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 Re: منبر السودان الديمقراطى يستضيف الدكتور سليمان بلدو فى واشنطون (Re: Kostawi)
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نرحب بالدكتور ســليمان بلــدو فى واشنطن
وكما هـو معروف فانه من المشاركيين المهمين
فى مسيرة مفاوضات السلام فى السودان
من نيفاشا الى الدوحــة ... لدية مفتاح الكثير
من الاســئلة ..؟؟ لما يدور وراء الكواليس ..
ومشاركة الاخ عمـر اسماعيل كمعقب رئيسى تضيف
عمقا اخر للحــوار ...
مرة ثانية مرحبا بالدكتور بلدو وننتظـر اللقاء...
شــكرا يا هجــام
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Re: منبر السودان الديمقراطى يستضيف الدكتور سليمان بلدو فى واشنطون (Re: Kostawi)
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| Quote: Suleiman Baldo and Ushari Mahmoud, two Sudanese researchers who produced a landmark report on the 1987 al-Daein massacre, were detained and interrogated by security forces when their book was published in Khartoum. The researchers had uncovered the reemergence of slavery, which was linked with the freedom given to the unpaid Arabized tribal militia to seize human "war booty" in their raids on southern villages. "Arab tribal groups were also armed in Darfur against the Fur and Zaghawa, of whom thousands have been killed. |
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero072204.html
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Re: منبر السودان الديمقراطى يستضيف الدكتور سليمان بلدو فى واشنطون (Re: Kostawi)
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AD-DA'EIN MASSACRE
More than a thousand Dinka men, women and children were killed, some burned,to death, by inhabitants of the town of Ad-Da'ein, in western Sudan in March 1987.
Ad-Da'ein is linked by railway to the regional capital Nyala and to Khartoum, and serving as a major commercial centre for the region, including the grain and cattle trade.
Its population of 60,000 is largely from the Rezeigat ethnic group, with others from the Dinka, Fur, Zaghawa, Jur, Berti and Hausa, and it is an Umma party centre of influence.
The Dinka began migrating to Ad-Da'ein during the first civil war, but many returned south after the 1972 Addis Ababa peace accord.
When the second civil war broke out in the mid-1980s and their villages were repeatedly attacked by militias, many Dinka fled again to Ad-Da'ein in search of food and work. Most were employed as temporary labourers in agriculture and building: carrying water, digging latrines and bricklaying. Out of some 17,000 adults, only a handful were employed by the government. Top
In the 1960s the Dinka in Ad-Da'ein built a church on land given by one of the Rezeigat sheikhs, and attempted to develop good relations with the Muslirn community. In the climate of hostility of the 1980s, however, some 400 hundred Muslims petitioned the local judge to remove the church. Even the church's roof-top solar heating system apparatus aroused suspicions of "espionage". Top
On the evening of 27 March, 1987, an armed Rezeigat group attacked the church, where 25 Dinka had congregated after evening prayers. The attackers went on to the homes of Dinka families in the neighbourhood and burned them down, killing at least five people. Top
That night, some Dinka fled; some hid with families in town, and others gathered, under police protection, in Hillat Sikka Hadid, a neighbourhood beside the railway station. Next morning, government officials moved them to the railway station itself, and put them into eight railway wagons, as well as the station police compound, intending to move them out of town for their own safety. Top
A mob of townspeople, mainly Rezeigat, descended upon the railway station and began attacking the southerners: by sunset more than a thousand Dinka had been killed, many burned alive in the railway wagons. Some children were abducted from the site. The train eventually set off, taking the survivors to Nyala. Top
Two lecturers from the University of Khartoum, Dr Ushari Mahmoud and Dr Suleiman Baldo, learning of the massacre and the civilian government's attempts to cover it up, set out to investigate. They concluded that the various official accounts were contradictory, and the claims of "provocation" that were offered were too flimsy to explain the scale of the killings. Awkward questions arose about how much the massacre was planned or anticipated by government officials, and the disappearance of individuals such as the local Christian priest. Top
In gathering information from eye-witnesses and survivors, Dr Mahmoud and Dr Baldo also uncovered evidence of slavery. . They presented testirnonies which outlined the patterns of Rezeigat militia behaviour in seizing slaves, the role of government policy in the civil war in distorting inter-ethnic relations, and the government's lack of action against the practice of slavery. Top
Further investigation of the massacre at Ad-Da'ein was blocked by a majority vote in the parliament during Sadiq al-Mahdi's premiership. The university lecturers who had reported the massacre and the slavery were harassed and detained by the authorities on several occasions.Top
http://www.sudanupdate.org/REPORTS/Slavery/slavery%20re...AD-DA'EIN%20MASSACRE
(عدل بواسطة Kostawi on 10-08-2010, 08:55 PM)
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Re: منبر السودان الديمقراطى يستضيف الدكتور سليمان بلدو فى واشنطون (Re: Kostawi)
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Mr. Suliman Baldo from International Crisis Group
I want to make a comment that will have an impact on strategies for the Prosecutor and the level of cooperation the OTP should expect from states in Africa . In all three ICC investigations on the continent there is a strong organic link between state actors and non-state actors, between government armies and militias responsible for committing massive human rights violations. This is well known of the Janjaweed militiamen in Sudan who were trained and armed by the Sudanese army. But there is less acknowledgement of the roles of the Ugandan and Rwandan armies in Congo during their presence in that country. As occupying powers in eastern and northeastern DR Congo between 1998 and 2002, these two national armies trained many equally abusive militias. The Ugandan People ' s Defence Force (UPDF) trained both Hema and Lendu militiamen in the strife torn Ituri region, thus stoking the deadly ethnic conflict there. The UPDF continued supporting and manipulating these militias in Congo even after the end of the war, when the Ugandan army had withdrawn from the country in 2003. UN investigations have established links between the highest powers in Uganda and militias in the Congo . The Rwandan ' s army ' s support of the mainstream faction of the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-Goma) and several local militias affiliated with the RCD should receive equal attention from the Prosecutor.
We have a situation where States extend only selective cooperation to the ICC. The Ugandan government cooperates fully with the ICC investigation of the northern Uganda case, but would not be inclined to cooperate on its own role in Congo during 2002/2003 and to date. The Congolese government is willing to share information on Uganda ' s role in eastern Congo but not on national rebel and militia leaders who rose to prominence during the transitional period and are poised to play prominent roles in national politics in the post electoral period. Likewise, the Sudanese government is willing to go out of its way to facilitate the northern Uganda investigation, but is not at all cooperating with the Darfur investigation. The close connection between Sudan ' s national army and the LRA should also be investigated.
The ongoing ICC investigations should therefore take into account the duplicity of the national actors in these cases. Investigators should subject the conduct of national armies and power structures in all three countries to close scrutiny, particularly in relation to events on which they are less inclined to cooperate.
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%2...is%20group?lan=fr-FR
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Re: منبر السودان الديمقراطى يستضيف الدكتور سليمان بلدو فى واشنطون (Re: Kostawi)
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Dealing with Somaliland
Suliman Baldo, Development and Cooperation (D+C) | 1 Jul 2006
Soon after the state had collapsed in Somalia 1991, the self-declared Republic of Somaliland proclaimed independence from the rest of the country. Whereas the southern part of Somalia slid into anarchy, Somalilanders restored peace and built up effective government structures. On its summit at the end of June, when this comment was already written, the African Union discussed the sovereign status of the territory. Somaliland’s application for AU membership provides an opportunity to settle the issue peacefully.
On 18 May 2006, the self-declared Republic of Somaliland marked fifteen years since it proclaimed independence from Somalia. Its sovereignty is still unrecognised by any country, but its president, Dahir Rayale Kahin, submitted Somaliland’s application for membership to the African Union in December 2005. The claim to statehood hinges on the territory’s separate status during the colonial era from the rest of Somalia and its existence as a sovereign state for a brief period following independence from Great Britain in June 1960.
However, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government, which is still struggling to establish its authority in southern Somalia, also claims sovereignty over the territory of Somaliland. The issue is becoming an increasing source of tension. Somaliland’s application for membership gives the African Union an opportunity to prevent a deeply rooted dispute from evolving into an open conflict. The African Union’s intervention should be designed to create an environment favourable to the peaceful settlement of differences without prejudice to the final outcome. The framework for determination of Somaliland’s sovereign status should address four central questions.
First, should Somaliland be rewarded for creating stability and democratic governance out of a part of the chaos that is the failed state of Somalia? Somaliland has made notable progress in building peace, security and constitutional democracy within its de facto borders. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people have returned home, tens of thousands of landmines have been removed and destroyed, and clan militias have been integrated into unified police and military forces. A multi-party political system and successive competitive elections have established Somaliland as a rarity in the Horn of Africa and the Muslim world.
Secondly, what are the prospects for peaceful preservation of a unified Somali Republic? The issue is more than political; it is a matter of personal identity for millions. Most southern Somalis are very attached to the notion of a united Somali Republic, but many Somalilanders – scarred by the experience of civil war, flight and exile – refer to unity only in the past tense. An entire generation of Somaliland’s youth has no memories of the united Somalia to which young southerners attach such importance. Squaring that circle will not be easy.
Thirdly, would granting Somaliland either independence or significant autonomy adversely impact the prospects for peace in Somalia or lead to territorial clashes? Somalia has been fractured by war and lawlessness for so many years – the prospect of at least a part of it becoming stable is tempting. However, some people argue that the rest of the country will only continue in chaos if separatist aspirations are rewarded.
Finally, what would the African Union’s recognition of Somaliland imply for separatist conflicts elsewhere on the continent? Membership in the African Union includes a commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of fellow states. Since Somalia is an AU member and its seat is no longer vacant, the admission of Somaliland would arguably violate this fundamental principle.
The African Union should appoint a Special Envoy to examine these questions, consult with all relevant parties and report on the legal, security and political dimensions of the dispute and offer options for solutions. Ultimately, there are only two possible outcomes: some form of united Somali state (whether in the form of a federation, confederation or a unitary arrangement involving considerable autonomy), or independent neighbours. The African Union’s challenge is to provide timely, neutral leadership in order to ensure a just, peaceful and enduring settlement, before confrontation and violence become the only options imaginable by both parties.
Suliman Baldo is Africa Program Director at the International Crisis Group
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Re: منبر السودان الديمقراطى يستضيف الدكتور سليمان بلدو فى واشنطون (Re: Kostawi)
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Darfur's peace plan: the view from the ground
Suliman Baldo, 23 May 2006
The test of the Darfur peace agreement lies in the implementation of its provisions for security and disarmament, says Suliman Baldo of the
Suliman Baldo is Africa programme director at the International Crisis Group.The world greeted the signing of the Darfur peace agreement (DPA) by the government of Sudan and the largest of the three rebel movements on 5 May 2006 with a sigh of relief. But while the accord does offer a necessary first step towards ending the carnage, a lot more needs to be done if peace is to return to the beleaguered region of western Sudan.
The origin of today's humanitarian disaster lies in the political conflict that erupted in this region in 2003. The Sudanese government responded disproportionately to a small rebellion launched by groups of young men in March of that year, in protest against the marginalisation and neglect of their region and the deadly attacks on their indigenous communities throughout the previous decade by militiamen of Arab origin. The government's army led these same militias, known as the janjaweed, into an indiscriminate counter-insurgency campaign targeted at these same communities.
The campaign has so far left more than 200,000 people dead and forcibly displaced more than 2 million, mostly from the nomadic and sedentary Zaghawa and the settled Fur and Massaleit peoples, who collectively identify themselves as Africans – though in Darfur's deceptive environment, victims and perpetrators are all black and all followers of sunni Islam. The cruelty of the government's actions sent thousands of survivors to the ranks of the rebellion. Darfurians inside the country and abroad became engaged, mainly on the side of the rebels, providing them with political backing and resources.
The rapid and uncontrolled growth of the movements proved a complicating factor, as their political action is generally weak, and their military command and control diffuse. The largest of the movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA), formally split in 2005 into two factions after months of wrangling among its leaders. One faction is headed by Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur, who commands the following of his Fur people. The rival faction, led by Minni Minawi, is militarily stronger, with fighters predominantly from the Zaghawa people. Only the latter signed the Darfur peace agreement.
A fragile agreement
The DPA rests on several shaky pillars that all need urgent shoring up if the pact is to hold. Its protocols for wealth – and power-sharing – purport to address the political grievances at the origin of the conflict, but the Sudanese government made few concessions to the Darfur movements in both areas. This is best exemplified by the size of Khartoum's commitment – a pathetic $30 million – to a compensation commission the DPA establishes to help more than 2.5 million war victims restart their lives literally from the ashes of their homes and farms.
It is, however, the agreement's ceasefire protocol that needs the most attention. Whether the DPA will live or die will depend on the implementation of its security provisions. Without this, the rebels will not disarm and the displaced and refugees will not return – that is, the war will not be over.
Unfortunately, the DPA relies far too much on the government to carry out many of the accord's provisions. For example, Khartoum is solely responsible for disarming the janjaweed despite the government's failure to comply with earlier commitments under United Nations security-council resolutions requiring it to neutralise them.
Another weakness is the African Union's lack of capacity to undertake all the implementation tasks the DPA demands of it. These include the verification of the assembly and disarmament processes for the janjaweed and later for the movement's fighters; the establishment and enforcement of buffer zones around camps for the internally displaced and the main humanitarian corridors from which the parties are excluded; and the separation of the parties' areas of control. The African Union peacekeepers are already overwhelmed with the serious deterioration of the security situation in the region, and they have little capacity or expertise to take on these new tasks.
At the political level, the first test for the African Union mediators who brokered the Abuja deal is to stay focused on broadening the buy-in of additional stakeholders beyond the SLA's Minni faction. Abdel Wahid has been holding out for a supplement letter to be appended to the agreement committing the government to boosting the compensation fund, allowing for greater SLA involvement in providing security for civilians as they return to their original homes, and granting it a role in the supervising the disarmament of the janjaweed. These are not unreasonable demands, and no effort should be spared to bring Abdel Wahid and his followers on board. His rejection of the agreement was in large part a contributing factor in the demonstrations and rioting that broke out in the displacement camps in rejection of the agreement. The African Union has given the holdouts until the end of May to either accept the deal as is or face sanctions, but in the meantime, it has failed to put in place a proper process to secure Abdel Wahid's signature.
The internationals' role
Rebel fragmentation is already playing out in other ways, challenging the implementation of the agreement. The Minni faction has the largest number of fighters, but its command exercises only loose control over them, and some might be tempted to act independently from their leaders. The smaller Justice & Equality Movement (JEM), who rejected the agreement, has little military presence on the ground, but it has proven political and propaganda savvy and thus could act as a real spoiler for the DPA. All the more reason why the African Union and its international partners should continue the effort to persuade Abdel Wahid to sign the agreement so as to broaden its constituency and isolate the hardliners.
In March and April, JEM helped President Idriss Dèby of neighbouring Chad to repel a succession of serious attempts to topple his regime led by Chadian armed groups backed by the Sudanese government. Deby has returned the favour by supporting an alliance of Darfur movements that are predominantly Zaghawa formed in January 2006. Dèby and members of his ruling circles are themselves Zaghawa, but since the signing of the DPA, he has distanced himself from the SLA's Minni faction and appears to be keeping JEM in reserve to retaliate against any further destabilisation attempts by his opponents who are still recruiting in Sudan.
Finally, the Darfur pact does not direct or mandate planning for the anticipated takeover of peacekeeping operations in Darfur by the United Nations. Close coordination between the African Union and the UN will be crucial for the success of the DPA during the intermediary period between its signing and the handover of the peacekeeping operation to the UN, which should now take place before October. Given the fragility of the agreement and the risks it is facing, the UN would be well advised to prepare for a robust mission, with a clear mandate to protect civilians under Chapter VII of the UN charter and with the capability to keep in check both rebel spoilers and government hardliners who might be tempted to continue experimenting with regime change across the border in Chad
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Re: منبر السودان الديمقراطى يستضيف الدكتور سليمان بلدو فى واشنطون (Re: Kostawi)
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?Could peace unravel
by Suliman Baldo
If the international community does not confront the hard issues – ending ruling party support for its proxy southern militias, challenging corruption, fostering democracy and broadening participation and transparency (particularly in relation to oil revenues) – Sudan’s respite from war may be short-lived.
Like most negotiated agreements, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) included something for everyone but left all parties short of their full goals. The deal was predicated on extensive sharing of power, wealth and security arrangements and established an asymmetrical federal system, with the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) existing as a buffer between the central government and southern states but no parallel regional government in the North.
Although the CPA is detailed and comprehensive, it reflects the direct interests of only the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).. The exclusion of the many other groups on the periphery threatens the long-term viability of the agreement. The NCP and the SPLM – long-time sworn enemies – have become strange bedfellows who must work together on implementation at the expense of former allies left on the outside.
The peace deal poses a real threat to many groups associated with the NCP regime which signed the CPA under some duress both to deflect international pressure over Darfur and to strengthen its domestic power base by securing a partnership with the SPLM. Most NCP members recognise that the free and fair elections required by the CPA in 2009 would probably remove them from power. Many also fear that the self-determination referendum will produce an independent South, thus costing Khartoum much of its control over oil and other southern natural and mineral resources. There are signs the NCP seeks to undercut implementation through its use of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) militia, bribery and divide-and-rule tactics. It actively encourages hostility between southern groups, with the hope that intra-south fighting will prove sufficiently destabilising for the referendum to be postponed indefinitely without its being blamed.
These tactics are likely to intensify if pressure over Darfur diminishes and the African Union-sponsored talks in Abuja remain stalled due to divisions between the two main rebel movements. Regime policies towards Darfur have not changed, despite foreign disapproval. The architects of ethnic cleansing retain significant power in the new government of national unity, which thus far remains unwilling to take the military and political steps needed to resolve the conflict: neutralising the Janjaweed militias and establishing genuine power and wealth sharing between Darfur and Khartoum.
In preparation for the SPLM’s arrival in Khartoum, NCP leaders prepared multiple incentives. An NCP leader told the International Crisis Group (ICG): “They have new cars and houses set aside to offer. Each strong SPLM figure will be assigned a deputy from the government security services to watch over them.” Members of the first SPLM delegation to reach the capital joked that they would be ‘subsidised’ upon arrival. This is what was done with many southern politicians during the peaceful interlude of 1972-1983 that was ushered in by the Addis Ababa Agreement and what has been done to weaken other opposition groups since the present leaders took power in 1989. The NCP’s intransigence during the negotiations for the establishment of the Government of National Unity and its appointment of known hardliners to key security and economic ministries and as advisors to the president indicated its determination to retain control. Realising the consequences of being outmanoeuvred, the mood among the SPLM and the northern opposition was gloomy as as the long-awaited implementation of the CPA got underway.
John Garang survived numerous challenges and splits to hold the SPLM together, only to find a tragic death in a helicopter crash three weeks into the implementation of the CPA. The peace negotiations were conducted by a select group around Garang, creating resentment among those excluded. Salva Kiir, new President of South Sudan, had a high-profile clash with Garang in November to December 2004 over the lack of transparency and consultation in decision making. Remaking the SPLM into an open, transparent body inclusive in its decision making was an important challenge Garang had just begun to deal with; it is more critical than ever now that he is gone. It is now less likely to be able to make a major contribution towards resolving the war and humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur or the simmering problems of eastern Sudan. The odds of southern secession have increased.
If the SPLM is to do its part in preventing an eventual breakdown of the CPA and return to war, it must make fundamental shifts in the way it operates. It has struggled, however, in its transition from a rebel movement to a political party. Its lack of inclusiveness and transparent decision making has mirrored in some ways its long-time foe’s approach to governance. It is far behind its ti####ble for converting its guerrillas into a new army and has made little progress in creating institutional structures of governance and changing overly centralised methods of taking decisions, weaknesses that have been compounded by lack of money. There is growing frustration as early expectations of the peace have not been met.
Increased public and diplomatic support for the peace agreement and particularly the SPLM is needed at this difficult time. The troika partners, the USA, UK and Norway, have a particular responsibility. More must be done to ensure that hard-line elements in Khartoum opposed to the CPA do not exploit Garang’s death to back away from its strict implementation. The UN Security Council must react quickly to any violations of the CPA’s ti####ble in order to keep the parties on course
Recent deals signed by the SPLM to develop oil concessions in the South violate the CPA, have generated considerable criticism both from the government and within the SPLM itself, and should be scrapped. Given that Khartoum’s approach to oil has long been even more problematic, it is urgent to review all contracts signed in the past year. Worryingly, the CPA has no mechanism for rapidly resolving disputes that have arisen over North-South boundaries in the oil areas, risking further delay in much needed disbursement of oil revenue to the GoSS.
Key recommendations made by the ICG are that:
· The NCP must end all support to SSDF members who have not been integrated into the Sudan Armed Forces.
· IGAD, the US and the UK should establish a commission, similar to the Abyei Boundary Commission, to determine the North-South borders in the oil-producing areas.
· The international community should provide technical expertise to assist the SPLA transition from a guerrilla force to a professional army.
· Churches, women’s organisations and other civil society groups need enhanced capacity to promote South-South dialogue.
· UNMIS should provide a peacekeeping force in the South with sufficient rapid response capacity to protect civilians and respond to outbreaks of violence, particularly offensive actions by rogue militias.
· The SPLM should address transparency and accountability in the new GoSS by establishing an anti-corruption commission, creating a post of auditor general, requiring ministers to declare assets and developing an enforceable code of conduct for civil servants.
· More women must be included in all government bodies and commissions.
Even if implementation moves forward, Sudan is likely to remain unstable for the foreseeable future given the problems in Darfur and elsewhere that have no easy answers. With the CPA, the people of Sudan have taken a small but important step towards turning the country around but the road ahead is far from certain.
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:-5...&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
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Kostawi
Mannan
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست