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 Darfur in the Hague Conference: Final Report
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DARFUR IN THE HAGUE FOR TWO DAYS -
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ABOUT THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR
20-21 NOVEMBER 2004
THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
FINAL REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. Themes
3. Welcome Speech and the First Speech of the Conference
4. Conference Proper
4.1. First Topic: Identity and Cultures in Sudan
4.2. Second Topic: Darfur Conflict
4.3. The images of Darfur through a Sudanese diaspora’s eyes
4.4. Third Topic: The role of the International Community including Sudanese Diaspora
4.5. Food for thought – How do the panel see the following ten years of Sudan?
4.6. Long Term Solutions and Expectations
4.6.1. The long-term solution of JEM (Justice and Equality Movement)
4.6.2. The long-term solution of SLM (The Sudan Liberation Movement)
4.6.3 The long-term solution and Armed Movements
4.7. Conclusions and recommendations
1. Introduction
The 20th century has been the century of wars, conflicts, disputes, coups, counter-coups, nationalist and ethnic movements. On the eve of the new century, it is about time to understand and solve the social and political instabilities, which are the main reasons of the conflicts. This anguish will end through establishing an environment, in which mutual understanding through communication will be encouraged. Open communication in search of new forms of intervention is therefore a pre-condition to the understanding and resolution of issues and conflicts where traditional power politics and diplomacy have failed in delivering sustainable peace. For this reason, the conference was set to have a genuine dialogue among Sudanese and between Sudanese and others. It is a vital and realisable goal when people are listened to instead of talked at. At the end, the conference expected to reach shared conclusions and recommendations.
Different political entities and organisations are involved in the conflicts in Sudan. They have manifestly failed to fulfil their responsibilities to improve the communication, which is a precondition of peace. The commitment to the idea of 'peaceful co-existence' is necessary to prevent conflict, protect civilians, end war, guarantee human rights and create the conditions of permanent peace. This mission and responsibility cannot be entrusted solely to organisations located in Sudan. Having experienced some advantages that Sudanese people lack, Sudanese diaspora should be and will be at their disposal.
The common goal shared by every Sudanese is to end the conflict. If silence means consent, they have chosen to talk and share ideas, they have chosen to establish open communications. The main goal of the conference was to have a genuine and sustainable dialogue among each other simultaneously interacting with the international community. Considering the characteristics that form the commonalties of the shared Sudanese identity, they strongly believe working together for a common goal is possible.
They promise to embrace the moral imagination and courage, which are necessary to create a 21st century culture of mutual understanding and develop certain patterns for enriching the common national identity.
They strongly expect to generate unity and cohesion resulting in the clear demonstration of the root causes of the crisis in Darfur and possible solutions.
The conference was organised by New Sudan Organisations Network (NSON) and sponsored by NOVIB and ICCO. The main aim of the conference was to address the 'root causes of the conflict in Darfur-Sudan'.
The three major topics of the conference were:
1. Identity and Cultures in Sudan
2. Root causes of the Crisis and Possible Solutions
3. The role of the International Community including Sudanese Diaspora
The Methodology of the Conference/ Debate
Mr. Jos van Burden was the moderator of the debate. His model of debate ensured the panel of speakers, reactors and audience to participate freely. It created a kind and encouraging atmosphere, which enabled everybody to talk and share more, which is believed to be the precondition of having a common understanding of the issues.
One of the panel members gave the opening speech of the respective topic. Then he asked the other panel members to talk/react to the same topic. The rest of the conference participants were given a chance to share their opinions, comments, and/or ask questions/clarifications on the topic at hand.
2. Themes
The topics of the of the conference were motivated by the following themes:
• Identity and Cultures in Sudan
Sudan is a very rich country in terms of different cultures. However, identity has become an important issue in Sudan very recently.
• Commonalties
It is time to rediscover the common aspects of Sudanese identity, such as tolerance, hospitality, mutual respect and recognition. Besides the common characteristics, there are common practices such as intermarriage. Conflict resolution at micro-level requires the clear understanding of current realities and practices including intermarriage as well as economical interdependency among the different regions.
• Non-commonalties
Non-commonalties are also discussed in order to be endowed with a clear idea of the 'other', which is a fundamental base for communication.
• Humanitarian Impact of the War in Darfur
The violation of basic human rights is one of the root causes and results of the conflict. These violations include the denial of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as political and civil rights. They affirm the universality and indivisibility of human rights and call for stronger mechanisms to redress to victims for the violation of their rights.
An action should be conducted to prevent women from being raped, to protect all of the Sudanese people from forced replacement and to create ways for young men to have a strong self-esteem other than the belief that they have to hold a gun to gain respect from others.
• Inclusion of the Marginalised Groups in the Peace-Making Process
Redefining security in terms of human needs instead of national sovereignty and national borders will establish new priorities leading to the construction of a new social order which ensures the equal participation of marginalised groups, including women and moves toward collective security for all. Too often, negotiations for peace and security are restricted to the warmongers, and imposed on those most affected, particularly women and children. Those who have suffered the most must have a place at least during the implementation, emphasising equal representation of women.
• Root Causes of the Crisis
There are many reasons of the current conflict situation such as remainders of the colonial powers, oil, government policies lacking equality and rule of law, the political structure lacking secularity, inequality in economical distribution and poverty, lack of democracy.
• Possible Solutions of the Crisis in Darfur
It is time for Sudanese people to take the initiative to end up the conflict.
They intend to focus on the similarities and differences between the situations in the South and in Darfur to enhance their imagination for the possible solution models.
• Role of Diaspora
They are profoundly encouraged that the diaspora asserted the commitment to peace and to wrest peace making away from the exclusive control of politicians and military establishments.
Diaspora is ready to take an active role in creating channels of utilising negotiation and new diplomacy methods of settling disputes, while not rejecting the contributions of the international community.
• The Role of the International Community
The role of the governments, international and supranational organisations, IGOs and NGOs, as well as the impact of multi-national companies should be discussed to have a profound conception of the reasons and the probable solutions for the conflict.
.3. Welcome Speech and the First Speech of the Conference
Mohammed Gamaledeen Hamid general coordinator of NSON gave the welcome speech of the Conference. His speech was meant to give inspiration to the audience and to describe the situation briefly.
Here below is the full text of the speech of NSON:
“Your Excellencies, distinguished guests and compatriots,
Seven years ago there was a major exhibition in Amsterdam about our ancient Kingdoms along the river Nile. It was an impressive show of a part of our cultural heritage. Several statues of Nubians, dating from the 13th century before Christ, showed signs of torture. Of some, the hands and the anklets had been tied on their back. There was also a remarkable walking stick, once used by the Egyptians. Its bottom consisted of a small Nubian head. With each step they apparently wanted to humiliate the man. We are worried that we, Sudanese, 33 centuries later have taken over this role of humiliating each other.
We are the owners of an abundant nature and of a rich history and culture. But instead of living in peace and enjoying development, from Independence onward we have known war, civil strife, famine and underdevelopment. In our darkest moments, we fear that our country will disintegrate.
The recent meeting in Abuja has resulted in a cessation – at least on paper - of hostilities and some other measures. This result, how positive it may be, is not a long-term solution of the Darfur crisis. We all know that Sudan - and then I mean first of all the children, women, and men in villages and towns - are in dear need of an inclusive, all comprehensive peace agreement, with which our country can face the future.
Many Sudanese have left their country. The Diaspora is diverse, but we have in common that each of us thinks every day and every night about home, about relatives and friends who have stayed behind, and about the hardships they are facing. Since 1999 several efforts have been made in the Netherlands to unite the Sudanese Diaspora. To a certain extent we have succeeded to do so, and one of the results is this conference on the Crisis in Darfur.
The Sudanese community in the Netherlands is largely organised around civil society organisations, working side by side to represent the interests and preoccupations of the community. NSON was born in this context to fill a gap in the realm of Sudanese/Dutch co-operation, mainly regarding issues of development of our local communities in Sudan and the positive participation of Sudanese in the Dutch society.
Your Excellencies, distinguished guests and compatriots,
We as Sudanese have a lot of prejudices about each other. We see recently also a clear polarisation around the issue of identity, wealth and religion. Difference along ethnic lines has galvanised the Sudanese political scene enormously. It is therefore an urgent need to embark on a dialogue as Sudanese on: where are we heading to, and what do we aim to realise together? Also how could we keep our country united, given the serious challenges that the whole country is currently facing?
Sudan needs such a dialogue as much as it needs the water of the Nile, its fertile soil and its people.
The aim of this conference is for the Diaspora to provide water and food to the actors inside Sudan, to the Government, the political groupings and the civil society. As Diaspora we are ready to contribute to peace and development and to stimulate the thinking about long-term solutions for the challenges of our country.
Your Excellencies, distinguished guests and compatriots,
On behalf of the New Sudan Organisations Network, and of the other organisers of this conference Darfur in The Hague for Two Days I welcome all of you, all speakers, all attendants, and especially those who had to come from overseas. I also welcome the non-Sudanese attendants. Your presence is crucial, since Sudan’s problems and their solutions have international dimensions. I welcome all of you and wish that our dialogue will bear fruit.
Two Dutch co-financing agencies, Novib Oxfam International and ICCO, are sponsoring Darfur in The Hague for Two Days. Before I invite Novib’s director Mrs. Sylvia Borren to open the conference, I would like to tell you that Ms. Emine Dalyan will be reporter during the first day, and Mrs. Corazon Dee during the second. They will help us to write down conclusions at the end of the conference. The Dutch journalist Mr. Jos van Burden will be the moderator of the conference. He has been a regular guest of Sudan since 1985 and visited Sudan in both the centre, the south, the west and the east).
The honour to give the first speech of the Conference was Sylvia Borren’s, who is the current general director of Novib Oxfam International based in The Netherlands. In her impressive speech, she initially expressed her wishes to get further in the dialogue. For her, there was no need to redefine the situation, which everybody was more or less aware of. She stressed the importance of the gender inequality, role of diaspora, open means of communications(in which the pain should also be recognised) democracy and the responsibility of international community that has not met the required level. She also described the position of Novib Oxfam. Novib Oxfam is there to ensure the international awareness and help to find out possibilities to create a solution to the conflict in Darfur and in Sudan).
4. Conference Proper
4.1. First Topic: Identity and Cultures in Sudan
Identity and cultures in Sudan was the first topic of the conference. Prof. Dr. Mohamed Abo Sabib (lecturer of Islamic Art at Uppsala University) has an introductory talk focusing on commonalties and Dr. Abdalla Bola (Chairman of Sudan Human Rights Organisation in Paris and former lecturer in Art and Culture at Sudan University of Art and Technology) on non-commonalties.
In addition to Mr. Abo Sabib and Mr. Bola, panel members of the first discussion were:
• Mr. Abdulgasim Idris (Ambassador of Sudan in the Netherlands)
• Dr. Hasan Abdin (Ambassador of Sudan in the United Kingdom)
• Dr. Karin Willemse (Erasmus University, Dept. of Non-Western history)
• Dr. Nada Mustafa Ali ( Sudanese academic and Human Rights activist)
• Dr. Ali Dinar (Outreach Directorate Africa Studies Center at University of Pennsylvania).
Highlights of the topic about Commonalties and Non-Commonalties:
• Human Rights
The most basic commonality for everybody is the fact that they are human beings. Because of this very existential phenomenon, they have basic equal human rights.
Everyone accepted including the government investigation committee that there is an alarming violation of human rights.
• Diaspora
Perception of identity is changed and sharpened as experiencing by the diaspora.
Diaspora can influence the implementation of international laws and policies and put pressure on Western governments for a solution.
• Effects of globalisation
Commonalties disappear because of globalisation. Globalisation affects the loss of identities all around the world.
• Sudanese as Main Identity
Everyone in Sudan believes that they are Sudanese. They identify themselves mainly with Sudanese identity, which is inevitably followed by other sub-identities or ethnic origins..
• Territory
Sudanese people are sharing the same territory, which they inherited from colonial governments. Sudan is like a little Africa and Sudan has the 2% of world’s total territory.
• Language
Everyone accepts that Arabic is the linguafranca, although some people think that it is a part of the problem. Some Sudanese groups are forced to speak in Arabic, although they are not Arabs. For some of the Sudanese groups, Arabic is a tool of domination of the Arabs on other ethnic groups.
Here it becomes very important to distinguish the matter. Arabic as a tool of Arabisation process is different than Arabic as a tool of Sudanisation process. Common language is one of the unifying tools.
• Common history
Sudanese people share a common history going back to ancient times.
• Common art conceptions and artistic performances
Different ethnic groups and tribes in Sudan have common dance figures, which are different from its neighbouring countries.
• Common celebration patterns
Items they were used in Northern Sudan are now being used in Southern Sudan, and vice-versa. But these kind of commonalties are horizontally scattered, not vertically.
• Mediation
In Sudan, mediation was a common method up to 1950s in order to resolve the conflicts.
• Democracy
Everyone and each political body including the government want representative democracy to be strengthened.
This will also avoid minorities issues to become a problem, since there will be a majority of “voters” and a minority of “elected politicians”.
• Intermarriage
Intermarriage is a very common phenomenon, which gives hope that the possibility of peaceful co-existence is not only a dream for Sudanese people, it can be a reality. Millions of Sudanese women manage to live in a different surrounding after having been married to their husbands from other tribes.
• Violence and masculinity
There are different economic and political backgrounds of violence. But the results of violence and masculinity will also have to be addressed. Rape and gender issues are important problems of contemporary Sudanese society.
• Armed young Sudanese men and gender inequality
Gender inequality is a common problem in all regions of Sudan. Most of the young men carry weapons. For them, it is a tool to gain respect from others. They do not contribute to the society they are living in. Women do most of the labour.
Men are not aware of the responsibility of being a father, being a husband and being a man. Young Sudanese men of different ethnic groups hold their weapons because they believe they gain respect when they have guns in their hands.
Women are victimised, their husbands are taken away, and their sons die. They are blamed to be illiterate and bad Muslims. Treating them in this way marginalise them further and worsens the problems. Inclusion of women would only be possible if existing leaders take cognizant and represent the interests of women and young boys.
• Gender, class, ethnic, racial inequalities
One of the most common things in Sudan is the difference of gender lines, class lines, ethnic lines and racial lines. Colonialism and post-colonialism were experienced differently above and below these different lines.
Although being Sudanese is a dominant discourse, the identity of being Sudanese is described and improved by power holders.
• Restrictions on Power Sharing
Another commonality is the fact that not everyone is sharing or has the potential to share power. There are no open channels for everybody who desires to participate the governing bodies. Elites exclude others from governance.
• New Sudan
Everyone supports the idea of creating a New Sudan. Common vision for this concept will be defined altogether with the help of international community as well.
• No wishes to exterminate the “other”
Different tribes and ethnic groups live in Sudan without a wish to exterminate the other. They share the same land together.
• Foreign People’s Attitudes
Sudanese people are referred to be Sudanese when they go outside. Foreigners treat them as Sudanese regardless of their ethnic background.
• Prejudices about other Ethnic Groups
This is another common phenomenon, which is the result of lack of enough information.
Some Sudanese people think that other ethnic groups in Sudan are cannibals. Even Sudanese media has a racial bias. The relationship should be re-defined. They should be equals rather than slaves & rulers.
• Institutionalisation
The formation of social and political institutions would let Sudanese people establish and experience stability.
4.2. Second Topic: Darfur Conflict
Panel members of the second topic were:
• Prof. Fatima Abdal Mahmod (former Minister, now an MP and in the national investigation commission about Darfur)
• Dr. Nada Mustafa Ali (Sudanese academic and Human Rights activist)
• Jemeera Rone (representative of the Human Rights Watch)
Dr Karin Willemse (Erasmus University, Dept. of Non-Western history) and Dr. Ali Dinar (Outreach Directorate Africa Studies Center at University of Pennsylvania) also participated in the discussions.
Highlights of the discussions:
• Lack of dialogue
The problem in Darfur is the lack of a more inclusive and wider representatives to a dialogue. Sudan needs a properly working democracy and this is also related with to idea of creating a new Sudan.
There is also a danger of simply reducing the conflict into the ethnic problems and scarcity of natural resources.
• Diversity
One of the contributory aspects of the conflict is the diverse nature of the Sudanese society. There are fifty-seven different ethnic groups in Sudan and they speak fifty-four different languages.
Although racial differences are nothing more than genetic reality, current practice in Sudan shows racial difference as deterrent to a more equitable distribution or allocation of political, social and economic resources For governmental jobs, there is an implicit tribal bias. People belonging to some tribes are occupying majority of government positions. A state has the responsibility to act equally to her citizens. It is not tolerance, it is the citizenship right of people. Moreover, any religion should not in any way give superiority to the believers of that certain religion.
Secularism and democracy will stop the imposing of the pressure of “distinguished” groups on others.
• Freewill of people
There is an agreement that the unity of Sudan will be based on the freewill of people. Constitutional rights ensuring justice and respect for all citizens of Sudan will be the basic principles of New Sudan.
• Implementation of the agreements
The government and the SPLA agreed to sign a power-sharing agreement. Implementation of the agreement would create expected and unexpected results. This agreement includes secession as an option. Darfurians support the peace movement in the south, but they do not support the secession.
• Women
Women are not regarded as full citizens. They are not accepted as subjects who can contribute the peace process. They have become the objects of crimes (victims) or the objects of misplaced great aims (like Jihad through raping).
Women are performing most of the labour in Sudan most especially in the areas of conflicts where most of them have lost their husbands and sons. They know how to “survive” in a different environment, in which they find themselves surrounded by another ethnic group through their marriages because it is always the women who have to leave their tribe and move into their husband’s tribe.
The songs of women and their oral narratives that reflect the war and the pains caused by war should be heard to have a deeper understanding of the conflict. Women’s political interests are more inclusive and comprehensive which goes beyond issues that are mentioned in the ongoing political debate.
• Children soldiers
Government uses children soldiers. The explanation of the Sudanese government was that, they did not have families. They are resocialized and they contribute to the community by becoming a soldier.
• Negotiation
Naivasha Protocol between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) on power sharing was a negotiated model, which has been signed on 26 May, 2004. Sudanese government hope that this protocol will also be a model for the Darfur Conflict.
The second feature of this protocol is power sharing. People of Darfur would not simply share power at the local level, but at the central level as well.
Third point is the fair share of the resources of the country, social justice and political equality.
The government of Sudan explicitly mentioned that Naivasha Protocol was signed after fifteen years of negotiations. But in Darfur, the negotiations have just started.
• Political parties and their representative power
Some of the Sudanese feel that the existing political parties do not genuinely represent them. And that the government of Sudan only take the political parties into consideration. They feel that public opinion is ignored and they feel that they are excluded from the system.
• Human rights violations in Sudan
There are human rights violations in Sudan, which are also witnessed and mentioned by the government of Sudan. Some government representatives deny them when they are confronted despite the glaring evidence presented to them by other groups.
Independent organisations as well as some government organisations agree that there are human rights violations. The government’s approach is to assure the implementation of the law sometimes to the extent of violating human rights.
• Rape
Rape has been used as a tool for ethnic cleansing. According to an inquiry made by the UN, rape is a war crime in Darfur.
Emotional support and counselling should be provided to women who are rape survivors. Sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted children are other problems that have to be confronted and dealt with..
Fifteen to twenty per cent f the women in Darfur are raped. Here, it was emphasised that the numbers are not important related to such an issue. Rape is rape. A single incident is as equally important as any number. In Sudan, rape became justified by political and religious ideology (Jihad) after February, 2003. From then on, the conception of rape has been changed. Rape is seen as a tool by which the dignity of women is taken away and by which the dignity of men is taken away through their women.
Dr. Ali Dinar showed a videotape that he had recorded during his visit to Darfur. This ten minutes videotape showed the evidences and the extent of the violence in Darfur. His visit was approximately at the same time when Prof. Fatima Abdal Mahmod was in Darfur to make the investigation about the situation in Darfur.. Dr. Dinar’s investigation showed that the people of Darfur suffered from violation against their very basic rights including the rape but government investigations report the contrary. During the conference Prof. Fatima Abdal Mahmod as a government representative was explaining that there were no complaints submitted to them during the investigations. This was met with strong comments from the participants of the conference.
• Security
Government has made efforts to implement security by sending more than 5000 policemen to Darfur. International aid organisations are also there. But another aspect of the security problem is the lack of trust of the police forces. For the people of Darfur, policemen are not there to protect them but they are there to protect the vested interests of the state, or government.
• Internationalisation of the conflict
Darfur conflict is internationalised. The outside world is now aware of what is happening in Darfur. It is the fervent hope of everyone in the conference that this recognition would provide positive results for the resolution of the conflict in Darfur.
4.3. The images of Darfur through a Sudanese diaspora’s eyes
One of the participants of the conference was Khalid Kodi, who is a well-known Sudanese artist based in Boston. He is a painter, illustrator, graphic designer and also a musician. He teaches at the Boston College's Department of Fine Arts.
According to him, the dialogue to solve the conflict only takes place between politicians. There were no other stakeholders including novelists, artists, and poets. He believes that the artists are capable of speaking about things that politicians will never address. He showed eight slides including the ones shown below:
He briefly described the slides: “In the first picture we see skulls. This one shows the loss of lives. Individuals loose their lives with different weapons. Skulls tell the truth about the damage done to the individuals. In the second picture the same skulls are coloured. This shows how the killings are justified. People kill, because they think it is justified to kill.
In the slide below, the image shows villages, which were burned before forcing people to move somewhere else. I used real fire to make this illustration”.
The paintings, which surrounded the conference venue, reflected the current sufferings of the people of Sudan, which are beyond words of description. One wonders how can such sufferings escape the conscience of the powers that be or those who have the power to stop them.
4.4. Third Topic: The role of the International Community including Sudanese Diaspora
Highlights of the discussions:
• According to Mr. Aryan Schothof ( Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) , The Netherlands Government receives monthly reports about the situation in Darfur and submits them to the EU. Reports indicate that every month the situation is becoming worse. This includes assessment of the aid that was supposed to reach the beneficiaries. If the relief aid does not reach the intended beneficiaries, then the Netherlands and other countries under the European may stop sending aid. He therefore believes that something urgent should be done about the situation to stop the condition to further worsen.
• China and Russia are said to be blocking the decision of the Security Council to intervene the conflict. Despite such oppositions, the UN peacekeeping forces have intervened in the conflict based on humanitarian grounds.
• Civil society has a great role to play in peace-building.
• Diaspora in the Netherlands organized the conference and gathered experts, academics, interest groups, Sudanese Diaspora organizations in NL and abroad, international organizations, and the Dutch Foreign Ministry who have something to say about the alarming situation in Darfur and Sudan.
• Lasting peace is not yet there in Darfur or in Sudan. The new Dutch Asylum Law forces the refugees to leave the Netherlands to go back to Sudan. However, this has created an urgent vital problem for them.
4.5. Food for thought – How do the panel see the following ten years of Sudan?
• Sudan is going to be a secular state. They are going to have a constitution, in which all citizens have equal rights.
• The implementation problem is solved by good functioning institutions.
• Everyone in Sudan shall have an equal chance to compete for any political or civil position.
• The cycle of taking up in arms, getting power and being heard by the government will be broken.
• There will be representation through elections, instead of tribal representation.. Tribal representation does not genuinely reflect the opinion of the constituents.
4.6. Long Term Solutions and Expectations
Participants were:
• Dr. Ali Dinar (Outreach Directorate Africa Studies Centre at University of Pennsylvania)
• Mr. Nahar Osman (from SLM - The Sudan Liberation Movement)
• Mr. Idris Azraq (Representative of JEM – Justice and Equality Movement)
JEM and SLM are the two important political opposition groups in Darfur. Their long term solutions on the crisis of Darfur were mentioned by their representatives.
4.6.1. The long-term solution of JEM (Justice and Equality Movement)
According to Mr. Azraq Sudan is a micro Africa. Two per cent of the world territory is occupied by Sudan. There are 600 ethnic groups and more than 100 languages. There are six regions in Sudan. But according to JEM there is the domination of Northern Sudan. The rest of the regions are not included in the power sharing and in the process of policy-making. Sudanese are suffering from an internal colonisation. It is a kind of apartheid. They believe that Darfur problem cannot be solved as long as the problem of Sudan is not solved.
The representative of JEM explained that they have a more comprehensive approach. For them, the only way for the liberalisation of politics is not only through the economy. Multi-party elections should be adopted and a federal system should be established. People should be able to decide on their destiny by electing their governors. All regions must participate in this process. JEM mentions that they live in a post-modern world and they should have a post-modern approach. Their conception is to establish freedom to the extent of the will of people. If some parts of the society want to live under Islamic rules, they should have the right to do it because they believe that it is not appropriate to deny their spiritual values. If another part of the society wants to have democracy such as the system in Western societies, they should have the right to do so. For them, secularism would not satisfy every member of the society. Respect of every religion would be more comprehensive.
4.6.2. The long-term solution of SLM (The Sudan Liberation Movement)
Mr. Nahar Osman expressed that what is happening in Darfur this is not only the problem of Darfur but the problem of the whole Sudan as well. All the political regimes worsened the problem. For him the root cause is the lack of proper political participation. SLM aims to establish a democratic, secular state of institutions and enlarge the right of self-determination for all the regions of Sudan. Mr. Nahar Osman explained that the Darfurians are not separatists. But the most important aspect of the problem according to SLM is the non-representative ness of the ruling elite in Darfur.
4.6.3 The long-term solution and Armed Movements
Dr. Ali Dinar asked the other panel members whether armed resistance could be a solution for changing the injustice to full extent. Both the JEM and the SLM representatives explained that they were forced to raise arms and resist the government of Sudan because they could not find any other option but taking arms. For them, non-violence does not work in that territory.
4.7. Conclusions and recommendations:
The conference ended with Salih Kaki (NSON development and peace building department) expressing his gratitude for presence and active participation of everyone and shared the scenarios/options that were open to the Sudanese diaspora and their supporters in their quest for lasting peace in Darfur and in Sudan.
1. Win /Loose situation where all the different stakeholders continue to fight and add more sufferings to the alarming situation. A situation where opposition groups continue to take up arms to fight the unpopular government. A situation where the government uses illegal and inhumane means to perpetuate themselves in power.
2. Loose/loose situation where the entire nation suffers from the continued protracted atrocities. Situations where the Sudanese diasporas remain wandering around the world seeking willing countries to temporarily host them.
3. Win/Win situation where all stakeholders in Sudan and Sudanese diasporas are given a systematic and orderly chance to express their opinions and together find new interventions and solutions to attain lasting peace in Darfur and in Sudan.
He expressed the idea of preparing and disseminating a Declaration of Peace as a result of the conference (See the enclosed “ Sudanese Diaspora Declaration of Peace” ). And to work on the following recommendations:
1. To continuously explore the role of the Sudanese Diaspora in the Netherlands and in other places in the cessation of the armed conflicts in Sudan.
2. To assist in improving the interaction between the Sudanese diaspora with other diaspora organisations who are facing the same problems, with the representatives of the ruling government of Sudan, with regional organisations, with the international community who are supportive of lasting peace in Sudan and in other parts of the world affected by civil wars.
3. To strengthen the networks of the Sudanese diaspora by conducting or facilitating the conduct of conflict resolution and conflict prevention trainings, seminars and conferences.
Sudanese Diaspora Declaration of Peace
The Hague, Netherlands
21 November 2004
Background:
The conference brought together some 200 participants for a two-day conference to discuss the root causes of the conflict in Darfur-Sudan and the role of the different stakeholders and players specifically the Sudanese Diaspora in attaining peace not only in Darfur but also throughout Sudan. They came as individuals and as representatives of organisations from The Netherlands, Sudan and from various parts of the world. It was successful in generating interest and active participation of stakeholders and actors who are important in the Darfur and Sudan peace processes. The New Sudan Organizations Network (NSON) organised the conference in partnership with NOVIB Oxfam International and ICCO. It was held last 20 and 21 November 2004 in The Hague, The Netherlands.
The conference addressed the following issues: i) defining the political root causes behind the civil war in Darfur region try to initiate and develop the best resolutions to end the conflict to pave the way for a comprehensive settlement and lasting peace in the region; ii) examining IGAD`s peace agreement between the government of Sudan and SPLM as a possible role model for resolving the case of Darfur and other possible potential conflicts in other parts of the county, such as Bega in eastern Sudan and the Nubian of the far North of the country; iii) investigating the backgrounds of the conflict by examining the impact of the other non-political possible root causes of the conflict in Sudan in general: ethnicity, religion, culture, history and the problematic question of the national identity; iv) encouraging and stimulating more involvement of the Dutch government, Dutch public opinion and the international community with the end in goal of attaining peace and development in Sudan.
Highlights of the Conference
1. Sudanese speakers took turns in sharing their ideas about the Sudanese commonalities and differences. The conference highlighted the historical role of ethnical and religious differences and intolerance in Sudan’s civil wars. While the war is not simply a matter of religion or ethnical differences, it is argued that the various factors contributing to the conflict have found expression in religious terms or/and ethnical fanaticism. The conference also discussed the need for a comprehensive and analytical understanding of the influence of religion, culture and ethnicity in Sudan to identify the means and mechanisms of easing the tensions created by religion and ethnical differences.
2. The conference addressed the lack of power sharing between the political ruling centre (Arab-Muslim) and marginalized areas of Sudan. The struggle for political authority and economic resources has been closely tied to communal tensions between not only the North and the South but in general between the political ruling centre (Arab-Muslim) and marginalized areas of Sudan such as the recent case of Darfur region in western Sudan. These were exhaustively discussed by the opposition parties representatives who were in turn asked by the participants about their alternative plans compared to the current government not only in the short term but as well as long term strategic plans.
3. The Sudanese diaspora composed of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers of various professional competence took turns in expressing their dissatisfaction with the current government and shared the initiatives and the steps they are taking to contribute to attaining peace and development in Sudan from an outsider’s viewpoint looking into the worsening conditions in Sudan. The initiatives are varied from organising Sudanese diaspora to send or facilitate relief and rehabilitation assistance to war torn and post conflict areas; expressing their anguish through art and art exhibits; listening to the voices of the victims by conducting video documentaries to increase awareness of the outside world about the atrocities committed which are consistently denied by the government – rape victims, displaced villages, communities deprived of their basic necessities, and other human rights abuses.
4. The international community representatives of Human Rights Watch, NOVIB OXFAM International, and Dutch Foreign Ministry who attended the conference shared their own analysis of the Sudan-Darfur situation and reiterated the recommendations that were in place. They emphasised the adherence of the current government and opposition parties to international laws and agreements and the impositions of sanctions when they commit human rights violations – children in combat, rape of women, annihilation of communities or tribes equivalent to ethnic cleansing where there are tremendous existing factual documentations. Aside from their own personal account and organisation studies they also shared about other studies and documentations that are being conducted by Sudanese themselves and international organisations despite the restrictions and the risks they face in acquiring them. They have expressed their support to the initiatives aimed at attaining lasting peace in Sudan.
These were the premises that led to the formulation of the Preamble and the principles guiding it.
The Preamble
Seven years ago there was a major exhibition in Amsterdam about our ancient Kingdoms along the river Nile. It was an impressive show of a part of our cultural heritage. Several statues of Nubians, dating from the 13th century before Christ, showed signs of torture. Of some, the hands and the anklets had been tied on their back. There was also a remarkable walking stick, once used by the Egyptians. Its bottom consisted of a small Nubian head. With each step they apparently wanted to humiliate the man. We are worried that we, Sudanese, 33 centuries later have taken over this role of humiliating each other.
We are the owners of an abundant nature and of a rich history and culture. But instead of living in peace and enjoying development, from Independence onward we have known war, civil strife, famine and underdevelopment. In our darkest moments, we fear that our country will disintegrate.
We therefore call upon our leaders in the current government, representatives of the opposition parties and the international community to expand the stakeholders with emphasis on being gender sensitive both in substance and in number in the ongoing peace negotiations. Peace negotiations should include representatives of the Sudanese diaspora and community leaders in conflict areas and displaced villages. Issues discussed and negotiated must pay particular focus on the specific needs of the women, the children and other vulnerable groups.
We call upon the government and the opposition parties to abandon war as an instrument of settling their dispute. Internationally, we call on all governments and opposition parties to negotiate peacefully and use non-violent means to seek consensus. We support an international, multilateral, verifiable, freeze in the production and deployment of weaponry, especially nuclear weaponry, as the first step in a disarmament process that must include a commitment to negotiation, arbitration, conciliation, and compromise as the replacements for armies and navies in their international dealings.
We call upon the government and the opposition to agree, sign and adhere to the humanitarian and security protocols on the Darfur crisis. We believe that the humanitarian protocol will guarantee aid workers unfettered access to Darfur and protect its 1.5 million displaced people from harassment and murder. We support the call of opposition parties that Darfur should be a no-fly zone for all military aircraft to stop the systematic and continuous air bombardments, which are consistently denied by the government. We support the disarmament of the government’s Janjaweed militia, a proxy force of mounted Arab militia, which has been accused of large-scale atrocities against black civilians.
We support the call of the international community to impose sanctions to perpetrators whenever and wherever atrocities are committed.
We support the strengthening and/or establishment of Sudanese Diaspora organizations and other Diaspora groups all over the world to engage in peace activities and conflict resolution. We further support the setting up of peace building platforms or federation of Diaspora organizations.
We support the establishment, in as many places as possible, of academies of peace and conflict resolution to build capacity in preventing and resolving conflicts for sustainable peace in this world.
We dedicate ourselves to an effort for the widest possible dissemination and advocacy for this Declaration of Peace, and to educate ourselves on issues of peace and to share with those who are left behind and others what we learn. We must work together on removing the causes of war by promoting the things that make for peace. We believe in peace on earth because we are all human beings with different beliefs. Peace is possible as we see in places where we have taken refuge and we will work together to obtain it and perhaps look to the future where we will enjoy the fruits of our labor upon our return to our motherland.
Principles
These were the dominant concepts that prevailed during the conference.
1. Peace
There is an urgent need for the Sudanese people, wherever they are, to unite, recognise each other’s commonalities and respect each other’s differences. They must continuously build understanding of socio – cultural, political and economic changes that will enable them to contribute to build a global justice and culture of peace.
2. Secularism
All religion and supernatural beliefs must be respected at all times and they should not in anyway affect the affairs of the government nor dictate any social, economic or political decisions. The Sudanese must aspire to prevent any entanglement between government and supernatural beliefs.
3. Gender sensitivity
There is a need for the Sudanese to be gender sensitive which means having the ability to recognize gender (similarities and differences between women and men) issues, and especially the ability to recognize women's different perceptions and interests arising from their different social location and different gender roles.
3. Democracy
The Sudanese must strive for a genuine democratic government in which the people elect representatives (representative democracy) or directly (direct democracy) vote on issues to form a government on their behalf with the firm idea that everyone in a country has equal rights.
Annex 1:
Redemption of a Lost Pedigree: The Dilemma of Arabic-speaking Sudanese,
The Ja‘aliyyin example
Mohamed Abusabib - Uppsala University
“I am taking the Ja‘aliyyin groups as my main example in this paper. These groups start with the Shaiqiyya in the north, and followed to the south by the Manasir, Rubatab, Merafab, Ja‘aliyyin proper, Batahin, and Jammu‘iyya (to mention the larger groups). They claim Arabic origin and link themselves to the Prophet’s uncle, al-‘Abbas, through a common ancestor called Ibrahim Ja‘al. I am also using the term inhabitants of the central Nile Valley to refer to these groups as well as the Nubian-speaking groups in the far north.
For sometime I have been contemplating the cultural and ethnic relations between the inhabitants of the central Nile Valley, particularly these Ja‘aliyyin groups, and the peoples around them to the east, west and south. I want to begin this point by mentioning three simple but telling examples.
First example. Upon hearing about the objections and clashes lead by the Islmists in Khartoum University some months ago following an exhibition organized by students from the Nuba Mountains of the culture of the region, including samples of a local beer made out of dura called al-Marisa, I began thinking of another matter. First of all this drink is the most common drink for the majority of the Sudanese, including the Ja‘aliyyin. Also, this drink is a very old Nubian traditional drink, and the word marisa is derived from the Nubian word mirsa. When I was seven years old my family moved from our village near Marawi, the urban centre of the Shaiqiyya, to Kasala town in eastern Sudan. My schoolmates in primary school used to call me playfully “al-shaiqi sharrab al-marisa”, that is, you shaiqi the one fond of drinking Marisa. I remember quite well that I never felt angry or provoked. On the contrary, I was always wondering, even at that age, as what was wrong in that, and used to reply by saying, “ yes, because we are men, not like you;” contrasting my origin as a country boy with them as town folk.
Like many of my generation, I was very young when I first tasted al-marisa, perhaps five or six years old. In fact, until late 1950s and early 1960s al-marisa used to be served during festivals in those riverain societies, particularly during marriage festivals, which continue for a week or so and attended by guests coming from distant places. The people there gave up serving this drink not because they all of a sudden turned good Muslim. This drink was simply gradually replaced by lemon juice (al-sharbat) and then by Pepsi cola and Coca cola, particularly in urban centres. Whatever description we might give to this kind of change, such as an urbanization or modernization process, the fact remains that this change was a response to economic and social developments in the community.
Second example. The military regime of Abbud built the National Theatre in Omdurman, and in 1962 organized the first national musical festival. One of the main reasons behind the regime’s concern with culture as being crucial for the unity of the country was the demand by the southern movement at the time for a federal system. The demand was justified by cultural differences said to exist between the north and the south. The intended strategy behind these festivals was to contain the non-Arabic Sudanese cultural entities and, eventually, remould them into the Arabic Islamic matrix, and Omdurman National Theatre is viewed by the regime as a cultural microcosm of this matrix. However, the festival triggered an unprecedented artistic and aesthetic interaction between the modern urban music and song of the capital and the musical traditions of the other Sudanese cultures. Today music from Dar Fur and Kordofan, from the Beja, Engessana (waza), Shaiqiyya, Azandi, and Shiluk (komba) have become essential part of Sudanese musical repertoire. This clearly shows the common aesthetic outlook and basic artistic traits among the major musical traditions in the country (pentatonic/diactonic scales). Here the political establishment and the artistic institution in general are at cross-purposes. The political establishment aims to assimilate and exclude, whereas the various Sudanese art forms are interactive and inclusive.
The third example is from the field of dance. Dance is the major art form in both the central Nile Valley and the cultures around it, and the general structure of the body movement is the same. Like the rest of African dance, the human body is “polycentric” or “multi-focal” in the sense that the rhythmic movement involves all parts of the body with varying emphasis. And if we look at the dances of the Ja‘aliyyin groups, the Nubian-speaking Danaqla and Mahas, the Beja in the east, Engessana, Hamar, Miseiriyya, Jawam‘a, Hawazma, Ta‘aisha of Kordofan and Dar Fur, to mention some major groups, we will see that there is clear emphasis on the chest and neck and the dialogue between them as one unit and the rest of the body. These similarities are definitely not a matter of chance. They show that these groups have common artistic conceptions and common aesthetic sensibilities and outlook. After all, the arts are the most genuine manifestations of the innermost feelings, aspirations, and psychological make-up of the group, and hence its cultural disposition.
We can of course go on counting examples from all aspects of life, particularly the rites of passage, which are common between these Sudanese groups.
My point is that simple and everyday examples like these clearly show our cultural roots and draw attention to the close ethnic and cultural ties between the inhabitants of the central Nile Valley and the groups around them. This is precisely the conclusion of leading archaeologists on Sudan, such as Adams (Nubia, Corridor to Africa, 1977) and Bruce Trigger (Paradigms in Sudanese Archaeology, 1994) who affirm that the societies of the Nile Valley cannot be understood independently from the peoples who inhabited the neighbouring grasslands. And of course the ethnic and cultural origin of these inhabitants as Nubians is now a common knowledge in archaeological, historical and linguistic studies. And even looking at the matter from the present political situation, the regions of the country where the marginalized people have staged their revolution and adopted a common programme for a new Sudan, are the same regions where the historical core cultures of Sudan existed for centuries. Namely, the Fur Sultanate, the Musabba‘at and Taqali kingdoms of Kordofan, the Funj Kingdoms (a continuation of the Nubian civilization), the Beja chiefdoms in the east, the Nilotic chiefdoms and other smaller chiefdoms in the south.
On the other hand, the idea held by some people that the inhabitants of Sudan are made up of desperately unrelated ethnic groups brought randomly together within a territory called Sudan, is indeed a naive idea. I believe it is important when we speak of cultural diversity and pluralism not to have this false idea in mind. It is politics and ideology, which either consolidate these common ethnic and cultural ties between Sudanese societies or complicate them.
Now, with this point concerning the relationship between the inhabitants of the central Nile Valley and the people around them in mind, and given the fact that identity is a dynamic historical process, socially and culturally conditioned, how can we approach the identity of the Ja‘aliyyin groups and their claim of Arab origin? Is there any possibility on our part at this critical moment of history to work out a chosen and conscious strategy to intervene in this process, so as to contribute to the redemption of what I call a lost identity of the Ja‘aliyyin groups, and reconstruct it as it was on the historical realities and on new basis that would fit into the socio-political landscape of New Sudan?
Perhaps we can agree on a clear theoretical and political discourse and also on some sort of practical move concerning the identity of this group. I am saying “we” because this claim is no more a “private Ja‘ali affair”. Therefore my main concern in the rest of this paper is to suggest a general framework of this discourse and this practical move. My suggestion is that there are two aspects of this discourse: one is the theoretical aspect of the Ja‘aliyyin identity and how to deal with it. The other is the practical aspect, which includes both the intellectual and political fronts.
Starting with the theoretical aspect, I would like to point out the following features:
First, the identity of the Ja‘aliyyin group is central to any approach to the identity crisis in Sudan. Because here the historical and socio-political dimensions of the identity crisis are most clear. This immediately brings into question the definition and nature of the “northern political elite”, which ruled the country since independence. The __expression “northern political elite” became problematic because it is used by many as equivalent to the concept of the Centre, which in turn is used as equivalent to the Ja‘aliyyin groups. Now, is the __expression “northern political elite” an “exclusive ethnic club” belonging to the Ja‘aliyyin groups or is it an “inclusive class concept”, in the socio-economic meaning of class?
A good answer to this question is found in the work of historians, particularly the new school of Sudanese historiography, represented by historians such as O’Fahey, Spaulding, al-Qaddal and some others. They trace back the origins of this political elite to the late eighteenth century. That was the time of the “rush for Arabic descent” and the fabrication of genealogies, which trace families to distinguished Arab tribes and Islamic personalities. This process was led by the rising merchant community and the Islamic learned men (the ulama), who both constituted the core of a new middle class and laid the foundation of a new socio-economic and ideological power base (I am quoting O’Fahey). [4] This socio-economic alliance was consolidated during the Turkiyya and the Mahdiyya, and took its defined modern form in the 1940s with the formation of the political parties and the emergence of the Ansar and the Khatmiyya as the biggest political parties. The commercial class, the new capitalist elite, smaller Sufi sects, and politically ambitious individuals among the intelligentsia joined either of the two major Sufi sects [5]. So, the old alliance of the 18th century took a new modern form.
At this point I would like to refer to the approach adopted by Dr Khalil Ibrahim in the “Black book” as an example of what could be described as an exclusive ethnic approach. This approach does not see the great difference between the elite and the poor masses of the north to which the majority of the ruling elite belongs ethnically, and also limits the membership of the elite’s club to awlad al-bahar, the Ja‘aliyyin, which is incorrect. The other approach, which could be described as an inclusive or open class approach exposes clearly not only the nature of the ruling elite, but also defines the concepts of the Centre and Peripheries or the marginalized on a socio-economic basis and not on an ethnic one. In this sense those from the north, west, east or south Sudan who joined the civilian and military regimes since independence, including the Inqaz, and adopted what we call policies of the Centre are also part of the ruling elite. (Ahmed Husein, the speaker of the Justice and Equality Movement declared that the movement was fighting for political and social rights and not for the separation of religion and state, this matter should be left to the people. This statement puts the movement and its leadership right within the northern political elite. The question of religion is the basis upon which this elite has built its ideology to legitimise its monopoly of power.)
A second is that at the intellectual, political and artistic levels debate on identity shows certain developments. The ideas of Arabism and Afro-Arabism of the 1920s, 1940s, and 1960s, died away, and now we have the concept of Sudanism high on the agenda. In practical life, we have profound ongoing social, economic and political changes in Sudanese society. We have this huge movement of population from the countryside to towns and acceleration of urbanization process and intensification of interethnic relations. We have the immigration to oil-rich Arab countries and the swelling of Sudanese in diaspora and the resulting identity shock, so to speak. We have also the political crisis reaching its peak with the Islamists in power, and, of course, the progress of revolution in the south, the west and the east. All these changes and challenges have touched off the question of identity and raised it now within a new political and social context. All these developments suggest that the process of identification and the conflict over it among competing social powers has been developing in a certain direction at both the grass roots’ level as well as in the intellectual debate.
Therefore, the conviction of Arabic origin among the Ja‘aliyyin groups must have been more or less questioned at both the intellectual as well as the grass roots levels. I believe this is the case, and that a large section of those affiliated to the Ja‘aliyyin groups, including the educated, half educated and laypersons, is now struggling with the difficult question as who I am? Many do not know the answer or are not sure of it, and this is precisely the kind of dilemma they suffer. What this section of population is undergoing is a risky search for a new identity at a very difficult time.
A third feature is that the claim of Arab origin has been turned into a systematic political conduct, and philosophy of rule. I would like to illustrate this by three examples.
First example. In 1939 the Graduate Congress sent to the British colonial authorities what is known as “Note on education”. The congress was dominated by the same groups and figures who inherited power after independence. This note includes the following scandalous recommendation by the congress which explains its vision and philosophy of education in the country:
“In numerous aspects of our life we have much in common with Arab countries of Islamic Orient which is due to our akin descent. We therefore consider that education in this country should take an Islamic Oriental character and not a pagan African one, or in other words that the Arabic Language and Religion Instructions should receive the greatest possible care in all stages of education. [6]
Second example. After some investigation I found that fourteen of the twenty-one Directors and Deputy Directors of Sudan Radio, and later Sudan TV, from independence in 1956 until the early 1980s came from Omdurman families (Omdurman is the largest of the three towns comprising the capital), while the remainder came from the other two towns of the capital. In this type of situation there is no chance for anyone with a provincial accent to hold any leading position in either Sudan Radio or Sudan Television. In addition, the members of the committees that permit the broadcast of new singing voices and approve new songs also came from the same area. It should be no surprise that not only do all modern Sudanese singers come from the Arabic-speaking groups, it is simply inconceivable that a singer with an accent could ever be a member of this elite.
The third example. The first lesson in the Arabic grammar syllabus used in the fifth grade of primary school begins with the following introduction:
“When the Prophet, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, was sent forward with the message, and Islam spread into the world and the Islamic conquests were many, the Arabs entered Egypt, ruled it, and introduced Islam into it. Then they moved into Sudan from Egypt, some of them coming from Hijaz [in Arabia]. They defeated the Nubian Kingdom and established the famous Sinnar Kingdom, which is known to us as the Black Sultanate or the Funj Kingdom.”
Every body knows that the Arab-Muslim army was blocked by the Nubians in 652, and the country has never been conquered by the Arabs. Also, it is a simple historical fact that the Funj Kingdom was established by a section of the indigenous population of the central Nile Valley called the Funj, and lasted from 1504 to 1821.
Finally a fourth feature in this theoretical aspect of the discourse is the theories concerning the Arab claim of the Ja‘aliyyin. It is possible to speak of three positions held by certain scholars.
The first position is represented by what is currently described as al-‘Urubiyyin, the Arabocentrics. Some of them (such as the folklorist and writer Dr ‘Abdullahi ‘Ali Ibrahim) follow the old Western tradition of defining identity as simply what an individual or a group perceives of himself or itself. They take seriously the traditional genealogies kept by the Ja‘aliyyin groups, which trace their origin to al-‘Abbas, and regard them as a symbol of a choice adopted by the group for practical reasons.
A second position is represented by advocates of the idea of hybridism or Afro-Arabism, popular during the 1960s. It defines these groups as a mixture of Arab and Nubian blood. The idea is still held by many intellectuals, scholars, and politicians from all political orientations, including the left. (It is even included in the charter issued by Sudan Liberation Movement).
A third position believes that this group is actually culturally Arabized and not Arabic by blood. The historian Yusuf Fadl uses the term Arabized Nubians to describe the group, and agrees with archaeological conclusions that the size of Arab migration into Sudan is much exaggerated. However, the three positions agree on the inauthenticity of the traditional genealogies, but most importantly, they agree that the mainstream acculturation process in Sudan is the Arabization/Islamization process, that eventually the rest of Sudanese cultures will be assimilated into Arabic/Islamic culture, because this culture, according to them, is more sophisticated and superior.
The mainstream acculturation process is a Sudanization process, which has been continuing for centuries, assimilating and digesting cultures arriving into the country from different directions. And the revolution in the marginalized regions is in one important cultural sense, a resistance to this illegitimate interference by the ruling elite with this historical process.
But I would like to give one example to show that what has not been given enough consideration by Arabocentrics is the conceptions of the average Ja‘ali person and the various contexts in which he or she defines his/her identity.
In the Shaiqiyya tradition the adjective Arabic has three meanings according to the context. A Shaiqi may tell you that their ancestor is al-‘Abbas, but he has nothing more to add. Arabic also may mean a simple unsophisticated person from groups of nomads dwelling not far from the Nile. But this adjective is usually used to mean an uprooted person, that is, a qula‘i in the Shaiqi colloquial Arabic. An uprooted person is the one who does not own a piece of land on the Nile even if he or she belongs to the same community. It is indeed a social stigma to be an Arab in this last sense. This is a value system deeply rooted in the central Nile Valley, which reflects the value of land, and according to this value system al-‘Abbas himself was of course an uprooted person.
Now concerning the practical aspect of this discourse, is there any practical move that could stir up the question of identity and put it on a constructive course of action? I have a suggestion in this direction, which involves the relation between the Ja‘aliyyin groups, and the groups in western Sudan in particular.
With the advent of the Mahdist movement in 1881, a religious, political and ideological conflict developed between Mohamed Ahmed Abdalla, the so-called al-Mahdi and the Khatmiyya sect lead by Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, the grandfather of the present head of the sect. This conflict, or rather this animosity, was politically and socially institutionalised within the general nationalist context at the hands of Abd –al-Rahman al-Mahdi and Ali al-Mirghani. For the last 123 years the Ansar and Khatmiyya divide turned into a continuous process of shifting identities, at one time it is a political identity, at another it is a religious one, at a third it is an ethnic divide.
At times of elections, for example, the Ja‘aliyyin groups rally round the Khatmiyya sect as their political identity. One important means to stir up this political identity at that moment is to raise the fear that Awlad al-Mahdi and Awlad al-Gharib (sons of al-Mahdi and the westerners) might be able to take the rein of power in Khartoum alone. In our own language today, this is a continuous reproduction of the 19th century religious and ideological conflict; a continuous exploitation by the two sectarian parties of our people in the Northern province and in Dar Fur and Kordofan for their own political benefit. I believe it is high time to challenge this historical divide by taking a more effective action on both the intellectual and political fronts. This action is not only necessary, but it is very urgent. That is because the Ansar and the Khatmiyya sects, as socio-political structures have been weakened by the political developments and by the weight of new generations looking for alternatives, something that has led to political vacuum, which the Islamists have been exploiting. And although the statement in Asmara Declaration of Principles, which affirms the separation of religion and politics (No political party should be established on religious basis), is good, practically the sectarian parties will continue with the old political game. It is we who should change them. And, after all, this is the time for a search for alternatives and construction of new identities.
My point is that, why leaving this matter of Ansarism and Khatmism to the leadership of the two sects. We are not dealing with certain brands of Islamic faith rather we are in the midst of a critical socio-political struggle.
Now, if we look at the present political situation, there are many signs that the Northern province in general has already started to move against the Centre. Kush Liberation Movement issued a detailed programme in September stating its commitment to the agendas of New Sudan, and the question of Nubian identity is raised as an integral part of the programme. The Manasir have established organizations inside and outside the country with the aim of defending their land and their culture against the illegitimate actions and arrogant behaviour of the Ingaz regime concerning the Merowi dam. [7] Even the Shaiqiyya whom many think are submissively loyal to the Khatmiyya sect have shown tuff stands many times. For example as far back as the elections of 1958, they refused nomination for the elections from outside the region, and after the uprising of 1985 calls among the young generation in many villages were high demanding the land donated by their fathers to the Khatmiyya family being given back. And now discussions among the educated generations from the province focus on the poverty and marginalization of the region. We hope that in the near future a body representing various parts of the northern province will be established so that the region will speak with one voice.
To face these challenges it is important to establish permanent grass root means of contact and create active forums, including regular conferences, in order to promote dialogue among political movements and organizations of civil society and, in particular, contact with societies and clubs representing villages or regions inside and outside the country.
Intellectually, this dialogue will focus on the historical ethnic and cultural ties between the riverain groups around them, and expose the ideological bias built by the sectarian parties and the elite in general over the decades. Politically, through these networks of contact political movements and organizations of civil society address current political, social, and economic issues and express mutual solidarity and actively contribute to solutions on the grounds that whatever happens in any part of the country concerns all of us.
Having said this, perhaps as a first step towards realization of these forums of contact at the grass roots and towards facing the challenge of building a new Sudan, it is possible to convene a conference that would address an issue which I believe is still among the great challenges facing us, namely, religious sectarianism (al-Ta‘ifiyya). The conference may convene under the theme: “Religious Sectarianism and the Creation of a New Sudan”. It discusses three main topics: historical roots; the political, social and ideological influence; and the future of sectarianism (of course Ansarism and Khatmism are at the heart of the sectarian establishment.) Scholars of related specialities to the theme, intellectuals and politicians will be asked to address these issues from objective and scientific approaches. It would be rewarding if the conference will be organized within an academic environment. Leiden University, for example, is one possible sponsor or cooperator, given its well-known contribution to Islamic studies. The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, ISIM, is one of its most active institutions. These are just very tentative ideas about the matter. “
Annex 2:
Report of Freedom House about Sudan
Sudan [8]
Political Rights: 7 [9]
Civil Liberties: 7
Status: Not Free
GNI per capita: $340
Population: 38,100,000
Life Expectancy: 57
Religious Groups: Sunni Muslim (70 percent),Indigenous beliefs (25 percent), Christian (5 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Black (52 percent), Arab (39 percent),Beja (6 percent), other (3 percent)
Capital: Khartoum
Ten Year Ratings Timeline (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status):
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
7,7,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF
Overview
Long-elusive peace in Sudan finally seemed at hand at the end of 2003. While some fighting did take place throughout the year, including alleged massacres, the government and the main rebel group in the country's south agreed to sign a comprehensive peace agreement that would end nearly twenty years of continuous war that has claimed more than two million lives. Some internally displaced refugees returned to the south, and more humanitarian aid was delivered to war-affected areas. The United States hinted that sanctions against Sudan would be lifted if there was meaningful progress in the peace process and cooperation in the war against global terrorism. International enthusiasm over progress in the peace process, however, overshadowed the emergence of a new and separate battlefront in the country's west, which had claimed thousands of lives and generated a massive refugee crisis by the autumn. Hassan al-Turabi, a leading Sudanese Muslim cleric and former leader of the ruling governing party, was released from prison.
Africa's largest country has been embroiled in civil wars for 37 of its 47 years as an independent state. It achieved independence in 1956 after nearly 80 years of British rule. The Anyanya movement, representing mainly Christian and animist black Africans in southern Sudan, battled Arab Muslim government forces from 1956 to 1972. In 1969, General Jafar Numeiri toppled an elected government and created a military dictatorship. The south gained extensive autonomy under a 1972 accord, and for the next decade, an uneasy peace prevailed. Then, in 1983, General Jafar Numeiri restricted southern autonomy and imposed Sharia (Islamic law). Opposition led again to civil war, and Numeiri was overthrown in 1985. Civilian rule was restored in 1986 with an election that resulted in a government led by Sadiq al-Mahdi of the moderate Islamic Ummah Party, but war continued. Lieutenant General Omar al-Bashir ousted al-Mahdi in a 1989 coup, and al-Mahdi spent seven years in prison or under house arrest before fleeing to Eritrea. Until 1999, al-Bashir ruled through a militarycivilian regime backed by senior Muslim clerics including Hassan al-Turabi, who wielded considerable power as the ruling National Congress (NC) party leader and speaker of the 360-member National Assembly.
Tensions between al-Bashir and al-Turabi climaxed in December 1999; on the eve of a parliamentary vote on a plan by al-Turabi to curb presidential powers, al-Bashir dissolved parliament and declared a state of emergency. He introduced a law allowing the formation of political parties, fired al-Turabi as NC head, replaced the cabinet with his own supporters, and held deeply flawed presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2000, which the NC won overwhelmingly. Al-Turabi formed his own party, the Popular National Congress (PNC), in June 2000, but was prohibited from participating in politics. In January 2001, the Ummah Party refused to join al-Bashir's new government despite the president's invitation, declaring that it refused to support totalitarianism.
Al-Turabi and some 20 of his supporters were arrested in February 2001 after he called for a national uprising against the government and signed a memorandum of understanding in Geneva with the southern-based, rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). In May 2001, al-Turabi and four aides were charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government, and al-Turabi was placed under house arrest. In September 2002, he was moved to a high-security prison.
Al-Bashir began to lift Sudan out of international isolation by sidelining al-Turabi, who was seen as the force behind Sudan's efforts to export Islamic extremism. Although Vice President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha--who replaced al-Turabi as Islamic ideologue--maintains a firm commitment to Sudan as an Islamic state and to the government's self-proclaimed jihad against non-Muslims, al-Bashir has managed to repair relations with several states, including Iran, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, and even the United States. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, al-Bashir issued a statement rejecting violence and offered his country's cooperation in combating terrorism. Sudan had previously provided safe haven for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network.
Sudan's civil war has pitted government forces and government-backed, northern Arab Muslims against southern-based black African animists and Christians. The government also has sponsored the Popular Defense Force, a volunteer, militant Islamic militia that fights against southern rebels. Some pro-democracy northerners, however, have allied themselves with the SPLA-led southern rebels to form the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), while northern rebels of the Sudan Allied Forces have staged attacks in northeastern Sudan. Some southern groups have signed peace pacts with the government, but there is fighting among rival southern militias. A convoluted mix of historical, religious, ethnic, and cultural tensions has made peace elusive, while competition for economic resources has fueled the conflict. Past cease-fire attempts have failed, with Khartoum insisting on an unconditional cease-fire and the SPLA demanding the establishment of a secular constitution first. In 1999, Khartoum inaugurated an oil pipeline, helping to finance its war effort and ultimately bring greater urgency to the peace initiatives.
Throughout the war, the government has regularly bombed civilian as well as rebel targets. International humanitarian relief efforts have been hampered by ceasefire violations and have sometimes been deliberately targeted by parties to the conflict. The government has denied humanitarian relief workers access to rebel-held areas or areas containing large concentrations of internal refugees.
A peace plan proposed in December 2001 by former U.S. senator John Danforth called for "one country, two systems" in Sudan, with an Islamic government in the north and a secular system in the south.
The international community stepped up its mediation efforts in the civil war in 2002, in part to prevent Sudan from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism, as Afghanistan had prior to September 11, 2001. Peace talks under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which continued in 2003, focused on southern self-determination, borders, and the application of Sharia in the south.
In January 2002, U.S.-mediated peace talks between the government and rebels took place in Switzerland, leading to a breakthrough agreement affecting the Nuba mountain region, a 30,000-square-mile area in the heart of Sudan. The black Africans native to the Nuba region numbered more than one million in 1985, but have been reduced to some 300,000 today. The government has bombed the region frequently and enforced blockades preventing food, fuel, clothing, and medicine from entering.
While in 2002 the government agreed to extend the Nuba agreement and participated in further talks in Machakos, Kenya, rebels reported government-sponsored attacks in several towns and villages. The government also bombed southern villages with MiG fighters and helicopter gunships.
In the fall of 2002, the United States passed the landmark Sudan Peace Act, which recognized Sudan as guilty of genocide. The act authorized direct aid to the south to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance. It also specified sanctions against Khartoum if Sudan is deemed to be hampering humanitarian efforts or judged not to be negotiating in good faith. At the same time, the Canadian oil company Talisman quit drilling operations in Sudan after enduring years of pressure from human rights organizations. It also sold its 25 percent stake in Sudan's Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. Human Rights Watch has documented how the Sudanese government has used roads, bridges, and airfields built by international oil companies to wage war in the south, especially in the oil-rich Western Upper Nile region. The report charges some of the companies with complicity in human rights abuses, claming that executives ignored government attacks against civilian targets.
In 2003, substantive peace talks finally resulted in a relaxation of hostilities and the highest degree of optimism yet that a final resolution of the conflict was within reach. However, reports of fighting and massacres surfaced during the year. Canadian and U.S. nongovernmental groups reported a massacre by army regulars in a village in the upper Nile region, citing the discovery of the remains of approximately 2,000-3,000 villagers, including children.
Despite the massacre reports, U.S. President George W. Bush announced in April that the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A were negotiating in good faith. The Sudan Peace Act requires the president to determine the state of talks every six months. The U.S. State Department, however, reported to the U.S. Congress about possible war crimes in Sudan, including possible genocide in the Upper Western Nile region.
In October, the government and the SPLM/A agreed to sign a power-sharing agreement at the end of 2003. The deal would effectively end the war and begin a six-year transition period leading to a referendum on southern secession, during which time the government would withdraw 80 percent of its troops from the south. Outstanding issues included whether to extend Sharia law to the capital, Khartoum, home to many non-Muslim southerners, and how to share profits accrued from southern oil fields.
In November, amidst ongoing negotiations and an overall improved security climate, refugees began returning to the south, raising the specter of an enormous logistical challenge and a potential health crisis. There are approximately 1500,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries and 3-4 million internally displaced people.
The United States still maintains sanctions against Sudan based on the country's human rights abuses and its apparent support for terrorism. Sudan tried to demonstrate its cooperation in the war against terrorism during the year. In May, security forces conducted a raid on an alleged terrorist training camp in Kardofan, killing four Saudi nationals. Seventeen other Saudis were arrested for taking part in weaponstraining exercises in a remote part of western Sudan. Thought to be possible al-Qaeda operatives, they were deported to Saudi Arabia. However, Sudan's commitment to combating terrorism was called into question in June, when Greek authorities operating in the Mediterranean Sea seized a vessel carrying 680 metric tons of explosives destined for a Sudanese port. The listed recipient, a Khartoum-based chemical company, turned out not to exist. Sudan claimed the explosives were for peaceful purposes.
In June, Sudanese Foreign Minister Osman Ismail met with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington to discuss the removal of Sudan from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. On the day of the meeting, Sudanese forces reportedly attacked ten villages in Eastern Upper Nile, killing at least 60 villagers and abducting several children.
In February 2003, a separate warfront opened in western Darfur province; armed conflict over competing land claims erupted between mostly black agriculturalists and government-backed nomadic Arab militias, known as Janjaweed. The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) rebel and JEM groups were formed in defence of farmers and landowners, who demand greater regional economic rights and self-determination. Despite a cease-fire between the SLM, JEM and the government in November, attacks by Janjaweed against farming villages continued. The government said it no longer backed the Janjaweed, but it also restricted humanitarian access to the conflict areas. The United Nations reported that the fighting displaced 500,000 people, with many fleeing west to neighbouring Chad, and about 1 million internally displaced people. According to the United States, several thousand people were killed in the fighting.
In October, Hassan al-Turabi was released from prison. Analysts suggested that with the government now negotiating closely with the SPLA, there was little need to continue holding al-Turabi, who, as a political rival to President Omar al-Bashir, had previously signed a peace deal with the rebel group.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Sudanese cannot change their government democratically. The December 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections cannot credibly be said to have reflected the will of the people. The major opposition parties (NDA), which are believed to have the support of most Sudanese, boycotted in protest of what they said were attempts by a totalitarian regime to impart the appearance of fairness. The EU declined an invitation to monitor the polls to avoid bestowing legitimacy on the outcome. Omar al-Bashir, running against former president Jafar Numeiri and three relative unknowns, won 86 percent of the vote. NC candidates stood uncontested for nearly two-thirds of parliamentary seats. Voting did not take place in some 17 rebel-held constituencies, and government claims of 66 percent voter turnout in some states were denounced as fictitious. The president can appoint and dismiss state governors at his discretion.
There is little press freedom in Sudan. Journalists practice self-censorship to avoid harassment, arrest, and closure of their publications. There are several daily newspapers and a wide variety of Arabicand English-language publications. While all of these are subject to censorship, some do criticize the government. Radio and television stations are owned by the government and are required to reflect government policy in broadcasts. Penalties apply to journalists who allegedly harm the nation or economy or violate national security. A 1999 law imposes penalties for "professional errors."
In March, state security police detained without explanation a journalist with the Khartoum Monitor, an English-language daily. This marked the beginning of year-long harassment of the paper by the government. In July, the Sudanese Court of Crimes Against the State revoked the paper's publishing license because of a 2001 article on slavery in the country's south. Shortly afterward, the paper's editor, Nhial Bol, was involved in a car accident, which many believed to be a deliberate attempt by the state to kill him. In October, Bol fled to Kenya and reported receiving death threats. The government also seized copies of the Arab-language As Sahafa and closed the daily Alwan for "inciting sedition."
Islam is the state religion, and the constitution claims Sharia as the source of its legislation. At least 75 percent of Sudanese are Muslim, though most southern Sudanese adhere to traditional indigenous beliefs or Christianity. The overwhelming majority of those displaced or killed by war and famine in Sudan have been nonMuslims, and many have starved because of a policy under which food is withheld pending conversion to Islam. Officials have described their campaign against nonMuslims as a holy war. Under the 1994 Societies Registration Act, religious groups must register in order to gather legally. Registration is reportedly difficult to obtain. The government denies permission to build churches and destroys Christian schools, centers, and churches. Roman Catholic priests face random detention and interrogation by police.
Emergency law severely restricts freedom of assembly and association. Students are forbidden to participate in political activities according to the Acts of Student Codes, introduced in 2002 after several university students in Khartoum were suspended for engaging in human rights activities, including organizing symposiums on women's rights and attending a conference on democracy. Other students have been expelled for organizing political activities, and security forces have forcefully broken up demonstrations. In November 2002, the government closed the University of Khartoum indefinitely after students protested attacks on dormitories by progovernment student militias. Several students were injured and arrested. The clashes erupted following student celebrations of the thirty-eighth anniversary of protests against Sudan's first military government and against the banning of the University Students Union four years ago, when opposition groups were poised to win campus elections. The student's union remained banned in 2003. While many international nongovernmental organizations operate in Sudan, the government restricts their movement and ability to carry out their work, which often includes providing essential humanitarian assistance.
There are no independent trade unions. The Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation is the main labor organization, with about 800,000 members. Local union elections are rigged to ensure the election of government-approved candidates. A lack of labor legislation limits the freedom of workers to organize or bargain collectively. Equality of opportunity and business and property rights are generally restricted to Sudan's Arab, Muslim community.
The judiciary is not independent. The chief justice of the Supreme Court, who presides over the entire judiciary, is government-appointed. Regular courts provide some due process safeguards, but special security and military courts, which are used to punish political opponents of the government, provide none. "Special courts" often deal with criminal matters, despite their use of military judges. Criminal law is based on Sharia and provides for flogging, amputation, crucifixion, and execution. Ten southern, predominantly non-Muslim states are officially exempted from Sharia, although criminal law allows for its application in the future if the state assemblies choose to implement it. Arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture are widespread, and security forces act with impunity. Prison conditions do not meet international standards. In June, the Sudanese Organization Against Torture reported the arbitrary arrest and torture of several people, including students suspected of engaging in political activities or harboring SPLA sympathies. Early in the year, three men in northern Darfur accused of bank robbery were hanged after quick trials in which the accused were denied legal representation. Their appeals and attendant entreaties from the European Union went unheeded.
Serious human rights abuses by nearly every faction involved in the civil war have been reported. Secret police have operated "ghost houses"--detention and torture centers--in several cities. Government armed forces have reportedly routinely raided villages, burning homes, killing residents, and abducting women and children to be used as slaves in the north. Relief agencies have discovered thousands of people held captive in the north and have purchased their freedom so that they could return to the south. International aid workers have been abducted and killed. In 2002, the International Eminent Persons Group--a fact-finding mission composed of humanitarian relief workers, human rights lawyers, academics, and former European and American diplomats--confirmed the existence of slavery in Sudan. After conducting extensive research in the country, the group reported a range of human rights abuses, including what under international law is considered slavery. The report also addressed abductions and forced servitude under the SPLM/A's authority.
Although there has been no organized effort to compile casualty statistics in southern Sudan since 1994, the total number of people killed by war, famine, and disease is believed to exceed two million. Up to four million people are internally displaced due to government efforts to clear black Africans from oil fields or potential oil drilling sites. In recent years, the government has blocked aid shipments and relief workers to areas affected by war and prevented relief workers from reaching civilians.
Women face discrimination in family matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, which are governed by Sharia. Women are represented in parliament and hold 35 of the assembly's 360 seats. Public order police frequently harass women and monitor their dress for adherence to government standards of modesty. Female genital mutilation occurs despite legal prohibition, and rape is reportedly routine in war zones. According to Amnesty International, women have less access to legal representation than men. President al-Bashir announced in January 2001 that Sudan would not ratify the International Convention on Eradication of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women because it “contradicted Sudanese values and traditions.” Children are used as soldiers by government and opposition forces in the civil war.
Annex 3:
Peace Agreements in Sudan
Machakos Protocol (02-07-2002)
Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (15-10-2002)
Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities Between the GOS and SPLM/A
Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period (05-09-2003)
Framework Agreement on Wealth Sharing Between the GOS and the SPLM/A (01-07-2003)
Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur (08-04-2004)
Naivasha Protocol Between the GOS and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power Sharing (26-05-2004)
Protocol Between the GOS and the SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States (26-05-2004)
Protocol Between the GOS and the SPLM/A on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict (26-05-2004)
Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in Sudan (05-06-2004)
Annex 4: [10]
[1] Please check annexes to find Mr Abo Sabib’s speech
[2] The numbers are different than the ones mentioned the day before)
[3] Please look at annex 4 for the map of Sudan.
[4] See O’Fahey and Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan, 1974; Spaulding, the Heroic Age in Sinnar, 1985.
[5] See Tim Niblock, Class and Power in the Sudan, 1987.
[6] Mohamed Omer Beshir, Educational Development in the Sudan, 1898-1956, 1969, p. 237.
[7] For example, the Leadership Office of Hamadab Affected People and Principal Coordinator of the Hamadab
[8] This information is taken from the web site of Freedom House on 30 November, 2004, http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/cou...tryratings/sudan.htm
[9] A rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom.
[10] Taken from
(عدل بواسطة Ahmad Sanad on 02-23-2005, 06:33 AM)
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Khalid Kodi
benyya
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تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست