|
|
|
 Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: Abobakr Shadad)
|
نوذج برقيه عن انتخابات الرئاسه وموقف ياسر عرمان فى سباق الرئاسه
===============================================================
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Viewing cable 10KHARTOUM105, SPLM Presidential Candidate Arman on Election Prospects
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10KHARTOUM105 2010-02-12 10:23 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2233
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0105/01 0431023
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 121023Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0193
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE
IGAD COLLECTIVE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000105
SIPDIS
ADDIS ABABA FOR AU -- AMBASSADOR BATTLE
NSC FOR MICHELLE GAVIN
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/12
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PBTS ECON ECIN EPET PNAT SU
SUBJECT: SPLM Presidential Candidate Arman on Election Prospects
CLASSIFIED BY: REWhiteehad, CDA, STATE, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (c) Summary. On February 11 Charge d'Affaires met with the
Sudanese Popular Liberation Movement's (SPLM) Yasir Arman, Deputy
Secretary General of the SPLM (head of Northern Sector) as well as
the SPLM candidate for national president. An ebullient Arman
charted an electoral calculus that would give him an edge over
incumbent President Bashir and commented on how he planned to
conduct the SPLM campaign in the North and South. The discussion
migrated to Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation and
post-referendum issues and the urgent need for action on both
fronts. We concur that Arman is a competitive candidate but
continue to believe that the outcome of the election will depend
largely on the probity of the voting process and on how popular or
unpopular Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) are, two
things that will remain unknown until the ballots have been
counted. We continue to think that Arman has a steep hill to
climb, but should he manage to make it to the top, there will be a
fascinating new vista for Sudanese politics ahead. End summary.
-----------------------------
Adding up the Numbers
-----------------------------
¶2. (c) Arman was escorting out one of the top lieutenants of
Osman Mirghani's Democratic Unionist Party when the Charge arrived,
and when Arman returned to the office he explained with a broad
smile that a large number of Mirghani's followers were unhappy with
Mirghani's overtures to the NCP and were willing to talk with the
SPLM. Arman said that his optimistic public statements about
besting Bashir in the April national elections were backed by solid
numbers. He said that the SPLM would receive more than
three-million votes from the approximately 4.3 million voters
registered in the South. He added that NCP Presidential Advisor
Salah Ghosh had confided to SPLA General Mathok that the NCP
thought that Arman and the SPLM would garner as many as
four-million more votes in the North. It this estimate were
correct, Arman said, he would be the clear favorite going into a
second round.
¶3. (c) Arman said that he planned to dial back the rhetoric and
run a positive campaign even if the NCP attempted to drag the SPLM
down into the mud. He admitted that there were a number of issues
at play that would affect the tenor of the campaign. First and
foremost, he did not know if the NCP would allow an unfettered
campaign, or if they would resort to bureaucratic obstruction and
the heavy hand of the security services to disrupt the opposition.
There was also a serious security deficit in the Darfur states that
the NCP could exploit. However, he concluded, the NCP was
unpopular with most of the people in Darfur, both Arab and African
tribes; with the Nubians in the North; along the Red Sea coast; in
many North/South border areas; and increasingly with young people
in the central riparian area from where the NCP draws most of its
support. Arman said that northerners who want unity realize that
electing the SPLM is the best means of ensuring it . He discounted
the argument that the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment
against Bashir had whipped up a wave of nationalism that would
sweep Bashir and the NCP back into office. To the contrary, Arman
interpreted recent public incidents in which Sudanese had thrown
shoes at or insulted Bashir in State House and at a large public
funeral as indications of a growing lack of respect for and fear of
the president.
¶4. (c) Charge pointed out that a credible election would bestow
increased legitimacy on whoever prevails on the national level, and
that the same will hold true in Southern Sudan. It was important
that opposition parties be allowed to campaign without obstruction
and that SPLM candidates contesting the same seats instruct their
supporters to avoid violence. Arman said that he fully concurred,
and that the SPLM understood that it too needed the legitimacy an
election would bring, especially if the North reneged on the
January 2011 self-determination referendum. At that juncture, it
would be essential to have a duly elected legislative assembly in
the South to decide on the best course of action. Arman said that
the one caveat was Lam Akol. He posed no threat to Salva Kiir's
KHARTOUM 00000105 002 OF 002
election as President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS),
but the SPLM would not tolerate Akol's use of militia forces to
foment disorder.
----------------------------------
Looking to 2011 and Beyond
----------------------------------
¶5. (c) Charge observed that the elections are only two months
away, and the referendum ten. Arman replied that the SPLM was
seized with the urgency of the situation and alarmed by the
complexity of issues that must be resolved in less than a year:
elections, referendum, a political deal in Darfur and the ICC. He
said that it was unlikely that the movements in Darfur would agree
to any political settlement until they saw what emerged from the
elections. He thought that it would be much easier to broker a
deal were the SPLM to win.
¶6. (c) Charge said that the P-5 Chiefs of Mission had met with
the AU Troika headed by Thabo Mbeki three weeks earlier and
reviewed the work plan that Mbeki had submitted to the SPLM and NCP
for comment. What was the SPLM reaction to this proposal? Arman
said that he had met with Mbeki two days before, and that there was
clearly a role for Mbeki, although Arman refused to be further
drawn out on the subject. Charge asked about the idea US role, to
which Arman replied that it was essential that the US remain
involved as a guarantor of any agreements that emerged from
negotiations between the two parties. He said that he did not
foresee a major role for the Assessment and Evaluation Commission
(AEC) in post-referendum issues, a view that echoed what we have
heard from the NCP. Arman concluded by stating that he expected
the NCP to resort to its usual stall tactics to impede
implementation of unresolved CPA issues, although he thought that
they might be more willing to show good faith in discussing
post-referendum issues, especially the big three of wealth-sharing,
nationality, and management of borders. He said that the NCP had
still not named its candidates for the Southern Sudanese and Abyei
Referenda Commissions; Charge reminded him that neither had the
SPLM.
------------
Comment
------------
¶7. (c) Arman made a good case for his prospects as a candidate,
but we still believe that he remains the underdog, albeit one with
teeth. We cannot say if the argument that Arman's election would
improve prospects for unity will resonate in the North, but we are
convinced that his triumph at the polls may be the last and only
means of making unity attractive enough for southerners to take a
second look. A Bashir win will virtually ensure the separation of
the South, and even an Arman upset would not necessarily guarantee
the reverse. It would yield, however, a radically altered
political dynamic for dealing with Darfur and engineering an
amicable separation/federation of the North and South. It would
also create an interesting shift within the SPLM, whose core
constituency and leadership would remain in the South, but whose
most influential member would suddenly be a Northerner from
Khartoum.
WHITEHEAD
| |
 
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: Abobakr Shadad)
|
تحياتي دكتور شداد،
بالأمس شاهدت في الجزيرة عرضا عن الوثائق التي تم العثور عليها في مبنى المخابرات العامة الليبية والتي تكشف عن التعاون السري الكبير بين الولايات المتحدة ونظام القذافي وكذلك بريطانيا ورغم ذلك لم تتردد هذه الدول في التضحية بنظام القذافي عندما اصطدم ببعض شعبه، وهذه بشرى لنا في السودان بأن التعاون السري بين المخابرات الأمريكية وبين نظام البشير سوف لن يكون سببا كافيا لاستمرار الدعم الأمريكي لنظام البشير الذي ملأت سيرته الآفاق، وأن أمريكا لن تتردد في ركل البشير بعيدا لاسيما وجرائمه تتزايد يوما بعد يوم. كنت أود أن أقرأ بعض هذه الوثائق فقط لأفهم كيف يفكر هؤلاء الناس الذي يزعمون الدفاع عن الحرية والديمقراطية وحقوق الإنسان ومعاداة مجرمي الحرب، ومع ذلك ظلوا يدعمون نظام البشير سرا وعلنا طيلة عقود، وسارعوا لنجدة الليبيين بسبب بضع مئات من القتلى في حين لم يجعلهم مئات الآلاف من ضحايا دارفور وجبال النوبة والنيل الأزرق ينجدون أهل السودان ولو بكلمة، ربما لو قرأنا نحن السودانيون كيف يفكرون عن بلادنا ربما نفهمهم وتزول الغصة من قلوبنا! وإذا عرف السبب بطل العجب! لكن للأسف الروابط التي وضعتها يادكتور لم تفتح معي، وأعدك بأنني إذا تمكنت من قراءة أي شئ مثير للاهتمام فيها سأترجمه واضيفه لبوستك هذا، فقط أرجوا توضيح لماذا لا يفتح الرابط هل هكره أصحاب الرسائل حماية لها؟
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
سلامات يا محمد عثمان
الرابط شغال ...حاول البحث عن طريق Browse by origin وادخل حرف ال K تجد عالم من الغرائب
كنت اقرا من برقيه سرية تتحدث عن اسلمة الجنوب
هذا بعض منها بواسطة مترجم قوقل الكيشه ...غايتو بتورى السياق العام للموضوع حسب وجهة النظر الامريكية
أدهشنى قله الاوراق التى تتحدث عن العلاقات المتبادله بين البلدين فى مراسلات تعتبر دبلوماسية اما هنا فهى تجسس وتحسس ونقل
دفائق الامور .. وفى كل شئ .... غايتو انت لحدى اسى ما جابو سيرتك يمكن لى قدام ....
: الخرطوم 3990
¶ 1. سري -- النص بأكمله.
مقدمة وموجز
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
¶ 2. موجز : هناك أدلة واضحة ومتزايدة على أن
وقد شرعت الحكومة التي تهيمن عليها الجبهة القومية الإسلامية في الخرطوم
حملة لأسلمة جنوب السودان وأولئك
الجنوبيين المشردين معظمهم من الذين يعيشون في الشمال. IN
مناطق تسيطر عليها الحكومة في الجنوب ، لGOS / الجبهة IS
تعهد سياسات للسيطرة الإسلامية على المستوى الإقليمي
والحكومات المحلية والخدمة المدنية. خلال ال
خلال العامين الماضيين ، في صفوف العليا والمتوسطة المحلية
لقد تم الإدارة والخدمة المدنية "حذفت - OUT"
مع المسلمين والجنوبيين وGOS المتشدد / أنصار الجبهة الإسلامية
باستبدال كبار المسؤولين الفنيين المهنية وغيرها
موظفيها. وعلاوة على ذلك ، نتيجة للتربية GOS
السياسات ، والأطفال غير المسلمين في المدن التي تسيطر عليها GOS
جوبا ، ويضطر الرنك وملكال وواو ، وراجا TO
تعلم اللغة العربية ودراسة الإسلام. ويشترط على المدارس TO
استعمال اللغة العربية بوصفها اللغة الوحيدة للتعليم ، وحتى
المدارس التي تديرها المسيحيين. في جوبا ، ولاية الاستوائية
وزير التربية والتعليم مؤخرا أن رسمنا يجب أن يكون الإسلام
يدرس ابتداء من المشتل مستوى المدرسة.
¶ 3. وفي الشمال ، وغير المسلمين ، الروتيني الجنوبيون FACE
التحرش والتمييز ، وتلقي في الوقت نفسه
الرسالة التي إذا أصبحت المسلمين ، حياتهم سوف
تحسين. الجماعات الإسلامية ، وأبرزها الدعوة
الاسلامية (IE الدعوة الإسلامية) ، وتقديم مساعدات في شكل
من الطعام والمال للحث على الجنوبيين على منصب
المسلمين. HAS MADE GOS / سياسة الجبهة اعتناق الإسلام
مريحة ومربحة في أغلب الأحيان ، وضرورية في بعض الأحيان ل
البقاء في الشمال.
¶ 4. هذا بالإضافة إلى GOS هو الضغط المتصاعد على
ديني مسيحي الأفراد والمؤسسات. التقارير
من المضايقات والترهيب والسجن للكنيسة
وقد زادت العاملين في الاشهر الاخيرة. يعتقد كثير
أن هذا يعتبر دليلا للGOS / نية الجبهة القومية الإسلامية في نهاية المطاف إلى
استئصال "أجنبي" وجود الكنيسة من السودان ،
بالتالي ، إلى GOS / الجبهة الآمال ، وترك المجال مفتوحا ل
الإسلام.
¶ 5. يتحدد GOS / الجبهة لاطلاق ناجحة
أسلمة الحملة. عززت قبضتها على تكنولوجيا المعلومات
المحلية والإقليمية الحكومات في GOS المناطق التي تسيطر عليها
THE SOUTH ، مع هدف طويل الأجل لإدخال السمعة
الشريعة الإسلامية في الجنوب. ومن المهم أيضا EFFECT
GOS / سياسات الجبهة القومية الإسلامية على الأطفال الجنوبية. هؤلاء
ويضطر الأطفال إلى تعلم اللغة العربية والاسلام و
تعلم أن ننظر إلى المسلمين عن الطعام والمساعدات. إنهم
ممتصة أيضا الدرس الذي لغير المسلمين على الارجح
ولا أمل أو مستقبل في السودان. موجز END.
حكومة في الجنوب
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
¶ 6. وفي عام 1990 ، أعلنت GOS نظام اتحادي لل
الحكومة بالنسبة للسودان ، وإعطاء ظاهريا GOS التي تسيطر عليها
مناطق الجنوب قدرا كبيرا من الحكم الذاتي و
بإعفائها من الشريعة (I. الشريعة هاء).
وفي وقت لاحق ، ومع ذلك ، بدأت الخرطوم حملة تطهير واسع
من جنوب الحكومات الاقليمية والمحلية والمدنية لل
الخدمة ، وكثير باستبدال غير المسلمين مع المسلمين في الجنوب
وGOS / أنصار الجبهة الإسلامية المتشددة.
¶ 7. ينقسم جنوب السودان الى ثلاث دول : UPPER
النيل وبحر الغزال ، والاستوائية. كل دولة
محافظ ، نائب محافظ ، ولجنة شعبية. THE
المحافظين ، الذي عينته الخرطوم ، كلها من غير المسلمين
الجنوبيين. عقب اصدارها اعلانا من الفيدرالية ،
عين أنصار الجبهة الإسلامية GOS المتشددين نائبا
المحافظين ووزراء الدولة للتعليم وAS
الثقافة والمال والتجارة. هؤلاء المعينين
الإجابة ورد فقط إلى الخرطوم. للنائب
المحافظين ، وليس كما كان من قبل المحافظين ، لقد
المسؤولية عن هذه الوزارات الرئيسية. بل هو أيضا
موثوقة ذكرت أن هذه الدولة قد طهرت وزراء ،
أو هي في عملية تنقية ، لموظفيهم
غير المسلمين وأنصار الجبهة الإسلامية NON -. THE المحافظون
وهكذا تم تجريد فعالا اكثر قوة حقيقية. IN
بالإضافة إلى ذلك ، في 8 آب ، وابرز اثنين من كبار الجنوب
تم استبدال المحافظين (REF). ARE THE NEW المحافظين
أيضا غير المسلمين الجنوبيون لكن الرجال على حد سواء هي FIRM
أنصار الجبهة القومية الإسلامية. (ملاحظة : في التلفزيون ، وطنيا
مراسم اداء اليمين ، كانت المحافظين المعينين حديثا
أظهرت أداء اليمين من Office ، ONE HAND التي أثيرت ،
أخرى على القرآن. END ملاحظة.
¶ 8. وقد أفيد أن بعض المسؤولين في
تحتل المرتبة العليا والمتوسطة للإدارة والمدنية
تكون خدمة GOS في المناطق التي تسيطر عليها "حذفت - OUT"
وحلت عليها الجنوبيون والمسلمين وGOS المتشدد / NIF
مؤيديه. تاريخيا ، كانت أفضل المدارس في الجنوب
لديها مدارس الكنيسة كانت ، لذا فإن أفضل تعليما وأكثر
العاملين بالحكومة من ذوي الخبرة في الجنوب غالبا ما تكون
المسيحيين. كثير من تلك باستبدال منهم LESS
مؤهلين وتنقصهم الخبرة ؛ مؤهلاتهم فقط
هو أنهم مسلمون. FORCED تقاعد
بات غير المسلمين وأنصار الجبهة الإسلامية NON - نطاق واسع.
وهناك العديد من المتعلمين والجنوبيون الآن توضيح
واجهتها على نحو متزايد في الخرطوم الذي "كان يفعل
IMPORTANT شيء في الجنوب ".
¶ 9. في تموز 1991 ، ذكرت صحيفة GOS التي تسيطر عليها
لم تحظ اللجنة الشعبية الاستوائية
السلطات التشريعية ، وان اللجنة سوف
من الآن فصاعدا صياغة وتمرير القوانين المحلية. (ملاحظة :
هل اللجان الشعبية في بحر الغزال وأعالي النيل
على ما يبدو نفس الولاية ، وعلى الرغم من AS
حتى الآن لا توجد أية العامة التي هي عليه الآن
عمل على هذا النحو. ملاحظة النهاية) وهذا هو في
النقيض من ذلك ، أوضحت الصحيفة ، أن الشعبي
اللجان في الشمال التي هي فقط والاستشارية
الهيئات التنظيمية. THE أعضاء من الجبهة الشعبية في الجنوب
لجان ، أفيد سيكون "مختارة" ل
"تمثل الشعب لحين اجراء انتخابات."
الانتخابات ، هل أوضحت صحيفة ، لن تعقد الآن
وبسبب الحرب الأهلية. (FYI : هذا كان متوقعا من قبل
المنسوبين الجنوبية. END FYI).
¶ 10. تعليق : في الواقع ، GOS / الجبهة هو "التعبئة" هذه
شبه البرلمانات. وأفيد بأن الرشوة ، وفي
شكل نقود ، والمنازل ، والسلطة ، وكثيرا ما يستخدم لGAIN
إن دعم الجنوبيين الذين يتم تعيينهم بعد ذلك الى
اللجان الشعبية. هكذا نرى أن بعض الساسة الجنوبيين ، ل
الكسب المالي ، ودعم GOS / الجبهة وسياساتها.
الخوف من أن بعض الجنوبيين الشعبي
في نهاية المطاف لجان / جمعيات استخدامها ل"الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة
INTO الشريعة. "في أوائل عام 1991 ، في محادثة مع
CHARGE ، صرح زعيم الجبهة القومية الاسلامية حسن الترابي أنه إذا كان الناس
وفي جنوب صوتوا لأحكام الشريعة الإسلامية فإنه يصبح من القانون. IN
خطابه في 31 ديسمبر ، قال الرئيس البشير "THE
هل الوضع القانوني في الولايات الجنوبية تبقى كما
أي حتى إنشاء الهيئات التشريعية الجديدة التي
ستنفذ...." بسبب غموض
هذا البيان ، ويخشى بعض المراقبين ان البشير بمهارة
فتح إمكانية أن الشريعة قد يكون يوم واحد
تشريعات للجنوب. غالبية الجنوبيين
ليسوا مسلمين ، وبموجب كل المؤشرات ، لا يريدون ل
أن يحكمها القانون الإسلامي. الجنوبيون يخشون من أن
هل GOS / الجبهة التلاعب اللجان الشعبية حتى يتمكنوا
سيصوت لMAKE الشريعة الإسلامية في الجنوب. END تعليق.
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: Abobakr Shadad)
|
عن موقف الحركه من الانتخابات وعرمان ورفض الجنوبيين الكبير لترشحه للرئاسه
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000310
2010-02-22 14:18
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM EAID SU
SUBJECT: SE GRATION MEETS SOUTHERN OPPOSITION LEADERS
¶1. (SBU) Summary: On February 18 U.S. Special Envoy (SE) to Sudan,
General Scott Gration met in Juba with Southern Sudan opposition
party leaders who told him that funding for opposition parties and
space for campaigning are critical if there is to be any chance for
free and fair elections in Southern Sudan. Attendees see a glimmer
of hope for free elections in the south in the fact that 374
members of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) were
ejected from the party on February 17 for running as independent
candidates, stating that the SPLM's fracture creates space for the
opposition. Attendees also widely rejected Yasir Arman, the SPLM's
presidential candidate, for ethnic and strategic reasons. The SPLM
is clearly using illegitimate means to make life difficult for
southern opposition parties, an approach to democracy that may be
difficult to unlearn. End Summary.
---------------------------------------
Funding for Opposition Parties Critical
---------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) On February 18 SE Gration met with Southern Sudan
opposition party leaders who told him that funding for opposition
parties is critical if there is to be any chance for free and fair
elections in Southern Sudan. Leaders in attendance represented
every significant party in the southern opposition, including the
National Congress Party (NCP) and Lam Akol's SPLM - Democratic
Change (SPLM-DC). Attendees stated that funding for the SPLM is
overwhelming by comparison with that available to opposition
parties, largely because the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)
and the SPLM are not truly separate, and the funds of the GoSS
support the SPLM and its election campaign. They also asserted
that the SPLM receives aid from the international community, either
directly, or through aid received by the GoSS. Further, they
pointed out that as the incumbent party, the SPLM is in a position
to take credit for development and dole out money to influence or
buy votes.
¶3. (SBU) Attendees stated that opposition party funding is
necessary to fund campaign transportation, voter education, and
most importantly, ballot box monitoring during elections.
Attendees noted that having monitors in all voting centers will be
a huge undertaking and expense, and while they welcomed
international monitors, international monitors will be wholly
insufficient and most polling locations will be monitored solely by
party members. Attendees argued that ultimately, funding for
opposition parties is about making the electoral process more
transparent. Attendees made clear that they look to the
international community for this help because neither the
Government of National Unity nor the GoSS will provide funds.
---------------------------
Space to Campaign Crucial
---------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Opposition party leaders in attendance stated that the
SPLM and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) are intimidating
their candidates and obstructing their parties' campaign
activities. They agreed that generally it is safe for them to
campaign in Juba because of the international presence, but that
when their party members enter rural areas they are truly in danger
from SPLA forces. They noted that the SPLA is in effect the army
of the SPLM, not the army of Southern Sudan, and that many SPLM
politicians are also SPLA commanders.
¶5. (SBU) Attendees stated that only the international community,
and the signatories to the CPA in particular, could hope to reign
in the SPLM's campaign of intimidation and obstruction. In fact
they placed some of the blame for the SPLM's behavior on the
international community, and the U.S. in particular, stating that
U.S support to the SPLM has made them strong, and that the SPLM
would not act in this manner without support from the West. They
said that if these activities continue unabated, the opposition
KHARTOUM 00000310 002 OF 002
will be forced to withdraw from the election because they cannot
face the forces of the SPLA and police.
¶6. (SBU) Opposition party attendees see a glimmer of hope for free
elections in the south in the fact that 374 members of the SPLM
were ejected from the party on February 17 for running as
independent candidates. Attendees stated that the SPLM's fracture
creates space for the opposition because if the SPLM were united it
would squeeze out all opposition. Attendees asserted that it is
not possible to peacefully split with the SPLM, and that the SPLM
will crack down on these independents as they have done on other
opposition parties. As a consequence, attendees opined that these
independents will not return to the SPLM after elections, but will
instead form a new party.
------------------------------------------
Yasir Arman Opposed by Southern Opposition
------------------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Attendees widely condemned the SPLM's presidential
candidate. On a personal level they asked how the SPLM could ask
them to vote for a Muslim Arab. On a strategic level, attendees
expressed a fear that the election of Arman will create confusion
and discord in the south. They stated that, if elected, Arman will
seek to delay the referendum in order to have more time to make
unity attractive, an idea they categorically opposed. Attendees
said they will do everything they can to ensure Arman is not
elected. They did not have the same opinion about GoSS President
and SPLM nominee Salva Kiir, whom (with the exception of SPLM-DC)
they support, and they indicated that their hope is to achieve a
divided government, with the SPLM controlling the Presidency of
Southern Sudan and the opposition parties controlling the Southern
Sudan Legislative Assembly.
¶8. (SBU) Comment: Southern opposition leaders in attendance spoke
convincingly about the problems facing them. The SPLM is clearly
making life difficult for opposition parties in the South. The
Government of Southern Sudan has received nearly unconditional
support from the international community and appears less concerned
with the credibility of elections than with consolidating authority
in the lead-up to the southern referendum. Even the opposition
party leaders stated that they want a unified south until after the
referendum, and that they hope to democratically transform the SPLM
and the South at some later date. The danger is that a precedent
will be established in Southern Sudan whereby the incumbent party
bullies and crushes opposition, and that this approach to democracy
will be difficult to unlearn. End Comment.
ورواية مترجم قوقل الكيشه
NCLAS القسم 01 من 02 الخرطوم 000310
2010-02-22 14:18
الحساسة
SIPDIS
مجلس الأمن القومي لMGAVIN ، LETIM
PASS USAID PLS DEPT لAFR / السودان
اديس ابابا أيضا لUSAU
E.O. 12958 : N / A
TAGS : PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM عيد SU
الموضوع : SE غريشن يجتمع مع زعماء المعارضة الجنوبية
¶ 1. (امن الدولة) موجز : في 18 فبراير المبعوث الأميركي الخاص (SE) إلى السودان ،
التقى الجنرال سكوت غرايشن في جوبا جنوب السودان مع المعارضة
قادة الحزب الذين أبلغوه بأن التمويل لأحزاب المعارضة و
مساحة لحملة حاسمة إذا أريد أن يكون هناك أي فرصة لل
انتخابات حرة ونزيهة في جنوب السودان. الحضور نرى بصيصا
الأمل لاجراء انتخابات حرة في الجنوب في حقيقة أن 374
كانوا أعضاء في الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان (الحركة الشعبية)
طرد من الحزب في 17 فبراير من أجل تشغيل كما مستقل
المرشحين ، مشيرا إلى أن كسر الحركة الشعبية لتحرير يخلق مساحة لل
المعارضة. الحضور كما رفض ياسر عرمان على نطاق واسع ، وعلى الحركة الشعبية
المرشح الرئاسي ، لأسباب عرقية والاستراتيجية. الحركة الشعبية
يستخدم وسائل غير مشروعة بشكل واضح لجعل الحياة صعبة بالنسبة
أحزاب المعارضة الجنوبية ، وهو نهج للديمقراطية التي قد تكون
من الصعب طرح فكرة. موجز نهاية.
---------------------------------------
التمويل لأحزاب المعارضة الحرجة
---------------------------------------
¶ 2. (امن الدولة) في 18 فبراير التقى غرايشن SE مع جنوب السودان
قادة الأحزاب المعارضة الذي قال له ان التمويل للمعارضة
الأحزاب أمر بالغ الأهمية إذا أريد أن يكون هناك أي فرصة للحرة ونزيهة
الانتخابات في جنوب السودان. تمثل في حضور قادة
كل حزب كبير في المعارضة الجنوبية ، بما في ذلك
حزب المؤتمر الوطني الحاكم والحركة الشعبية لام اكول -- الديمقراطية
التغيير (الحركة الشعبية - DC). وذكر الحضور بأن التمويل من أجل الحركة الشعبية
الساحقة بالمقارنة مع تلك المتاحة للمعارضة
الأطراف ، إلى حد كبير لأن حكومة جنوب السودان (حكومة الجنوب)
والحركة الشعبية ليست منفصلة حقا ، والصناديق التابعة لحكومة الجنوب
الحركة الشعبية ودعم حملته الانتخابية. وأكدوا أيضا
ان الحركة تتلقى المساعدات من المجتمع الدولي ، إما
مباشرة ، أو من خلال المساعدات التي تلقتها حكومة الجنوب. كذلك ، فإنهم
كما أشار إلى أن الحزب الحاكم ، الحركة الشعبية في موقف
اتخاذ الائتمان للتنمية وتوزع الأموال للتأثير أو
شراء أصوات الناخبين.
¶ 3. وذكرت (ادارة امن الدولة) الحضور بأن المعارضة تمويل الحزب
وسائل النقل اللازمة لتمويل الحملة الانتخابية وتثقيف الناخبين ، و
والأهم من صناديق الاقتراع ، ورصد خلال الانتخابات.
ولاحظ المجتمعون أن وجود مراقبين في جميع مراكز الاقتراع سيكون
مهمة ضخمة وعلى نفقتها ، وبينما رحبوا
مراقبين دوليين ، وسوف يكون كليا مراقبين دوليين
وسيتم رصد المواقع غير كافية وحدها من قبل معظم الاقتراع
أعضاء الحزب. جادل بأن الحضور في نهاية المطاف ، وتمويل
أحزاب المعارضة هي القرارات حول العملية الانتخابية أكثر
شفافة. جعل الحضور الواضح أنها تنظر إلى
المجتمع الدولي على هذه المساعدة لأن لا
وحكومة الوحدة الوطنية ولا حكومة الجنوب لتوفير الأموال.
---------------------------
مساحة لحملة حاسمة
---------------------------
¶ 4. (امن الدولة) قادة الأحزاب المعارضة في حضور وذكر أن
الحركة الشعبية وجيش تحرير السودان (الجيش الشعبي) وترهيب
على المرشحين وعرقلة حملة حزبيهما
الأنشطة. واتفقوا على أن عموما أنها آمنة بالنسبة لهم
حملة في جوبا بسبب الوجود الدولي ، ولكن هذا
عندما أعضاء حزبهم دخول المناطق الريفية هم حقا في خطر
من قوات الجيش الشعبي. وأشاروا إلى أن الجيش الشعبي هو في الواقع الجيش
الحركة الشعبية ، وليس جيش جنوب السودان ، وأن العديد من الحركة الشعبية
القادة السياسيون أيضا الجيش الشعبي.
¶ 5. (امن الدولة) ذكرت أن الحضور فقط للمجتمع الدولي ،
والموقعين على اتفاق السلام الشامل وبخاصة ، يمكن أن نأمل في عهد
في حملة التخويف من الحركة الشعبية والعرقلة. في الواقع
ضعوا بعض اللوم لسلوك الحركة الشعبية على
المجتمع الدولي ، والولايات المتحدة على وجه الخصوص ، مشيرا إلى أن
أحرزت الولايات المتحدة لدعم الحركة الشعبية منهم القوي ، وأن الحركة الشعبية
لن يتصرف على هذا النحو من دون دعم من الغرب. هم
وقال انه اذا هذه الأنشطة مستمرة بلا هوادة ، والمعارضة
الخرطوم 00000310 002 من 002
سوف تضطر الى الانسحاب من الانتخابات لأنهم لا يستطيعون
مواجهة قوات الجيش الشعبي والشرطة.
¶ 6. (امن الدولة) الحضور أحزاب المعارضة ترى بصيصا من الأمل مجانا
الانتخابات في الجنوب في حقيقة أن 374 من أعضاء الحركة الشعبية
وقد طرد من الحزب في 17 فبراير من أجل تشغيل كما
المرشحين المستقلين. وذكر الحضور بأن الحركة الشعبية الكسر
يخلق مساحة للمعارضة لأنه إذا اتحدت الحركة الشعبية انها
واستنزاف كل المعارضة. وأكد المجتمعون أنه
ليس من الممكن تقسيم سلميا مع الحركة الشعبية ، وأن الحركة الشعبية
ستتخذ اجراءات صارمة ضد هؤلاء المستقلين كما فعلوا في غيرها
أحزاب المعارضة. نتيجة لذلك ، رأى المجتمعون أن هذه
وسوف لن يعود الى المستقلين الحركة بعد الانتخابات ، ولكن سوف
بدلا من ذلك تشكيل حزب جديد.
------------------------------------------
عارض ياسر عرمان من قبل المعارضة الجنوبية
------------------------------------------
¶ 7. (امن الدولة) على نطاق واسع الحضور أدانت الرئاسة في الحركة الشعبية
مرشح. على المستوى الشخصي وتساءلوا كيف يمكن أن يطلب من الحركة الشعبية
عليهم للتصويت لعربي مسلم. على المستوى الاستراتيجي ، والحضور
وأعربت عن خشيتها من انتخاب عرمان سيخلق البلبلة
والفتنة في الجنوب. وأوضحت أن ذلك ، في حال انتخابه ، سيكون عرمان
تسعى لتأجيل الاستفتاء من أجل الحصول على مزيد من الوقت لجعل
جاذبية الوحدة ، وهي الفكرة التي تعارض بشكل قاطع. الحضور
وقالت أنها سوف تفعل كل ما في وسعهم لضمان عدم عرمان
المنتخبة. ولم تكن لديهم نفس الرأي حول رئيس حكومة الجنوب
والحركة الشعبية سلفا كير مرشحا ، منهم (باستثناء الحركة الشعبية - DC)
انهم يدعمون ، وأنها أشارت إلى أن أملهم هو تحقيق
تنقسم الحكومة مع الحركة الشعبية السيطرة على رئاسة
جنوب السودان وأحزاب المعارضة السيطرة على الجنوب
السودان الجمعية التشريعية.
¶ 8. وتحدث قادة المعارضة الجنوبية في الحضور : (امن الدولة) التعليق
مقنع حول المشاكل التي تواجههم. ومن الواضح أن الحركة الشعبية
مما يجعل الحياة صعبة بالنسبة للأطراف المعارضة في الجنوب. و
وقد تلقت حكومة جنوب السودان غير المشروط تقريبا
بدعم من المجتمع الدولي ، ويبدو أقل قلقا
مع من مصداقية الانتخابات مع توطيد سلطة
في الفترة التي تسبق إجراء الاستفتاء في الجنوب. حتى المعارضة
وقال زعماء الحزب انهم يريدون جنوبي موحد حتى بعد
الاستفتاء ، وانهم يأملون في تحويل ديمقراطيا للحركة الشعبية
والجنوب في موعد لاحق. يكمن الخطر في أن يشكل سابقة
وستقام في جنوب السودان حيث الحزب الحاكم
الفتوات ويسحق المعارضة ، وأن هذا النهج إلى الديمقراطية
سيكون من الصعب طرح فكرة. نهاية التعليق.
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: Abobakr Shadad)
|
تحياتي دكتور شداد، يبدو أن الموقع وفقا لما تقوله رويترز تعرض لهجمة سايبرية وأعيد تشغيله ولكنه لا زال لا يعمل بالنسبة لبعض المستخدمين:
WASHINGTON | Wed Aug 31, 2011 4:24am EDT
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - WikiLeaks said its website had been the target of a cyber attack late on Tuesday as it proceeded with the release of thousands of previously unpublished U.S. diplomatic cables, some still classified.
"WikiLeaks.org is presently under attack," said a message on WikiLeaks' Twitter page, which is believed to be controlled by Julian Assange, the controversial Australian-born founder and chief of the whistle-blowing organization.
WikiLeaks later described the problem as "a cyber attack." In a subsequent message on its Twitter feed, it said the website was back up though some users were having problems accessing it.
على كل فشلت محاولتي في دخول الموقع حتى عن طريق موقع ثالث، وإلى أن يفتح الموقع بكامل طاقته سأتابع ما تتحفنا به ولكن أرجو وضع النص الانجليزي لأن ترجمة قوقل للعربية بشعة!
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
يا محمد عثمان ياخوى الكلام الفوق ب الانجليزى هو عبارة عن سرد لمقابلات ياسر عرمان مع الامريكان وليس الموتمر الوطنى والامريكان
وانت تقول امريكا بتدعم البشير سرا وعلنا واذا كان الحال كما تزعم انت وليس كما جا فى الوثائق لكان حلا بلادنا افضل
اما بخصوص قولك (نحن) اى تقصد نحن السودانين وقراتنا لوثايق الامركيان فانا لا اظن ان ذلك سوف يغير شئا لاننا شعب لا يجمعنا الا الاطار الجغرافى الذى فرض علينا
تحسبنا جميعا وقولوبنا شتى
فاذا قرانا ام لم نقرا كلو واحد
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: motaz ali)
|
أخيرا تمكنت من دخول الموقع، ووصلت للصفحة الرابعة من الوثائق السودانية وحتى الآن لا أرى ما يريب ؟؟؟!!!
ويا معتز ياخوي انت حاضر المسلسل ده من البداية ومن أيام دنا عذابها؟
تم الاعتراف بنظام إرهابي عسكري باطش هو نظام الإنقاذ وإعطاءه الشرعية الدولية لكي يعقد اتفاق نيفاشا الذي فصل الجنوب، ولكي يعمل كمقاول باطن استخباراتي، وظل هذا البورد عبر السنين يمتلئ بأخبار التعاون السري بين الطرفين، والزواج بين الدولة العظمى ونظام الانقاذ زواج عرفي سري لذلك لم يستفد منه الشعب السوداني مثلما استفادت الشعوب الأخرى التي صادقت أمريكا مثل كوريا أو تايوان، ولكن استفادت منه قيادات الحركة الإسلامية التي كدست الدولارات وانفتحت لها المطارات والبنوك الأجنبية!
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وصلت للصفحة السادسة عشر، وما قرأته حتى الآن جعلني أشعر بالخجل لأنني ارتبت في السياسة الأمريكية تجاه السودان، وكدت أصدق ما يقوله أصحاب نظريات المؤامرة الغربيين من أن أمريكا دولة تحكمها من وراء الكواليس مجموعة صغيرة من العائلات المترابطة بروابط القرابة والدين والتي تمتلك المصارف الكبرى وأجهزة الإعلام، والتي تسير السياسيين بخيوط خفية وتتحكم في كل شئ عبر الجمعيات السرية، وتسيطر على عقول الجماهير عبر الإعلام وتجعلهم يعيشون وهم أنهم أحرار!
فهذه الوثائق السرية تعكس صورة لدولة ملائكية تريد الخير لشعب السودان وتريد أن تضمد جراحه وتمنع القتل والتشريد والخراب، إنها المدينة الفاضلة حقا!
الوثيقة الوحيدة التي جعلتني أشعر بالغضب الشديد تجاه نظام حكم حسني مبارك تورد كيف أن المصري أسامة شلتوت سعى لإقناع الأمريكان بأن نظام البشير هو صمام الأمان الوحيد للسودان وان انهياره يعني الطوفان، وبلغ به الكذب أن زعم أن مقتل الصحفي محمد طه محمد أحمد من عمل جماعة التكفير والهجرة! يجب أن يقرأ الاتحاديون هذه الوثيقة باهتمام شديد ليروا كيف أن مصر حسني مبارك باعت حزبنا بثمن بخس لنظام البشير، فالحمد لله على سقوط حكمه!
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06KHARTOUM2277.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002277
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR AF/SPG, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SU EG US
SUBJECT: IN SUDAN, EGYPT PREFERS THE DEVIL IT KNOWS
REF: A. KHARTOUM 02157
¶B. KHARTOUM 01976
Classified By: P/E CHIEF E. WHITAKER, REASON: SECTIONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) In a September 16 meeting with Poloff, Egyptian DCM
Osama Shaltout expressed his government's concern for Sudan's
political stability in light of recent public unrest, the
looming collision between the Sudanese government and the
international community on Darfur, and the beheading of
journalist Mohammed Taha (Ref A). Echoing comments made by
Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit earlier in the
week, he said that the Government of Egypt (GoE) feared the
erosion of the National Congress Party-dominated regime and
the development of a "security vacuum" on its southern
borders. He indicated that the alternative to the current
regime would be less desirable to both the USG and the GoE
and insinuated that incidents like the beheading of
journalist Mohammed Taha, allegedly at the hands of Islamic
extremists, could increase in frequency as the regime's
strength declines.
¶2. (C) Shaltout attributed Taha's assassination to the
extremist group Takfir wal Hijra, and underscored the utility
of the current Sudanese government by asking if there were
any truth to reports that it had ceased to cooperate with the
USG on counter-terrorism. Shaltout said that past fears of
regime instability in Sudan had prompted Egyptian
reconciliation efforts, despite links between the NCP and its
predecessor, the National Islamic Front (NIF), to terrorist
acts against the GoE--most notably the 1995 assassination
attempt on President Hosni Mubarak. The implication was that
the USG should adopt a similarly pragmatic approach based on
it security interests and in an effort to find peace in
Darfur.
¶3. (C) According to Shaltout, the GoE is privately
encouraging Sudan to accept UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1706 in order to forestall a collision with the
international community, which would only yield to greater
isolation and undermine the Sudanese government's ability to
maintain order. He predicated that the Sudanese leadership
would permit UN intervention within three months. Shaltout
reacted positively to rumors of the imminent replacement of
Foreign Minister Lam Akol, as it would shore up regime
stability and open a more constructive dialogue with the
international community. (Comment: Rumors of a cabinet
re-shuffle are widespread in Khartoum, and the most
often-mentioned replacement for Akol is Minister of Cabinet
Affairs Deng Alor. End comment.)
¶4. (C) COMMENT: Shaltout's analysis of the current situation
in Sudan indicates the continued potential for prominent Arab
buy-in to bring Sudan back from the brink (Ref B). Recent
Arab League support for a rejection of UNSCR 1706 may be due
less to pan-Arab solidarity than to a desire to avoid
undermining Sudan's current regime. Egyptian fears of a
security vacuum on its southern border could be used to
induce the GoE to exert more pressure on the Sudanese
government to accept UN re-hatting in the interest of
long-term stability. END COMMENT
HUME
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: أحمد أمين)
|
وثيقة هامة بها جزء يوضح لماذا لا تؤيد أمريكا تغيير نظام البشير (حتى تاريخ الوثيقة) وفي بدايتها تحليل للتركيبة القبلية المهيمنة على السلطة في الخرطوم يخلص إلى تركز السلطة في يد الجعليين يليهم الشايقية ثم الدناقلة
أترجم منها هذا الجزء:
رقم
12
C
"سياسة تغيير النظام من الممكن أن يصبح تطبيقها بنجاح صعبا بدرجة استثنائية. ليس للسودان تراث في الحكم بخلاف حكم القبائل القبائل الثلاثة المهيمنة في الخرطوم، و إذا خلف هذا النظام نظام آخر يتكون من هذه القبائل الثلاثة فإنه سيحتفظ بالجزء الأكبر من وجهة نظر حكومة نظام البشير، وفي الواقع فإن الكثير من معارضة البشير يتكون من عناصر تعارض صفقة السلام مع الجنوب، وتتبنى شعارات إسلامية و ترفض تقاسم السلطة مع القبائل الأفريقية من دارفور أو شرق السودان أو الجنوب، وإذا تغير النظام فربما يستدعي الأمر فرض عقوبات أقسى ، في حين أنه لا يتوافق مع الأهداف الإنسانية للولايات المتحدة في دارفور أو مع خطوات تغيير الدولة السودانية"
انتهى الاقتباس.
يعني أن كاتب الوثيقة لايرى فرقا بين حزب الأمة والاتحادي والمؤتمر الوطني! هل يعقل هذا!
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/01/07KHARTOUM118.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000118
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KDEM SCUL AU UN SU US
SUBJECT: U.S./SUDANESE RELATIONS: IN A LONG WAR, NO QUICK
VICTORIES
REF: A. KHARTOUM 00094
¶B. KHARTOUM 00106
Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. policy toward Sudan confronts a
fundamental contradiction: although legally Sudan is
organized as a nation-state, in reality Khartoum is an Arab
capital struggling to rule a vast African hinterland.
Ethnic conflict, economic change, and the declining
legitimacy of Khartoum's rule cause instability throughout
Sudan. Khartoum still controls the money and weapons, but in
the South and in Darfur its rule is failing. U.S. policy,
first to negotiate a North/South peace and now to end the
conflict in Darfur, requires active engagement with this
government in Khartoum. Although alternative policies, such
as seeking either regime change in Khartoum or a division of
the country, would not depend on relations with Khartoum;
these policies conflict with the goals of humanitarian relief
in Darfur and the economic development of the South. Over
the next two years, U.S. policy needs to focus on two
challenges, both of which require the cooperation of
Khartoum: first, placing a competent UN peace-keeping force
in Darfur and, second, fostering free and fair national
elections to be held later no later than January 2009. End
Summary.
--------------------------
All Roads Lead to Khartoum
--------------------------
¶2. (C) In Sudan, Khartoum rules. The British ruled the
country with just over 50 officers in its Sudan service by
relying on traditional authorities and apathy in the
provinces. That imperial tradition continued in independent
Sudan. The government controls the capital, but elsewhere it
accepts conditions approaching chaos. In fact, for more than
a generation the government has fomented chaos by funding
tribal militias in the South and in Darfur to confront other
indigenous groups that have taken up arms against the
garrisons in provincial capitals. The confluence of the Blue
and White Niles in Khartoum and the convergence of the rail,
road, and air transport networks in Khartoum re-enforce the
capital's pre-eminence. Khartoum is the fulcrum of power in
Sudan and the gateway between African Sudan and the rest of
the world.
