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 The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace
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25 July 2005
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ended war between the Khartoum government and the insurgent Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), Africa's longest civil conflict. Yet as SPLM Chairman John Garang was sworn in as 1st Vice-President on 9 July, implementation lags badly. The main obstacles are the old regime's lack of will to embrace genuine power sharing and elections, and ultimately allow a southern self-determination referendum after the six-year interim period and lack of capacity in the South to establish and empower basic structures of governance. To keep the accords on track, the international community must focus on broadening participation and transparency, particularly handling of oil revenues, promote SPLM dialogue with the government-allied militias and quickly deploy the UN peace support mission, whose monitoring operations will be key to breaking the links between Khartoum and those southern proxies.
The peace deal poses a real threat to many groups associated with the National Congress Party (NCP) regime, which signed the CPA under some duress both to deflect international pressure over Darfur and to strengthen its domestic power base by securing a partnership with the SPLM. Most members recognise the free and fair elections required in 2009 would likely remove them from power. Many also fear the self-determination referendum will produce an independent South, thus costing Khartoum much of its oil and other mineral wealth. There are signs the NCP seeks to undercut implementation through its use of the militias (the South Sudan Defence Forces, SSDF), bribery, and through the tactics of divide and rule. It actively encourages hostility between southern groups, with the hope that intra-south fighting will prove sufficiently destabilising that the referendum can be postponed indefinitely without its being blamed. These tactics will likely intensify if pressure over Darfur diminishes.
If the SPLM is to do its part in preventing an eventual breakdown of the CPA and return to war, it must make fundamental shifts in the way it operates. It has struggled, however, in its transition from a rebel movement to a political party, indeed to the point that its lack of inclusiveness and transparent decision-making has mirrored in some ways its long-time foe's approach to governance. It is far behind its timetable for converting its guerrillas into a new army and has made little progress in creating institutional structures of governance and changing overly centralised methods of taking decisions, weaknesses that have been compounded by lack of money. There is growing frustration as early expectations of the peace have not been met.
The SPLM leadership must begin to democratise its movement and empower the nascent civil institutions of the new Government of Southern Sudan. The South-South Dialogue with southern political opposition groups launched in Nairobi in April was a positive step, but the late June negotiations with the SSDF fell short of an agreement. The recently concluded National Constitutional Review Commission failed to bring in most of the main northern opposition parties -- they boycotted it as rigged in favour of the NCP and the SPLM -- as well as the armed groups from the east and west.
Recent deals signed by the SPLM to develop oil concessions in the South violate the CPA, have generated considerable criticism both from the government and within the SPLM itself, and should be scrapped. Given that Khartoum's approach to oil has long been even more problematic, it is urgent to create the National Petroleum Commission called for in the CPA's Wealth Sharing Agreement so it can review all contracts signed in the past year. The CPA has no mechanism, however, for rapidly resolving disputes that have arisen over North-South boundaries in the oil areas and that promise at least to delay disbursement of oil revenue the Government of Southern Sudan vitally needs to meet its CPA commitments. International actors, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the U.S. and the UK, should work with the parties to immediately form a commission to delimit those boundaries.
RECOMMENDATIONS
ON THE DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTATION
To the Government of Sudan and the SPLM:
1. Request the IGAD Secretariat to work with the Joint National Transition Team as a focal point for implementation of the peace accords.
ON THE OTHER ARMED GROUPS IN THE SOUTH
To the Government of Sudan:
2. End all support to South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) members who have not been integrated into the Sudan Armed Forces and stop directing misinformation to the SSDF regarding the peace accords.
3. Allow SSDF members to participate in the dialogue process with the SPLM.
To the Sudan People's Liberation Movement /Army (SPLM/A):
4. Seek internal agreement on the structures of the new SPLA army and speed up its reorganisation, in order to facilitate a transparent, participatory dialogue with the SSDF without pre-conditions.
To the UN, U.S., UK, Norway, Italy, Other Donor Countries and IGAD Member States:
5. Press the government to cease all efforts to recruit and arm new factions in the South and immediately stop inciting clashes there.
6. Give more technical expertise to assist the SPLA transition from a guerrilla force to a professional army.
7. Advance stability in the South by pushing for a reopened SPLM-SSDF dialogue, providing technical expertise and high-level diplomatic support to the efforts of the Moi African Institute to facilitate a swift agreement, and working with churches, women's organisations and other civil society groups to begin an SPLM-SSDF reconciliation process.
8. Establish a mechanism to hold all parties accountable for the actions of former SSDF officers integrated into their respective forces.
To the UN Mission in Sudan:
9. Deploy rapidly throughout the South to monitor and interdict supply lines and especially arms shipments from government garrisons to non-integrated SSDF.
10. Ensure that the peacekeeping force in the South has sufficient rapid response capacity to protect civilians and respond to outbreaks of violence, particularly offensive actions by rogue militias.
TO ADDRESS SPLM CONSTRAINTS
To the SPLM:
11. Broaden internal participation in decision-making processes and empower institutions of governance in order to help build the Government of Southern Sudan.
12. Prioritise a 2nd SPLM National Convention as the body to endorse the process of transition to government and support internal democratisation.
13. Address transparency and accountability in the new Government of Southern Sudan by establishing an anti-corruption commission and formalising in the constitution for southern Sudan an auditor general position, a code of conduct for officials, and a requirement for ministers to declare assets, as in the Interim National Constitution.
TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS IN THE OIL SECTOR
To the SPLM:
14. Deregister the deal granting White Nile Ltd. an oil concession in Block Ba, sign no new deals until the National Petroleum Commission is established, and clarify the legal status of Nile Petroleum Corp. with respect to the Government of Southern Sudan.
To the Government of Sudan:
15. Cease new activities in the oil sector -- including contracts and operations -- until the National Petroleum Commission is established.
To the Government of Sudan and the SPLM:
16. Establish the National Petroleum Commission quickly and use it to review contracts signed since conclusion of the Wealth Sharing Agreement and otherwise provide transparency and civilian oversight of the sector.
To the SPLM, the Government of Sudan, the UN Mission, the IGAD Secretariat, and Other Capable Parties:
17. Establish a border commission, similar to the Abyei Boundary Commission, to determine the North-South borders in the oil producing areas..
To the U.S., UK, Norway, Italy, Other Donor Countries and IGAD Member States:
18. Urge the SPLM to cancel the deal granting an oil concession to White Nile Ltd.
ON THE NEED FOR BROADER POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
To the Government of Sudan and the SPLM:
19. Take steps either to empower the inclusive Constitutional Review Process called for in the Machakos Protocol to function as a genuine national dialogue or re-constitute the National Constitutional Review Commission after the 2009 elections, with each party represented as determined by election results and provisions in place to protect key terms of the peace accords.
20. Include women in all positions, including as ministers and members of commissions and as administrators and employees in the civil service of the government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan.
Nairobi/Brussels, 25 July 2005
read media release
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محمد الامين محمد
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست