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 Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: أحمد أمين)
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وثيقة هامة بها جزء يوضح لماذا لا تؤيد أمريكا تغيير نظام البشير (حتى تاريخ الوثيقة) وفي بدايتها تحليل للتركيبة القبلية المهيمنة على السلطة في الخرطوم يخلص إلى تركز السلطة في يد الجعليين يليهم الشايقية ثم الدناقلة
أترجم منها هذا الجزء:
رقم
12
C
"سياسة تغيير النظام من الممكن أن يصبح تطبيقها بنجاح صعبا بدرجة استثنائية. ليس للسودان تراث في الحكم بخلاف حكم القبائل القبائل الثلاثة المهيمنة في الخرطوم، و إذا خلف هذا النظام نظام آخر يتكون من هذه القبائل الثلاثة فإنه سيحتفظ بالجزء الأكبر من وجهة نظر حكومة نظام البشير، وفي الواقع فإن الكثير من معارضة البشير يتكون من عناصر تعارض صفقة السلام مع الجنوب، وتتبنى شعارات إسلامية و ترفض تقاسم السلطة مع القبائل الأفريقية من دارفور أو شرق السودان أو الجنوب، وإذا تغير النظام فربما يستدعي الأمر فرض عقوبات أقسى ، في حين أنه لا يتوافق مع الأهداف الإنسانية للولايات المتحدة في دارفور أو مع خطوات تغيير الدولة السودانية"
انتهى الاقتباس.
يعني أن كاتب الوثيقة لايرى فرقا بين حزب الأمة والاتحادي والمؤتمر الوطني! هل يعقل هذا!
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/01/07KHARTOUM118.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000118
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KDEM SCUL AU UN SU US
SUBJECT: U.S./SUDANESE RELATIONS: IN A LONG WAR, NO QUICK
VICTORIES
REF: A. KHARTOUM 00094
¶B. KHARTOUM 00106
Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. policy toward Sudan confronts a
fundamental contradiction: although legally Sudan is
organized as a nation-state, in reality Khartoum is an Arab
capital struggling to rule a vast African hinterland.
Ethnic conflict, economic change, and the declining
legitimacy of Khartoum's rule cause instability throughout
Sudan. Khartoum still controls the money and weapons, but in
the South and in Darfur its rule is failing. U.S. policy,
first to negotiate a North/South peace and now to end the
conflict in Darfur, requires active engagement with this
government in Khartoum. Although alternative policies, such
as seeking either regime change in Khartoum or a division of
the country, would not depend on relations with Khartoum;
these policies conflict with the goals of humanitarian relief
in Darfur and the economic development of the South. Over
the next two years, U.S. policy needs to focus on two
challenges, both of which require the cooperation of
Khartoum: first, placing a competent UN peace-keeping force
in Darfur and, second, fostering free and fair national
elections to be held later no later than January 2009. End
Summary.
--------------------------
All Roads Lead to Khartoum
--------------------------
¶2. (C) In Sudan, Khartoum rules. The British ruled the
country with just over 50 officers in its Sudan service by
relying on traditional authorities and apathy in the
provinces. That imperial tradition continued in independent
Sudan. The government controls the capital, but elsewhere it
accepts conditions approaching chaos. In fact, for more than
a generation the government has fomented chaos by funding
tribal militias in the South and in Darfur to confront other
indigenous groups that have taken up arms against the
garrisons in provincial capitals. The confluence of the Blue
and White Niles in Khartoum and the convergence of the rail,
road, and air transport networks in Khartoum re-enforce the
capital's pre-eminence. Khartoum is the fulcrum of power in
Sudan and the gateway between African Sudan and the rest of
the world.
¶3. (C) Members of just three tribes hold the balance of power
in Khartoum. The ethnic Arab Ja'aliyin, Shaiqiya, and
Dunqulah tribes come from the Nile valley north and south of
Khartoum. Members of these three tribes, which account for
only a small percentage of Sudan's total population, dominate
the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), as they have
previous governments. Of the 26 senior members of the NCP,
President Bashir is from the Ja'aliyin (nine in total,
including Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie and
Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al-Khalifa); Vice President Ali
Osman Taha is from the Shaiqiya (seven in total, including
Oil Minister Awad Al-Jaz and Intelligence Director Salah
Abdallah Ghosh, and, the Dunqulah provide six (including
Minister of Presidential Affairs Bakri Hassan Salah,
Presidential Adviser Mustafa Ismail, and Minister of Defense
Abd Al-Rahmin Mohamed Hussein). The same pattern repeats
itself in the upper echelons of the military and security
services. Although one of Sudan's two largest traditional
political parties (the Umma Party) has relied more on support
from the Ansari islamic sect and population west of the Nile
and the rival Democratic Unionist Party has relied on the
Khatmiya sect and population east of the Nile, the tribes of
the Nile valley controlled those parties as well. This
long-term concentration of power is extraordinary, and it
will not change in the near term.
¶4. (C) In 1989, a military coup brought President Bashir to
power. Although many members of the government are
civilians, the government stays in power because it controls
the arms and the money. In the past year Bashir has
increasingly turned to fellow military officers, such as
Minister of Defense Hussein and Minister of Presidential
Affairs Bakri, for advice. The money that Sudan receives for
petroleum sales pours into the national treasury, not into
the private economy. The government concentrates the
benefits of the economic boom in Khartoum and the surrounding
Nile Valley. There has been no benefit in Darfur, or in
Eastern Sudan, or in the South. Bashir's government is a
praetorian regime that rules by controlling the military and
the money.
KHARTOUM 00000118 002 OF 003
¶5. (C) Hassan Al Turabi's National Islamic Front (NIF) was
the political party behind the 1989 coup. Since then, Turabi
has been pushed from power by his own followers, who renamed
the party the National Congress Party. The NCP retains an
islamist agenda on social matters, and at times it appeals to
the xenophobic instincts of Sudan,s Arab tribes, for example
in opposing UN peace-keeping in Darfur. It cultivates good
relations with Iran and Hamas, but it is equally attentive to
good relations with other states in the region. The
character of the party remains islamist, but any popular
appeal it has is based less on ideology than on controlling
the levers of power and the symbols of wealth. The bottom
line is that the party chieftains, after 18 years in power,
think far more about retaining power in Khartoum than they do
about changing the world.
-----------------------
Character of the Regime
-----------------------
¶6. (C) President Bashir remains more a military man than a
politician. Rapid economic growth, which is set to see the
economy expand by 400 percent between 2000 and 2012, has
helped him to stay in office despite signing the CPA, which
all opposition parties and many members of the NCP opposed,
and despite repeated military defeats in Darfur. In public
speeches he often makes hard statements that go beyond
government policy. In official meetings he listens carefully
and responds point-by-point. He is unlikely to change his
position during a meeting, but he can change his position
over time, as he has regarding the UN role in Darfur. He is
a pragmatic decision-maker, but his criteria for
decision-making reflect Sudanese, nationalist, islamist
culture.
¶7. (C) The installation of a Government of National Unity
(GNU) in July 2005 did not weaken the NCP's grip on power.
First Vice President Salva Kiir comes to Khartoum for only
one or two days a month, and no minister from the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) has gained real power.
The NCP controls the real power ministries (defense, finance,
petroleum, interior, intelligence). In the past year, Vice
President Taha, one of the two architects of the CPA and an
advocate of greater cooperation with the international
community, has been pushed toward the margins of power, and
NCP leaders associated with hard-line policies have become
more important. After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) and formation of the Government of National
Unity, the policies of Khartoum have hardened.
¶8. (C) These rulers of Khartoum design Sudanese foreign
policy in their own interest, as they see it. They have
built strong economic relations with China, India, and
Malaysia, their main partners in the strategic petroleum
sector. They have diversified sources of arms (e.g.,
Belarus, Ukraine, China, Iran). They have emphasized Third
World solidarity, hosting recent summits of the Arab League,
the African Union (AU), and the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States (ACP). They have correct, but not
warm, relations with European countries. They would like to
have &normal8 relations with the United States -- an end to
economic sanctions and the designation as a State Sponsor of
Terrorism, some debt relief, accession to the WTO, and an
exchange of ambassadors. However, beyond maintaining
cooperation in fighting terrorism, they seem to have given up
seeking closer relations.
-----------------------
Choices for U.S. Policy
-----------------------
¶9. (C) John Garang's vision was "A New Sudan," one in which
all Sudanese would be treated fairly and even a Southerner
could become president. The USG backed that vision in the
negotiations that produced the CPA. As long as the NCP and
SPLM remain committed to that agreement, including the plan
for free and fair national elections by January 2009, the
politics of Sudan can change from the inside by Sudanese,
rather than mainly as a response to outside pressure. Now
the death of Garang, the ongoing conflict in Darfur (Ref A),
and problems in implementing the CPA (Ref B) have all made
the transformation of Sudanese politics more difficult.
¶10. (C) Ever since the 1989 coup, the United States has
applied economic sanctions against Sudan. The list of
sanctions has increased by executive action (e.g., inclusion
on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism) and by
legislative action (e.g., the Darfur Peace and Accountability
KHARTOUM 00000118 003 OF 003
Act). The campaign to encourage disinvestment from firms
doing business in Sudan is beginning to have a real impact on
European firms, who often raise money in U.S. financial
markets. Now the United States has practically no trade or
investment in Sudan, but it is Sudan,s largest donor.
Although represented at only the charge d'affaires level, the
U.S. embassy has good access to senior regime figures.
Whatever the validity and impact of U.S. sanctions policy,
the USG cannot promote an end to the conflict in Darfur or
re-activate political change inside Sudan with only
sanctions. Progress will require some active engagement with
the Khartoum government.
¶11. (C) There are at least two policy alternatives that would
respond, in part, to the fundamental contradiction that
although Sudan is legally a nation state, in reality Khartoum
is an Arab capital ruling a vast African hinterland. One
such approach is to promote a "Two Sudan Policy," with
strong, open support for the South in any dispute with the
North over the CPA, economic investments that tie the South
to East Africa rather than to Khartoum, and direct USG
training and supplies for the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA). Such a policy would aim at the independence of the
South either through the planned 2011 referendum or by
unilateral action. It would leave in place essentially
military regimes with tribal bases of power in both Khartoum
and Juba. A Two Sudan Policy would complicate USG efforts to
resolve the crisis in Darfur, and it would put at risk the
significant Sudanese cooperation in the war on terror and USG
concerns for regional security.
¶12. (C) A "Regime Change" policy could prove exceptionally
hard to implement successfully. Sudan has no tradition of
rule other than by Khartoum's dominant three tribes, and a
successor regime from those tribes would retain much of the
perspective of the Bashir government. In fact, much of the
opposition to Bashir is from elements that oppose the peace
deal with the South, invoke islamist slogans, and reject
sharing power with the "African" tribes from Darfur, Eastern
Sudan, or Southern Sudan. Regime change might be consistent
with an even stronger sanctions policy, but it is not
consistent with U.S. humanitarian objectives in Darfur or
with steps to transform the Sudanese state.
¶13. (C) As a point of reference, two other policy
alternatives are being practiced or advocated, but neither
seems suitable for the United States. China engages Khartoum
essentially as a business partner, without looking too
closely at internal affairs. However, even the Chinese are
beginning to acknowledge that their business interests may be
put at risk by insecurity in Darfur and in the South. The
International Crisis Group, which advocates maximum pressure
on Sudan and minimum engagement with Khartoum, would
effectively sacrifice humanitarian operations in Darfur,
international engagement in promoting the CPA, and long-term
Western economic interests in Sudan.
------------------
Staying the Course
------------------
¶14. (C) No policy is going to produce a quick, secure peace
in Darfur or a rapid transformation of Sudanese political
culture. In the context of the state failure that now
envelops Darfur, the deployment of a UN peace-keeping force
offers the best way to contain and to reverse the tide of
chaos. As explained in Ref A, the attitudes of President
Bashir have shifted somewhat and the challenge now is to
widen that opening. As for Sudan,s internal transformation,
the two-year period before planned national elections is
neither too short nor too long, but perhaps just the right
amount of time, to push past the stumbling blocks in the CPA
(Ref B). Sudan,s chronic instabilities cannot be resolved
easily, but active U.S. engagement can shift the Khartoum
government toward a better path.
HUME
¶12. (C) A "Regime Change" policy could prove exceptionally
hard to implement successfully. Sudan has no tradition of
rule other than by Khartoum's dominant three tribes, and a
successor regime from those tribes would retain much of the
perspective of the Bashir government. In fact, much of the
opposition to Bashir is from elements that oppose the peace
deal with the South, invoke islamist slogans, and reject
sharing power with the "African" tribes from Darfur, Eastern
Sudan, or Southern Sudan. Regime change might be consistent
with an even stronger sanctions policy, but it is not
consistent with U.S. humanitarian objectives in Darfur or
with steps to transform the Sudanese state.
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| العنوان |
الكاتب |
Date |
 مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:03 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:04 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:09 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:20 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 08:25 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-03-11, 10:10 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 10:44 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-03-11, 11:05 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-03-11, 11:05 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | SAIF MUstafa | 09-04-11, 00:04 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-04-11, 00:25 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | motaz ali | 09-04-11, 03:11 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 04:24 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 08:26 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | أحمد أمين | 09-04-11, 12:06 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | أحمد أمين | 09-04-11, 12:12 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 06:21 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 06:40 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 06:48 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-04-11, 07:48 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 05:28 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 06:00 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | قلقو | 09-05-11, 06:56 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | أحمد أمين | 09-05-11, 11:17 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 03:44 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | بريمة محمد | 09-05-11, 07:24 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 08:41 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 08:54 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:08 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:20 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:42 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 09:56 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Abobakr Shadad | 09-05-11, 10:49 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 11:31 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-05-11, 11:45 PM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-06-11, 00:20 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | محمد عثمان الحاج | 09-06-11, 00:38 AM |
| Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس | Kostawi | 09-14-11, 09:15 PM |
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