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 Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future (Re: abubakr)
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السيناريو (2)
حرب الحدود بعد الانفصال
Border Wars (War – Secession)
A Sudanese future history 2009-2012
Before the referendum of 2011, the South became increasingly disgruntled. Southern politicians increasingly accused the NCP of a policy of non-implementation of the CPA. The census results were renegotiated, but many southerners believed the numbers were still far from the truth. The South made more and more threats to secede, if needed by force and without a referendum. The result was a growing mistrust between the Northern and Southern elites and populations. The election campaign was rough, with many accusations from both sides. Inflammatory speeches led to polarisation and Southerners closing ranks against their common enemy. Although tribal issues and power struggles had been played up during 2009, these were now pushed onto the backburner. In the end, the NCP won elections in the North, while the SPLM managed to unite ranks and gained an overwhelming majority in the South. The referendum result in the South came as no surprise – it chose independence.
In the Abyei referendum, the local population voted to become part of the South. Fearing that after Southern independence other areas might also opt for secession, the NCP elite was unwilling to let the South go. Since 90 per cent of Khartoum’s oil revenues came from wells in the South and Abyei, it could not afford to lose these.
Polarisation between the North and the South meant that they had not discussed important issues and neither side had come to an agreement about the future after the referendum. The (border) status of Abyei and a number of issues around the contested areas of Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains/Southern Kordofan had not been resolved. The citizenship and ownership status of Northerners in the South and Southerners in the North was not properly dealt with. Also, issues such as the national debt and ownership of government organisations and companies were unclear.
One month after the referendum, the South declared independence. The SAF, having already positioned forces and tanks on the border, crossed the ceasefire lines just two days later. They invaded areas in the South where large groups of people from Northern tribes were living, arguing that they were protecting them. Khartoum claimed that the majority of the population in these areas had voted in favour of unity. The SAF met with a relatively well trained and equipped SPLA, which had turned itself partly into a conventional army, with three tank battalions. As a result, the Northern troops were not able to penetrate far into the South.
Sudan in this scenario in 2012
In 2012, the frontline between the SAF and the SPLA forces fluctuates in the oil rich borderlands. Although the North is possibly better equipped and trained, the Southern forces are much better motivated. They want to defend their country, while in the North support for the war is waning and body bags are feared. There is a belt of so-called flashpoints along the border. Conflicts are fought in, among other regions, Abyei, Nuba Mountains/Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.
The fighting in Abyei is carried out directly by the Northern forces and is the scene of some big tank battles. The bulk of the fighting outside Abyei, however, is done by militias. The Khartoum government uses militia from tribal groups such as the Misserya to fight groups it dismisses as bandits, such as the Nuba, who are not part of the newly independent South, but no longer want to be part of what is left of Sudan. In Abyei, the Misserya also fight the Dinka Ngok. Islamic militant groups have joined Northerners who believe that Sudan should remain one united Islamic state. As a result, the conflict is increasingly drawn along religious lines. The North may be in a better military position, but the South is supported by the United States and the European Union. Also Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia support the secession as it was carried out in accordance with the CPA. Even Egypt considers recognising Southern independence.
In the North, the NCP remains firmly in power. It is still a divided party, but the nationalistic hawks are in charge and have rolled back civil liberties acquired under the CPA. They believe the North should not grant independence to any part of Sudan because it might set a precedent. Accepting the South’s independence, for example, might lead Darfur to choose the same path. The war in Darfur has intensified as the Darfurian groups try to take advantage of the situation. Although tensions in the far north and east increase, security forces are able to control these. The nationalists in Khartoum are tough on Southerners still stuck in the North. Nationalist groups terrorise Southerners in Khartoum, leading to many casualties. Parts of Khartoum where most Southerners live have become ghettos, which Southerners cannot leave because militias and thugs guard the access roads. The only protection Southerners have is from SPLA soldiers of the Khartoum brigade. Many try to escape to the South; others have no way of leaving as they are trapped. Southern Sudan declares itself a democratic multiparty federation and is relatively stable. It has introduced its own currency – the South Sudanese Shilling and English has become the national language. Juba is relatively safe, and is only hit by air raids every once in a while.
Nevertheless, the new country is severely hampered. There are still high levels of insecurity, and not only in the border areas. This is because the new government has to direct all its attention to the war and is therefore less able to ensure law enforcement throughout the country. Social violence and banditry thrive and cattle raiders often go unpunished. Like the North’s, the South’s economy is severely affected by the fact that the fighting takes place in the oil-rich borderlands. As oil production has come to a standstill, both countries’ revenues have shrunk to just a small percentage of what they could be. Despite this economic downturn, in the South there is some interest from investors, but many are put off by the high levels of corruption.
This scenario is not likely to be a lasting one. If the SPLA manages to resist the Northern troops, the situation is likely to develop into ‘Be Careful What You Wish For: Somalia?’. If it is not, the situation is likely to become ‘The Last War Revisited’.
Suggestions and policy options for the international community in this scenario in 2012
The relative short-term stability in the South allows for some development assistance and capacity building to take place. At the same time, humanitarian relief is needed in the border areas as well as in parts of the North. The international community may also try to manage the conflict. The main policy options are:
• providing training to leadership to ensure better educated and better substantiated decision-making
• providing development assistance in its broadest sense in the more secure areas including: support for education; development of health care infrastructure; rehabilitation of physical infrastructure; and improving local water supplies and food production
• support for repatriation of refugees, resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), their reintegration into local communities, and for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the areas they can and want to return to
• providing humanitarian assistance to meet basic needs, including food, medicine and shelter
• support for and monitoring of future elections
• providing a peacekeeping presence to protect civilians, mainly in the border regions
behind the frontline, and humanitarian assistance under Chapter 7 of the United
Nations Charter
• establishment of a humanitarian corridor from the North to the South
• mediation between the North and the South
• strengthening of governance structures in the South to enhance the GoSS capacity to
deliver services to its population
• supporting civil society to strengthen Southern unity
• supporting civil society and the political opposition to ensure good and accountable
governance in both the North and the South.
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| العنوان |
الكاتب |
Date |
| السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:33 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:34 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:35 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:45 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:50 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:54 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 05:58 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 06:03 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 06:06 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 06:15 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 08:03 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | مهيرة | 06-02-10, 08:28 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-02-10, 08:47 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | محمد على طه الملك | 06-03-10, 00:30 AM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-03-10, 05:03 AM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | abubakr | 06-04-10, 09:57 PM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | الطيب شيقوق | 06-06-10, 06:20 AM |
| Re: السودان 2012 سيناريوهات للمستقبل-Sudan 2010 Scenarios for the future | ابراهيم عدلان | 06-17-10, 11:54 PM |
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abubakr
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