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Quote: HomeMagazineOur PoliticsNSG DocumentsContact UsTheory ResourcesLinks SHARIA LAW: Religious arbitration and the privatization of law An interview with Amina Sherazee by Neil Braganza On January 17th, 2005, former Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd recommended that the province of Ontario allow religious law-such as Muslim law, also known as “sharia”-to be used in private arbitration to settle commercial and family disputes if parties agree to it. Private arbitration is toted as a wonderful voluntary alternative to the public court system. Boyd’s report examining the question of religious arbitration was commissioned by current Attorney General Michael Bryant. NEIL BRAGANZA interviewed Toronto lawyer and human rights activist AMINA SHERAZEE for New Socialist on March 23rd, 2005. Neil Braganza: What would sharia arbitration in Ontario involve? How would it work? Amina Sherazee: To be honest, I don’t think sharia arbitration is workable. There is a lot of ambiguity and uncertainty as to how it would be implemented, monitored and applied. The proposal is that sharia arbitration involve informal forums adjudicated by qualified arbitrators who are members of arbitration societies and have some training in arbitration principles (though not necessarily formal legal training). Arbitrators, of course, would also have to have some awareness of sharia law. Now it is important to point out that there are different schools of thought in Islam. There are different interpretations of the various tenets of sharia by various Muslims communities. There are different religious sects, with different religious precepts, and all this is complicated by different cultural interpretations of those religious precepts. There is no one universal codified Muslim law because the laws vary according to different schools of thought. There are the Shias, the Sunnis and the different branches of Sunnism and Shiaism. Nevertheless, the proponents of sharia arbitration are proposing that it involve the arbitration of family law matters, and inheritance matters, and of course commercial arbitration. NB: Why do people, especially those in Muslim communities, oppose the idea of sharia civil arbitration? What is the concern about the impact it might have on women? AS: The organizations I represent and am familiar with are not opposed to the use of sharia law for commercial arbitration. They have no problem with two parties who share commercial interests and who are more or less equal using sharia law to settle commercial disputes. However, there is a problem with using religious arbitration to deal with what should properly be seen as public and social issues. For example, though the regulations of family law, child welfare, inheritance rights and so on all relate to property rights and disputes between private citizens, those disputes-for instance, disputes over the division of property and support for ex-spouses and children, the feminization of poverty and the best interest of children-concern and impact on the public at large. In our society, we try to regulate these issues through law because it is widely recognized that these issues have an impact on the public and on how we relate to one another. People in Muslim communities who are opposed to sharia arbitration don’t want these public issues to become privatized. Rather, they understand and appreciate that aside from the law there are social relationships between people that determine how (or whether) legal rights are exercised. These relationships-for example, gender inequality, or inequalities of economic and financial power-are public issues and problems because they cut across all cultural and religious communities. We don’t want people-who more likely than not will be women-being put in the position of having to bargain away their rights just to acquire a standard of living for themselves and their children. Now, because we are dealing with sharia we have to look at the occurrence of these inequalities within Muslim societies. There have been very conservative interpretations of sharia, and there is no way to monitor the prevalence of such interpretations in arbitration hearings. For this reason sharia arbitration can have a very adverse impact on women. Plus, because Muslim women often face cultural and linguistic barriers, threats of stigmatization and pressures of assimilation-all made worse by their economic inequality-there is no reliable way to guarantee that women’s legal rights will be protected in sharia arbitration hearings. Another reason for opposing sharia is that it undermines the rule of law and that it is a move to establish a different set of laws for Canadians in the Muslim communities. This raises major questions about the marginalization and segregation of Muslims from the rest of society. So the concerns are twofold. The first concern is how inequality is going to play out in perpetuating discrimination within Muslim communities. The second concern is that the different application of different laws is going to ghettoize and exclude Muslims from the rest of society. NB: In your opinion, why is the Canadian government considering this now, and whose interests would be served with the introduction of sharia arbitration? AS: The Ontario government is dealing with it now because there was a lot of media controversy after the Islamic Civil Institute announced that it was already using sharia law in binding arbitration of family disputes. The announcement came as a surprise to many of us. People started asking why this is being allowed and why this is occurring. The proponents of sharia responded by saying that religious arbitration was permitted under the Arbitration Act. Opponents to sharia disputed this, arguing that there is nothing in the Act that allows people to use sharia in family law and child welfare matters. Furthermore, opponents charged that it is very problematic that groups are claiming that the right to religious arbitration is a given. This whole debate probably would not have happened if the issue did not receive the profile it did in the media. The second part of your question asks whose interests are served by introducing sharia. There are two main interests that are served. First, sharia arbitration serves the interests of the elite within the Muslim communities in that it gives them a way to determine property matters to their benefit. Some sharia law can be construed to serve the interests of men over women because it can be read to stipulate, for instance, that a woman is only entitled to a quarter of the inheritance that a male heir is entitled to. Furthermore, some rules around custody and child and spousal support payments and support rights are very much in favour of men. So it serves the interests of the patriarchal economic elite. Second, I think that sharia law to a great extent serves the interests of the government. Religious arbitration is a way for the government to offload many of the services it should be providing to make the legal system more relevant, responsive and accessible to religious, cultural and racial communities. To properly remedy the lack of legal services, the government would have to do a complete overhaul of the legal system: it would have to make the judiciary more representative, it would have to provide interpretation and cultural services, it would have to incorporate the values of litigants into both legal procedure and some of the law itself, and so on. Religious arbitration is a great way for the Ontario government to avoid these responsibilities by claiming that groups can just regulate themselves on their own and meet their own needs. This frees the government to narrow its focus to the dominant cultures of society while claiming that special minority groups are both marginal to public interest and an unnecessary financial strain on the system. In other words, religious arbitration is about the privatization of law and the privatization of legal services. Furthermore, it’s about not having to address the current inequality and discrimination that exists within the legal system. For instance, if you look at the judiciary on the federal level you’ll see that there is isn’t a single person of colour who is a judge-not one! In the provincial courts in Ontario it was not until 1989 (yes, 1989!) that we had the first black judge. I just read in the news that by the year 2017 visible minorities are going to be the visible majority. But if that’s the case then the composition of the judiciary should be reflecting that reality. Establishing sharia arbitration is a way for the government to avoid dealing with racism and exclusion in the legal system. Now, proponents of religious arbitration claim it is less expensive and more accessible. But that’s only because legal aid has been eroded by underfunding. When proponents romanticize religious arbitration as being cheaper and more informal, their argument relies on the fact that the current legal system is in disrepair. For example, proponents claim that a husband and wife can duke it out in an arbitration court in front of an arbitrator who charges them very little money or no money at all, and that this will be a quick, easy and cheap way for the couple to settle their dispute. But at the same time, proponents claim that if you don’t have arbitration, you’ll have to get a lawyer, go through a completely inaccessible court system, suffer long delays, pay for your own lawyer and so forth. Thus, there’s a lot of scaremongering used to sell religious arbitration to communities. Furthermore, this plays on and reinforces the problems because it accepts a completely racist, classist and inaccessible legal system. Rather than taking up the larger task of making the legal system more accessible and less discriminatory and racist, proponents of religious arbitration are offering people a way to accommodate these inequalities and live with them. These inequalities exist because the government has abdicated its responsibility to properly fund legal aid. Proponents of sharia are trying to push litigants into the private resolution of their disputes, and the government is trying to get out of the business of governance and permit the privatization of resolving family breakdown. NB: How would you make sense of the move to introduce sharia law in the context of the general crackdown on Muslims since September 11th, 2001? AS: I think it’s a further marginalization and a further exclusion of that community from services and legal entitlements. The way Muslims are being treated by the courts is a by-product of the racial exclusion that Muslims have faced historically. The indefinite incarceration of Muslims under the draconian security certificate process, the routine violation of their due process rights and the fact that there are no Muslims in the federal judiciary-these are all examples of the systemic marginalization and exclusion of Muslims. Sharia arbitration is part of this pattern because it is a way for the government to acknowledge these problems but at the same time transfer the responsibility for solving these problems from itself to Muslim communities. It is important to trace out how the government is contradicting itself here. Marion Boyd’s report recommends that sharia law be allowed because, in general, religious arbitration should be allowed. But if you look at her actual recommendations, they not only interpret the law as it is, but propose to change the law. For example, there are recommendations for many amendments to the Family Law Act, the Arbitration Act, and to the Child Law Reform Act. So the question is: if the Ontario government needs to amend the law to make religious arbitration legal, why is it allowing religious arbitration to happen right now? Doesn’t this mean that the religious arbitration that is happening today in Ontario is happening illegally? And if it is happening illegally, how can anyone claim that it has any legitimacy? The answer to this last question raises more issues. When the groups I represent were invited to give deputations to Marion Boyd, we were informed that when she was the Attorney General at the time that the Arbitration Act was passed in 1991, she intended for it to apply to family arbitration. Why? Because she claimed Jewish leaders had lobbied her to permit religious arbitration. However, nowhere in the legislation is this clearly reflected.The sharia law debate is exposing all this back-room wheeling and dealing. And now, the people who were not part of those deals are demanding that the process be made more open and democratic. Rather than allowing Boyd-who is now a private consultant-to interpret the law in response to people who happen to have her ear, the government should be saying that religious arbitration is illegal until the proper process is followed to make it legal. After all, despite Boyd’s willingness to respond to whatever voice manages to lobby her, as it stands now there is nothing in the Arbitration Act that says that religious-based arbitration is allowed, and her report confirms that. The position of the Muslim groups opposed to sharia is that we would like a statement from the Attorney General saying that what’s happening right now is illegal and it should be prohibited. And if supporters of religious arbitration want it to be sanctioned and made legal, then there has to be a proper legislative debate on the issue. In a way, Marion Boyd’s report usurps parliamentary process. What is supposed to happen is that a parliamentary committee studies a law and creates a bill. The bill is supposed to be debated within the committee, and the committee is supposed to receive and incorporate submissions from the public. The bill is then supposed to be debated in parliament, and if it passes third reading it becomes law. But instead of striking up a parliamentary committee, the government hired a private consultant (Boyd). The Boyd report is thus a sneaky way to undermine public debate on laws before they are enacted. So, not only does the content of the Boyd report represent, effectively, a call to privatize legal services, but the very manner in which that report was commissioned and produced represents a move to privatize parliamentary procedure. What we are seeing is the privatization of government and the privatization of legal services and justice. I think that is the biggest concern around religious arbitration. And clearly this should not just be the concern of the Muslim community but the concern of all. NB: What would the government have to fear from broader consultation? AS: The government wants to avoid a much needed overhaul of the legal system. Those who support religious arbitration and Boyd’s usurpation of parliamentary process isolate the debate and try to make it very insular. But the truth is that the issue has implication for general law. Keeping the issue insular prevents us from asking why our legal system doesn’t reflect the needs and concerns of various groups in this province. It prevents us from asking how we could change the system for the better, or asking about an entirely different system. That deeper conversation would involve everyone. Even non-Muslims would be involved in the debate. But if it is framed as a “sharia law” debate then a broader discussion suddenly becomes unnecessary. Furthermore, by hiring a private consultant to study what is framed as a very private and narrow issue, what the Attorney General is doing is in fact allowing the dominant members of certain groups to petition that consultant and influence her. After all, who are the most vocal? The most vocal are the most organized, and the most organized are the most financially capable. So that’s another big problem with this process. It’s keeping a lid on the Pandora’s box instead of opening the Pandora’s box in a very public and democratic manner and actually dealing with what comes out of it. NB: Any last thoughts? AS: The reason I don’t think we should have religious-based arbitration is that we need one law to apply to everyone. The only way to accommodate different values and different religions is to do so within the one publicly funded and controlled legal and judicial system, not by creating substandard procedures and systems for different groups. Creating sub-systems of adjudication ghettoizes and marginalizes those who are already marginalized. It not only segregates a community, it contributes to the further marginalization of people who are already marginalized within that community. This moves them farther away from the public eye and makes it more difficult for them to fight back to reclaim their rights. So, religious arbitration establishes a very dangerous slippery slope towards the privatization of public matters. Its proponents use the concept of “multiculturalism” as a justification to segregate people and give them a different standard by which they will be judged. That’s not multiculturalism. Real multiculturalism means integrating the margin into the centre. I think that the philosophy behind Marion Boyd’s report is that groups should have “equal but different” treatment. But, as Martin Luther King has informed us, the principle of “equal but different” is precisely the rhetoric used to justify segregation. Rather than isolation and exclusion from the mainstream, we need desegregation and incorporation into the mainstream. Amina Sherazee is a staff lawyer at Downtown Legal Services in Toronto and a human rights activist. Neil Braganza is a member of CUPE 3903 at York University and a member of the New Socialist Group. New Socialist Issue #51 – May/June 2005

Quote: OPEN LETTER TO ONTARIO PREMIER DALTON McGUINTY Don't ghettoize women's rights Margaret Atwood, Maude Barlow, June Callwood, Shirley Douglas, Michele Landsberg, Flora MacDonald, Margaret Norrie McCain, Maureen McTeer, Sonja Smits, Lois Wilson In support of the “No Religious Arbitration Coalition” Saturday, September 10, 2005 Dear Mr. McGuinty: An important tenet of Canadian democracy hangs in the balance of your response to the matter of religious arbitration in the province of Ontario. While many Canadians may assume that we are all governed by one system of laws, created by publicly elected officials who are accountable to the electorate, your government is poised to shift the ground under this cornerstone of liberal democracy. While our public system of law is not always perfect, it is designed to recognize the realities of all citizens and is open to public scrutiny and improvement. Such is not the case with private systems of law, such as religious laws. The public may identify this issue from media reports as "Sharia law in Ontario," but they, and you, need to understand that this is a matter of the formal separation of all religious matters from the business of the state. This is in no way an infringement on religious freedom, which we endorse as an equally important tenet of Canadian democracy. Religion should simply remain an important part of the lives of citizens but not of public law. Surely the separation of church and state is understood by today's politicians to be the fertile ground upon which modern, rights-based democracies such as that in Canada have flourished. Arbitrariness, petty theocracies and selective -- rather than universal -- access to public law await us if we simply treat this issue as a detail in the daily business of government. Ontario's commitment to religious freedom, anti-racism and multiculturalism are very important to us and to all Ontarians. Some have argued that to deny arbitration based on religious laws is a breach of these commitments. We do not agree. Allowing the use of religious arbitration will lead to divisiveness, the ghettoization of members of religious communities as well as human-rights abuses, particularly for those who hold the least institutional power within the community, namely women and children. We urge you to speak strongly in favour of Ontario's commitment to one system of laws for all, as well as for freedom of religion and anti-racism. Prohibit the use of religion in the arbitration of family law disputes through appropriate amendments to the Arbitration Act. The eyes of the world are quite literally watching Ontario at this time to see if we have the courage to move forward on this issue in a way that preserves our common bond and is inclusive and respectful of all. Sincerely, Margaret Atwood Maude Barlow June Callwood Shirley Douglas Michele Landsberg Flora MacDonald Margaret Norrie McCain Maureen McTeer Sonja Smits Lois Wilson In support of the “No Religious Arbitration Coalition” The Hamilton Spectator Pubdate:September 12, 2005 Page: A01 Section:Local Edition:MET Length:873 Grits to outlaw shariah and all religious courts Byline/Source: Keith Leslie The Canadian Press Dateline: Toronto Premier Dalton McGuinty says Ontario won't allow the use of shariah law to settle Muslim family disputes such as divorce. And his government will move to prohibit all religion-based tribunals, including existing ones used by Jewish and Christian families. "There will be one law for all Ontarians," McGuinty said yesterday. And he added: "I've come to the conclusion that the debate has gone on long enough." McGuinty said: "There will be no shariah law in Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one law for all Ontarians." McGuinty said religious arbitrations "threaten our common ground," and promised his Liberal government will introduce legislation "as soon as possible" to outlaw them in Ontario. "Ontarians will always have the right to seek advice from anyone in matters of family law, including religious advice," he said. "But no longer will religious arbitration be deciding matters of family law." Last December, a report from former NDP attorney general Marion Boyd recommended the province allow and regulate shariah arbitrations much the same way it does Christian and Jewish tribunals, setting off a firestorm of protests. Homa Arjomand, the women's rights activist who organized a series of protests across Canada and Europe last Thursday to convince McGuinty to abandon shariah, was elated when she heard the news yesterday. "I think our voice got heard loud and clear, and I thank the government for coming out with no-faith-based arbitrations," said Arjomand. Tarek Fatah, head of the Muslim Canadian Congress, which has called for reforms within Canada's more traditional Muslim organizations, called McGuinty's surprise announcement "a great victory for all Canadians, but particularly Muslims in Canada, and a defeat for Islamic fundamentalists and those who are preaching it in Canada." In Hamilton, Muslim leaders expressed disappointment at the announcement. "We respect the law of the land," said Imam Abdul-Rauf Sanni of Hamilton mosque. "But shariah law does not go against Ontario law. We help families." Shuja Qureshi, a mosque member, said: "There's nothing wrong with shariah law. "The government cannot force us not to use it. It will be used and it will be used effectively." Rabbi Morton Green of the Adas Israel Synagogue, said: "The type of arbitration I have been involved in for the last 48 years has never violated the law of the land." Another representative from Ontario's Jewish community also expressed disappointment. "We're stunned," said Joel Richler, Ontario region chairman of the Canadian Jewish Congress. "At the very least, we would have thought the government would have consulted with us before taking away what we've had for so many years." Richler said the current system -- in place since 1992 -- has worked well and he saw no reason for it to be changed. "If there have been any problems flowing from any rabbinical court decisions, I'm not aware of them," he said. Despite calling for an end to all religious arbitrations, Ontario's New Democrats were not happy with the way McGuinty handled the debate. "By merely sitting on the issue, and by hiding his head in the sand, McGuinty allowed the debate to in fact fester and grow pretty ugly," said NDP justice critic Peter Kormos. Opposition leader John Tory agreed with the NDP's position that McGuinty mishandled the debate. "One of the tests of leadership in a diverse society is that you not allow issues like this -- which are complex -- to boil over into angry, polarized debates. By letting it go on, and suddenly ending it mysteriously on a Sunday afternoon, is not probably the best kind of leadership that one could show." Currently, Ontario's Arbitration Act allows civil disputes ranging from custody and support to divorce and inheritance to be resolved through an independent arbitrator, if both parties agree. Catholics, Mennonites, Jews, aboriginals and Jehovah's Witnesses, among others, have -- until now -- used the act to settle family law questions without resorting to the courts. But those who opposed permitting sharia family arbitration argued that the reforms would give legitimacy and an unenforceable appearance of oversight to a legal code they say is -- at its heart -- unfair to women. McGuinty said the debate gave his government time to "step back a little bit" and look at the original decision. "It became pretty clear that was not in keeping with the desire of Ontarians to build on common ground ... of one law for all Ontarians," he said. With files from Dana Borcea, The Hamilton Spectator STORYID=200509121222005 DeleteReplyForwardSpamMove...

Quote: Toronto Star Monday September 12, 2005 Page 1 McGuinty says 'No' to sharia law PRITHI YELAJA AND ROBERT BENZIE STAFF REPORTERS In a surprise announcement that caught both supporters and opponents of sharia law off guard, Premier Dalton McGuinty says he will move quickly to ban all religious arbitration in the province. McGuinty made the announcement in a telephone interview with The Canadian Press yesterday after months of debate and controversy surrounding use of Islamic sharia law in family arbitration. "I've come to the conclusion that the debate has gone on long enough," the premier told the news agency. "There will be no sharia law in Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one law for all Ontarians." The announcement prompted tears of joy and cartwheels among opponents of sharia who say they suffered constant harassment, including verbal taunts, physical attacks and even death threats by fundamentalist Muslims because of their stance. "I'm just thrilled! It validates what we've been saying. It's a big victory for separation of religion and state and a huge defeat for Islamic fundamentalism," said Tarek Fatah, of the Muslim Canadian Congress, adding the group feared McGuinty would allow sharia after receiving a report recommending it by former NDP attorney-general Marion Boyd. "I want to congratulate the premier for taking such a bold and courageous decision. It restores my faith in politicians," said Fatah. Boyd could not be reached for comment yesterday. Proponents of sharia expressed shock and disappointment at what they call McGuinty's "flip-flop" on the issue, and the fact that he went against the recommendations of Boyd's report. "He is misguided and will alienate many people of faith in this province," said Mohammed Elmasry, head of the Canadian Islamic Congress. "He obviously caved in to political pressure from a minority with a loud voice. Not only will it cost him at the polls in the next election, the problem won't go away ... Arbitration will continue anyway, because it is part of our social fabric." "If McGuinty is worried about women abuse," Elmasry said, "then recognizing and regulating arbitration is much better than the ad hoc procedure that is currently happening because, when you regulate it, there is transparency and accountability." A representative from Ontario's Jewish community also expressed surprise at McGuinty's decision. "We're stunned," said Joel Richler, Ontario region chairman of the Canadian Jewish Congress. "At the very least, we would have thought the government would have consulted with us before taking away what we've had for so many years." Richler said the current system — in place since 1992 — has worked well and he saw no reason for it to be changed for either his or other religious communities. "If there have been any problems flowing from any rabbinical court decisions, I'm not aware of them," he said. The decision likely will not affect marriage tribunals of the Catholic Church, which simply decide whether a marriage was "sacramentally valid," said Suzanne Scorsone, spokesperson for the Archdiocese of Toronto. Such tribunals do not access the Arbitration Act because they do not deal with issues such as custody, property division or support payments, she said. Members of the Canadian Council of Muslim Women who had met just yesterday to plot their next move in fighting further legalization of sharia law, were overjoyed at McGuinty's decision. "We're still in disbelief. But it's such good news. It's remarkable. We're very happy because it's been a difficult fight. We got a lot of flak from other Muslims who called us Islamaphobic," said Nuzhat Jafri, a spokeswoman for the group. "It was way too complicated for the government to allow faith-based arbitration. Most faiths, whether we like it or not, are not fair to women because they are based on a patriarchal tradition." Banning all religious arbitration is an "equitable move," Jafri added. "To single out Muslims would have been discriminatory." Just hours before McGuinty's announcement, writer June Callwood, actress Shirley Douglas and other prominent Canadian women had, as a group, issued an open letter to him on behalf of the No Religious Arbitration Coalition. Elated, Callwood and Douglas were full of praise for McGuinty. "Wow, that's brilliant!" said Callwood. "So many women and a lot of men, too, felt this (sharia) was going to be a disaster. To do it in one big stroke is wonderful. It provides consistency." McGuinty's decision "will be cheered around the world," said Callwood. Douglas was equally effusive. "It's terrific. Dalton McGuinty has made a move he will be proud of for a long time." Expanding legal use of sharia would have been a "huge step backward for women ... being dictated to by men and elders of the (faith) ... this is a recipe for deep trouble for women in those communities ... why terrorize people with that kind of insecurity? I'm very pleased he's discontinuing the others as well. Religion has no place in law." Under the 1991 Arbitration Act, sharia law is already legal in the province so long as both parties agree to its use and the arbitrators' decisions do not violate Canadian law. Aboriginal, Christian and Jewish tribunals have operating similarily under the act for the past 14 years. Because of concerns over expanding use of sharia law in dispute resolution, the Liberals asked Boyd, whose government effectively allowed religious arbitration, to review the issue. Since December, the government has sat on Boyd's report, which recommended retaining sharia law and other religious arbitration as an option to resolve familial disputes such as child custody and divorce. Liberal inaction on the matter infuriated and frustrated supporters and opponents of religious tribunals. Last Thursday, McGuinty was vilified at a Queen's Park protest for appearing tacitly to endorse sharia, which critics charge treats women unfairly. Similar demonstrations were held in Montreal and abroad in Amsterdam, Paris and Rome. The premier told Canadian Press such religious arbitrations "threaten our common ground," and promised to introduce legislation "as soon as possible" to outlaw them. Sources told the Toronto Star McGuinty came to the conclusion he had to prohibit all tribunals after a meeting last Wednesday with Attorney-General Michael Bryant, who has been wrestling with the tricky issue for months. Bryant could not be reached for comment. "Ontarians will always have the right to seek advice from anyone in matters of family law, including religious advice. But no longer will religious arbitration be deciding matters of family law," McGuinty told CP. Both opposition parties said they supported an end to religious tribunals, but panned the way the premier came to it. Progressive Conservative Leader John Tory said last night he was "very disappointed" that McGuinty would announce such sweeping policy through the media. He said faith groups should have been consulted. "This appears to have been drawn up on a napkin — 4:20 p.m. on a Sunday seems a funny time to be making up major policy in an interview." NDP MPP Peter Kormos (Niagara Centre) said he was "pleased" McGuinty appears to be adopting the New Democrat position of preventing religious tribunals from deciding issues best left to courts. But Kormos criticized the premier "for allowing this to fester. His delays, his head-in-the-sand approach has provoked a debate that has become unpleasant and harmful and at times hateful." There was much pressure from the 17-member Liberal women's caucus to ban sharia law. Liberal MPP Kathleen Wynne (Don Valley West), one of the members urging prohibition of religious tribunals, was "relieved" at the decision.

Quote: Hi Tragi, Thanks again for your time yesterday. It was so helpful to talk to you. All best, Sharon The Hamilton Spectator Pubdate:September 13, 2005 Page: A02 Section:Local Edition:MET Length:850 Shariah law ruling divides church, state Ontario's ban on faith-based arbitration of family law cases praised, panned by women's rights groups, religious leaders Byline/Source: Sharon Boase The Hamilton Spectator As women's groups bask in the glow of their hard-won victory over the use of Islamic law in Ontario, religious leaders and multiculturalism advocates wonder if the province hasn't wound up a loser. Rabbi Morton Green, who has helped resolve divorces and business disputes using Jewish law since 1958, believes religious arbitration provides an affordable and more humane approach to conflict resolution than the courts. Premier Dalton McGuinty's announcement Sunday that all religious-based arbitration of family law cases must stop is "too radical and will do more harm than good," says Green. Spending anywhere from six months to a year with divorcing couples, Green will interview both parties separately, all the while counselling them in the interests of healing anger and maintaining civility. "My method is in-depth and you get a real feel for both people," says Green, of Hamilton's Adas Israel Synagogue. "I want to find a way of restoring the social order and I think this is the highest level of justice." Just last week, Green got a call from a man who admitted that if he and his wife had listened to Green, they could have saved $325,000 in legal costs. McGuinty's decision to close the door on all forms of religious arbitration was the right thing to do, says Alia Hogben. She is the executive director of the Canadian Council of Muslim Women, one of about 100 groups in a Toronto-based coalition formed two years ago to fight the introduction of shariah law. Their next step is to advise the province on redrafting arbitration and family law legislation to ensure shariah will never be used in Ontario. "This issue has nothing to do with multiculturalism or with religious freedom," Hogben says. "We have never said that people should not have the freedom to get advice from their religious leader. But we are saying the law of the land shouldn't then come and sanction it." Members of the International Campaign Against Sharia Court in Canada say religious arbitration leads to divisiveness, ghettoization of members of religious communities and human rights abuses, particularly against women. There are five schools of shariah law and each interprets Islamic jurisprudence differently. There are also dramatic variations from country to country. Typically, shariah favours fathers over mothers in custody cases and men over women in inheritance cases and doesn't require alimony to be paid in divorce cases. "We never said Islam is bad or unfair, but we think that human nature is always looking for what is good for oneself," says Tragi Mustafa, a Hamilton Muslim involved in outreach and advocacy work with Muslim women. "This is what the men do using our shariah law." Mustafa knows of two cases in the Hamilton Muslim community where she says a woman's rights were bulldozed by her husband. One involved a Jordanian woman whose husband sent her back home to Jordan "because she wasn't a good listener." He kept the children and arranged for another wife. The other case involved a couple originally from the Middle East who built up a business over a decade. Mustafa says the husband sold the business without his wife's knowledge, hid the assets, declared bankruptcy and then left her. She is on welfare raising their children. "She worked day and night building the business with him. Under Canadian law, she is supposed to be entitled to half" says Mustafa. "If we had shariah law, he could do it openly, keep his business and she could never say a single word." Dr. Karen Bird, a political scientist at McMaster University who specializes in multiculturalism at home and abroad, says she has noticed a creeping intolerance of Muslim cultures. Multiculturalism policies were drafted with a less diverse society in mind, she notes. "I worry (this decision) may be a symptom of intolerance toward Muslims," Bird says. Growing Muslim communities have caused some European countries to ratchet back on multiculturalism policies, she says. And Western societies are quick to knock the treatment of women in non-Western societies and cultures, while failing to examine the treatment of women around them. "I think there will be more and more issues like this," Bird says. "We don't have as clear a line between church and state in Canada, and that is one of our strengths. "As diversity changes, the old policies aren't appropriate or adequate. "There are real puzzles that as a society we have to sort out." [email protected] 905-526-2452 STORYID=200509131223127

Quote: هنيئا باسقاط قيم الشريعة الاسلامية .....!! من قبل المستنيرين والمستنيرات ..في كندا وهنيئا لنا اهل السودان ..ان اصبحنا عالميين نرفد الدول بالمستنيرين والمستنيرات الذي يضيئون دروب الاخرين ..بملاحم النضال ...حتى اصبحوا قبلة وقدوة للاخرين (تنهال عليهم التلفونات) لتاخذ نصائحهم وارشاداتهم..وتهنيء وتبارك انتصاراتهم ...!!!ومعا جميعا من اجل عالم خال من الاسلحة النووية ..والفئران ..والاسلام والقرآن ..!!

سوره الصف

أتقوا الله الذى امد لكم فى العيش وذادكم من نعمه لتطالبوا ان يبقى العالم من غير اسلام وقرآن
ولا تأمنوا مكر الله
ولا تغتروا بأمهاله لكم كل هذا الوقت عسى ولعل تتوبوا او يخرج منكم من يعبد الله حق عبادته
ولتسقط الاستناره ان كانت هذه اهدافها ومبادءها
هنيئا لكم ايها المستنيرون بأستنارتكم
ولا حول ولا قوه الا بالله

وفى امان الله
لا اله الا الله

Quote: لازال المتدينون يخافون من التغيير، مهما يكن بسيطا وطبيعيا، وبخاصة إذا كان مطلبا للآخر، فمهما يكن واضحا، بريئا أو غير بريء، فلن ينظر إليه إلا بالريبة والشك، ويلفع بالتهويل، في دلالة على ضعف الثقة في أنفسهم ودينهم، وضعف معرفتهم به، والتي منبعها من عدم التدبر في القرآن، واتخاذه قائدا حيثما أشار، وإن خالفت مؤشراته الدين السائد.

Quote: Quote: انتصرت قوى الاستناره و الانسانيه في ولاية اونتريو باسقاطها لمشروع القوانيين الاسلاميه حسبنــــــــــا الله ونعم الوكيـــــــــــــــــــل

Quote: Arbitration, Religion and Family Law: Private Justice on the Backs of Women by Natasha Bakht March 2005 ISBN #0-895996-89-9 (This publication is also available in French) Acknowledgements: This paper would not have been possible without the efforts of many people who contributed by sharing information, clarifying points of family law and Islamic jurisprudence, reading and re-reading drafts and providing their important feedback. The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of all the women of NAWL's working group for their input on previous drafts of the paper. I am particularly grateful for the supervisory role played by Andrée Côté on this project. Her knowledge of feminist academic/activist work combined with her gentle inquisitive manner was an inspiration. Funding for Part One of this paper was provided by the Canadian Council of Muslim Women, the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority and the National Association of Women and the Law with financial support from the Women's Program, Status of Women Canada. The remainder of the paper was funded by the Law Commission of Canada and the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation. The opinions expressed in this document do not necessarily represent the official policy of the funders. Arbitration, Religion and Family Law: Private Justice on the Backs of Women OUTLINE Part One: Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law I. Arbitration and Family Law in Ontario A. Ontario’s Arbitration Act 1. The Role of Arbitrators B. The Arbitration Process C. The Content of Arbitral Awards in the Family Law Context 1. Division of Property 2. Spousal Support 3. Custody, Access, Child Support and Other Matters Involving Children D. Court Intervention in Arbitral Agreements and Awards 1. Appeal Process 2. Process of Judicial Review 3. Setting Aside Arbitral Agreements and Awards 4. Declaration of Invalidity by a Non-Party 5. Unusual Remedies E. Judicial Interpretation of Private Agreements 1. The Interpretation of Voluntariness and Free Will F. Judicial Interpretation of Islamic Agreements 1. Legal Representation G. Multiple Interpretations of Sharia Law 1. Reservations to CEDAW: Example of the Diverse Application of Sharia Internationally II. The Potential Impact of the Arbitration Regime on Women A. Section 15 Charter Analysis 1. Standing: Who Can Invoke a Charter Right? 2. Distinction in Purpose or Differential Treatment in Effect 3. Based on an Enumerated Ground 4. Whether the Distinction or Differential Treatment is Discrimination 5. Section 1 of the Charter 6. Conclusion Part Two: Human Rights Framework I. Culture and multiculturalism A. Multiculturalism in Canada B. The Multiculturalism Paradox C. The Impact of Accommodation on Minority Women II. Religious freedom A. Freedom of Religion Under Domestic Law B. Religious Freedom Under International Law III. The Legal Supremacy of Women’s Rights in the Charter and in CEDAW A. International Legal Framework B. Canada’s Rights Regime C. Islam and the Conflict between Women’s Rights and Religious Practice D. Conclusion: Universality and indivisibility of human rights Part Three: The Separation of “Church” and State I. Basic concepts and historical context II. Considerations in the Canadian Context Part Four: Law Reform Options I. Islamic Institute of Civil Justice: Muslim Sovereignty II. Canadian Council of Muslim Women: One law for All III. Marion Boyd Recommendations IV. Reformist feminist proposals: A. Dual Governance B. Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund Proposal V. National Association of Women and the Law A. NAWL Opposes Arbitration in Family Law B. NAWL Opposes Faith-Based Arbitration in Family Law C. A Framework for Mediation D. Improving the Justice system E. Conclusion Arbitration, Religion and Family Law: Private Justice on the Backs of Women In Canada and other parts of the world, many religious groups have been organizing to implement policies that would influence the manner in which civil society is run. It has been argued that this use of religion for political gain threatens to undermine hard won entitlements to equality and basic human rights. Much media attention has recently focused on the issue of the formation of arbitration tribunals that would use Islamic or sharia law to settle civil matters in Ontario. Certain members of the Muslim community in Toronto belonging to the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice have proposed such tribunals. In fact, the idea of private parties voluntarily agreeing to have their disputes resolved by an arbitrator using a foreign legal system is not new. Ontario’s Arbitration Act has allowed parties to resolve disputes outside the traditional court system for some time. Other religious groups including several Jewish communities have created Jewish arbitration tribunals or Beis Din in order to resolve civil matters between individuals using the Arbitration Act. Some of these tribunals have been sitting in parts of Canada since 1982, setting a precedent for Muslim communities to do the same. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the legal implications of arbitration tribunals that will utilize sharia law in Ontario. Part one of the paper will investigate the role of arbitrators, the mechanisms for appealing arbitral awards to the courts, judicial interpretation of arbitral agreements and awards, the importance of legal representation and the gender-based impact on women with an accompanying analysis of the section 15 right implicated under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Key sections of the Arbitration Act will be examined and contrasted with the reality of how such clauses are likely to be interpreted to the disadvantage of women. The general process of arbitration in Ontario will also be outlined. Though the scope of arbitration tribunals can include a wide range of legal areas, the principal area of inquiry of this paper will be family law with a particular emphasis on the impact that sharia law could have on Muslim women in Ontario. The paper will also consider the broad issue of the increasing privatization of family law. Part two of the paper will examine the human rights framework with an emphasis on the role of multiculturalism and the protection of religious freedom both domestically and internationally. In particular, the unique position of women within minority groups will be examined. Part three of the paper will consider the doctrine of the separation of “church” and state with a view to understanding Canada’s relationship with religion and religious communities. Finally, part four of the paper will summarize and assess various law reform proposals put forth by key actors in the debate around religious family arbitration in Ontario including the preliminary recommendations put forth by the National Association of Women and the Law. The paper ends with reflections on the need to have ongoing discussions and consultations on this topic and the many areas that it implicates. Part One: Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law I. Arbitration and Family Law in Ontario Although the bulk of this paper addresses the distinct circumstances of family arbitration in Ontario, most other provinces of Canada have also enacted arbitration legislation. The debate in Ontario surrounding the use of religious principles to resolve family law matters will have implications for many of the provinces of Canada. It is hoped that the issues raised in this paper, specifically the suggestions for law reform will influence Ontario, other provincial governments and the federal government to reexamine the situation of family law and arbitration, in particular, its implications for women. A. Ontario’s Arbitration Act Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution by which people are given a voluntary alternative to the increasingly lengthy and expensive cost of litigation under the traditional court system. Under arbitration, parties agree to have their dispute settled by an adjudicator agreed upon by both parties. Ontario’s Arbitration Act, amended in 1991, sets out the rules to be used in resolving civil disputes. For example, the Act sets out how the arbitrator is appointed and how he or she conducts the resolution of disputes. The parties are given much freedom to design their own processes because arbitration is considered a private system that is entered into by agreement. In the family law context, mediation and arbitration are perhaps the most common alternatives to litigation. In mediation the parties design an agreement themselves with the assistance of a neutral mediator. This is considered advantageous because lawyers often cannot predict what a judge will do if disputed issues go to trial. A settlement, such as a separation agreement, gives the parties control over their own financial and property rights and can be filed with a court and then enforced as an order. It can also ensure that values different from those propagated by the state can serve to guide individuals’ interests. Mediation ensures privacy and can promote more constructive parenting relationships after divorce in cases where there is no abuse or oppression. Notably however, there has been much feminist critique of the perils of mediation generally and within the context of domestic violence. Mediation is regarded as a consensual process, from which a party is free to withdraw at any time. The use of arbitration is a relatively new development in family law. The Arbitration Act was amended in 1991 with a view to resolving civil disputes in a more cost effective manner. The original intent of the act was likely to increase efficiency in primarily commercial and not family law matters. Arbitration is different from mediation in that the parties agree to have a third person adjudicate their dispute for them in a similar manner that a judge would. Some perceived advantages to arbitration are that the process is considered private, is often less expensive than litigation and an arbitral award can be filed with a court and then enforced as a court order. Filing an arbitration order with a court is neither mandatory nor does it represent court oversight of an arbitral award. It merely means that a party to the arbitration agreement has recourse to enforcement should another party fail to abide by the arbitrator’s decision. Once an arbitration agreement is signed, the parties do not have the option of withdrawing from arbitration. This can be particularly problematic where an agreement to arbitrate is signed at the date of marriage, but the actual arbitration does not take place until years later, during which time a person may have changed her/his mind about wanting to submit a dispute to arbitration. In the context of arbitration using religious principles, this may pose problems for the individual whose religious beliefs change over the course of time. The Arbitration Act allows parties to arbitrate most civil matters without express limits. Arbitrators however, may only impose such decisions on parties that the parties could bind themselves to directly. In other words, matters of a criminal nature that involve the state, or disputes involving individuals or institutions who have not agreed to arbitrate are not matters that can be arbitrated upon. Similarly, disputes involving public status such as marriage and divorce cannot be resolved by arbitration. Divorce is additionally, a federal matter and thus, is also outside the provincial jurisdiction of arbitration. Typical disputes that are resolved via arbitration are commercial disputes, construction disputes, rental disputes and intellectual property issues. Certain family law matters particularly upon the dissolution of a marriage or common law relationship can also be submitted to arbitration, for example spousal support or a division of matrimonial property. 1. The Role of Arbitrators Ontario’s Arbitration Act allows consenting parties to have their disputes settled by any mutually agreed upon person. Arbitrators are required by ss. 11(1) of the Act to be independent and neutral as between the parties, unless the parties decide otherwise. The Act does not require arbitrators to have any special training since the parties are free to choose whomever they believe will be the most appropriate person to resolve their dispute. Pursuant to ss. 10(1) of the Act, anyone who can get her/himself chosen by disputants or by a court can be an arbitrator. Arbitrators are required by ss. 11(2) and (3) of the Act to disclose to all parties any circumstances of which she/he is aware that may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Arbitrators are lawyers or private citizens who may or may not make a living through adjudication. Generally, private parties appoint arbitrators and they pay the arbitrator’s fees. If however, the parties to arbitration cannot agree on who should arbitrate a matter, a court can be asked to appoint someone under ss. 10(1) of the Act. The court will normally appoint someone based on suggestions made by one of the parties. Arguments are made by both parties to persuade the court as to who to appoint. Though several media sources have noted that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the supreme law of the land that will preclude discriminatory provisions in arbitral agreements, it must be recalled that arbitration impacts only civil disputes. The Charter is legislation that applies to state action and not disputes between private individuals. Thus, the Charter does not bind arbitrators per se. Where however, an arbitral award is filed with a court and enforced as an order governmental action may well be implicated. Though the Charter became part of the Constitution of Canada in 1982 and by virtue of s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 any law that is inconsistent with the Charter “is to the extent of the inconsistency of no force or effect”, it is difficult to predict what impact this will have on legislation that allows two parties with informed consent to agree to arbitration using any “rules of law.” Traditionally perceived as facets of private life protected from state intrusion, certain family law matters have been acknowledged as subjects of public scrutiny and influence. For example, in the matter of spousal support where government action is not implicated, the courts have utilized a process of interpretation by which Charter values have been imported into disputes between private individuals in order to recognize and redress historic disadvantages endured by women. An argument can be made that arbitration involving family law, no matter what legal framework is used to resolve the dispute, should by analogy and in order to maintain coherence in the law also import Charter values. Alison Harvison Young makes the major claim that substantially because of the Charter family law can no longer be characterized as falling within the domain of private law. The Charter has “articulated values such as equality that form a framework or backdrop of principle, in turn creating an overall degree of integrity or coherence” and it has legitimated a methodology of adjudication that openly articulates policy considerations. However, should reliance be placed on Charter values, there is no reason why only equality and not other Charter rights such as freedom of religion would be selectively included in determining the content of private agreements. It has been suggested that the progressive changes evident in family law over the years are not simply the result of Charter values, but the robust values of equality indigenous to family law. B. The Arbitration Process Parties to arbitration and sometimes their chosen adjudicator sign a contract called an arbitration agreement that stipulates the time frame, the scope of the issues to be adjudicated upon and other relevant matters which the parties wish to submit to arbitration. Some arbitration agreements are very complex and comprehensive including the specific processes by which arbitration will be conducted, while other agreements are very simple. The Arbitration Act stipulates in ss. 5(3) that an arbitration agreement need not be in writing. A domestic contract covering matters governed by the Family Law Act or the Children’s Law Reform Act such as custody and access to children or support obligations must however, be in writing, signed by the parties and witnessed otherwise it is unenforceable. It is uncertain whether arbitration agreements resolving family law matters, but made outside the context of a domestic contract under Part IV of the FLA need to be in writing. It is useful to emphasize the distinction between an arbitration agreement and an arbitral award. The arbitration agreement is signed by the parties to authorize the arbitrator to act, whereas the arbitral award is the decision or reasons of the arbitrator. Subsection 32(1) of the Arbitration Act provides that parties to arbitration can choose the legal framework by which their disputes will be settled. Parties are free to adopt any “rules of law” to govern their arbitrations, so long as the results are not prohibited by law or purport to bind people or institutions that have not agreed to the process. In other words, the Act has opened the door to utilizing any code including religious principles for resolving civil matters in Ontario. According to ss. 5(5), an arbitration agreement may be revoked only in accordance with the ordinary rules of contract law. Section 6 of the Act authorizes a court not to enforce an arbitral award if the parties did not have real consent to arbitrate. Thus, if brought to the attention of a court, an arbitral agreement could be challenged on the basis that it was signed under duress, coercion, undue influence, misrepresentation or based on unconscionability. The success of a party’s attack or resistance to an arbitral award on the ground of non-consent to an arbitration agreement will depend on the facts in each case and the interpretation of consent, coercion, undue influence and/or duress given by the courts in past cases (see below “Judicial Interpretation of Private Agreements”). Subsection 50(3) of the Act provides that the court shall enforce an arbitral award. Thus, arbitration awards are final and binding in the province of Ontario unless set aside or appealed according to the Act. C. The Content of Arbitral Awards in the Family Law Context There are some limits on the substance of arbitration agreements. Theoretically, discriminatory provisions or clauses that incorporate for example a gender bias cannot be included as part of an arbitral agreement as this would likely be considered unconscionable under the principles of contract law. As a practical matter, given the private nature of arbitration a court will not be aware of unfair provisions unless a review mechanism is utilized. It is certainly not illegal to contract out of certain statutory rights. Indeed the alternative dispute resolution process encourages parties to design their own bargains that are suited to their individual needs. There are however, certain base requirements. In the family law context, agreements on property division and spousal support require full disclosure of finances from each party and a clear understanding of the consequences of the agreement. A clear understanding of the nature and consequences of the agreement typically includes the ability to read and access to independent legal advice. If these criteria are not present, a court can set the agreement aside if one party applies. Where as a result of a marriage breakdown one party would require social assistance, the government would rather have that party’s former spouse pay spousal support as required than burden the state with this matter. Thus, this may be another instance when a court could set an agreement aside. Moreover, the law does not enforce certain kinds of agreements, as contrary to public policy, such as that women remain chaste as a condition of separation. In addition, some rights, at least theoretically, cannot be waived in advance, such as the right to occupy the matrimonial home because this could impact on the rights of any children of the marriage. 1. Division of Property A married couple in Ontario has the right under the Family Law Act to an equal division of property upon the dissolution of the marriage. A married couple can agree to vary their statutory rights to the “net family property” by virtue of a domestic contract. A domestic contract may include a clause wherein the parties agree to arbitration in order to resolve their dispute. Where an alternative means of dividing the parties’ property is resolved via arbitration, a court’s primary concern on appeal will be to examine whether the arbitration order failed to consider undisclosed significant assets, whether a party understood the nature or consequences of the arbitration agreement and any other matter in accordance with the law of contract. The safeguards of the law of contract would include considering such factors as whether the parties received independent legal advice and whether an agreement may be rendered invalid by reason of duress, unconscionability, misrepresentation or inequality in bargaining power. 2. Spousal Support A court will consider similar factors in determining whether to set aside an arbitration order that dealt with spousal support between married or common law spouses or same-####### partners. If an agreement produces unconscionable results or will force family dependants to seek public assistance or if the terms of the arbitration agreement were being breached, a court may grant an order respecting spousal support that overrides the terms of the arbitral award. 3. Custody, Access, Child Support and Other Matters Involving Children Because the Arbitration Act provides no express limits to the content of arbitrations, parties can have matters such as custody, access, child support and other matters including the moral and religious education of their children arbitrated upon. In fact, private agreements regarding custody and access are far more common than court mandated orders. The Islamic Institute of Civil Justice has made statements to the effect that custody, access or child support matters will not be arbitrable. In fact, there is no legal impediment to doing so. As child support falls under the joint jurisdiction of the provinces and the federal government, an arbitrator will be unwise to stray far from the Child Support Guidelines. Section 56(1.1) of the FLA additionally provides that a court may disregard any provision of a domestic contract where the child support provision is unreasonable having regard to the child support guidelines. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice has noted that though the Arbitration Act governs all types of civil disputes, its clauses are not framed particularly for family law and “still less are they drawn for custody and access matters.” Significantly, in Duguay v. Thompson-Duguay and Hercus v. Hercus, the Court explicitly held that it retains its inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to intervene in arbitral awards where necessary in the “best interests of the children.” The courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability such as minors or the mentally unwell. However, because arbitration is a private order any award affecting children would only be alterable if brought to the attention of courts. D. Court Intervention in Arbitral Agreements and Awards There is no guarantee that arbitration will eliminate time-consuming and expensive litigation as the Arbitration Act provides a procedure by which a party can appeal and/or judicially review an arbitral award under certain circumstances. Arbitration does not necessarily lead to court intervention. Parties may be satisfied with their arbitral awards or unable for a variety of reasons to bring the matter to court. Arbitrations and the awards that result from them are by their nature private. Unless the awards are challenged in court or need to be enforced, the process remains outside the public realm. Particular arbitral tribunals may, but are not required to develop their own rules with respect to the keeping of records and/or transcripts. For some participants this privacy is considered one of the attractions of the arbitration process, but for others it could result in isolation and the privatization of oppression. As the Ministry of the Attorney General points out in a letter to the Canadian Council of Muslim Women: Even plainly illegal activities may occur unless state authorities find out about them in some way. Similarly, people may suffer from unjust arbitral awards, unless they bring them to the attention of the courts. The following sections will delineate the distinction between appeals and judicial review and outline the circumstances when such procedures may be available. 1. Appeal Process Section 45 of the Arbitration Act outlines the details of the technical right of appeal available to a party. Where an arbitration agreement makes no mention of appeals on questions of law, a party may appeal an award with the permission of the court. Permission will only be granted where the court is satisfied that the matter is of sufficient importance to the parties and the determination of the question of law will significantly affect the rights of the parties. Arbitration agreements that specifically provide for rights of appeal on questions of law, questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law will be examined by the court and the court may require an arbitral tribunal to explain any matter. The remedies available to a court are to confirm, vary or set aside an arbitral award or remit the matter to the arbitral tribunal with the court’s opinion and/or directions. In an appeal, a court is entitled to afford a certain deference or regard to the arbitrator’s decision. The appropriate degree of deference is called the standard of review. In Robinson v. Robinson, a family law decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the court noted “that a court should not interfere with the arbitrator’s award unless it is satisfied that the arbitrator acted on the basis of a wrong principle, disregarded material evidence or misapprehended the evidence.” Generally, courts will be strict in their review of pure questions of law and will replace the opinion of the arbitrator with their own. That is, an arbitrator’s decision will have to be “correct” if it is not to be overturned. If a party to arbitration under the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice appealed a pure question of law to a court, it is most likely that the applicable law wherein a tribunal must be correct would be Canadian law and not, any version of the sharia opted into by the parties. The underlying rationale for this standard is the principle of universality which requires appellate courts to ensure that the same legal rules are applied in similar situations. An alternative possibility is that the court will decide an appeal based on sharia according to the rules of inter-state arbitration. Thus, if the parties agree to the substantive law of another jurisdiction, at the arbitration itself arguments will be made on both sides as to what the law of that jurisdiction actually is. An appellate court would use this record to make its decision as to whether an error has been made in the law of that jurisdiction. Where there is incomplete information in the record or where parties have not argued the law of the foreign jurisdiction, the court will assume that the foreign law is the same as Ontario’s law. Importantly, under this situation parties to arbitration or their lawyers/other representatives will be required to argue the relevant “rules of law”. This could provide the strongest protection for vulnerable parties particularly where there is a concern that an award may permit something that would be contrary to Ontario’s family law regime as by default the assumption of the court will provide a type of statutory minimum standard. However, an inevitable consequence of this rule will likely result in a battle between the more conservative and modernist Islamic scholars who will be used as experts at the arbitration to determine the nuances of sharia law. For parties concerned about unjust arbitral awards, the mechanism of appeal is the strongest safeguard against awards that are contrary to Canadian law. The findings of fact made by an arbitrator are owed the highest degree of deference. They cannot be reversed unless the arbitrator has made a “palpable and overriding error.” This standard recognizes that the trier of fact is better situated to make factual findings owing to her/his extensive exposure to the evidence, the advantage of hearing oral testimony including assessing the credibility of witnesses, and the familiarity with the case as a whole. It is very unlikely for a court to overturn an arbitrator on a finding of fact. Similarly, questions of mixed fact and law will only be overturned where the arbitrator has made a palpable and overriding error. If however, the arbitrator has made some extricable error in principle with respect to the characterization of the law or its application, the error may amount to an error of law and is therefore subject to the highest standard of correctness. Importantly, parties to arbitration can agree to waive their rights of appeal in the arbitration agreement. It is most likely that parties will contract out of their appeal rights particularly where the intent and purpose of seeking arbitration is to be subjected to an alternative legal framework to that provided by Canadian courts. This severely limits the oversight of arbitral awards that courts can provide, however it does not constrain the courts entirely. 2. Process of Judicial Review There are situations through judicial review when a court can set an arbitral award aside because the Arbitration Act provides that parties cannot agree either expressly or by implication to vary or exclude section 46 (setting aside an award). Judicial review, unlike the appeals process, tends to be rooted in matters of a procedural nature (See below “Setting Aside Arbitral Agreements and Awards”). The standard of review used by the courts in judicial review of an arbitral award is a complex test that incorporates a variety of different factors used to determine how much deference should be given to an arbitrator’s decision. Where a matter is judicially reviewed courts will usually respect and enforce the terms of an award unless the decision is unreasonable or patently unreasonable. As noted in Duguay and Hercus, “[t]he legislature has given the courts clear instructions to exercise the highest deference to arbitration awards and arbitration disputes generally.” In other words, the courts’ general tendency will be to respect the decisions of arbitrators. Under principles of administrative law, one factor that courts must consider in determining the level of deference owed to an arbitrator’s decision is the specialized expertise that a tribunal may have as compared to the court. Where an arbitrator can claim highly specialized expertise, for example in a situation where two parties have agreed to have their dispute settled according to certain religious principles, theoretically, courts will militate in favour of a high degree of deference, that is, favour upholding the arbitrator’s decision. It is likely that the expertise of a tribunal will be the determinative factor. There are however, three other components to the functional and pragmatic approach to judicial review which may vary the degree of deference. 3. Setting Aside Arbitral Agreements and Awards Most safeguards in the Arbitration Act refer to procedural guarantees. However, there is some case law to suggest that courts will interpret certain sections of the Act to include certain guarantees as to the substance of the arbitral award. Subsection 19(1) of the Act guarantees that parties shall be treated equally and fairly. Subsection 19(2) ensures that each party is given an opportunity to present a case and respond to the other parties’ cases. In Hercus, Templeton J. held that there was nothing in the Arbitration Act that limits the concept of “fairness” in s. 19(1) to mere procedural fairness. Rather, she felt that s. 19(2) of the Act more specifically addresses the concept of procedural fairness. This is an encouraging finding that suggests courts may be more willing in the family law context to interpret arbitral awards substantively based on fairness. Generally, s. 6 of the Act permits a court to intervene in arbitral matters: (1) to assist in the conduct of arbitrations; (2) to ensure that arbitrations are conducted in accordance with arbitration agreements; (3) to prevent unequal or unfair treatment of parties to arbitration agreements; and (4) to enforce awards. Subsection 20(1) of the Act states that the arbitral tribunal may determine the procedure to be followed in the arbitration subject to some guidelines provided by the Act. According to ss. 46(1) of the Act, a court may set aside an arbitral award on a party’s application in certain circumstances. The following section outlines the specific clauses of ss. 46(1) and provides an example to illustrate their meaning. An award will be set aside where: 1. A party entered into the arbitration agreement while under a legal incapacity. The court would not enforce for example, an agreement entered into while a person was impaired or where a minor entered into an agreement. 2. The arbitration agreement is invalid or has ceased to exist. An arbitral agreement may be invalid if the time frame set out in the agreement has expired or if a particular procedural guarantee has not been met. This section may also be used to set aside awards that are contrary to public policy, for example requiring unreasonable conditions such as chastity or where the contract is unconscionable. 3. The award deals with a dispute that the arbitration agreement does not cover or contains a decision on a matter that is beyond the scope of the agreement. For example, if the subject matter of an arbitration agreement purports to deal only with the division of property upon the breakdown of a marriage, an award that refers to spousal support would be considered outside the scope of the agreement. Subsection 46(3) of the Act, however, provides a restriction wherein a court shall not set aside an award where a party has agreed to the inclusion of the matter, waived the right to object to its inclusion or agreed the tribunal has power to decide what disputes are referred to it. Thus, a clause in an agreement giving the tribunal power to decide what matters are under its jurisdiction or a waiver of rights clause could prove extremely disadvantageous in later attempting to have a court set an award aside. 4. The composition of the tribunal was not in accordance with the arbitration agreement or, if the agreement did not deal with that matter, was not in accordance with the Act. This is a procedural guarantee that ensures that the manner in which the arbitration is conducted is consistent with the intent of the parties or the Act. 5. The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of being the subject of arbitration under Ontario law. A court would set aside an agreement that for example, purports to bind a third party or a falls outside the jurisdiction of civil law. The following clauses provide circumstances that permit a court to intervene when arbitration is not carried out in a just manner: 6. The applicant was not treated equally or fairly, was not given an opportunity to present a case or to respond to another party’s case, or was not given proper notice of the arbitration or of the appointment of the arbitrator. 7. The procedures followed in the arbitration did not comply with this Act. 8. An arbitrator has committed a corrupt or fraudulent act or there is reasonable apprehension of bias. 9. The award was obtained by fraud. 4. Declaration of Invalidity by a Non-Party Interestingly, ss. 48(1) of the Act, provides that at any stage of an arbitration a party who has not participated in the arbitration can apply to the court for a declaration that the arbitration is invalid because: (a) a party entered into the arbitration agreement while under a legal incapacity; (b) the arbitration agreement is invalid or has ceased to exist; (c) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of being the subject of arbitration under Ontario law; or (d) the arbitration agreement does not apply to the dispute. This section may provide an important protection for vulnerable parties who do not have the emotional or financial resources to pursue a matter in court. Presumably, a sympathetic family member or an organization that knows the details of the party’s situation could apply to the court for a declaration of invalidity where for example, they suspect that a party has entered an agreement without true consent. By contrast, such a provision could also be used to undermine the legitimate position of party who has voluntarily agreed to arbitration. 5. Unusual Remedies Subsection 50(7) of the Act provides that if the arbitral award grants a remedy that the court does not have jurisdiction to grant the court may grant a different remedy or remit the matter to the arbitral tribunal with the court’s opinion to award a different remedy. Thus, where a matter reaches a court some protection exists as to the type of remedy that will be awarded. E. Judicial Interpretation of Private Agreements Critical to understanding the impact arbitration will have on parties is an awareness of the approach courts are taking to the increasing privatization of certain areas of the law. The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized in several family law cases, its interest in upholding parties’ private bargains: …n a framework within which private parties are permitted to take personal responsibility for their financial well-being upon the dissolution of marriage, courts should be reluctant to second-guess the arrangements on which they reasonably expected to rely. Individuals may choose to structure their affairs in a number of different ways, and it is their prerogative to do so. In Miglin v. Miglin, a case involving the interpretation of a separation agreement, the Supreme Court of Canada held that trial judges must balance Parliament’s objective of equitable sharing of the consequences of marriage and its breakdown under the Divorce Act with the parties’ freedom to arrange their affairs as they see fit. Accordingly, a court should be loath to interfere with a pre-existing agreement unless it is convinced that the agreement does not comply substantially with the overall objectives of the Divorce Act. This decision suggests that there is some notion of a core public order that private parties are obliged to respect in family law. Indeed the progression of family law cases in Canada since Murdoch v. Murdoch indicates that family law matters have become a matter of public law and policy. While the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Miglin provides some protection against grossly unfair agreements, it has noted recently in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne that deference will be given to agreements that deviate from the statutory matrimonial property regime particularly where negotiated with independent legal advice regardless of whether this advice was heeded. In this case, a couple, both of whom were lawyers, entered into a marriage agreement on the day of their wedding. Both parties had independent legal advice. The wife’s lawyer wrote an opinion letter to her indicating that the draft marriage agreement was “grossly unfair” and that she would be entitled to much more under the statutory regime. For a variety of reasons, she signed the agreement anyway. Though the minority in this decision notes that “simply ‘signing’ the agreement…does not cure its substantive unfairness”, the majority states, “f the respondent truly believed that the Agreement was unacceptable at that time, she should not have signed it.” Hartshorne, a case originating in British Columbia, is particularly worrisome because the majority of the Supreme Court did not take advantage of the relatively low threshold for judicial intervention in the variation of domestic contracts that is available to judges. Under the B.C. Family Relations Act, a court may reapportion assets upon a finding that to divide the property as provided for in a domestic contract would be “unfair”. By contrast in Ontario, the threshold for judicial oversight of domestic contracts is much higher. Judges are only permitted to set aside a contract in specified circumstances such as, where a party fails to disclose significant assets or liabilities, where a party does not understand the nature or consequences of the contract, or otherwise, in accordance with the law of contract. The fairly conservative judicial interpretation of “fairness” in the B.C. context suggests that judges will likely interpret a Hartshorne-type situation in Ontario similarly if not with less interventionism. 1. The Interpretation of Voluntariness and Free Will Also of note in Hartshorne are certain facts surrounding the voluntariness of entering into a domestic contract. As noted earlier, the husband and wife entered into a marriage agreement on the day of their wedding and with independent legal advice. Although the testimony of the husband and wife varies, at the time of the signing of the agreement, it was agreed that the wife was upset and reluctant to sign the agreement. The trial judge noted that in the defendant’s mind: [S]he felt she had no choice but to sign an agreement. The wedding date was set, she had a 20 month old child, she was planning another child (and in fact was pregnant but did not know she was pregnant at the time), and she had committed to a life with the plaintiff. It was her evidence that the plaintiff was dominating and controlling, and that she knew that if she did not sign the proposed agreement, it would be a complete bar to a good relationship…Sometime after the wedding, but before the parties and their guests went out for dinner, she recalls that she was in the kitchen with one of her friends, Leslie Walton. The plaintiff was after her to sign the marriage agreement before they went out for dinner, and she ended up signing the agreement while Leslie Walton was present. On her evidence, she was crying and very upset…Ms. Walton, in her evidence…recalls the plaintiff and the defendant coming in, and that they were discussing something. The defendant was clearly upset and was crying. The plaintiff gave her a pen, and the defendant looked up at Ms. Walton and said words to the effect that “You’re my witness, I am signing this under duress”. Ms. Walton never saw the document, but was simply aware that the defendant was signing something. The trial judge held that “notwithstanding the defendant’s emotional upset at the time” the evidence fell short of establishing a basis for finding that the agreement was unconscionable, or that it was entered into under duress, coercion or undue influence. The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial judge’s finding on this matter. As is obvious from the above decision, the courts have set a high threshold for the test of duress or coercion. Though the common law recognizes a defence of duress, its scope has remained narrowly defined with relief chiefly limited to cases of physical threat. There is a general protection afforded in the law where undue advantage is taken by virtue of inequality of bargaining power. Inequality in bargaining power may result from any of various aspects of the parties’ circumstances such as “abuse or intimidation or…learning or other disability…anxiety or stress or a nervous breakdown or indulgence in drugs or alcohol.” Other factors held to indicate the necessary inequality include old age, emotional distress, alcoholism and lack of business experience. It appears that any situation that results in a weaker party’s being “overmatched and overreached” will qualify for relief if the stronger party secures immoderate gain. There is a well established line of cases providing relief from agreements on the basis of undue influence, which describes an advantage accruing from “a longstanding relationship of control and dominance.” Certain relationships such as solicitor-client and doctor-patient, give rise to a presumption of undue influence. The relationship of husband-wife is not included in that class of special relationships. However, where an inequality of bargaining power can be established, for example if the husband has subjected the wife to abuse, a court will set aside an agreement based on undue influence and unconscionability. Syed Mumtaz Ali, current head of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice, explained the law of minorities as sharia law sets it down. Muslims in non-Muslim countries are expected to follow the sharia to the extent that it is practical. According to Ali, until recent changes to the Arbitration Act, Canadian Muslims have been excused from applying the sharia in their legal disputes. Now that arbitration agreements are considered final and binding, “the concession given by Shariah is no longer available to us because the impracticality has been removed. In settling civil disputes, there is no choice indeed but to have an arbitration board [emphasis added].” It is certainly not implausible to imagine a situation where a devout Muslim woman would be susceptible to pressure to consent to arbitration by sharia law because of a pronouncement such as Syed Mumtaz Ali’s. Indeed very similarly, Rabbi Reuven Tradburks, secretary to the Beis Din of Toronto’s Va’ad HaRabbonim notes: “In this city, we actually push people a little to come [to arbitration by Jewish law] because using the Beis Din is a mitzvah, a commandment from God, an obligation.” According to Homa Arjomand, head of the new ‘International Campaign Against Shari’a Court in Canada’, most at risk are young immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa or certain South Asian countries, where sharia law is practised “and has been used to subjugate them their entire lives. They know nothing different.” Whether religious or moral coercion of this type by an Imam, spouse or others will be deemed to affect the equality of bargaining power of the parties will depend on the facts of each case. F. Judicial Interpretation of Islamic Agreements It is possible that judicial interpretation of arbitral awards that invoke Islamic law principles may stray from the family law precedents set wherein parties’ bargains are given much weight. Indeed, the precise reading that courts will assume when reviewing awards based on religious principles remains uncertain because of conflicting case law. In Kaddoura v. Hammoud, a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice, the court refused to require payment of the mahr, a Muslim marriage custom, because the contract had a religious purpose and accordingly, was not an obligation that should be adjudicated in the civil courts. In this case, an amount of $30,000 was due to the wife under an Islamic marriage contract. The contract conformed to s. 52(1) of Ontario’s Family Law Act in that the provision was not vague nor was the agreement signed under circumstances suggestive of inequality or duress. Despite the obligatory nature of the mahr under Islamic principles however, the court held that the agreement was unenforceable by Canadian courts. Pascale Fournier has argued that judges frequently perceive Muslim cultural differences as too drastic to fit within existing legal categories. In Kaddoura, the judge’s reasons reveal that it was the religious dimension of the mahr that rendered the agreement unenforceable. The judge notes: While not, perhaps, an ideal comparison, I cannot help but think that the obligation of the Mahr is as unsuitable for adjudication in the civil courts as is an obligation in a Christian religious marriage, such as to love, honour and cherish, or to remain faithful, or to maintain the marriage in sickness or other adversity so long as both parties live, or to raise children according to specified religious doctrine. Many such promises go well beyond the basic legal commitment to marriage required by our civil law, and are essentially matters of chosen religion and morality. They are derived from and are dependent upon doctrine and faith. They bind the conscience as a matter of religious principle but not necessarily as a matter of enforceable civil law. As Fournier notes, in erroneously importing a Christian, majoritarian comparison with the Islamic institution of the mahr, the judge overlooks that whereas Christian vows constitute moral obligations that are indefinite insofar at they can only bind the conscience, the mahr is a clear financial obligation. “The court’s message is that a valid agreement between two Muslim parties is unenforceable, not for vagueness like the Christian examples deemed analogous, but because of the agreement’s religious purpose.” The “apparent cultural anxiety” in Ontario associated with entering the “‘religious thicket’, a place that the courts cannot safely and should not go” is contrasted with cases of near identical facts in British Columbia where the courts’ interpretation of the enforceability of the mahr has been very different. In N.M.M. v. N.S.M., a decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court, it was held that the mahr was enforceable as a valid marriage agreement per s. 48 of the Family Relations Act. The court’s reasons were a reiteration of two previous cases in B.C., Nathoo v. Nathoo and Amlani v. Hirani, wherein the enforceability of the mahr was also recognized. Dorgan J. in his concluding comments in Nathoo held: Our law continues to evolve in a manner which acknowledges cultural diversity. Attempts are made to be respectful of traditions which define various groups who live in a multi-cultural community. Nothing in the evidence before me satisfies me that it would be unfair to uphold provisions of an agreement entered into by these parties in contemplation of their marriage, which agreement specifically provides that it does not oust the provisions of the applicable law. Kaddoura suggests that Ontario’s judges will be reluctant to intervene in internal matters involving religious principles whereas N.M.M., Amlani and Nathoo indicate that B.C.’s judges may give more deference to religious principles where an agreement is voluntarily entered into by consenting parties. An appellate court’s interpretation of such matters is required to clarify the legal position in Canada. A notable distinction between the mahr cases and arbitral awards that use sharia law is that the former may be deemed an unrecognizable category of Canadian family law while the latter is not necessarily. The mahr can be relegated to a place of pure religion that need not be decided by “our judicial system.” That is, the court may decide the mahr is a dispute involving Islamic law in which they have no expertise and thus will not intervene. Alternatively, the court may find, as in B.C., that the mahr issue ought to be considered a matter of family or contract law, an area in which the courts have comparable expertise to that of any arbitrator and is therefore justiciable. Matters that may be considered in arbitration such as division of family property, spousal support and child support which are recognizable under a Western legal framework are not as easily relegated to the un-justiciable even where the resolution of such issues may be less recognizable, that is, via sharia law. However, in Brewer v. Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Ottawa of the Anglican Church of Canada, the plaintiff Anglican rector whose relationship with the Anglican Church was governed by the cannons and rules of the Church, began a recognizable action for damages for wrongful dismissal. It was held that in adjudicating Church disputes, the court would look not to the merits of the decision, but rather at adherence to the rules, procedural fairness, the absence of mala fides (bad faith) and natural justice. Given the conflicting case law in Canada on the mahr and the lack of specific case law on arbitrations dealing with Islamic religious principles, it is difficult to predict with certainty how much deference, if any, courts will give to religious arbitral awards that parties voluntarily agree to and whether courts will tend to prefer outcomes that reflect the statutory and judicial standards of family law developed in Canada. 1. Legal Representation The Supreme Court of Canada has noted that independent legal advice at the time of negotiation is an important means of ensuring an informed decision to enter an agreement. Obtaining legal advice will be essential for parties to understand what they are entitled to under Canadian law versus the legal framework they choose under the Arbitration Act. At certain Beis Din, lawyers have the indispensable role of reviewing any contracts before their clients sign them, unless the client waives that right. Typically, lawyers are not welcome at the Beis Din, but in the event that they are present their role is not as advocate for their clients. Rather, they are to assist rabbis in marshalling the facts in order to give them an understanding of secular law, and to assist them in seeing how secular law can affect any decisions of the Beis Din. Canadian courts have stressed the importance of independent legal advice in order for parties to be of equivalent bargaining power. Ironically, it may be that a failure to get independent legal advice may be the best protection a vulnerable party will have in getting a court to review and overturn an unfair arbitration agreement. Where, however, parties sign an agreement to abide by a ruling and consent is found to be voluntary, the courts will likely impute knowledge of the system of laws one is submitting to. It is unlikely an argument that one didn’t realize or understand the impact of a particular set of rules would be successful particularly, where an attempt to contest the ruling is based on a dislike of the outcome. Arbitrations can be informal processes where disputants may feel comfortable representing themselves or having a non-legal advocate or a para-legal represent them. Arbitrations, however, can also duplicate the formality and adversarial atmosphere of a court wherein legal representation may be more appropriate. Parties who choose the arbitration route are not eligible to receive any legal representation though Legal Aid Ontario. Moreover, it is unlikely that a lawyer would agree to represent a client at a tribunal that employs religious law because currently, the standard liability insurance provided by the Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, the insurance carrier for the Law Society of Upper Canada (members of the Ontario bar), does not cover lawyers acting in any area except Ontario/Canadian law. When discussing arbitration before the Beis Din, a Toronto lawyer notes: When it comes to Jewish law, Canadian lawyers really don’t know anything. But even those who do know some halacha…[it] would be negligent to go before the Beis Din and argue Jewish law, since they are not covered for it in their insurance policy. If they made a mistake with financial repercussions, they could be personally liable. Thus, despite its recognized utility, in practice, independent legal advice may be of little use to clients who submit to arbitration using an alternative legal framework; this is so because most Ontario-trained lawyers are likely to be unaware of the repercussions and consequences of a system of law that they are not familiar with. Lawyers may only be of assistance to clients to the extent of explaining their rights in the Canadian legal context. G. Multiple Interpretations of Sharia Law The scope of this paper does not allow an in depth examination into the intricacies or various schools of thought of sharia law. Indeed it is impossible to know what version of sharia will be used for civil matters in Ontario since the Arbitration Act allows parties to agree to any legal framework they desire. Parties may agree to very specific interpretations of the sharia or they may agree to submit to the sharia generally, putting faith in the arbitrator’s expertise. What is known about sharia is that it is a complex legal framework that is meant to be a complete system for regulating every aspect of human life: The rules, obligations, injunctions and prohibitions laid down by or derived from the Qur’an and the Sunnah produce a complete picture of the Muslim community, from which no part can be removed without the rest being damaged. Sharia law does not translate appropriately or fairly when utilized in a patchwork fashion. Indeed Syed Soharwardy, a founding member of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice, has written: “Sharia cannot be customized for specific countries. These universal, divine laws are for all people of all countries for all times.” Yet, by virtue of living in Canada, sharia law can only be applied in a limited way to certain civil matters. Syed Mumtaz Ali’s contradictory claim to both his own comments and Soharwardy’s that a “Canadianized sharia” will be utilized should be received with concern. Ali notes: “It will be a watered-down sharia, not 100 per cent sharia. Only those provisions that agree with Canadian laws will be used.” If this is the case, some Canadian Muslims may feel insecure subjecting themselves to distortions of Islamic principles where such principles are understood as immutable. On the other hand, the fact that sharia is subject to interpretation may be an asset in addressing women’s concerns. 1. Reservations to CEDAW: Example of the Diverse Application of Sharia Internationally The application of sharia law internationally reveals that Islamic countries are not homogenous and have a great deal of diversity in culture and even faith. Exploring the tenets and historical foundations of “cultural Islam” leads one to the understanding that much discretion lies in the interpretation of Islamic law and its correlation to international human rights standards. Perhaps the most telling example of this are the reservations made by Muslim countries in the name of Islam to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The Convention is an international legal instrument or treaty that requires respect for and observance of the human rights of women. It was adopted in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly and came into force in September of 1981. Countries that ratify CEDAW have the option of invoking reservations to certain provisions of the treaty. Reservations serve to exclude or modify the legal effect of the reserved provision(s) in their application to that country. For example, a country’s reservation might read: The Government of the Republic of X will comply with the provisions of the Convention, except those which the Government may consider contradictory to the principles of the Islamic Sharia, upon which the laws and traditions of X are founded. Several Muslim countries have invoked reservations to CEDAW specifically citing sharia law as the motivating force behind these reservations. The most reserved articles relate to rights of women in the area of family law, which has always been jealously guarded by Muslim countries as being regulated by Islamic law, whereas other fields of life including the running of governments and financial institutions are not so guarded against ‘infiltration’ of ‘secular’ laws. Notably however, perceptions of what constitute Islamic norms and what falls outside their ambit vary extensively, particularly with respect to women’s rights. Wide ranges of factors including political, socio-economic as well as religious considerations motivate reservations entered by Muslim countries. However, not every Muslim country has entered a reservation in the name of Islam. In fact, a group of Central Asian Republics and some other Muslim countries have ratified the CEDAW without any reservations whatsoever, providing further evidence for the disparate “Islamic” positions adopted by varying jurisdictions. “The situation is further complicated where no uniform position vis-à-vis Islamic law is adopted by Muslim States since each jurisdiction presents its own specific blend of an ‘operative’ and ‘cultural’ Islam, distinct from other jurisdictions.” The reason for the lack of consistency in invoking sharia is due to the absence of a unified interpretation of religious law. Increasingly, Muslim feminists and Islamic reformers are asserting that the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet provide much support for the idea of expanded rights for women. A growing movement is contesting the model of gender rights and duties found in traditional Islamic jurisprudence and discourse and promoting instead interpretations and understandings of Islamic law and justice rooted in notions of gender equality. Contemporary Muslims such as Abdullahi An-Na’im and Fatima Mernissi have reexamined the sources and concluded that Islam calls for equal rights for men and women. In contrast, opponents of feminism turn to the juristic tradition and the associated cultural norms, which reflect the values of patriarchal societies. The differences in approaches to understanding Islam have been compounded by the absence of any generally recognized central authority for resolving disputed points of sharia doctrine. Faisal Kutty, a Toronto-based lawyer, states the fact that there is virtually no formal certification process to designate someone as being qualified to interpret Islamic law compounds the problem: As it stands today, anyone can get away with making rulings so long as he has the appearance of piety and a group of followers. There are numerous institutions across the country [Canada] churning out graduates as alims (scholars), faqihs (jurists) or muftis (juris-consults) without fully imparting the subtleties of Islamic jurisprudence. Many, unfortunately, are more influenced by cultural world views and clearly take a male-centered approach. The lack of uniformity in interpreting sharia law poses a difficulty in assessing the impact on women of sharia arbitration tribunals in Ontario. The fact that arbitration is a private matter wherein records are typically not kept further complicates this problem. The lack of specified training required of religious leaders/arbitrators both in Islam and under the Arbitration Act suggests that women’s rights may well be in jeopardy. The fact that the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice has not released any by-laws, rules or guidelines indicating how the various schools of Muslim law will interact with family law matters in relation to women is also problematic. II. The Potential Impact of the Arbitration Regime on Women While it is possible that a feminist interpretation of sharia law or an interpretation of Islam that incorporates international human rights standards may result in arbitral awards that deal fairly with women, it is also feasible that under the current Arbitration Act a regressive interpretation of sharia will be used to seriously undermine the rights of women. John Syrtash acknowledges that “disadvantaged spouses”—that is women—may be adversely affected by a family law system that defers to religious or cultural traditions. As the Act currently stands, any conservative, fundamentalist or extreme right wing standard can be used to resolve family law matters in Ontario. Indeed a pre-Rathwell-ian legal standard that resorts to stereotypes about women’s prescribed familial roles would be a legitimate standard by which to make family law decisions under the Arbitration Act, resulting in the exacerbation of women’s disadvantage through unfair division of property, spousal support, child support, custody and access awards. Gender bias that operates to the detriment of women in family law is not a new or uncommon phenomenon in Canadian law. Though judicial and statutory measures have been taken to ameliorate the economic disadvantage or unfair treatment that women experience, overall, women’s economic well-being and role/work recognition continues to suffer. Nonetheless, a review of family law jurisprudence over the past 20 years reveals some beneficial developments to women. The Arbitration Act threatens to hinder these developments by providing no safeguards whatsoever to ensure women’s equality. Arbitral awards may bear no relationship to what the parties would be entitled to if they went to court. Much of the feminist critique surrounding mediation is relevant and applicable to arbitration. The following is an example: There is currently no mechanism in place to ensure that those legal rights and entitlements are reflected in…[arbitration] agreements, or are even fully considered by the parties. Moreover, the private nature of… [arbitration] means that the process is not open. This means that women may cede hard-won legal rights behind closed doors. Further…there is no means to review and track what is happening to women in… [arbitration]. Studies have found that private bargaining in family law tends to yield inferior results for many women. In his study of factors that impact on negotiated spousal support outcomes Craig Martin found that “the support claimant is the party who will have the least resources and so will be least able to bear the transaction costs” associated with private bargaining. He also notes that “psychologically and culturally, support is still viewed as a favour given to dependent women, rather than a form of entitlement.” Indeed arbitrators will bring their own set of biases, which are seldom acknowledged, to their decision-making. One of the consequences of the “privatization of justice” is that social inequities may be reproduced in privately ordered agreements, and yet remain hidden from the public eye. As a result, the status quo is maintained and women’s inequality in relation to this “private sphere of the family is no longer a public concern.” As has been noted by one author “‘[p]rivate justice’ renders the personal apolitical.” With no legal aid or mandatory legal representation, there are serious concerns as to whether women will be truly free in their choice to arbitrate. Gila Stopler has argued that unlike racially-, ethnically-, and religious-oppressed communities which strive to instill in their members the recognition of their own oppression, the oppression of women is compounded by societies that strive to deprive them of the recognition of gender based oppression and prevent them from creating the space and the cooperation required to form resistance. Women may be susceptible to subtle but powerful compulsion by family members or may be the targets of coercion and pressure from religious leaders for whom there may be a financial interest in people seeking arbitration. In the context of battered women and mediation, it has been noted that [t]he reality is that a battered woman is not free to choose. She is not free to elect or reject mediation if the batterer prefers it, nor free to identify and advocate for components essential to her autonomy and safety and that of her children… This comment is equally relevant to battered women agreeing to arbitration. It is highly unlikely that a battered woman will be capable of negotiating the terms of an arbitration agreement in a way that is fair to her interests. New immigrant women from countries where sharia law is practiced are particularly vulnerable because they may be unaware of their rights in Canada. These women may be complacent with the decision of a sharia tribunal because arbitral awards may seem equal to or better than what might be available in their country of origin. An immigrant woman who is sponsored by her husband is in an unequal relationship of power with her sponsor. It may be impossible for a woman in this situation to refuse a request or order from a husband, making consent to arbitration illusory. Linguistic barriers will also disadvantage women who may be at the mercy of family or community members that may perpetuate deep-rooted patriarchal points of view. If a woman manages to access the court via judicial review or appeal, she may well be told that she “chose” the disadvantageous situation that she finds herself in, further entrenching her feelings of helplessness and inferiority. The consequences of family arbitration with few limits will seriously and detrimentally impact the lives of women. This gender-based impact will likely be felt widely and will have intersecting class, (dis)ability, race and cultural implications. In the following section an attempt will be made to outline the issues and arguments that may be raised by a section 15 equality analysis under the Charter. A. Section 15 Charter Analysis Section 15 of the Charter is meant to catch government action that has a discriminatory purpose or effect on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground and impairs a person’s dignity. Section 15(1) provides: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, #######, age or mental or physical disability. At the heart of s. 15(1) is the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as equal human beings, equally capable and equally deserving. The test for determining a s. 15 infringement is three-pronged. Firstly, does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the rights claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics? If so, there is differential treatment for the purpose of s. 15(1). Secondly, was the claimant subject to differential treatment on the basis of enumerated or analogous grounds? And finally, does the differential treatment discriminate in a substantive sense, bringing into play the purpose of s. 15(1) in remedying such ills as prejudice, stereotyping and historical disadvantage? In challenging the use of sharia law in civil disputes in Ontario as discriminatory against women it is necessary to move a step back and challenge the enabling legislation, the Arbitration Act, under which the use of sharia law is permitted. This is necessary because in order to invoke a Charter right, one must demonstrate some form of governmental action. 1. Standing: Who Can Invoke a Charter Right? Typically, an individual who is of the view that her/his equality rights have been infringed would bring an action to a court challenging the constitutionality of the Arbitration Act on the basis of s. 15 of the Charter. This scenario requires a set of facts where for example, a woman who has submitted her family dispute to a sharia law arbitrator, upon receiving the arbitral award, then challenges the use of family law in arbitration generally, arguing that her equality right is threatened by the Arbitration Act. A private citizen or organization is generally not entitled to direct a reference to the court, but may in certain specific situations bring a declaratory action in which no relief is sought other than an order of a court that a statute is contrary to the constitution. In order to gain standing, an organization would have to demonstrate that (1) the case raises a serious legal issue; (2) it has some genuine interest in bringing the proceeding; and (3) there is no other reasonable or effective way to bring the issue before the court. In seeking to gain standing, criteria (1) and (2) are unlikely to pose much difficulty for a legitimate organization with an interest in securing women’s rights. The decisive factor will be criteria (3). Because an alternative method of bringing this matter to a court exists, that is, via a claimant whose rights have been directly infringed, it is unlikely the courts will grant standing. Assuming that this hurdle is overcome, we proceed with the Charter analysis. 2. Distinction in Purpose or Differential Treatment in Effect The Arbitration Act does not make any direct distinction between individuals. It is a statute that is open to any adult person to use. The argument at this stage of the s. 15 test is that the Act, in not setting any express limits as to the type of civil law under its jurisdiction, disparately impacts women. Specifically, the Act permits the use of family arbitration. Women are negatively impacted because of the possibility that any legal framework may be used to decide family law issues, even frameworks that hold no regard for recognized principles of equality or statutory criteria under the Family Law Act or the Divorce Act. 3. Based on an Enumerated Ground Because private ordering tends to replicate social inequities, of particular concern is that the oppression women experience in society generally will be duplicated in arbitrated agreements and awards. This distinction for the purpose of a s. 15 analysis, is based on #######, which is clearly, an enumerated ground. It may well be that more than one ground of distinction for example, race, ethnic origin or colour will be implicated. Depending on the facts of a case, arguments relating to multiple grounds of distinction can be made. 4. Whether the Distinction or Differential Treatment is Discrimination In this portion of the s. 15 analysis four main contextual factors will be considered: Firstly, the nature of the interests at stake will be examined. Women’s right to ensured equality in family law matters is a significant interest. The judiciary has recognized the importance of fairness to women in family law issues in past cases, albeit not directly in the context of the Charter. However, Charter rights are not absolute and will have to be balanced such that other Charter rights that are also in issue can coexist together. Proponents of sharia arbitration will argue that s. 2(a) of the Charter, which protects freedom of religion, is implicated. Moreover, the argument will surely be made that an important feature of Canada’s constitutional democracy is respect for minorities, including religious minorities. While multicultural privileges can be protected using s. 27, which mandates interpretation of the Charter in a way consistent with the enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians, s. 28 of the Charter reads: “Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, all the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.” Secondly, the Court will consider whether there has been any pre-existing disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping or prejudice experienced by the individual or group. The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly stated that women suffer disadvantage in familial relationships. In M. v. H., Justice Gonthier wrote of a “dynamic of dependence” that disadvantages women in heterosexual relationships. In Moge, the Court recognized “that women have tended to suffer economic disadvantages and hardships from marriage or its breakdown because of the traditional division of labour within that institution.” The Court’s recognition of the multiplicity of economic barriers that women face in society and the consequent social dislocation and a loss of familiar networks for emotional support and social services, clearly indicates recognition of the pre-existing disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping or prejudice experienced by women. The third contextual factor refers to proposed ameliorative purposes or effects. This factor is aimed mainly at recognizing the importance and value of affirmative government measures to ameliorate the position of already disadvantaged groups. The government may try and argue that religious minorities are affirmatively benefiting from the Act as it currently stands, however, this argument may be difficult to sustain upon an examination of the intention behind the Act. The more likely conclusion is that this factor does not apply and has only a neutral impact on the analysis. Finally, the correspondence to the actual needs, capacities or circumstances of the claimant will be considered. It is not entirely clear to the author whether this contextual factor will be relevant to making a s. 15 claim for women. In recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions, this portion of the test has been inappropriately used to import s. 1 issues into s. 15. In other words, factors that reduce the likelihood of finding a Charter infringement are considered at this stage, rather than at the s. 1 stage where the government bears the burden of establishing a justification for the infringement of a Charter right. It is possible that the government will argue that the Act does correspond to the needs, capacities and circumstances of women by giving them a choice as to whether to submit to arbitration. Indeed it may be argued that this is particularly true for Muslim women who for religious reasons may have reason to want their family law disputes resolved by arbitration. While it is important to make arguments regarding the compulsion and pressure to arbitrate that many women will endure, it may not be strategic to put forth the generalized argument that all women will always be unable to make free choices. In order to demonstrate the negative impact that family arbitration has on women, one will have to consider whether as a strategy it is appropriate to delve into the likeliness that the sharia will be implemented fairly. Where a concrete set of facts exits, this may be easier to do by simply examining the arbitral award without making gross generalizations about the ability of the sharia to be progressive for women. Importantly, the courts have stated their unwillingness to make judgments on religious principles. It is possible to make a general argument about the impact that the privatization of family law is having on women. Indeed many scholars have written about the dangers of the state washing its hands of responsibility in matters that are “private.” The ideology of the public/private dichotomy allows government to clean its hands of any responsibility for the state of the ‘private’ world and depoliticizes the disadvantages which inevitably spill over the alleged divide by affecting the position of the ‘privately’ disadvantaged in the ‘public’ world. The practical consequence of non-regulation by the government “is the consolidation of the status quo: the de facto support of pre-existing power relations and distributions of goods within the ‘private’ sphere.” The difficulty lies in supporting this argument. The burden of proving all elements of the breach of a Charter right rests on the person asserting the breach. Because arbitration is a private process and records are typically not kept, the fulfillment of this obligation is seriously hampered. Though in several cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has been prepared to make findings of fact without or with very little evidence, relying on the “obvious” or “self-evident” character of the findings, this has typically been done at the s. 1 justificatory stage of the Charter analysis, which benefits the government and not the rights-claimant. Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, a s. 15 case, involved a decision of the British Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT) not to accredit a free-standing Evangelical teacher-training program at Trinity Western University (TWU) because students from that program were required to sign a community standards document in which they agreed to refrain from “sexual sins including…homosexual behaviour”. The BCCT was concerned that the TWU community standards, applicable to all students, faculty and staff, embodied discrimination against homosexuals. The BCCT argued that graduates from the TWU teacher-training program would not treat homosexuals in the BC public school system fairly and respectfully. The Supreme Court of Canada relied on the lack of a factual foundation in dismissing the appeal: “The evidence to date is that graduates from the joint TWU-SFU teacher education program have become competent public school teachers, and there is no evidence before this Court of discriminatory conduct.” The Court noted that the BCCT’s evidence was “speculative” and involved inferences “without any concrete evidence” that the views of TWU graduates would have a detrimental effect on the learning environment in public schools. This case strongly suggests that a rights-claimant must have more than approximate or tentative evidence of discrimination, which will be difficult to obtain given the lack of records and/or statistics. However, as previously noted, there has been much feminist critique of the privatization of justice. The use of academic articles and expert testimony is certainly one method by which a claim of discrimination can be made out. Another possibility may be the use of judicial notice, a technique wherein judges acknowledge the obvious nature of a phenomenon without requiring tangible evidence to justify it. Judicial notice has been used to recognize the operation of systemic racism against certain communities in the criminal law. There is no reason why it is not possible to persuade a judge to take judicial notice of systemic sexism. Based on the above analysis, it is likely that a court will find that the use of arbitration in family law with no limits disparately impacts women. Strong arguments can certainly be made that this disparate impact is discriminatory and affects the dignity of women. 5. Section 1 of the Charter Upon finding a s. 15 infringement of the Charter the onus of proof shifts to the government to establish that the infringement is justifiable in a free and democratic society pursuant to s. 1. The s. 1 test is two-pronged calling for the government to firstly, delineate a legislative objective of the Arbitration Act that is pressing and substantial and secondly, to demonstrate proportionality between the rights violation and the means chosen to achieve the legislative objective. It is at this stage of the analysis that the government will attempt to demonstrate that it has balanced the equality rights of women with the competing Charter claimants’ right to freedom of religion. In this phase of the analysis, the government will likely address arguments about the cost efficiency of arbitration, the inability of courts to handle all civil disputes because of the scarcity of judicial resources and the necessity of catering to the multicultural ethos of Ontario. 6. Conclusion The implementation of sharia arbitration tribunals in Ontario raises a complex range of issues. When the resolution of family law matters is relegated to the private domain of arbitration with no limits, there are serious threats to the equality rights of certain vulnerable groups such as women. Because the Arbitration Act provides no safeguards for the equality rights of women, this critique is not limited to merely sharia arbitration tribunals, but to all religious arbitration and any system of law that does not acknowledge the dignity and worth of women. Though the traditional justice system is by no means perfect, the last 20 years of jurisprudence in family law demonstrates that certain gains have been made. These hard-won rights are seriously threatened by the underlying principles of the current Arbitration Act. In considering strategies for law reform it is critical that certain questions be explored such as: Is it possible to include safeguards to the arbitration process that will adequately protect women? Can one avoid the predictable limits of such safeguards? Is it possible to reinvent dispute resolution such that feminist concerns are met? Should family law matters be excluded from the Arbitration Act altogether? Given the government’s huge investment of resources in alternative dispute resolution, how likely is a prohibition of all family law matters from the Act? The Canadian Council of Muslim Women has concluded that Ontario ought to have the courage to acknowledge that the Arbitration Act should not be used for family law purposes. Indeed there is some precedent for this position from the province of Quebec, which has declared that family arbitration is not permissible. The Attorney General of Ontario and the Minister for Women’s Issues appointed Ms Marion Boyd to review the province’s arbitration process and any current problems with the Arbitration Act, with specific reference to faith-based arbitration. In her lengthy report entitled “Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion,” Boyd weighed the competing interests of the over 100 individuals and groups with whom she consulted and examined the relevant constitutional issues. The report concludes with 46 recommendations which endorse family arbitration generally and religious arbitration for family and inheritance matters for all faiths. Boyd’s report states that the engagement of religious minorities with provincial legislation will create an institutional dialogue and help minorities engage with the larger society. She concludes that the use of religious arbitration will promote a shared sense of social identity and social integration. Accordingly, she details a system where the practice of religious arbitration may be normalized and entrenched. Several organizations including the National Association of Women and the Law have been critical of Boyd’s report and have made alternate proposals. The final outcome of this matter remains to be seen. The government of Ontario has yet to announce how it will resolve this controversial issue or its intentions with respect to Boyd’s recommendations. Part Two: Human Rights Framework I. Culture and multiculturalism Cultural autonomy and gender equality are not always easily reconciled. The clash between these areas is a pervasive issue in the law. States with a multitude of communities within their borders are likely to face this issue in different guises and perhaps with increasing frequency. Canada has for years grappled with the question of how to incorporate a plurality of cultures and traditions while simultaneously defining a nation in the absence of a single collective identity. This issue has been complicated by the fact that Canada has a commitment to upholding both a policy of multiculturalism and an obligation towards women’s rights. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects both the freedom of religion and the equality rights of all people from infringements by the state. Although these values need not necessarily conflict, in the context of religious arbitration tribunals, they have created a tension that must be resolved. In recognition of the increasing diversity of many societies, several authors have posited a theory of liberalism that includes the accommodation of the cultural rights of certain minority groups. Will Kymlicka for example, has argued that individuals born into minority groups may need protection from the majority society in order to enable their autonomy. A multicultural or differentiated citizenship model relies on the protection of basic individual rights for a just social order. However, it also recognizes that justice may require the recognition of traditions and unique ways of life for members of non-dominant cultural minorities, through group-based protections. While liberal theory posits that individuals must decide how best to achieve the good life, the protection of minority rights acknowledges that culture is often the context which enables this choice. Kymlicka has convincingly argued that culture allows individuals to meaningfully comprehend society; it is the lens that permits one to see the array of available options “across the full range of human activities including religious, recreational, social, educational and economic…in public and private spheres.” A. Multiculturalism in Canada Canada’s commitment to cultural pluralism is evidenced by its official policy of bilingualism and multiculturalism. The multicultural framework in Canada “openly promotes the values of diversity as a necessary, beneficial, and inescapable feature of Canadian society.” This framework is thought to be a way in which minorities can retain cultural distinction without compromising their social equality. In its early days, Canada’s policy of multiculturalism was criticized for among other things its emphasis on the mere “song and dance” aspect of cultural pluralism, its failure to improve the living conditions of many new immigrants and the promotion of fragmentation rather than a common vision of values for all Canadians. In the late 1970s, the government’s focus with multiculturalism funding was aimed at transforming public opinion toward the increasing cultural diversity in Canada combined with combating racism. In the context of large decreases to the multiculturalism budget generally in the 1990s, activities with a view to multicultural or multiethnic programmes were more likely to be funded than those of a monocultural or monoethnic nature. More recently however, the “federal government has progressively moved to resolve the ongoing tension between multiculturalism and citizenship in favour of the latter.” In 1997, the multiculturalism programme was modified to focus on a three pronged approach: (1) Canadian identity (people of all backgrounds should feel a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada); (2) civic participation (everyone must be an active citizen, concerned with shaping the future of their communities and their country); and (3) social justice (everyone must be involved in building a society that ensures fair and equitable treatment and that respects the dignity of and accommodates people of all origins). Direct funding to ethnocultural organizations is now seen as problematic because it is argued that such funding upholds the perception that multiculturalism is for special interest groups rather than for all Canadians. Different to the Canadian government’s policy of multiculturalism, the government of Quebec has adopted a policy of “interculturalism” that recognizes pluralism as a feature of modern Quebec, but seeks to integrate immigrants to a common civic culture using the French language. The promotion of French, the language of the majority, as the common public language of all Quebecers is seen as the instrument that allows the socialization of Quebecers from all origins and forces interaction between them. Despite some changes in policy content around multiculturalism that have put a greater emphasis on loyalty to Canada, the accommodation of cultural and religious groups has remained a commitment in order to combat racism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, discrimination and religious intolerance. Thus, Canada has made special efforts to protect minority groups from the destabilizing impact of the political, economic, social and cultural hegemony of the majority. For example, the religious community of Sikhs has been exempted from motorcycle helmet laws in British Columbia and from the official dress-code of the RCMP. Similarly, some Mennonite communities, the Doukhobours and the Hutterites have been granted certain exemptions from mandatory education in recognition of the potentially substantial interference that a broad and secular education could have on the religious development of the children from these communities. B. The Multiculturalism Paradox While there is little doubt that the accommodation of minority groups is an indisputable virtue, multicultural accommodation policies have typically been concerned with the relationship among different cultures and between a given minority community and the state. Often overlooked, but equally important, is the dilemma concerning the potentially injurious effects of inter-group accommodation upon intra-group power relations. Well-meaning accommodation policies by the state, aimed at leveling the playing field between minority communities and the majority society, may unwittingly allow systemic maltreatment of individuals within the accommodated minority group, “an impact in some cases so severe that it nullifies the individual rights of citizens.” Will Kymlicka has referred to this phenomenon as the distinction between external protections, or group differentiated policies designed to “protect a particular ethnic or national group from the destabilizing impact of the decisions of the larger society” versus internal restrictions, or cultural group claims to “restrict the liberty of members in the name of group solidarity”. While Kymlicka is in favour of external protections, he does not support the use of internal restrictions concluding that they are inconsistent with a system of minority rights that appeal to individual freedom or personal autonomy. He notes that a differentiated citizenship model must recognize the value and primacy of the individual while also recognizing the legitimacy of group-based accommodation. Kymlicka’s two concepts of external protections and internal protections can be viewed oppositionally as the two concepts are often two sides of the same coin. Thus, certain religious communities would view the withdrawal of their children from mandatory education as a necessary external protection in order to prevent undermining the religious development of the child. Kymlicka himself would argue that this group is imposing an internal restriction on its members by essentially making it difficult for their members to leave the group by severely limiting the extent to which these children would learn about the outside world. The multiculturalism paradox is represented by the reality in which sound attempts to empower traditionally marginalized minority communities ultimately may reinforce power hierarchies within the accommodated community. It appears then, that the task must be to find a way of accommodating cultural differences, while also protecting at-risk group members from sanctioned violations of their state-guaranteed rights. How can one protect women and other vulnerable individuals within the ambit of religious protection? “Indeed, one cannot comprehend (let alone redress) the plight of the individual in the multiculturalism paradox if one does not understand the complex and overlapping affiliations existing between the state, the group and the individual.” C. The Impact of Accommodation on Minority Women As previously noted, the arena of family law has long remained controversial as it brings to the surface the ability of a group to demarcate the boundaries of its membership while also being a key site of oppression for women. Many minority communities operating within a larger political entity possess traditions pertaining specifically to the family that have historically served as important manifestations of distinct cultural identity, “making family law a central pillar in the cultural edifice for ensuring the group’s continuity and coherence over time.” The importance of substantively accommodating women within cultural communities is illustrated by the situation of Native women in Canada. In the pre-Charter case of Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, an Aboriginal woman lost her challenge to the Indian Act which provided that unlike Native men, Native women who married a non-Native lost their status as Indians, as did their children. Although the Indian Act was the legislation of a colonial regime, in this case, the interests of the state were in line with the patriarchal interests of Native men. In 1981, the Human Rights Committee found that the Indian Act unreasonably deprived Sandra Lovelace of her right to belong to the Indian minority and to live on and enjoy her culture under article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Subsequent to this decision and the enactment of the Charter, the Indian Act was amended in 1985 and the statutory discrimination found in s. 12(1)(b) against women was eliminated. In reality, the legislation has left a continuing legacy of discrimination. A Bill C-31 reinstatee cannot pass her own status on to her children: only children born with a status father will have status. This “second-generation cut-off” enacted in Bill C-31 and now effected by s. 6(2) of the Indian Act means that cousins of the first degree will have different status under the Act depending on whether they descend in the male or the female line. Brothers and sisters have different ability to pass on their status to their children. A Bill C-31 woman who has a child out of wedlock must name the father, and he must be status, before her child is eligible. Mothers who are restored to Indian status by Bill C-31 will be grandmothers of children who cannot claim status, as well as those who can, depending on the marital arrangements of their parents. The Bill effects finer and finer differentiations among the Aboriginal community, has divided families, and will result in the extinction of some First Nations as the affects of the second generation cut-off are realized. Contrary to the views of some Band Councils who have argued “that the right to discriminate against and exclude women is part of the traditional heritage of Aboriginal peoples”, the Native Women’s Association of Canada recommends that there be a national Aboriginal Bill of Rights drafted from the grassroots that would be applicable to First Nations governments. Gender discrimination in family law has systemic effects on women’s equality, given the substantive breadth of that law, as well as its impact on women’s ability to exercise specific rights. Family law defines property relations between spouses and determines the economic and parental consequences of divorce. For women, these stakes are especially high with separation and divorce typically resulting in the feminization of poverty. The defence of “cultural practices” will have a much greater impact on the lives of women and girls than on the lives of men and boys, since far more of women’s time and energy goes into preserving and maintaining the private realm. Women’s roles inside the home as caregivers and nurturers are central not only to religious thought, but also to contemporary western political thought. Familial ideology is also central to capitalism…The nurturing nature of the family, in contrast with the marketplace, generates the belief that the impersonal force of the state should be kept out of the familial realm. Finally, the family and women’s reproductive role, as well as their roles as care-givers and nurturers, are central to nationalism, which views women as reproducers of the nation, transmitters of its culture, and symbols of the nation. In cases of separation or divorce, when women living within certain religious communities are told that they have limited or no legal rights to property, spousal support, or custody of their children, the accommodation of their group’s traditions means that women’s basic rights as individual citizens are violated. A growing body of research shows that accommodation in the family law arena imposes upon women a systemic and disproportionate burden, particularly in their traditional gender roles as wives and mothers. Some countries with multiple religious groups, particularly the ex-colonies of France and Britain, have retained religious law in family and inheritance matters (despite the struggles of women in these countries) and secular law in commercial and criminal matters. This was originally a colonial strategy to ensure civil unrest. Thus, individuals of certain religious affiliations have the internal rules of their respective religion apply to such matters as marriage, divorce, support, custody/access and inheritance while secular or civil law governs all other fields. In such multi-confessional states this body of law is known as “personal status law.” Personal status law may regulate procedural as well as substantive rights and thus, condition women’s ability to obtain redress for violations of the latter, as illustrated by the example of evidentiary rules that assign lesser weight to women’s testimony or completely bar their testimony. Importantly, under Canadian law there is no recognized concept of personal status law. Canadian law makes no distinction between secular and religious law. There is a single set of laws that apply to all people within Canada’s jurisdiction. Unlike France and Germany which may allow a “direct” application of family law from Muslim countries for non-citizen Muslims, Canada has a single set of laws that apply to all people within its jurisdiction. In France, as a result of stipulations of international private law and bilateral agreements, France must apply the laws of the foreigner’s country of… [nationality in most] matters of family law, more specifically in relation to disputes over “the status and capacity of persons”. This is true in so far as doing so does not contravene French public order or violate an international convention to which France is a party [such as the European Human Rights Convention]. These rules of international private law that incorporate…family law [from Muslim countries] at the domestic level to non-French citizens living within France are of crucial importance, as only one out of four million Muslims living in France have obtained French citizenship. Canada by contrast, follows the law of domicile where regardless of citizenship all people are subject to the same law by virtue of their residence in Canada. Susan Okin has asked, what happens when group rights are anti-feminist? She states “[o]ppressed people have often internalized their oppression so well that they have no sense of what they are justly entitled to as human beings.” That women from minority communities often feel the need to choose between their struggle against the sexism inside their communities and the racism/intolerance directed against them explains why oppression against women in minority communities often remains unchallenged by the women inside the community. The internalization process is certainly one of the most problematic legacies of long-term oppression. Okin ascribes to false consciousness potential disagreement arising from cultural defenses offered by women themselves. She explains that “[c]oming to terms with very little is no recipe for social justice....committed outsiders can often be better analysts and critics of social injustice than those who live within the relevant culture.” This argument addresses the inadequacy of a gender-neutral policy of cultural accommodation yet it is unsatisfactory in explaining the situation of women who may still find value and meaning in their community’s cultural tradition and in continued group membership, particularly where the minority culture itself is subject to repressive pressures from the broader society. While the liberatory and creative potential of allowing marginalized perspectives to redefine women’s condition is essential, states must not take advantage of the reluctance of women to speak out and interpret it to mean that minority women are content in their oppressive circumstances. The relationship between multiculturalism and feminism ought not to amount to a zero-sum game, in which any strengthening of a minority group’s rights implies an accompanying weakening in the rights for that minority group’s female group members. The resolution to the multiculturalism paradox cannot be guided by “an either-your-rights-or-your-culture ultimatum” in which women may either enjoy the full spectrum of their state guaranteed rights or participate in their minority communities. A new multicultural paradigm must break away from the either/or opposition as this forced stand off between two vital aspects of the experiences of women is unrealistic and undesirable. II. Religious freedom A. Freedom of Religion Under Domestic Law In Canada, the right to religious freedom is a basic human right protected both domestically and ratified as an international obligation. Section 2(a) of the Charter guarantees to “everyone” the “fundamental freedom” of “conscience and religion.” Like other Charter rights, s. 2(a) is subject to the s. 1 clause which may limit freedom of religion or conscience if it comes within the phrase “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Most recently, the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Reference re Same-####### Marriage, “The protection of freedom of religion afforded by s. 2(a) of the Charter is broad and jealously guarded in our Charter jurisprudence.” In Big M Drug Mart, Justice Dickson offered the following definition of freedom of religion: The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. The right to freedom of religion enshrined in s. 2(a) encompasses the right to believe and entertain the religious beliefs of one’s choice, the right to declare one’s religious beliefs openly and the right to manifest religious belief by worship, teaching, dissemination and religious practice. Section 2(a) emphasizes the protection afforded to both religious beliefs as well as religious practices. Peter Hogg has observed that Justice Dickson’s comments borrow from the language of article 18 of the ICCPR. At least one author has suggested that the right to freedom of religion is conceptualized in Canada as a negative liberty, that is, “it does not impose any positive obligation upon the state…to recognize positive legal effects to religious norms.” Custom, practice and individual belief within religious communities often diverge significantly from legal doctrine. However, each of these manifestations of religious belief are recognized and entitled to protection on an equal footing with religious law. The extent to which a particular interpretation of religious law is considered to be authoritative or aberrant, or a particular practice is deemed to have a legitimate foundation in religious law, does not determine whether international guarantees of religious freedom are applicable. Those guarantees recognize all such interpretations (with the exception of spurious or fraudulent claims) as manifestations of religion. Importantly, the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that it will not enquire into the contents of religious belief: [T]he basic principles underlying freedom of religion support the view that freedom of religion consists of the freedom to undertake practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with religion, in which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is sincerely undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his or her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious officials…Consequently, both obligatory as well as voluntary expressions of faith should be protected under the Quebec (and the Canadian) Charter. It is the religious or spiritual essence of an action, not any mandatory or perceived-as-mandatory nature of its observance, that attracts protection. Thus in the Canadian context, an individual’s sincere belief in a particular religious practice is given predominance over even the normative legal code of belief purported by religious authorities or the community. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of religious freedom suggests that the imposition of an arbitrator’s binding interpretation of a religious norm may violate an individual’s subjective view of her/his religion. While the inclusion of custom or sincerely held beliefs in the definition of religious law may entail the additional burden of engaging with offensive patriarchal practices never meant to be part of a religious code, the use of custom may also be used for progressive purposes. Religious law is not static. Custom and practice can assist in modifying religious traditions over time, “even within religious communities that insist on the immutability of the law as defined in religious texts held to be divinely inspired.” It has been noted that “Islam was not intended to freeze human history at the point in time at which God’s Word was revealed to the Prophet.” B. Religious Freedom Under International Law Under international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Declaration on Religious Intolerance) all guarantee the freedom, either individually or “in community with others” and “in public or private,” to manifest religion in worship, observance, practice or teaching. Donna Sullivan has argued that the right to manifest one’s religion or belief encompasses the right to observe and apply religious law, including the right to establish and maintain religious tribunals. “The application of religious law, by formal tribunals or religious leaders, in communal or individual life, and in public or private life, constitutes the observance and practice of religion.” In a number of belief systems including Islam, the observance of religious law is believed by some to be integral to religious practice. These interpretations of Islam emphasize the numerous prescriptive aspects of the religion on the daily life of Muslims. Importantly however, Islam also advocates that Muslims living in non-Muslim countries have a duty to obey the laws of that land. Thus, while the right to practice one’s religion may include the use of religious tribunals, there is no necessary implication that the decisions of religious tribunals have civil effect. As will be discussed in the following section, international and domestic norms guaranteeing the freedom of religion or belief are not absolute. Under international law countries are permitted to restrict manifestations of the freedom of religion in order to protect the rights of others. In Canada, rights under the Charter can also be limited by virtue of s. 1 which states that the rights and freedoms set out in it are “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” III. The Legal Supremacy of Women’s Rights in the Charter and in CEDAW A. International Legal Framework The potential clash between culture and religion, on the one hand, and human rights or gender equality, on the other, is expressly regulated in two international conventions— the CEDAW and the ICCPR, both of which have been ratified by Canada. Article 5(a) of CEDAW reads: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; Similarly, article 2(f) of CEDAW provides that: States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: (f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women; Article 5(a) imposes a positive obligation on states parties to “modify…social and cultural” practices in the case of a conflict, and article 2(f) imposes an obligation to “modify or abolish…customs and practices” that discriminate against women. Clearly then, CEDAW gives superior force to the right to gender equality over cultural practices or custom, including religious norms, thus creating a clear hierarchy of values. The U.N. Committee on CEDAW has stated that Convention articles 2 and 3 “establish a comprehensive obligation to eliminate discrimination in all its forms in addition to the specific obligations under article 5-16”. The prohibition of gender discrimination set forth in the Convention explicitly extends beyond state action to non-governmental conduct. Article 18(3) of the ICCPR also expressly regulates any potential conflict between the right to manifest one’s religion and the fundamental rights or freedoms of others. It states: Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Article 18(3) thus provides an exception to the “freedom to manifest one’s religion”, should a confrontation materialize with the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, including the right to gender equality also protected in the ICCPR pursuant to article 3. Through this exception, a hierarchy of rights is implicitly introduced, albeit in less categorical language than in CEDAW. Indeed the article, in providing an exception for such limitations as may be “necessary” to protect fundamental rights, may be read to imply that there will be an obligation on states parties to impose them. This appears to be the reading implicit in the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on the Equality of Rights between Men and Women, which although not expressly referring to article 18(3), holds that the right to religion does not allow any state, group or person to violate women’s equality rights. B. Canada’s Rights Regime In Canadian law, as in international law, both the right to gender equality and the right to freedom of religion and multiculturalism are protected. The right to equality between women and men is protected under the general equality provision of s. 15 of the Charter and additionally under s. 28 of the Charter which provides that “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.” The relationship between s. 15 and s. 28 of the Charter has been described in the following manner: Section 28 has…to be viewed in the light of the ‘limitations’ clause in s. 1 of the Charter and the ‘non abstante’ clause in s. 33. Based upon past experience, there was fear either that the legislatures through s. 33 might, on the one hand, exempt a law discriminating against women from the ambit of the Charter, or, on the other hand, that the courts might, through the ‘limitations’ clause in s. 1, so construe a law which discriminates against women as to consider it such a reasonable limit ‘as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. While s. 15 of the Charter is subject to the s. 33 legislative override clause, s. 28 is not. Similarly, s. 15 is subject to the s. 1 limitations clause however, because of section 28, it will almost never be “demonstrably justifiable” to deny sexual equality as provided by section 15(1). Freedom of religion is protected by virtue of s. 2(a) of the Charter and religious minorities also have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of s. 15’s general equality provision. The preservation of multiculturalism is recognized in Canada by virtue of s. 27 of the Charter which states that “[t]his Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage o