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 Re: احتمالات قضية لبنى من منظور دراسة الازمات وحل المشاكل Crisis Prevention and Problem solving (Re: Abuelgassim Gor)
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يا فتحى
الجزء هذا من اللينك
أرجو قراءته بهدوء وعاوز رايك طبعا....
أكيد حتفسرنى خطأ لكن ... فى رؤيتى البسيطة ربما الاطار الاحتمالى الذى وضعته المنبثق من ( منظور
دراسات السلم ) يفتح فضاء للمتخصصين فى القانون وحقوق الانسان للمدافعة بهدوء . لأن يا أخوى
ال on violent struglle نهج موجود وعلينا أن نشير اليه بهدوء فى حالة وجود أزمة مثل أزمة الاستاذة
لبنى
The study of nonviolent action has developed from three basic perspectives.
First, instrumentalists view the technique as a ‘functional
#####alent’ of war and other forms of conflict engagement, and they are
primarily concerned with how to improve and refine its practice. Second,
structuralists emphasise historical constellations and ideological motivations.
They tend to view nonviolent struggle as a component of a wider
effort, sometimes framed in terms of democratisation, or the history of
ideas. A third approach is normative and is based on ethical values, moral
convictions, religious faith, or spiritual groundings. Although the normative
school of thought is not necessarily the most common perspective
held by those who have historically practiced nonviolent resistance, it
is the most popular notion about the technique, which contributes to
misconceptions.
These three perspectives help to explain how nonviolent struggles are
launched or why people remain engaged. They are not mutually exclusive.
The decision to employ nonviolent struggle should be viewed in relation
to more general political goals and outcomes, for example, whether the
choice might affect long-term political dynamics beyond the conflict in
question. Most often, attention focuses on the initial stages of engagement,
including motivational factors, mobilisation, overcoming fear, recruitment,
and training. Emphasis is also placed on the procedures and
operations involved in the midst of engagement, for example, short- and
long-term tactical planning, developing back-up leadership, strains on
individuals involved, the necessity for trust within the action group, and
debates on strategy. Movements and social mobilisations do not adhere
to simple parameters—no easy beginning, middle, and end—nor do they
occur in a vacuum. Too often, because of the stresses, anxiety, and suffering
caused by the grievances or injustices at issue, at the point when
a movement finally becomes visible, a set of different pressures asserts
themselves, and at that moment internal long-term planning may collapse,
if indeed it had been devised. Nonviolent campaigns, struggles,
TEACHING MODEL: TOPIC 4
75
and movements must cast their gaze down a long road.
Nonviolent struggle tends to favour democratic principles and practices,
because the technique involves the joint participation of various organisations
and institutions throughout a society. Given the necessity for
decentralisation associated particularly with mass popular movements,
individuals must make personal, voluntary decisions to participate in
activities, and they must find the strength to make a commitment. In
a nonviolent campaign, no one can order or command someone else to
endure the penalties that may result from using a nonviolent method. In
this sense, acts of omission and commission that are purposefully conducted
become a form of realisation of political power potential, which
is often not maximally realised until the midst of the conflict situation.
(In acts of omission, people may refuse to carry out acts that they normally
perform, are customarily expected to do, or are required by law
or regulations to fulfil. With acts of commission, persons may perform
acts that they do not usually undertake, are not customarily expected
to make, or are prohibited from performing.) Once actualised, such potential
becomes an asset that can be utilised in the future. Such diffuse
or pluralistic societal power, once tapped, can be difficult to overcome,
even by governments.
In 2002 at a conference sponsored by the United States Institute of
Peace, participants from various nonviolent struggles throughout the
world noted that ‘while guerrilla armies or militias may sometimes be
effective vehicles for protecting a community from repressive violence or
unseating a dictator, they are typically undemocratic in their organisation
and often are unsuitable candidates for democratic leadership after the
old regime is gone’. Professor Clayborne Carson noted at the Natal workshop
that one of the least-studied aspects of nonviolent struggle remains
its ability to serve as a forerunner and predictor for the development of
democratic institutions: ‘How many democracies can you count that have
resulted from militarised national liberation struggles’? he asked.
On the question of how the character of a fight for independence or
liberation—nonviolent or violent struggle—shapes the governments and
social structures that result, see Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan-African
Insights on Nonviolence, Armed Struggle and Liberation in Africa (Trenton,
TEACHING MODEL: NONVIOLENT TRANSFORMATION OF CONFLICT
76
N.J., Africa World Press, 2000), a memoir by Bill Sutherland, an African
American World War II conscientious objector who moved to Ghana in
1953. Co-authored with Matt Meyer, his book includes interviews with
early independence leaders active in liberation struggles in Ghana, Mozambique,
Namibia, Uganda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The authors
set out to learn how the approach chosen affects the society that results.
The reader is given insight into some less-known deliberations on the
choice of nonviolent or military struggle.
Most groups that engage in nonviolent conflict expect to win, but
evaluating success and/or failure is not always straightforward. Sitting
down with the target group, adversary, or ruler is not enough to declare
success. All too often, nonviolent protagonists suspend action when in
actuality they have succeeded in reaching only the most modest of their
goals. Planning for long-term success is as important as preparing for
reprisals. Students of this field of study sometimes neglect paying attention
to what happens after a successful nonviolent struggle. This oversight
contributes to the discrediting of nonviolent action as an effective
form of conflict engagement. A striking labour union getting to the negotiating
table with the factory owner over health care does not mean
improved health care for workers. It simply means that the workers have
succeeded in achieving talks with management. Furthermore, conflicts
do not necessarily subside once specific campaign objectives are met.
Victories can be stolen, by coups d’état for example. (This is assuming
that concrete objectives have been identified in the first place. In many
instances, groups conducting various forms of nonviolent action fail to
establish clear objectives and goals.) In cases where specific objectives
have been successfully achieved, sustaining success may require new
strategies and the development of altered or innovative roles for the very
groups that had engaged in the initial nonviolent struggle.
In some ways, the field of nonviolent struggle is still in its infancy,
despite notable contributions from the likes of Peter Ackerman, Steve
Biko, April Carter, Souad Dajani, Mohandas K. Gandhi, Mara Lou Hawse
(Mother Jones), Robert L. Helvey, Kenneth Kaunda, the Reverend Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., Sir Stephen King-Hall, George Lakey, Chief Albert
Luthuli, Wangari Maathai, Rigoberta Menchú, Kwame Nkrumah, Patricia
TEACHING MODEL: TOPIC 4
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Abuelgassim Gor
Elbagir Osman
فتحي البحيري
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست