تقرير صندوق النقد الدولي عن الازمة المالية في امريكا والعالم!!!

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10-05-2008, 11:03 AM

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تقرير صندوق النقد الدولي عن الازمة المالية في امريكا والعالم!!!

    Quote: The Global Economy and Financial Turmoil: Finding our Footing
    Speech by First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky,
    International Monetary Fund,
    At the Center for Strategic and International Studies
    Washington D.C., September 18, 2008

    As Prepared for Delivery

    Introduction

    Financial market developments over the past few days have been dramatic: The bankruptcy of a major U.S. investment bank, the acquisition of another by a large commercial bank, the federal government's intervention to shore up the GSEs, followed by the Federal Reserve's provision of a massive emergency loan to stave off a disorderly bankruptcy of the world's largest insurance firm, are the latest searing manifestations of a financial crisis that has expanded suddenly to historic proportions.

    There is now almost universal consensus that the global economy is set to weaken, with the debate shifting from whether emerging economies would decouple from the advanced economies to whether the slowdown will be shallow and somewhat protracted or deep and very long. While the events of the past week underscore the seriousness of the situation, my message is today straightforward: this storm can be weathered without a damaging global recession, but attaining such an outcome will require clear and coherent policy responses from public authorities and institutions around the world, together with the restoration of private market functionality and an end to investors' spiraling crisis of confidence.

    It is obvious that the challenges at hand are daunting. The confluence without historic precedence of three shocks-to commodity prices, to housing markets, and to the financial sector-represents the source of the sharp strains sweeping across financial markets.. The contours of the challenges are shifting, however. With energy and commodity prices well down from their earlier, all-time highs, inflation pressures should begin to recede in most advanced economies, opening the prospect of a gradual restoration of consumers' purchasing power. At least in the battered US housing market, the prospect is emerging of an eventual bottoming out in the steep drop in activity, and we expect prices to begin to stabilize in the course of the coming year.

    According to IMF analysis, the most likely outcome is that the financial turmoil still underway in many advanced economy markets will not by itself prevent a gradual recovery in economic activity in 2009. Nonetheless, the turmoil is one reason why we expect the recovery to be only gradual. At the same time, the moderate growth we expect will not be sufficiently powerful to quickly end the deleveraging and sector shrinkage afflicting financial institutions in many key markets. Furthermore, the dangers created by the financial crisis still represent the principal risk to near-term growth prospects.

    There is no doubt about the ability of flexible market economies to rebound from adverse shocks. Moreover, non-financial corporate sectors in many key economies — in particular in the United States - have entered this period of financial turbulence in a relatively strong position of high profits and profit margins, solid productivity gains and low leverage. Nonetheless, a decisive public policy response to the current challenges also represents a necessary element for resisting the potentially significant damage from the financial turmoil.

    A bit more than six months ago, I spoke about the various macroeconomic, financial, and crisis management policies that were available to policymakers, urging them to "think the unthinkable".1 The unprecedented policy responses of the past few days — principally but not exclusively in the United States — have demonstrated that monetary and fiscal authorities in advanced economies have been willing to implement innovative and unorthodox measures when they appeared to be warranted. Some of the options that I outlined in those earlier remarks — most notably use of the public balance sheet to support specific institutions and markets — have been exercised. However, the essentially reactive and inevitably case-specific nature of many of these measures raises the question whether broader and more proactive approaches have become warranted.

    Outside the United States, and looking beyond the market turbulence that has followed in the wake of last weekend's events, there is no doubt that the macroeconomic picture is evolving in a worrisome direction. Advanced economies that appeared resilient earlier on are now faltering. As housing markets in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain turn down, concerns about feedback to the financial sector are mounting. Some key mortgage lenders in the United Kingdom are facing increasing losses, and policymakers have helped this week to arrange the sale of the country's fifth largest bank. In the emerging economies, the balance of risks in many countries is shifting as inflation risks have begun to recede and downside risks to growth have intensified.

    The IMF's flagship analyses of global economic and financial developments — the World Economic Outlook and the Global Financial Stability Report — will soon be released to the public and will provide our full analysis of current conditions and challenges. In anticipation of these documents' release, I will provide today the Fund's broad take on the current state of the global economy, explain in a bit more detail why we are cautiously optimistic about the underlying resilience of the global economy, and describe the key policy options that will need to be considered in order to stave off the very real risks to the global outlook.

    State of Play: The Global Economy on Two Tracks

    I will begin with the current situation.

    First of all, economic performance is becoming bifurcated. Advanced and emerging economies are moving in the same direction-that is, growth everywhere is slowing, decisively ending any hopes of a growth decoupling — but they are facing two different sets of problems.

    Nearing the end of the year's third quarter, most advanced economies are either virtually stagnant or on the verge of recession, while underlying inflation risks are becoming increasingly well contained.

    The growth slowdown that originated in the United States has spread, as evidenced by declines in activity in the second quarter in both the euro area and Japan. Advanced economies, in general, face a spell of growth well below potential, as they grapple with ongoing strains from the financial crisis that began a year ago, as well as the lingering effects of high oil prices and weaker external demand.

    For these economies, headline inflation reached 4½ percent in July-a rate not seen since the early 1990s. This acceleration was driven mainly by energy and commodity price increases. At the same time, underlying inflation has remained subdued, hovering around 2 percent. We expect headline inflation to moderate significantly in the advanced economies, reflecting the impact of retreating energy and commodity prices and the emergence of increasing margins of unused capacity.

    As for emerging economies, their aggregate growth rates continue to diverge-but not decouple-from the advanced economies. Put simply, emerging economies can not defy gravity in an increasingly multipolar world. Still, they can exhibit some important degree of resiliance. Activity gains in these economies is decelerating, but growth still is expected to remain near trend. Growth has moderated from an annual pace of 8¼ percent in the middle quarters of 2007 to 7¼ percent in the past three quarters, largely reflecting slower export growth as a result of weaker demand from advanced economies. More recently, there are signs that capital is beginning to flow out of many emerging economies, reflecting both declining risk appetite and moderating growth prospects. In response, many of these countries have experienced sharp exchange rate depreciations. In some cases, this is a welcome development, as previous appreciation pressure associated with capital inflows was leading to exchange rate overshooting. However, these new outflows also are creating risks for these economies that warrant close attention.

    The implication of these developments is that the balance of risks is shifting for many emerging economies. To be clear, inflation is still a key problem for some emerging economies and tighter policies are still required in some cases so as to ensure that hard-won gains in monetary policy credibility are not eroded. But for many other emerging economies, downside risks to growth are increasing, while risks to inflation appear more subdued. As the balance of risks shifts, so should policymakers' responses.

    A Confluence of Shocks

    Against this backdrop, the three major challenges-high commodity prices, the housing downturn in the United States and some other advanced economies, and the financial turmoil -- still remain. On their own, any of these three shocks could be dealt with through standard policies. However, the interplay of the three shocks has made policymaking much more difficult-as I will discuss shortly.

    Before doing so, I would like to elaborate on how each of these three shocks appears to be evolving.

    First, the energy and commodity price shock has introduced a serious constraint on the ability of policymakers to conduct countercyclical monetary policy, particularly in the advanced economies. The good news from this perspective is that this shock appears to be unwinding-at least to some degree. In particular, oil prices have fallen sharply in recent weeks. In our view, both the run-up in prices earlier in the summer and the subsequent decline in prices primarily reflect shifts in fundamentals - especially changes in expected demand and supply trends. With both supply and short-term demand for oil highly inelastic, small shifts in the supply-demand balance can lead to large price swings in cash markets. With demand still running strong early in the summer, and with perceived margins of excess capacity very tight - or even non-existent-prices rose dramatically. More recently, as oil demand has declined and supply has increased, prices have retreated from earlier highs. If these trends are sustained - that is, looking beyond the short-term disturbances created by the US hurricane season and by financial uncertainties-this would help create new space for countercyclical monetary and in some cases, budgetary policies.

    Second, the housing downturn-the epicenter of the slowdown in the United States-is still unfolding. House prices-on a national basis-continue to fall and inventories of unsold homes remain high. As prices fall, the collateral value of housing is declining, which is squeezing already limited access to credit. Despite this collateral effect, consumption has held up better than might have been expected, in part because the moderate drop in total employment has not prevented a modest ongoing gain in disposable income, including the impact of the income tax rebates that were distributed at the end of the second quarter. As I will discuss shortly, we see some prospective light at the end of the U.S. housing tunnel in the course of 2009. At the same time, house price declines and sharp drops in residential construction also are underway in some economies outside the United States. This is creating challenges for the authorities, as these weakening trends could still have some way to go before they are likely to be halted and eventually reversed.

    Finally, the strains in financial markets have intensified recently more than a year after the turmoil erupted, and we do not expect the turbulence to fully subside for some time to come.

    Stepping back from the events of the past week, the broader issue facing the financial sector is that many firms are facing the prospect of a much-reduced revenue stream compared to both recent experience and earlier expectations. At the same time, they face a prospective shortage of capital if price declines force new writeoffs. For sure, banks in the United States and Europe have raised substantial amounts of capital in the past year. But these infusions are still some $150 billion less than the writedowns, and further capital raising will become much more expensive, if not impossible.

    Given the scale of the financial distress, a protracted process of deleveraging and restructuring is unavoidable. In short, it has become obvious that the financial sector in the United States and elsewhere is in the midst of a historic reordering that will alter market and institutional structures. At this point, anticipating the outcome is highly speculative, but a return to rapid credit growth appears to be a long way off.

    The Global Outlook: A Gradual Recovery

    Given these challenges, one could reasonably expect that we would be pessimistic about the global outlook and the scope for recovery. For sure, the further tightening of financial conditions in light of recent events will have some negative implications for global economic activity, not least because it is likely to diminish the scope for a rapid recovery of credit creation. However, several factors provide a degree of reassurance that a severe downturn can be avoided.

    First, as noted earlier, oil prices have come down sharply in recent weeks. This should reverse a significant portion of the adverse terms-of-trade effects arising from the more than 60 percent increase in oil prices during 2008 and the erosion in purchasing power and real wages being felt by most advanced economies. In the United States, if oil prices remain at current levels, the implied boost to real disposable income will rival the value of the income tax rebates. Indeed, in our projections, we expect a modest rebound in consumption in both the United States and euro area over the course of 2009.

    Second, it is plausible to anticipate that the U.S. housing market will find a bottom in 2009. Already, the inventory overhang is diminishing, while affordability measures are returning to levels that appear much more consistent with past experience. The recent US Treasury support for the GSEs was intended to allow these agencies to expand their balance sheets through 2009, while direct Treasury purchases of the GSEs mortgages securities should help to keep mortgage costs down. As a consequence, we expect residential investment to find a floor. This will reduce the considerable drag-amounting to ¾ percent of GDP over the past two years-of the housing sector on economic activity. At the same time, the eventual stabilization of house prices should help restrain mortgage-related losses and contribute to restoring financial institutions to health.

    Third, while financial conditions have tightened in both the United States and in Europe, it does not mean that an economic recovery is thereby excluded. In the United States, for example, corporate finances in general remain relatively healthy. Productivity gains have helped to sustain profits. Time-limited investment tax credits will encourage corporate capital expenditures in the coming months. Moreover, recent IMF analysis suggests that a slowdown in credit intermediation does not necessarily impede economic recovery.

    Finally, relatively robust emerging market growth, led by strong domestic demand in several of these economies, has helped boost U.S. exports. Going forward, we expect net exports to support growth in the United States as the effects of the earlier declines in the value of the dollar take hold with a lag. Of course, the dollar has strengthened in recent months.Nonetheless, Fund analysis indicates that the US currency is still somewhat on the strong side relative to medium-term fundamentals. At the same time, the limited adjustment in the currencies of several economies with pegged exchange rate regimes and large current account surpluses has not been adequately supportive of global adjustment while preserving growth.

    Against this background, we project global growth to come in around 4 percent in 2008 and somewhat under 4 percent in 2009 on an annual average basis. However, the dynamics are portrayed more clearly when growth rates are examined on a fourth quarter over fourth quarter basis. Using this metric, global growth would slow from 4¾ percent in 2007 to near 3 percent in 2008 before recovering to around 4 percent in 2009.

    The challenges facing the global economy and financial system are clear, and downside risks to the outlook have increased notably. The overarching risk revolves around the feedback loop between continuing strains in financial markets and slowing economic activity. Despite aggressive policy actions aimed at alleviating liquidity strains and preventing systemic events, markets remain under severe stress. There is a clear risk that financial conditions could deteriorate further and more aggressive attempts by financial institutions to deleverage balance sheets could imply severe problems of credit availability. There also is a clear risk that emerging market economies, that have so far been relatively insulated from the financial turmoil, could be subject to large reversals of capital flows, with serious implications for economic activity.

    But the critical issue is how we deal with these challenges and risks. The remainder of my remarks will focus on policies to address the challenges that I have just outlined. Let me emphasize, however, that the confluence of shocks has made policymaking more difficult and resolving the current turmoil on a durable basis will require creative solutions across a range of policy instruments.

    Policies: Finding our Footing

    Monetary and budget policies are critical, but these provide only a first and second line of defense against the deleterious impact of a financial crisis. The use of public funds to safeguard the financial system that we have labelled the third line of defense may become imperative. It is appropriate that this option be considered in a broad, coherent and proactive manner.

    The first line of defense lies with monetary authorities, both in terms of liquidity provision to the financial sector and in setting policy interest rates. Monetary policy can play a critical role in helping individual economies find their footing, but the scope for policy easing ultimately will depend on each country's cyclical position.

    In advanced economies, we expect the slowdown in activity to help contain inflation going forward. Weakening domestic demand, increasing output gaps and sluggish labor markets should limit pressures on underlying inflation. Moreover, the recent sharp decline in oil prices should help alleviate short-term pressures on headline inflation. Hence, we see monetary policy as broadly appropriate at this time across most advanced economies. Outside the United States, given the downside risks to growth and the ongoing strains of the financial crisis, there could be scope to lower rates in the euro area and the United Kingdom if activity slows and inflation moderates as we expect.

    In many emerging economies, with the shifting balance of risks between inflation and growth, there is greater scope for countries with moderating inflation and policy credibility to take a wait and see approach. That said, serious inflation risks persist in countries where growth remains strong and where, given lags in pass-through, food and energy price increases are still in the pipeline. For these countries, monetary policy should have a tightening bias.

    Fiscal policy-the second line of defense-has played a role in the United States already and automatic stabilizers are appropriately providing support as growth slows in other advanced economies. In many emerging economies, budgetary policy will have to play a supportive role to monetary policy in helping to bring down inflation.

    Fiscal policy is broadly appropriate across the advanced economies, but room for maneuver is limited given the need for medium-term fiscal consolidation in many of these countries. However, support for the financial sector inevitably will involve budgetary costs that must be taken into account in considering policy alternatives.

    In emerging economies where inflation remains a problem, fiscal policy should play a more supportive role in restraining demand growth and easing inflation pressures. In particular, greater restraint on spending growth would be helpful as a complement to tighter monetary policy.

    Direct intervention-the third line of defense-has and must be considered so long as there are systemic risks to the financial system. And we must keep in mind that, although the situation is far from ideal, there are also a variety of other policy options that can be used, including further direct support to housing markets.

    In this regard, the Fund welcomed the recent actions by the U.S. authorities to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These actions represented a significant step-and a key lesson from past financial crises (notably in Japan and Scandinavia) is that direct public intervention should be of a large scale, as piecemeal efforts of this nature often are not effective.

    The measures taken should bolster the GSE's balance sheets and stabilize the funding of mortgages. They should also substantially reduce downside risks to the U.S. growth outlook related to shortages of housing finance, although by themselves are unlikely to turn around the U.S. housing market. Over the longer term, a deep restructuring of the GSEs remains essential to restore market discipline, minimize fiscal costs, and limit systemic risks for the future. Ultimately the conflict of private ownership and public policy objectives within the GSEs' former business model must be resolved.

    Even after the dramatic events of this past week, it would not be surprising if some additional financial institutions will not survive in their present form. Nor will market structures or instruments remain unaltered. In fact, it seems clear that the overall size of the financial sector will shrink in many markets. There is no inevitability to any over-expanding sector, at least not in relative terms. In these circumstances, the key is to strike the right balance between limiting moral hazard and safeguarding the financial system's effectiveness. This task is by no means an easy one, but the consequences-either in the short- or longer-term-would be severe if the pendulum swings too far in either direction.

    Notwithstanding the recent use of innovative and unconventional measures, more may be needed. The implication is that a more systematic approach may be required to deal with such basic issues as the disposition of distressed assets, the degree of protection offered to depositors, and the scale and scope of liquidity support that is offered to institutions and markets.

    The fact of globalized financial markets means that policy interventions need to be globally coherent and consistent in order to be effective. Although I am cautiously optimistic that the global economy will continue to be resilient in the face of significant headwinds, this does not imply that the policy challenges and tradeoffs are not daunting. At the IMF, we stand ready to assist our members in confronting these exceptional challenges, in understanding the critical policy tradeoffs, and in navigating successfully through the turbulent waters ahead.

    Thank you.

    1 See Lipsky, John, "Dealing with the Financial Turmoil: Contingent Risks, Policy Challenges, and the Role of the IMF", Speech at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 12, 2008.


    IMF EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
    Public Affairs Media Relations
    Phone: 202-623-7300 Phone: 202-623-7100
    Fax: 202-623-6278 Fax: 202-623-6772

    source;http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/091808.htm
                  

10-05-2008, 11:31 AM

wesamm
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Re: تقرير صندوق النقد الدولي عن الازمة المالية في امريكا والعالم!!! (Re: wesamm)

    تلخيص وافي للازمة المالية..

    Outbreak: U.S. Subprime Contagion
    Randall Dodd and Paul Mills

    Any of the myriad problems in the U.S. mortgage market could have been contained, but together they caused a crisis that spread across the globe

    The causes of the crisis in subprime mortgages have become clear. They started with poor underwriting practices, which became legion. But damage was propagated at each stage of the complicated process in which a risky home loan was originated, then became an asset-backed security that then formed part of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that was rated and sold to investors.

    What is not so clear, though, is how these losses could spread to other parts of the global financial system. Like an epidemic in which an invisible virus infects many people and communities, the financial crisis spread when losses to intermediaries in one nontransparent market raised concerns about liquidity and solvency elsewhere. Just as diseases are passed on by close human contact, pests, and contaminated food, so this financial crisis has been transmitted through connected markets and institutions while leaving others largely untouched.

    We examine the origins of the subprime crisis and the various places, some of them surprising, where the effects of the crisis have been found—such as markets in which banks make loans to one another, short-term commercial paper, and even municipal bonds.

    The U.S. subprime loan virus
    There is nothing inherently wrong or reckless about lending to borrowers with lower incomes and lower credit scores. But prudence dictates that in making subprime loans, lenders must control the risks by more closely evaluating the borrower, setting higher standards for collateral, and charging rates commensurate with the greater risks.

    Too often, however, standards were steadily loosened in recent subprime and "Alt-A" (whose risks are between prime and subprime) lending. Instead, many subprime mortgages were "ninja" loans—standing for no income, no job, and no assets. To make matters worse, many of these mortgages were issued with initially low "teaser" interest rates or with other terms, such as interest-only or negative amortization payment options, to make them seem more affordable to borrowers. This allowed borrowers to get larger mortgages, but created greater future payments for households when the teaser rate expired or principal repayments began.

    The rationale for such risky lending was that house prices were appreciating rapidly and had not fallen nationally in the United States since the 1930s. Therefore, any potential repayment problems would be substantially mitigated, if not eliminated, by higher market prices for the underlying collateral. If the borrower failed to repay on schedule, the home's increase in value would facilitate a refinancing or, in the event of foreclosure, would cover the loan and accrued interest and penalties. Under the assumption that house prices would continue increasing and loan-to-value ratios would always be falling, little could go wrong.

    The process of transforming home loans into securities (in which the income and principal payments are passed, through a trust, to investors) added problems. Whereas all pass-through, mortgage-backed-securities (MBSs) issued by the U.S. government–sponsored enterprises (GSEs)— Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—have common underwriting standards, the MBSs issued by the major Wall Street firms had varying loan standards. This made the costs of understanding disclosed information, and the premium on maintaining confidence, much higher. Due diligence from investors did not increase enough to compensate for this greater information burden.

    Instead, investors increased their reliance on the assessments of credit rating agencies. Although these agencies have a long and well-known track record rating bonds, subprime residential MBSs and CDOs were new and more complex. CDOs are structured credit securities backed by pools of securities, loans, or credit derivatives whose cash flows are divided into segments, called tranches, with different repayment and return characteristics.

    Because subprime mortgages were new, there was limited information on their past performance, a shortcoming that was especially important when trying to determine how these mortgages—individually and as a group—would perform during economic stress. Optimism about how subprime mortgages would perform led to more than 90 percent of securitized subprime loans being turned into securities with the top rating of AAA (IMF, 2008).

    Market incentives for loan originators, securitizers, and even credit rating agencies did not encourage skepticism of these hard-to-understand securities. Rather, the incentives increased the volume of transactions and encouraged disregard of issues such as credit quality and prudence because all players were getting paid to get deals done and because someone else—the end investors—would ultimately hold the risk.

    The complexity of these structured investments—which slice a security into several tranches, each with a different level of risk and sold separately—posed additional challenges for the rating process. The models used by the rating agencies, like other investors, proved to be inadequate at anticipating not only the level of individual defaults but also how defaults would occur simultaneously across housing markets in the United States. These shortcomings made it difficult to correctly quantify and differentiate credit risk tranche by tranche. Highly rated senior tranches were assumed to have little correlation with riskier, lower-rated tranches. However, as the poor quality of the loans became more apparent and securities were downgraded, tranches soon began to fall in value together.

    More problems occurred when the securities were distributed and traded. The vulnerability of leveraged, or thinly capitalized, investment positions and the illiquidity of many structured credit markets were exposed when trading was disrupted in a host of other markets—subprime-linked MBSs, CDOs, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), and credit derivatives (Dodd, 2007). High degrees of leverage, in which investors borrowed heavily or used derivatives to increase returns to capital, made investment strategies vulnerable to large market price movements. Mortgage originators, brokerdealers, hedge funds, and the structured investment vehicles (SIVs) banks maintained off their balance sheets were highly leveraged. The principal risk management strategy was to plan to trade rapidly out of a loss-making position. But such a strategy, which relies on markets remaining liquid, failed when markets rapidly became illiquid.

    It is a challenge to any financial market when trading becomes one-sided—with everyone trying to sell or to buy. But some markets have proved to be more reliably liquid than others. U.S. stock exchanges remained liquid even during the crash of 1987 and the bear market that followed the dot-com boom earlier this decade. This proved not to be the case with overthe- counter markets for mortgage-related securities and credit derivatives. These markets do not have dealers who are obligated or otherwise committed to supporting market liquidity by maintaining binding bid and ask quotes throughout the trading day. During periods of stress, they can withdraw from market making, and the absence of trading eliminates an independent way of marking-to-market portfolio positions (see "Over-the-Counter Markets: What Are They?" on page 34). As volatility in MBSs and credit markets increased, the riskiness of making markets and maintaining an inventory of the securities also rose. That reduced the willingness of dealers to offer market liquidity to those seeking to trade.

    The virus spreads
    Any of these problems alone would have posed a difficult but possibly self-correctable situation and been confined to the subprime market. Outright losses from subprime mortgages themselves have been relatively small, equivalent to a 2–3 percent fall in U.S. stock prices. But the problems coalesced and spread to many other key sectors of the financial system and economy. Overall, the IMF, in its April 2008 Global Financial Stability Report, estimated that global losses could reach $945 billion once other losses, such as in commercial real estate, were included. The speed and breadth of the spread was surprising, and analysts were confounded by many of the following 10 developments that spilled over from the subprime crisis.

    The dismal quality of subprime and Alt-A lending standards in 2006–07. As delinquencies and foreclosures mount, the poor quality of loans made in 2006–07 continues to shock analysts. Given the absence of a recession to prompt such losses, two things have become clear. First, many borrowers could afford their mortgage only if house prices continued to rise, allowing them to refinance before their teaser rates ended. With house prices now falling in many regions, loan delinquencies and foreclosures have risen sharply because borrowers are unable to refinance. Second, a large number of borrowers, brokers, and appraisers inflated house prices and borrowers' incomes on loan applications. Without continuing house price appreciation, many of these mortgages were unaffordable in any case. Although rate resets on subprime adjustable rate mortgages are exacerbating the delinquency problem, these were not the initial cause.

    The extent and speed of rating downgrades of asset-backed securities. Investors have learned to their cost that the credit ratings of structured credit securities are more likely to suffer rapid and severe downgrades than are corporate bonds (see chart). Not only have downgrades occurred more frequently to subprime securities, they have often been reduced several notches at once because of the sensitivity of such securities' ratings to increases in assumed credit losses. As a result, investors' faith in rating agency opinions has been shaken— credit spreads on AAA-rated U.S. residential MBSs have been priced at about the same level as BBB-rated corporate bonds since August 2007.

    Speeding down

    This has been a particular problem for banks that retained the "superior senior" AAA-rated tranches of CDOs that they sponsored. A number of banks did not have the expertise to analyze the risks of these asset-backed exposures and effectively relied on rating agency analysis for due diligence. Consequently, when these AAA-rated securities began to be downgraded starting in July 2007, these banks incurred significant mark-to-market losses.

    The panic in money market funds in August 2007. The first jolt to the wider markets came in July, when there was a significant round of subprime MBS rating downgrades (because of rising delinquencies) and two hedge funds sponsored by the Wall Street firm Bear Stearns tried to liquidate large positions in those securities. But it was not until the French bank BNP Paribas announced in August that it was suspending withdrawals from some money market funds that wider interbank market turmoil began. Fearing strong customer demand for cash withdrawals, money market funds defensively shifted their portfolios from medium- and long-term bank deposits and commercial paper (essentially corporate IOUs) to overnight and ultrashort maturities. This provoked strong demand for short-term liquidity and a collapse in the market for ABCP, the short-term paper that was being used to fund off-balance-sheet investments in long-term assets. That made it difficult for banks in Europe and North America to borrow for much longer than overnight. Even though there were few bank solvency concerns at this stage, the rewards for lending at longer maturities were insufficient to compensate for the risk of lending to a counterparty that might be in trouble.

    The "hidden" banking system. The collapse in demand for ABCP cast light on the SIVs that a number of banks had sponsored directly or to whom they had given significant backup loan commitments. Essentially, these off-balancesheet entities engaged in liquidity transformation—taking the short-run proceeds of ABCP sales and buying longerterm assets, akin to what banks traditionally do on balance sheet by taking in deposits and making loans. But because they were off balance sheet, they did not need as much capital to meet bank regulatory requirements. When the ABCP market collapsed, banks had to lend to these entities and soon had to decide whether to bring them officially onto their balance sheets. Some banks did, expanding their balance sheets and the amount of capital they required; some did not, triggering asset sales and forcing investors to incur losses. Although rating agencies and regulators knew about these entities, their size (more than $1 trillion in assets) and their contribution to the demand for risky assets were not widely appreciated before August 2007.

    The extent of banks' liquidity commitments. As banks' ability to fund themselves in the wholesale markets came under stress, they began to "hoard" liquidity by holding more cash-like assets and reducing the periods at which they would lend to other banks. Banks grew more concerned about how many lending commitments they had made to each other, to hedge funds, and to corporate entities. Simultaneously, because banks found it more difficult to raise funds by selling loans into securities markets, they had to keep more loans on their books. Banks were confronted with liquidity strains at both ends of the loan production line: they had to keep loans that they had planned on selling and had to honor loan commitments that they would rather not have. This coincided with banks' increasing reluctance to lend to one another. The result was unprecedented illiquidity in the interbank markets.

    The speed of bank liquidity runs. When counterparty credit concerns are high and liquid assets are being hoarded, even solvent banks can find it difficult to remain funded. The U.K.'s Northern Rock required emergency funding from the Bank of England because it could not securitize or otherwise sell the mortgages on its books, could not raise cash from other banks, and had insufficient liquid assets to survive for more than a few weeks. Similarly, Bear Stearns suffered a wholesale market "run" despite supervisory assurances that the firm exceeded regulatory capital requirements. Bear Stearns exhausted its $17 billion liquidity reserve in three days, even as the New York Fed and JPMorgan Chase negotiated a rescue. Northern Rock and Bear Stearns are but two examples of the fragility of trust in wholesale markets and of how quickly a firm can run out of cash when its reputation is tarnished and markets are illiquid.

    Fear of a tarnished reputation helps explain why banks have been reluctant to use the backup lines of credit they maintain with one another. They worry about generating rumors that they are becoming illiquid. For similar reasons, banks have been reluctant to use emergency liquidity support from central banks. As a result, the Fed developed a version of its discount window facility to allow a wider range of banks to bid for liquidity anonymously. Other central banks are seeking to ensure that use of their facilities does not generate market rumors.

    The concentration of subprime credit risk in bond insurers. Some bond insurers, who had previously specialized in providing credit protection for municipal and infrastructure bonds (the "monoline" insurance companies), began in 2003 to insure asset-backed securities and CDOs to reinforce the AAA ratings of the most secure tranches. Rising mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures sent the value of these securities tumbling and increased the liabilities to the insurers, and led to their being downgraded or put under ratings watch by the credit rating agencies. The two largest, Ambac and MBIA, were estimated to have lost $23 billion and were required to raise additional capital.

    The collapse of the municipal bond and student loan markets. The severe problems at monoline insurance companies sent a shock through the markets for municipal bonds and securities backed by student loans. More than one-half of the $2.6 trillion in outstanding U.S. municipal bonds are guaranteed by monoline insurers so that the bonds can receive AAA credit ratings. The guarantees have the effect of homogenizing many of the more than two million different bond issues outstanding into similarly rated AAA securities.

    In recent years, the market has been moving away from conventional fixed-coupon bonds and toward other innovative instruments, such as auction rate securities (ARSs). Although ARSs are usually long term in maturity from the point of view of the borrowers, lenders consider them short-term securities because their interest rate is reset frequently in a Dutch auction arrangement, when holders also have the option of selling the security. Under normal circumstances, the interest costs are lower to the issuer, and the investment is more liquid to institutional and corporate money managers. But problems with the insurers raised doubts about the credit ratings of the ARSs and, whereas broker-dealers traditionally provided clearing bids to ensure an orderly market, they ceased making such bids when they found themselves acquiring too many securities. As a result, auction after auction failed, and many municipalities have had to pay much higher interest rates.

    Many firms specializing in student loans used the ARS technique and, after auction failures, were forced to shut down their business or curtail making new loans.

    The dependence of the U.S. mortgage market on statesponsored entities in the crisis. The U.S. authorities have been unusually active in using federal agencies and governmentsponsored enterprises to support the mortgage market. This has taken the form of refinancing mortgages (the Federal Housing Administration), dramatically increasing lending to mortgage banks in need of liquidity and buying more MBSs (the Federal Home Loan Banks), buying more mortgages and issuing and buying more MBSs (the GSEs), and extending liquidity against a wider range of mortgage-related collateral from a wider range of counterparties (Federal Reserve). In short, the U.S. authorities have pulled almost every lever at their disposal to keep mortgage lending going.

    The scale of banks' forced deleveraging. Banks have suffered losses, absorbed assets from failed SIVs and hedge funds onto their balance sheets, and been forced to honor loan commitments. As a result, they have had to ration capital more strictly. With capital impaired and difficult, or very expensive, to raise externally, banks have sought to reduce voluntary loans and tighten the terms of the credit they already extend—whether on home equity loans to consumers or on loans to hedge funds. Commercial banks are naturally leveraged—holding capital that is a small fraction of total assets—and so a relatively small decline in capital can result in a much larger decline in total lending. One estimate is that the $400 billion of U.S. banking system losses from the current crisis would result in a $2 trillion decline in total lending and a 1.2 percent reduction in U.S. GDP (Greenlaw and others, 2008; IMF, 2008).

    Resistance: Not all surprises were bad
    Despite the many unexpected adverse developments during the spread of the subprime financial crisis, there were a few welcome surprises.

    First, the spread of the problems to emerging market economies has been limited thus far, and both global growth and demand for commodities have remained strong. Emerging markets have not been totally immune. Some countries, such as Kazakhstan and Iceland, have experienced banking sector strains, emerging market bond spreads have risen, and some emerging market equity markets have fallen sharply (after rising rapidly in the prior few years). But so far no major crisis has occurred, nor has there been a massive destabilizing flight of capital. Real economies have not contracted so far.

    Second, the willingness of sovereign wealth funds to supply capital to stressed commercial and investment banks has been a sign of the positive role that such long-horizon investment institutions could play in contributing to global financial stability. As of March 2008, such funds had contributed $45 billion in capital to banks and insurers, although continuing market losses make further capital injections less likely in the near term.

    Some possible cures
    Although policy measures are still being crafted, several key objectives need to be taken into account, both to correct current problems and to deter their recurrence:

    • Moderating leverage. Key parts of modern financial markets involve so much leverage that they are vulnerable to large price movements and market illiquidity. As we are seeing, unwinding that leverage exacerbates credit tightness, and distressed trading generates excessive price movements. Policymakers should tighten prudential restraints on leverage, perhaps through higher capital or collateralization requirements.
    • Improving liquidity management. Some major institutions have proved less resilient than expected to shocks in funding. Key market participants need to better provide for their operating liquidity.
    • Fostering market liquidity. Liquidity, and in turn the price discovery process, in over-the-counter markets has proved fragile. Steps are needed to bolster the dependability of liquidity in these markets—for instance, through formalizing dealers' quote obligations (as in the U.S. treasury market).
    • Promoting due diligence. Investors demonstrated a lack of due diligence and an overreliance on credit ratings in investing in structured securities. Institutional investors especially need to adopt investment guidelines that require greater due diligence as their fund managers move into new asset classes. To improve scrutiny, structured credit products need to become simpler and easier for investors to value independently.
    • Increasing transparency. The lack of market price transparency in structured credit instruments has exacerbated the accounting and valuation challenges created by—and contributing to—this crisis. Improvements in the public availability of price and trading information would aid in price discovery and market price valuation. In addition, banks need to be given appropriate regulatory incentives to consolidate off-balance-sheet entities when they are likely, in practice, to stand behind them.

    A stubborn strain
    What have we learned from this contagion? First, securitization has moved some credit risks from the banking system, but not as much as anticipated and at the expense of transparency. It is taking a long time to discover where the losses have accumulated. Second, over-the-counter markets are not necessarily liquid when under stress. The disruption to interbank markets has been more profound and long lasting than anyone anticipated before August 2007, meaning that institutions must be able to survive considerable periods on their own resources. Third, risk management at individual banks has focused on protecting the institution while largely ignoring systemic risks. As a result, individually rational actions to ensure survival have resulted in collectively irrational outcomes. And, finally, crisis resolution has become extremely complex in a world of dispersed risks and derivatives. Central banks have been required to innovate rapidly to contain the outbreak, and yet the crisis has persisted. Fighting this epidemic has proved far harder than the doctors imagined.

    References:

    Dodd, Randall, 2007, "Subprime: Tentacles of a Crisis," Finance & Development, Vol. 44 (December), pp. 15–19.

    Greenlaw, David, Jan Hatzius, Anil K. Kashyap, and Hyun Song Shin, 2008, "Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown," paper presented at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum Conference, February 29.

    International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008, Global Financial Stability Report, April (Washington).
    source;http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/06/dodd.htm
                  


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