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 مذكرة القوى الوطنية السودانية لمجلس الامن
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Nov.16th; 2004
The Chairman of the Security Council,
The Secretary General of the Security Council,
The Honorable Members of the Security Council,
The Honorable Representatives of the African Union and,
The Honorable Representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD),
Your Excellencies,
Two related factors have plagued the Sudan since its Independence in 1956. They aggravated its familiar problems, and created new extraordinary ones. The two factors are the civil war, and ideologically based totalitarian Governance. Just when consensus opinion in the country prepared for a great compromise to end the civil war and so enhance the possibility of making democratic Governance more sustainable, the country was taken over by a Regime committed to the opposite direction.
The first casualty of the 1989 coup d’etat was Democratic Government; the second was the almost successful Peace Process of 1989.
Government became despotic and the civil war was turned into a Holy War. Polarization in Sudanese politics, society, Regional and foreign relations became extreme. Various internal and external pressures persuaded the Regime to reconsider its ideological agenda, and opened the way for a negotiated settlement of Sudan’s conflicts. The IGAD mediation particularly Kenyan, plus international leverage, particularly American, helped the Sudanese negotiators reach the six Protocols, which formed the substance of the Nairobi Declaration of June 2004. The Peoples of the Sudan, and the International community welcomed this positive development towards Peace and Democratization in the Sudan.
The last months of the IGAD negotiations coincided with the irruption of the Darfur insurrection, which the Government chose to suppress by resort to the deployment of irregular troops composed of elements drawn from an opposite ethnic identity from the ethnic identity of the elements, which led to the armed resistance.
The tactics employed in this counter- insurgency campaign targeted the civilian tribal kins of the SLA and JEM, and consequently created a Humanitarian tragedy. The Humanitarian scourge of Darfur shook International public opinion, and ultimately resulted in the Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564.
The Chadian brokered cease-fire agreement last April, and the African Union brokered protocols on Humanitarian and security issues singed this month in ABOJA by the conflicting parties received National and International support.
The Peoples of the Sudan have supported all these steps in the peace process, they have appreciated the hard work and dedicated input of the IGAD, particularly Kenya, the African Union, particularly Nigeria and the International community particularly USA and EU, in the mediation efforts, which contributed to the success of the peace process.
The great concern of the Security Council particularly the Secretary General regarding all steps towards the peaceful settlement of the Sudanese conflicts has given great moral and legal weight to the Sudan Peace Process.
The decision by the SC to hold a special session in NAIROBI is a very meaningful gesture, which is highly valued by the Peoples of the Sudan. It would enhance the legitimacy of the Sudanese accords, and could enhance their sustainability.
The UN had played a much appreciated role in the success of the All Party Conference for Democracy in South Africa (the CONDESA) 1992-93, which resulted in a comprehensive and sustainable Program for the New South Africa.
The sustainability of the Sudanese accords is contingent upon a similar National mechanism.
The basic Achilles heel of Agreements is the test of implementation. Agreements may be reached bilaterally, but be applied on a National scale. To ensure National compliance they must be owned by the Sudanese National community. This is only possible through the mechanism of a CONDESA-type Sudanese National Constitutional Conference, with powers to review and ratify the bilateral Protocols.
1. Why the IGAD brokered Protocols Call for National Review and Ratification?
(A) Certain basic aspects of the protocols would review unquestioned ratification because they form parts of National consensus, namely, compromise on the issue of Religion and State, a basis for participation in Power, a basis for a fair distribution of wealth, Decentralization of Power and Administration, a Program for Democratic Governance, a transition period to create a new basis for the unity of the Sudan, and a Plebiscite to allow the Peoples of the South to freely determine their future preference. However, the absent majority must be enabled to review, own and commit itself to the specific formulations defined by the Protocols
(B) The absent majority feels strongly about certain items in the Protocols. Its position cannot be simply ignored. They are:
i. The MACHAKOS Protocol defines an Islamic North and a Secular South. It added to the geographic aspect a religious division.
ii. The Protocol about Wealth Sharing refers to the oil wealth of the South. This reference is unfortunate, because it tends to deprive the South of other sources, and to encourage secessionist choices in the South. It refers to percentages unrelated to any objective criteria. The South may be entitled to more than a proportionate share in National wealth to cater for post-war reconstruction and to bridge the development gap. To give the South a proportionate share in the country’s wealth, and to enhance its share by added percentages makes sense, ensures a large share for the South, and employs objective criteria. This caters for Southern aspirations without setting a precedent for unlimited claims by other Regions for percentages backed by force of arms. The objective criteria should satisfy all present and future claims.
iii. To allow more than one standing army for the period of Transition makes sense. To claim that a coalition between two admittedly partisan armies constitutes a National Army is nonsensical. The national interest of the Sudan demands the establishment of National criteria for the National Armed Forces, and to proceed to build it accordingly.
iv. The protocol for power sharing is really aimed at establishing a DIARCHY. It is only realistic to expect the two negotiating parties to allocate for themselves the Lion’s share. Such an arrangement would be accepted if it is accompanied by guaranteed Basic Freedoms, a definite National Composition of the Constitutional Commission, reforms to establish the National character of State Institutions, and definite schedules for free and fair elections to the executive and legislative organs of State.
v. The Protocol for Power Sharing refers only briefly and inadequately to the injustices of the past. The Peoples of the Sudan have suffered great humiliation in the past. Nothing short of the Truth and Reconciliation mechanism of South Africa is capable of healing the wounds.
vi. Two parties agreements suffer from differences over interpretation. A National Forum is the best means of redress.
2. Why the IGAD brokered Protocols are no Good Patterns for the Resolution of the Darfur Crisis?
(A) They would suffer from the same drawbacks herein outlined.
(B) There are two types of problems in Darfur, namely, problems between the center and the Region, and inter-Darfur problems. If the inter - Darfur problems are subjected to the IGAD Protocols patterns, they will fuel an unending civil war.
(C) The armed resistance in Darfur has a genuine case, which should be justly judged. However, many aspects of the conflict now have triggered an ethnic polarization, and have also acquired the character of proxy battles. The Whole Darfurian community and the Principals of the proxy battles must be represented in any serious settlement. Also, the political forces, which are not involved in the bilateral negotiations in the case of Darfur, are even more numerous than their Southern counterparts.
(D) The IGAD brokered Protocols have split up the 100% of Power and wealth between two parties. The same 100% is going to be subjected to further bilateral splits. Such political acrobatics are unrealistic and unnecessary. The 100% should be divided up once and for all in a National Forum.
(E) The tendency to give greater weight to armed groups will make the community, and indeed the Regions ungovernable, because it will encourage a split between the political leadership of each group and its military wings, and encourage a mushroom growth of military units for political gain. The result will be loss of control and anarchy.
3. From Ending Wars to Peace and Nation Building:
At this juncture in Sudan’s Modern History, the Peoples of the Sudan have realized through bitter experience that the National Plan upon which the country developed since 1956 requires a Radical Review to construct a MASTER PLAN for a New start into Nation Building. Nothing short of this Historic calling will resolve Sudan’s Conflicts. Bilateral accords are necessary to end wars; they are not sufficient to build peace or to build NATIONS. This comprehensive attitude could be helped or hindered by the Resolutions of the International Community.
To help the Peoples of Sudan in that endeavor, we look up to the Security Council to pass a Comprehensive Resolution concerning the Sudan. A Resolution, which satisfies the Following basic aspects:
First: To support the bilateral Agreements so far reached, and to encourage the parties concerned to continue with their negotiations to reach mutual agreement on the remaining points. Such bilateral agreements are essential for cease-fire arrangements, for facilitation of Humanitarian relief, and for increasing the areas of mutual concessions and historic compromises. But to ensure sustainable peace; these agreements should be endorsed by representatives of Sudanese people in atmosphere of democracy and freedoms.
Second: To continue with the investigations established by Resolution 1564, to hold the culprits accountable, and to mete justice to the victims. However, the wider issue of Reconciliation in Sudan should be sought in terms of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission after the South African pattern.
Third: The Humanitarian problem calls for even greater emphasis. There are now so many internally and externally displaced Sudanese Peoples. Their plight calls for a supreme National and International effort to secure their voluntary repatriation. This calls for security measures, which must be established. It also calls for a massive repatriation –cum- development program to encourage repatriation and to compensate the victims for their suffering.
Last but not Least: The security Council in its pursuit for Comprehensive Peace and Democratic stability in the Sudan should call upon the Sudanese Parties including Political parties and other civil society organizations to convene an All-Party National Constitutional Conference to review and ratify the Protocols which have been bilaterally reached, to discuss the Comprehensive Darfur Agenda, to include all other issues of potential conflict and to reach a New Master Plan for a reborn Sudan under an interim national broad-based government which will seek for implementation of such agreements and transformation of the system into a civil democratic system of governance.
The UN is a union of States and Nations. Especially due to the incidence of dictatorial governments, Nations have been marginalized, and the voices of States, even when they are unrepresentative of their Nations, have held exclusive sway. Within Nations, the tendency has been to listen to armed groups. This gives a premium to armed politics. It is true, to end armed conflicts; the conflicting Parties must be involved in negotiations. This necessary step must be followed by measures to establish Peace Construction, and Democratic Governance. Such measures demand National involvement.
The International Community is now highly involved and at several levels with the affairs of the Sudan. This clout will be squandered if it limits itself to the mere support of the bilateral Agreements so far reached.
We look up to the Security Council to support a Comprehensive and sustainable National Peace and Democratization agreement for the Sudan.
We have resolved to continue by all available means to seek such an Agreement. This represents the legitimate aspirations of the Peoples of the Sudan.
We look up to the Security Council to support the National endeavor of the Peoples of the Sudan.
Thank you,
We are the signatures:
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lana mahdi
Nasr
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست