minawi said that he feared
the "not only the NCP, but SAF has its factions and you agree
with one and the other does this." He was not opposed to
meeting Taha on Friday, September 19 but wanted tangible
results from the meeting and guarantees against further
attacks, and asked rhetorically "is he reaching out because
he is going to New York and has to look like a peacemaker?"
End note.)
¶7. (C) Ghosh said that the problem of Minawi "was not a deep
one." He cheerfully admitted that some of the problems were
created by the NCP, some were of Minawi's own creation and
had to do with corruption, lack of capacity and ethnic
problems between Zaghawa and non-Zaghawa. The death in a car
accident of Darfur negotiator Magzoub al-Khalifa in July 2007
had left a gap in relations with Minawi that the toxic Nafie
Ali Nafie, Al-Khalifa's successor with the Darfur file, had
not even bothered to try to fill.
Overland Deployment of Ethiopian and Egyptian UNAMID Troops
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶8. (C) CDA Fernandez suggested to Ghosh that the regime could
improve its image and relations with the West by allowing and
KHARTOUM 00001417 003 OF 003
encouraging Ethiopian and Egyptian UNAMID peacekeeping troops
to deploy overland to Darfur (as discussed with AF/SPG
Shortley via SVTC September 16). CDA noted that this would be
both a tangible and a symbolic change that would enhance
Western confidence that the regime wants to change its ways.
Ghosh promised to consider the proposal and discuss it with
others in the regime. CDA also noted that "if we look at
tangible results since July, we seem to be going backwards in
Darfur." The current military campaign, actions against IDP
camps, such as the Kalma massacre and harassment of NGOs
continues unabated, especially in South Darfur. Ghosh
responded that "the problem is that South Darfur state is in
the hands of the janjaweed," and is the stronghold of
Darfur's Arab tribes, unlike North and West Darfur states
where Africans serve as governor and there is less NGO
harassment and less pressure on IDP camps. CDA Fernandez
noted that there are Arab tribes, such as the Baggara
Rizeigat, who refused to join in the fighting, "there has to
be a way of ensuring order, without falling into brutality
such as we saw in Kalma." If there was a vote today on ICC
deferral today at the Security Council, "we would veto,
although there is still time to change. Ghosh readily
admitted that "we need to change."
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Friendly and eminently open to engagement with the US
throughout the meeting (never more so than in this particular
meeting), Ghosh was meticulously careful to present the
potential actions of Sudanese extremists in response to an
ICC arrest warrant as a risk, rather than as a threat by the
regime. The NCP is no doubt worried about keeping a lid on
extremists, but its primary concern at the moment is
convincing the West to help it avoid an ICC arrest warrant
against Bashir by any means necessary. The meeting of Ghosh
and Taha with SLM rep Tijane is a positive sign, but only if
the regime is serious about making tangible concessions to
Minawi in implementing more of the DPA in order to ensure his
return to Khartoum. The continued attacks on Minawi
simultaneous to the talks in Khartoum could be a sign that
the regime hopes to convince Minawi by all means necessary,
that it is entirely duplicitous, or - perhaps most alarming -
not completely in control of events. Unfortunately it is
likely the latter, as the regime has thus far proven itself
incapable even of presenting the basic outlines of a possible
solution to Darfur in its much touted Darfur People's
Initiative (which remains an empty shell weeks after being
announced). However the regime is under increasing pressure
to do something on Darfur in advance of the UNGA next week
and possible discussions of an article 16 ICC deferral in the
following weeks, and may yet present a proposal on Darfur in
advance of or at the UNGA, as VP Taha himself will head the
GOS delegation in NY next week (as predicted by FM Alor in
reftel).
FERNANDEZ
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الكاتب |
Date |
 مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:03 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:04 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:09 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:20 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:25 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-03-11, 10:10 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 10:44 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 11:05 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-03-11, 11:05 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | SAIF MUstafa | 09-04-11, 00:04 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-04-11, 00:25 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | motaz ali | 09-04-11, 03:11 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 04:24 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 08:26 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | أحمد أمين | 09-04-11, 12:06 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | أحمد أمين | 09-04-11, 12:12 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 06:21 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 06:40 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 06:48 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 07:48 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 05:28 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 06:00 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | قلقو | 09-05-11, 06:56 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | أحمد أمين | 09-05-11, 11:17 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 03:44 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | بريمة محمد | 09-05-11, 07:24 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 08:41 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 08:54 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:08 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:20 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:42 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:56 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-05-11, 10:49 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 11:31 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 11:45 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-06-11, 00:20 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-06-11, 00:38 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Kostawi | 09-14-11, 09:15 PM |
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