¶3. (C) Members of just three tribes hold the balance of power
in Khartoum. The ethnic Arab Ja'aliyin, Shaiqiya, and
Dunqulah tribes come from the Nile valley north and south of
Khartoum. Members of these three tribes, which account for
only a small percentage of Sudan's total population, dominate
the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), as they have
previous governments. Of the 26 senior members of the NCP,
President Bashir is from the Ja'aliyin (nine in total,
including Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie and
Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al-Khalifa); Vice President Ali
Osman Taha is from the Shaiqiya (seven in total, including
Oil Minister Awad Al-Jaz and Intelligence Director Salah
Abdallah Ghosh, and, the Dunqulah provide six (including
Minister of Presidential Affairs Bakri Hassan Salah,
Presidential Adviser Mustafa Ismail, and Minister of Defense
Abd Al-Rahmin Mohamed Hussein). The same pattern repeats
itself in the upper echelons of the military and security
services. Although one of Sudan's two largest traditional
political parties (the Umma Party) has relied more on support
from the Ansari islamic sect and population west of the Nile
and the rival Democratic Unionist Party has relied on the
Khatmiya sect and population east of the Nile, the tribes of
the Nile valley controlled those parties as well. This
long-term concentration of power is extraordinary, and it
will not change in the near term.
¶4. (C) In 1989, a military coup brought President Bashir to
power. Although many members of the government are
civilians, the government stays in power because it controls
the arms and the money. In the past year Bashir has
increasingly turned to fellow military officers, such as
Minister of Defense Hussein and Minister of Presidential
Affairs Bakri, for advice. The money that Sudan receives for
petroleum sales pours into the national treasury, not into
the private economy. The government concentrates the
benefits of the economic boom in Khartoum and the surrounding
Nile Valley. There has been no benefit in Darfur, or in
Eastern Sudan, or in the South. Bashir's government is a
praetorian regime that rules by controlling the military and
the money.
KHARTOUM 00000118 002 OF 003
¶5. (C) Hassan Al Turabi's National Islamic Front (NIF) was
the political party behind the 1989 coup. Since then, Turabi
has been pushed from power by his own followers, who renamed
the party the National Congress Party. The NCP retains an
islamist agenda on social matters, and at times it appeals to
the xenophobic instincts of Sudan,s Arab tribes, for example
in opposing UN peace-keeping in Darfur. It cultivates good
relations with Iran and Hamas, but it is equally attentive to
good relations with other states in the region. The
character of the party remains islamist, but any popular
appeal it has is based less on ideology than on controlling
the levers of power and the symbols of wealth. The bottom
line is that the party chieftains, after 18 years in power,
think far more about retaining power in Khartoum than they do
about changing the world.
-----------------------
Character of the Regime
-----------------------
¶6. (C) President Bashir remains more a military man than a
politician. Rapid economic growth, which is set to see the
economy expand by 400 percent between 2000 and 2012, has
helped him to stay in office despite signing the CPA, which
all opposition parties and many members of the NCP opposed,
and despite repeated military defeats in Darfur. In public
speeches he often makes hard statements that go beyond
government policy. In official meetings he listens carefully
and responds point-by-point. He is unlikely to change his
position during a meeting, but he can change his position
over time, as he has regarding the UN role in Darfur. He is
a pragmatic decision-maker, but his criteria for
decision-making reflect Sudanese, nationalist, islamist
culture.
¶7. (C) The installation of a Government of National Unity
(GNU) in July 2005 did not weaken the NCP's grip on power.
First Vice President Salva Kiir comes to Khartoum for only
one or two days a month, and no minister from the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) has gained real power.
The NCP controls the real power ministries (defense, finance,
petroleum, interior, intelligence). In the past year, Vice
President Taha, one of the two architects of the CPA and an
advocate of greater cooperation with the international
community, has been pushed toward the margins of power, and
NCP leaders associated with hard-line policies have become
more important. After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) and formation of the Government of National
Unity, the policies of Khartoum have hardened.
¶8. (C) These rulers of Khartoum design Sudanese foreign
policy in their own interest, as they see it. They have
built strong economic relations with China, India, and
Malaysia, their main partners in the strategic petroleum
sector. They have diversified sources of arms (e.g.,
Belarus, Ukraine, China, Iran). They have emphasized Third
World solidarity, hosting recent summits of the Arab League,
the African Union (AU), and the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States (ACP). They have correct, but not
warm, relations with European countries. They would like to
have &normal8 relations with the United States -- an end to
economic sanctions and the designation as a State Sponsor of
Terrorism, some debt relief, accession to the WTO, and an
exchange of ambassadors. However, beyond maintaining
cooperation in fighting terrorism, they seem to have given up
seeking closer relations.
-----------------------
Choices for U.S. Policy
-----------------------
¶9. (C) John Garang's vision was "A New Sudan," one in which
all Sudanese would be treated fairly and even a Southerner
could become president. The USG backed that vision in the
negotiations that produced the CPA. As long as the NCP and
SPLM remain committed to that agreement, including the plan
for free and fair national elections by January 2009, the
politics of Sudan can change from the inside by Sudanese,
rather than mainly as a response to outside pressure. Now
the death of Garang, the ongoing conflict in Darfur (Ref A),
and problems in implementing the CPA (Ref B) have all made
the transformation of Sudanese politics more difficult.
¶10. (C) Ever since the 1989 coup, the United States has
applied economic sanctions against Sudan. The list of
sanctions has increased by executive action (e.g., inclusion
on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism) and by
legislative action (e.g., the Darfur Peace and Accountability
KHARTOUM 00000118 003 OF 003
Act). The campaign to encourage disinvestment from firms
doing business in Sudan is beginning to have a real impact on
European firms, who often raise money in U.S. financial
markets. Now the United States has practically no trade or
investment in Sudan, but it is Sudan,s largest donor.
Although represented at only the charge d'affaires level, the
U.S. embassy has good access to senior regime figures.
Whatever the validity and impact of U.S. sanctions policy,
the USG cannot promote an end to the conflict in Darfur or
re-activate political change inside Sudan with only
sanctions. Progress will require some active engagement with
the Khartoum government.
¶11. (C) There are at least two policy alternatives that would
respond, in part, to the fundamental contradiction that
although Sudan is legally a nation state, in reality Khartoum
is an Arab capital ruling a vast African hinterland. One
such approach is to promote a "Two Sudan Policy," with
strong, open support for the South in any dispute with the
North over the CPA, economic investments that tie the South
to East Africa rather than to Khartoum, and direct USG
training and supplies for the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA). Such a policy would aim at the independence of the
South either through the planned 2011 referendum or by
unilateral action. It would leave in place essentially
military regimes with tribal bases of power in both Khartoum
and Juba. A Two Sudan Policy would complicate USG efforts to
resolve the crisis in Darfur, and it would put at risk the
significant Sudanese cooperation in the war on terror and USG
concerns for regional security.
¶12. (C) A "Regime Change" policy could prove exceptionally
hard to implement successfully. Sudan has no tradition of
rule other than by Khartoum's dominant three tribes, and a
successor regime from those tribes would retain much of the
perspective of the Bashir government. In fact, much of the
opposition to Bashir is from elements that oppose the peace
deal with the South, invoke islamist slogans, and reject
sharing power with the "African" tribes from Darfur, Eastern
Sudan, or Southern Sudan. Regime change might be consistent
with an even stronger sanctions policy, but it is not
consistent with U.S. humanitarian objectives in Darfur or
with steps to transform the Sudanese state.
¶13. (C) As a point of reference, two other policy
alternatives are being practiced or advocated, but neither
seems suitable for the United States. China engages Khartoum
essentially as a business partner, without looking too
closely at internal affairs. However, even the Chinese are
beginning to acknowledge that their business interests may be
put at risk by insecurity in Darfur and in the South. The
International Crisis Group, which advocates maximum pressure
on Sudan and minimum engagement with Khartoum, would
effectively sacrifice humanitarian operations in Darfur,
international engagement in promoting the CPA, and long-term
Western economic interests in Sudan.
------------------
Staying the Course
------------------
¶14. (C) No policy is going to produce a quick, secure peace
in Darfur or a rapid transformation of Sudanese political
culture. In the context of the state failure that now
envelops Darfur, the deployment of a UN peace-keeping force
offers the best way to contain and to reverse the tide of
chaos. As explained in Ref A, the attitudes of President
Bashir have shifted somewhat and the challenge now is to
widen that opening. As for Sudan,s internal transformation,
the two-year period before planned national elections is
neither too short nor too long, but perhaps just the right
amount of time, to push past the stumbling blocks in the CPA
(Ref B). Sudan,s chronic instabilities cannot be resolved
easily, but active U.S. engagement can shift the Khartoum
government toward a better path.
HUME
¶12. (C) A "Regime Change" policy could prove exceptionally
hard to implement successfully. Sudan has no tradition of
rule other than by Khartoum's dominant three tribes, and a
successor regime from those tribes would retain much of the
perspective of the Bashir government. In fact, much of the
opposition to Bashir is from elements that oppose the peace
deal with the South, invoke islamist slogans, and reject
sharing power with the "African" tribes from Darfur, Eastern
Sudan, or Southern Sudan. Regime change might be consistent
with an even stronger sanctions policy, but it is not
consistent with U.S. humanitarian objectives in Darfur or
with steps to transform the Sudanese state.
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
ظللنا نقرأ ونسمع عن التنافس الصيني الأمريكي على السودان، لكن هذه الوثيقة التي تتساءل هل التواجد الصيني في السودان هو تواجد لتنين قوي أم نمر من ورق، وتحلل باستفاضة شديدة التواجد الصيني في السودان ولا مبالاة الشعب السوداني بخصوصه، وقد ضحكت وأنا أقرأها، تبين بوضوح أنه لايوجد تنافس! على كل، أول مرة أعرف أنه أصبح هناك حي صيني China Town في الخرطوم ويتعجب الكاتب من كون لحم الخنزير يباع في المتاجر الصينية علنا رغم قوانين الشريعة الإسلامية! عسى ألا يكون لحم الكلاب ايضا مما يباع فيها!
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/01/07KHARTOUM119.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000119
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE, AF/RSA, AF/EPS, AND EAP/CM
NSC FOR PITTMAN, SHORTLEY, AND ASIAN AFFAIRS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2017
TAGS: PREL ECON EFIN ETRD PGOV SOCI SU CH
SUBJECT: CHINA IN SUDAN: RISING DRAGON OR PAPER TIGER?
KHARTOUM 00000119 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: China has quickly become Sudan's most
important market, absorbing nearly 70 percent of its total
exports in 2004, and 96 percent of its oil exports in 2005.
Chinese investment and immigration have risen sharply in the
past five years, especially in Khartoum, creating a kind of
Chinatown on the Blue Nile. On the eve of President Hu
Jintao,s expected visit to Sudan in early February,
questions remain about what kind of friend China actually is,
and about what impact its economic dominance is having on
Sudanese society. More importantly, the import of China's
long-term influence in Sudan seems increasingly open to
debate. The rising dragon may turn out to be a paper tiger.
End Summary.
-----------------------------------
China's Economic Dominance in Sudan
-----------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) "Create the new and strive beyond!" exhorts a banner
-- in Chinese -- above the entrance to Sudan Hotel, on a
tree-lined stretch of the Blue Nile in central Khartoum.
Originally built for wealthy European tourists, the hotel now
houses the senior management of the China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC). The banner -- and the hotel -- symbolize
China's growing demand for oil, and its increasing influence
over Sudan's economy. According to the most recent Bank of
Sudan figures, Sudanese exports to China topped USD 2.5
billion in 2004, or nearly 67 percent of the country's total
exports; preliminary data suggests these figures may have
risen as much as 70 percent in 2005, to USD 4.3 billion.
(Note: By contrast, Japan -- Sudan's second largest export
market -- accounted for only 11 percent of the country's
exports in 2004, and probably even less in 2005. End note)
Oil comprised 83 percent of Sudan's total exports in the
first half of 2005, and almost all of it -- 96 percent --
went to China.
¶3. (C) China is also one of the largest foreign investors in
Sudan, and one of its largest sources of foreign labor.
Though the dollar value of Chinese investment lags behind
totals from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, China
leads in the number of individual projects, according to the
Ministry of Investment. The number of registered Chinese
companies in Sudan jumped from 69 in 2000 to 124 in 2005.
But the number of registered Chinese workers rose even more
sharply over the same period, from 8,300 in 2000 to nearly
24,000 in 2005, based on Ministry of Interior figures.
Moreover, according to Professor Ali Abdalla Ali of the Sudan
University of Science and Technology (protect), as many as
40,000 more unregistered Chinese are working on oil
exploration or heavy construction projects across the country
with the tacit permission of local authorities. According to
one popular story in Khartoum, there are now over 100,000
Chinese in Sudan -- many of whom, according to the rumor, the
Chinese government released from prison to work in Sudanese
oilfields.
-----------------------------
What Kind of Friend is China?
-----------------------------
¶4. (C) In reality, more and more Chinese in Sudan work
outside the petroleum sector, in service industries catering
to the country's growing Chinese community. Khartoum's
eastern suburbs are fast becoming a sort of Chinatown on the
Blue Nile. Major Chinese companies like ZTE, Huawei, and the
Zijing Group have built large compounds not far from the
ever-expanding Chinese Embassy, complete with hotels and
travel agencies for their expatriate staff. Chinese doctors
have established a private hospital specializin in
traditional Chinese medicine, and a number of small Chinese
supermarkets and restaurants have popped up across the city,
openly selling pork and alcohol in defiance of local Shari'a
law. "I came here for the money," said one waitress
matter-of-factly. "It was better than staying at home in
Yantai." Though the shops and dumpling joints are popular
with Chinese and Western expatriates alike, most Sudanese
KHARTOUM 00000119 002.2 OF 003
seem remarkably indifferent to their new Chinese neighbors.
The University of Khartoum began offering Chinese language
courses four years ago -- with a Chinese-educated Sudanese
national as the professor -- but enrollment remains very
small. "I wanted to learn Chinese so I could work for a
Chinese company," said one former student in the class. "But
it doesn't matter if you speak Arabic or Chinese, because the
Chinese won't make a Sudanese person a manager. Besides,
Chinese was so hard -- now I want to learn English."
¶5. (C) Politically, of course, Sudan's Government of National
Unity (GNU) is anything but indifferent to China; it relies
not only on China's increasing demand for oil, but also on
its tacit international support on issues like Darfur. "A
lot of people in this government turn a blind eye to whatever
the Chinese are doing here -- working illegally, smuggling
goods, selling alcohol -- because they think they need them,"
said Professor Ali. "People feel grateful because China
helped Sudan drill for oil, even though the Chinese are just
helping themselves." More recently, however, some officials
in the ruling National Congress Party fault Beijing for not
using its veto against UNSC 1706, according to Ali. "They
want to know what kind of friend China really is." China
also remains a major arms supplier for the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF), though perhaps as much for economic as
political reasons. Given the size of Sudan's oil exports to
China, Sudan is one of the few countries that enjoys a trade
surplus with China -- some 2 billion dollars in 2004 alone.
According to Professor Ali -- who serves as an advisor to the
Ministry of Finance -- China has repeatedly tried to persuade
Sudan to convert its trade surplus into goods. "Last year
they offered to give us 8 billion dollars worth of arms," he
said, though he does not know if the Government accepted the
offer.
--------------------
Exporting Corruption
--------------------
¶6. (C) China's growing economic role in Sudan is starting to
raise questions among some Sudanese, especially
intellectuals. "It's exactly what the British did here --
classic informal imperialism," said Dr. Magdi el Gizouli
(protect), a suave UK-educated medical researcher and
prominent member of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP).
Gizouli has recently written eight editorials in the Khartoum
daily &Al-Ayam8 examining China's relations with Sudan; the
articles created "a bit of a stir" when published, Gizolui
admitted, but that seems to have been his primary goal. "No
one in Sudan wants to think of themselves as being
re-colonized, especially by China." Gizouli laughed at the
irony of a Sudanese Communist criticizing a nominally
Communist state as imperialist, but quickly added that he
didn't believe China had ever really been communist -- and
that the Chinese Communist Party had never had good relations
with the party in Sudan. "China is here to take our oil, but
what are they giving us in return? The British at least gave
us Western ideas. The Chinese just give money to a few
people in the Government who are already very rich."
¶7. (C) Professor Ali agreed, charging that China was actually
"exporting corruption" to Sudan. "We have been brought up
with British law and Islamic justice, but now the Chinese are
destroying it," he moaned. "They send government officials
to China in business class, show them the Great Wall, and
give them expensive gifts. And no one wants to talk about it
because their mouths are full of money." Chinese-style
corruption does seem to be making inroads in Sudan.
Khartoum's property market has become inflated, Ali charged,
because local Chinese managers have started "padding prices."
The contracting manager asks the seller to write the
contract for a higher price than the actual sales price, and
reports the higher figure to the company; he then keeps the
difference, or shares it with his boss. Worse, said Ali, as
more and more Chinese in Sudan enter the retail sector --
typically selling Chinese-made goods they smuggled into the
country -- they drive out local merchants who cannot compete
on price. "Sudanese always used to go to the Canton Fair,
but now they don't, because they simply can't complete with a
KHARTOUM 00000119 003.2 OF 003
Chinese merchant who hasn't paid customs duties." There has
been no talk of a boycott of Chinese goods, Ali admitted, but
most Sudanese prefer to buy Western goods simply because the
quality is better. "Of course we can't buy American goods
because of the sanctions, so we really don't have much
choice," he joked.
--------------------------
Comment: Dragon or Tiger?
--------------------------
¶8. (C) Professor Ali may be overstating his case, but China's
strong economic influence in Sudan no doubt stems at least in
part from the absence of U.S. economic competition. More
poignantly, China's increasing investment in Sudan and its
economic dominance here come not only in spite of U.S.
sanctions, but from China's thirst for new sources of oil to
fuel its own economic expansion -- an expansion funded by
U.S. investors and U.S. consumers. On the eve of President
Hu Jintao,s expected visit to Sudan in early February, it
seems too early to say what kind of impact China will have on
Sudan over the long term. If the broader international
environment changes, or if domestic resentment continues to
grow, China may seem less like a rising dragon and more like
a paper tiger.
HUME
التعديل لإضافة رابط الصفحة.
(عدل بواسطة محمد عثمان الحاج on 09-04-2011, 06:43 PM)
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وثيقة أخرى تثير الضحك، هل يعقل أن يكون الوهابي عبد الحي يوسف أحد الرموز الإسلامية القيادية بين مسلمي السودان التي تدعو للاعتدال ونبذ العنف؟
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/09/07KHARTOUM1438.html
S E C R E T KHARTOUM 001438
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR NCTC LIAISON JAMES VAN DE VELDE AND AF/PD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2017
TAGS: PREL KISL PINR SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN - IDENTIFYING "CREDIBLE VOICES" IN MUSLIM
COMMUNITIES THAT REJECT VIOLENCE
REF: STATE 122288
Classified By: ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. REASON: 1.4 (C).
¶1. (S) Embassy Khartoum has identified a few &credible
voices8 in Sudan,s Muslim community. The following
information was requested in reftel:
¶2. (S) NAME: Tigani Hassan Al-Amin, chairman of the Center of
Faith Research Center.
INFLUENCE: Al-Amin is known for his open-mindedness. His
influence is limited to Sudanese audiences, particularly his
university students and fellow academics, although he could
potentially have a wider reach.
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA: DPOB 1930s, Debebat (South Kordofan
State). Al-Amin is a veterinarian by training, obtaining
degrees from the University of Khartoum and the U.K. in the
1960s and 1970s. He teaches biochemistry at the University
of Khartoum, where he has also served as dean of students.
He has served as minister for agriculture for Khartoum State
in the late 1980s, as vice chancellor of University of Jazira
(central Sudan) in the early 1990s, and as governor of North
Darfur State in the mid-1990s. He interprets science in
accordance with the Qur,an. He is a member of the Islamic
Jurisprudence Council where he welcomed U.S. visiting
speaker, Imam Wainwright in 2005. In 1979, he traveled to
the United States as an International Visitor and Leadership
Program grantee.
GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF THE INDIVIDUAL,S INFLUENCE: Sudan.
AUDIENCE THE INDIVIDUAL DOES/COULD INFLUENCE: University
students and scholars, television audiences.
FORUMS USED BY THE INDIVIDUAL TO EXERT INFLUENCE:
Universities, television. Al-Amin appears occasionally on
Sudan Television and Blue Nile Television.
CREDIBILITY AND SUITABILITY: No known derogatory information.
Appears favorably disposed toward the U.S.
¶3. (S) NAME: Abdel Hai Yousif, imam of the Doaha Mosque in
Jebra (Khartoum).
INFLUENCE: Yousif is a respected voice among Sudanese and
could potentially have a wide reach.
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA: DPOB: Unknown, although believed to
be in his 40s. Yousif studied in Saudi Arabia and teaches
Islamic Jurisprudence at the University of Khartoum. Until
about two years ago, he had a television show entitled
&Al-Fatawa.8
GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF THE INDIVIDUAL,S INFLUENCE: Sudan.
AUDIENCE THE INDIVIDUAL DOES/COULD INFLUENCE: Scholars and
students, and potentially a broader audience spanning both
the younger and older generation.
FORUMS USED BY THE INDIVIDUAL TO EXERT INFLUENCE: Television,
radio, universities, mosques.
CREDIBILITY AND SUITABILITY: No known derogatory information.
Appears favorably disposed toward the U.S.
¶4. (S) NAME: Mohamed Hassan Mohamed Al-Fatih Gariballa,
leader of the Sammanyia (Sufi) sect.
INFLUENCE: Gariballa,s influence is limited to followers of
the Sammanyia sect.
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA: DPOB 01/25/65, Edinburgh, U.K. Gariballa
has led the Sammaniya sect since 2005. He holds a
bachelor,s degree in international law from the University
of Fez (Morocco), and teaches Islamic Jurisprudence at the
Gariballa Mosque. He spent five years in the U.K. where he
studied English and worked as a translator. As leader of the
Sammaniya sect and various charities, he has traveled
frequently to the U.K. and Nigeria. In June 2006, he
traveled to the United States as an International Visitor and
Leadership Program grantee (&U.S. Political Process for
Emerging Muslim Leaders.8)
GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF THE INDIVIDUAL,S INFLUENCE: Sudan.
AUDIENCE THE INDIVIDUAL DOES/COULD INFLUENCE: Sammanyia
adherents and the generation of younger Sudanese.
FORUMS USED BY THE INDIVIDUAL TO EXERT INFLUENCE: Mosques.
CREDIBILITY AND SUITABILITY: No known derogatory information.
Appears favorably disposed toward the U.S.
FERNANDEZ
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وثيقة أخرى مثيرة للاهتمام ترصد باستفاضة دور شقيق الرئيس البشير الطبيب عبد الله البشير وزوجته عبر مؤسستهما الخيرية مؤسسة رفيدة الطبية التي تزعم الوثيقة أنها تعالج آلام ضحايا سياسات بطش النظام، وتصف شقيق الرئيس بأنه الشقيق الطيب! هل يعني ذلك إشارة إلى أن كاتبها أحس بأن البشير يعد شقيقه الطبيب العسكري لخلافته؟ من العجيب أن الجمعيات الخيرية الخاصة بأسرة زعيم دولة مجاورة كانت هي المعبر الأكبر للفساد وسرقة مال الشعب وهو ما لم تتفحصه الوثيقة: من يمول المنظمة وماذا يدور في كواليس تعاملاتها المالية؟ على كل كون أن هذا الشقيق أثار اهتمام كاتب الوثيقة ربما يعبر عن إحساس منه بأن هذا الرجل يعد لدور أكبر في مستقبل السودان:
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08KHARTOUM195.html
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000195
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SE WILLAMSON AND AF/SPG
DEPARTMENT PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID SOCI KHIV SU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BASHIR'S NICER BROTHER: RUFAIDA MEDICAL
FOUNDATION ASSISTS VICTIMS OF THE REGIME'S OWN BRUTAL
POLICIES
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Led by President Omar Al-Bashir,s brother
and sister-in-law, the Rufaida Health Foundation (RHF)
promotes health services and disaster relief throughout
Sudan, notably to populations marginalized or victimized by
the policies of the Khartoum government. The Foundation also
works to promote HIV/AIDS and drug abuse awareness and
treatment. RHFs efforts highlight the contradictions of
Sudan,s political elite. End summary.
¶2. (U) On February 6, CDA Fernandez visited the small but
active Rufaida Health Foundation and met with RHF Secretary
General Dr. Abdullah Al-Bashir and his wife Dr. Nur El Huda
Shafie, RHF,s Executive Manager. Dr. Al-Bashir, who is an
Irish-trained surgeon in the Sudan Armed Forces Medical
Corps, is the younger brother of Sudanese President Omar
Al-Bashir. Dr. Al-Bashir noted that he must balance his work
load at the Foundation with his military duties. The
Al-Bashirs described the twin objectives of their Foundation
as medical disaster relief and promoting health services
throughout Sudan, including in Darfur and other marginalized
areas.
Disaster Relief ) Darfur and Beyond
-----------------------------------
¶3. (U) The Al-Bashir,s outlined the RHF,s activities in
Darfur. Partnered with the European Union, the Foundation
provides both physical and psychological-health services to
the local population, including IDPs. The Foundation's
services include psychological counseling and treatment to
victims of violence, notably traumatized women and children.
Education and therapy seek to promote a &culture of peace8
among the population by encouraging recipients to think about
ways they can work together to resolve problems. The NGO was
previously active in Nyala's teeming Kalma IDP camp and now
has an operation in neighboring Otash IDP camp. Dr. Nur
described working in Kalma "sitting with weeping women
telling you their stories, and you cry too."
¶4. (U) In addition to its Darfur activities, RHF provides
emergency medical assistance in natural and man-made disaster
areas elsewhere in Sudan, and in areas lacking basic medical
care via mobile clinics in partnership with UNICEF. The
Foundation has worked in South Sudan, for example, providing
post-conflict services in Bentiu, similar to what is
providing now in Darfur. CDA commented that, from his
experience, this type of mental health outreach is unusual in
the Arab world. Dr. Nur agreed that mental health services
currently are largely limited to hospitals and need to be
more broadly available.
HIV/AIDS and Drug Abuse Programs
--------------------------------
¶5. (U) The Al-Bashirs also described the Foundation's
efforts to combat HIV/AIDS and drug abuse. With the support
of UNAIDS, RHF works to encourage safe behavior among the
population (focusing on high-risk groups, including the
prison population and truck drivers) and to make HIV/AIDS
services available. RHF also provides drug education and
prevention services. Dr. Shafie noted that narcotics are a
growing problem in Sudan, due to its location on a transit
route for drug smuggling, which contributes to the spread of
HIV. The Foundation provides drug-education in the schools,
training students who provide the instruction, believing that
such peer-to-peer programs will have more credibility.
Opportunities for Partnership
-----------------------------
¶6. (U) The CDA expressed his admiration for the work that
RHF is doing and said he would encourage American NGO and
government institutions to get in contact to explore possible
opportunities for cooperation. He noted that USAID already
has a large health program in Sudan, mostly in the South but
it is consulting internally on how best to restructure its
programs in the rest of the country, especially in Darfur.
There is a need, of course, for improved physical and mental
health services throughout Sudan. He added that the United
States has been providing extensive emergency humanitarian
aid in Darfur, but wants to begin to transition to
development assistance, as it as done in the South. Health
programs will be a key part of development in Darfur but only
a real improvement in the security situation will enable the
international community to shift to early recovery programs.
KHARTOUM 00000195 002 OF 002
Comment
-------
¶7. (SBU) The work of the Rufaida Health Foundation reflects
some of the complexity and irony of Sudan,s internal
turmoil. While the GoS has marginalized wide swaths of the
country and its population - and has unleashed terrible
suffering in Darfur and earlier in the South - President Al
Bashir,s own brother ######### an NGO that is performing relief
work in these same geographic areas, notably to victims of
government-inspired violence. The Foundation also is
reaching out to areas that are neglected by Khartoum. We
resisted the temptation to ask this busy, well-intentioned
couple an obvious question: wouldn't their labors be
lightened if the Government headed by their brother wasn't so
bent on traumatizing so many of its own citizens?
FERNANDEZ
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وثيقة ربما تحمل البشرى بأن نجم نافع علي نافع الذي يمثل واحدا من أبشع وجوه بطش الإنقاذ واستهتارها بالشعب السوداني ربما يسير إلى هبوط في المؤتمر الوطني :
تقول الوثيقة في جزء منها تعقيبا على هجوم كلامي شديد شنه نافع على أمريكا (ترجمة سريعة لذلك الجزء فقط):
تحدث القائم فرناندز بتاريخ 19 فبراير مع دكتور مصطفى ووبخه على نغمة تعليقات نافع التي أتت بعد وقت قصير من زيارة إيجابية بارزة لواشنطن قام بها وزير الخارجية واسماعيل نفسه. ورد اسماعيل بأن السودان مخلص فيما يخص كل شئ قاله السودان في واشنطن، وأن ملاحظات نافع الخارجة على الخط هي للاستهلاك الداخلي أمام حضور جماهيري، ويجب أن توضع في ذلك السياق. وقال “ الشريعة ليست من ضمن أجندتكم في السودان ولكن الـ CPA ودارفور هي من ضمنها، تعليقات نافع لا معنى لها” ، وأضاف اسماعيل أنه يجب على الولايات المتحدة ألا تستقرأ الكثير من مثل هذه الانفجارات الكلامية بل يجب أن تستهدى بالتعليقات المكتوبة من جانب الرئيس البشير والتي هي ليست معادية للولايات المتحدة أو لتطبيق الـ UNAMID أو الـ CPA”، وواصل رده قائلا أنه في بعض الأحيان فإن مسؤولين أمريكيين كبار وحتى الرئيس بوش نفسه يقولون أشياء عن السودان يتوجب عليهم قولها لجمهور داخل المنزل لكن “ نحن نفهم أصول اللعبة”. !!!!
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08KHARTOUM239.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000239
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, S/E WILLIAMSON
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013
TAGS: PREF SU AU PGOV UN
SUBJECT: MORE BLUSTER FROM PARTY LEADER NAFIE
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Addressing a massive rally February 18 in Sodiri, on
the Kordofan/Darfur border, Presidential Advisor and National
Congress Party leader Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie lashed out at the
US administration and said that Secretary Rice should "lick
her elbow" (do the impossible) if she believes that Sudan
would succumb to US and western pressures to abandon its
adherence to Islamic sharia law, or to allow international
interference in internal matters. During his speech Nafie
also told the crowd that UNAMID activity in Darfur would be
restricted to its explicit mandate, and would not be
permitted to exceed it in the slightest. According to daily
newspaper Akher Lahza, Nafie also derisively characterized
the hybrid force as "forces of dough," and referred to JEM as
"robbers and murderers."
¶2. (C) Nafie's speech provides a sharp contrast to remarks
made by Presidential Advisor Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail the
same day, who said that his recent visit to Washington with
FM Deng Alor had been a successful one. In his press
statements, Osman said that discussions included proposals on
normalizing US-Sudan relations. Osman did not elaborate
further, saying that additional details would be made public
once the FM returned and had the opportunity to brief
President Bashir (Alor returns Wednesday evening). Other
press reports hinted that one outcome of the visit would be
the resolution of the fates of Sudanese Guantanamo detainees,
possibly to include the release of Al Jazeera cameraman Sami
al-Haj.
¶3. (C) Charge Fernandez spoke on February 19 to Dr. Mustafa
and chided him for the tone of Nafie's remarks so soon after
an ostensibly positive visit to Washington by the Foreign
Minister and Ismail himself. Ismail answered that Sudan is
sincere about everything it said in Washington and that
Nafie's off-the-cuff remarks were for internal consumption,
to a popular audience and need to be put in context. "Sharia
is not something on your agenda in Sudan, CPA and Darfur
are," he noted, "Nafie's words are meaningless". Ismail added
that the US should not read too much into such outbursts but
be guided by the written remarks of President Al-Bashir
"which are not hostile to the US, to UNAMID implementation or
to the CPA." He further riposted that sometimes senior US
officials, even President Bush, say things about Sudan that
they have to say for a domestic audience, but "we understand
how the game is played".
¶4. (C) Comment: Both Nafie's overheated rhetoric and his
timing are typical of the power jockeying that takes place
within the NCP. While Osman's public remarks are not
necessarily conciliatory, they at least suggest that the
state of US-Sudan relations is negotiable rather than
permanently, negatively fixed. Ismail's personal comments to
the CDA are right in that President Al-Bashir's official
remarks are the best gauge of Sudanese policy, but the regime
risks alienating its own radicalized masses if it continues
to whip them up and really does want a better relationship
with the U.S. Such a relationship would, sooner or later,
lead to confrontation with, or marginalization of, extremists
like Dr. Nafie. End comment.
FERNANDEZ
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: أحمد أمين)
|
وثيقة مضحكة ومبكية في آن: مضحكة لأن كاتبها يظن أن مضوي الترابي حزب أمة، كيف يقع هؤلاء الناس الذين ما تركوا صغيرة ولاكبيرة إلا أحصوها في خطأ كهذا؟ أما المبكي فهي محاولة "البزنسة" التي قام بها مضوي الترابي الرخيصة للتوسط بين الجيش السوداني (وهل هو جيش سوداني إنه مليشيا البشير) وبين الجيش الأمريكي زاعما أنه أخذ الضوء الأخضر في ذلك من البشير نفسهومن وزير دفاعه!
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
VZCZCXRO2021
PP RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1158/01 2160856
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030856Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1486
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVEC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001158
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: UMMA PARLIAMENTARIAN TURABI URGES SAF-US DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT COOPERATION, PROVIDES INSIDE LOOK AT ALL PARTY
DARFUR INITIATIVE
REF: KHARTOUM 1117
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 29 meeting with CDA Fernandez,
Umma Party Parliamentarian Mudawi al Turabi claimed to have
Presidential approval to initiate discussions for cooperation
on civil affairs between the Sudeanese Armed Forces (SAF) and
the U.S. Defense Department, including engineering projects,
relief efforts and other confidence-building measures. He
also provided insight into the mechanics of the all-party
initiative recently trumpeted by President Bashir (Reftel),
and how it is being used to formulate an international and
domestic political response to address the crisis in Darfur.
END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) Having recently returned from Washington, DC, Turabi
was eager to share with CDA Fernandez what he claimed was his
ongoing correspondence with a Col. Shannon Beebe of the
Office of the U.S. Army's Deputy Chief of Staff. While in
Washington, Turabi maintained that he had met with Col. Beebe
and various constituencies within the U.S. Department of
Defense, to whom he proposed a renewal of long dormant
U.S.-Sudanese military cooperation. Acknowledging the
political sensitivities involved in such an endeavor, Turabi
proposed cooperation on civil affairs, such as engineering
projects, expanding Darfur airstrips or relief efforts,
possibly in conjunction with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. He cited hydroelectric power projects as one area
of potential cooperation, noting that it would be "of good
value to Sudanese citizens." When informed by CDA Fernandez
that Post has attempted to engage the Ministry of Defense on
such issues in the past to no avail, Turabi asserted that
this time it would be different, as it had been blessed by
the Defense Minister, Major General Abdul Rahim Hussein, and
by President Bashir himself. Bashir had coincidently been
visting the MOD the same day that Turabi did and had approved
such an idea. CDA Fernandez then reminded Turabi that
whatever his correspondence with the Pentagon to date, any
such initiative must be introduced first through U.S. Embassy
Khartoum. Turabi promised an outreach from the Ministry of
Defense to the Embassy within the next few weeks, and also
said he would forward his correspondence with the Pentagon to
CDA Fernandez.
¶3. (C) Turabi then proceeded to shed some light on the
all-party Darfur initiative announced by President Bashir
during his recent trip to the region (Reftel). Turabi stated
that the initiative is taking shape with the formation of six
committees addressing i) political solutions; ii)
humanitarian solutions; iii) international engagement; iv)
public information; v) reconciliation; and vi) development.
The committees, he said, will be staffed by representatives
of the 32 existing political parties and aided by civil
society and academia. Each committee would have about 15
members. He described the initiative as an all-inclusive way
to meld the various constituencies' proposals to resolve
Darfur crisis. Turabi stated that Sadig al Mahdi will likely
play a big role and chair one of the committees, though
privately he expressed skepticism of al Mahdi as a tool for
resolution of the crisis. He also noted the involvement of
powerful insiders Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and
NCP Political Secretary Mandour al Mahdi, each of whose
engagement gives credence to the seriousness with which the
regime is approaching the initiative. The initiative would be
followed by some sort of mass meeting or conference,
including Darfuri rebels and civilians, and involving the
international community as observers.
¶4. (C) COMMENT: Turabi's involvement in the all-party Darfur
initiative provides an inside look at how party leaders are
coming together to formulate a plan that will serve as both a
domestic political response and as an answer to the
international community on Darfur. In order to be successful
however, the initiative must transcend the emphasis on
process and form to achieve substantive results in the very
near future. His rosy view on Sudanese eagerness to cooperate
with the US military (which assumes that we want to cooperate
with SAF) is totally at odds with the regime's track record.
MOD has stymied approval of USMILOBs for UNAMID, kept DLO and
Charge at a distance, and blocked travel by embassy officers
to Darfur that had been approved by other Sudanese government
agencies. While we have no reason to doubt Turabi's account,
it just doesn't ring true and we will be watching to see if
there is any substance at all to this confused story. End
KHARTOUM 00001158 002 OF 002
comment.
FERNANDEZ
التعديل لإضافة رابط الوثيقة
(عدل بواسطة محمد عثمان الحاج on 09-05-2011, 03:45 PM)
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: بريمة محمد)
|
لك الشكر أخي قلقو وأخي بريمة.
وثيقة مضحكة أخرى تتحدث عن آخر موضة ثوب سوداني في الخرطوم أيامها: ثوب أوكامبو!
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001393
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPAO KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: MY MY, IS THAT AN OCAMPO YOU'RE WEARING?
¶1. SUMMARY: The latest fashion craze for Sudanese women is a toup
(traditional Sudanese sari-like dress) named after International
Criminal Court chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo. The "Ocampo"
toup is a glittering, sequin-heavy design of chiffon. Its title
continues a trend of naming clothing items and other ubiquitous
parts of the Khartoum cultural landscape after significant social
and political figures. In a society where the concept of "sex
sells" is illegal, sardonic epithets are one the few ways of venting
that is vaguely tolerated by the regime. END SUMMARY.
¶2. Since the 1960s, merchants have been giving nicknames to products
in Sudan that have made their mark on the cultural tapestry of the
country. The Khartoum Belail ("Khartoum in the Night") refers to an
item of clothing with glitter-encrusted fabric, which was popular
with women throughout Sudan when Khartoum was the only major city
with regular electricity. Likewise, in the 1970s the donning of a
"Leyla Elwi" was for those hoping for a bit of the glamour made
popular by an Egyptian movie star of the same name. Proving that
Ocampo wasn't the first Argentine to leave a cultural mark on Sudan,
the striped "Maradona" (named after the famous soccer player and his
signature jersey) was a hit.
¶3. Beginning with the fall of Nimeri's regime in the 1980s, however,
the "Intifada" ("uprising") toup marked the beginning of a political
slant for items across the Sudanese marketplace. With the signing
of the CPA, the "Naivasha" became in style. After John Garang's
death, a popular Nokia cell phone was given the handle "Salva Kiir"
(so-called because it, too, was "new and black.") And the
ever-present wide-body Toyota pick-up truck was given the moniker
"Widad Babikir" (after Sudanese President Bashir's full-figured
second wife.) Along with the "Ocampo," a red silk design known as
"Hummer" (after the American military vehicle) is currently one of
most popular and expensive items, retailing at over USD 300 per
toup.
¶4. COMMENT: In a society where the nightlife of Khartoum was once
the envy of the continent and Sudanese university students were
revered for their objective attitudes, Sharia law and authoritarian
rule have forced many sentiments underground. As a recent Agence
France-Presse article on the "Ocampo toup" recently suggested,
despite its popularity, many shopkeepers are reluctant to openly
label or talk to foreigners about this latest fashion trend. But
these nicknames can provide a glimpse into the critical mindset
still alive inside a people largely disgruntled with their
government.
FERNANDEZ
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وثيقة تبين كيف أن صلاح غوش حاول تخويف الأمريكان من المتطرفين الإسلاميين فيما لو مضت محاولات إدانة البشير أمام المحكمة الجنائية الدولية للأمام، وبعد أن رأينا كيف أن الناتو تحالف مع جماعة جهادية متطرفة لها صلة بالقاعدة هي الجماعة الليبية المقاتلة من أجل إسقاط القذافي، هل لا تزال هذه الفزاعة تعمل؟
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001417
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE INTEL CHIEF WORRIED ABOUT ISLAMIC
RADICALS IF ICC ISSUES ARREST WARRANT AGAINST PRESIDENT
BASHIR
REF: KHARTOUM 1405
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The GOS will be hard-pressed to control the
actions of Islamic radicals in Sudan if the ICC issues an
arrest warrant against President Bashir, NISS Chief Salah
Ghosh told CDA Fernandez September 17. Ghosh clarified that
he did not tell French Presidential Advisor Bruno Joubert
that the GOS would "unleash" radicals against western
interests in Sudan if an arrest warrant is issued, but rather
that it would be increasingly difficult for the GOS to
control them and would even be challenged to protect itself
against extremist groups, who would question why the regime
is cooperating with the West if an arrest warrant is issued
despite such cooperation. On Darfur, Ghosh said that he and
Vice President Taha met with representatives of SLM leader
Minni Minawi September 17 to discuss ways of bringing Minawi
back into the GNU and requested US assistance to encourage
Minawi to return to Khartoum. Regarding UNAMID deployment,
CDA Fernandez encouraged Ghosh to press the regime to allow
Ethiopian and Egyptian peacekeepers to drive overland
directly into Darfur to facilitate their rapid deployment.
End summary.
Controlling Islamic Radicals in Sudan
-------------------------------------
¶2. (C) National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)
Chief Salah Ghosh told CDA Fernandez (accompanied by Station
Chief and polchief) September 17 that the regime will have a
difficult time controlling radical Islamic extremist groups
in Sudan if the ICC issues an arrest warrant against
President Bashir. Ghosh clarified that he did not tell
French Presidential Advisor Bruno Joubert that the regime
would "unleash" radicals against Western interests in Sudan
if an arrest warrant is issued, as the French and some other
diplomats have been saying. He noted that he had explained
this to Joubert in Arabic and Joubert's translator had put it
into French so NISS had no idea that such an alarming
misinterpretation was making the rounds. He asked that the
Americans "correct the record" with any misinformed Europeans
and added that he had told EU Special Representative Torben
Brylle, who speaks English, the accurate account. Ghosh
said the NISS currently keeps close tabs on Islamic radical
"cells" (he avoided using the term "terrorists") and meets
regularly with them. Ghosh said he personally has met with
these extremists in prison as well as others at the mosques
in order to "change their minds."
¶3. (C) Ghosh said that the regime had been successful in
turning many potential jihadists away from violent action
although they still held extreme views without actually
committing any crime. "We told them that real jihad is
organized fighting in defense of the country," so war with
Israel or with Chad would be jihad, but not targeting South
Sudan or diplomats or peacekeepers accepted by Sudan. "The
best way is to convince the cells to change their behavior,"
said Ghosh, but if there is an arrest warrant against
President Bashir "we will lose control" of the situation and
of monitoring these groups and it will be increasingly
"difficult to take care of security since we will be focused
on protecting our own leaders." He noted that two of the
members of a terrorist cell that killed US Embassy staff on
January 1 had roots in the regime's "Islamic Movement" but he
feared that a polarized political situation would turn such a
trickle into a torrent and sweep away the regime.
¶4. (C) Ghosh said that Islamic extremists will become
increasingly radicalized if there is an arrest warrant
against the President and will ask "what has the CIA done for
you? Why are we cooperating? Let's go to Jihad." Ghosh
pointed out that President Bashir, FVP Salva Kiir, and he
himself have already been identified as the top potential
targets by the busted Al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Niles
(AQTN) group of August 2007 due to perceived cooperation with
the West. Ghosh said the regime recognizes that "the ICC is
a political game" and that "the Save Darfur lobby is trying
to mobilize against us. Those are our enemies, we have no
other enemies, certainly not the United States." Ghosh
warned that an ICC indictment against the President "will be
KHARTOUM 00001417 002 OF 003
the start of a direct clash between us and the international
community." To avoid this, Ghosh urged greater engagement
between Sudan and the US and expressed hope for "greater
confidence" between the NCP and the USG. Politicians in the
US are harsh with the NCP and count our faults, never looking
for the positive, while the US is always willing to overlook
the defects of the SPLM in spite of corruption in the GOSS,
complained Ghosh. "We need close engagement if you want to
help us," urged Ghosh. He readily admitted that Sudan has
made many mistakes and needs to accommodate fully American
concerns about UNAMID deployment, a peace process and
American humanitarian concerns in Darfur.
¶5. (C) Ghosh said that he is committed fully to
counter-terrorism cooperation despite the pressure of some
politicians in the regime to stop it. If they end cooperation
with the U.S. "I will leave my position," he noted, as he
believed that both countries benefited from this. He made a
particular point of emphasizing the practical value of this
link as a means of bilateral communication between the GOS
and USG. He added that he understood Washington's suspicion
of the NCP, "you think they have too much power and you would
like to see them cut down to size." "We know that you are
for using the political process to weaken them some, using
your friends like the SPLM and other parties." This is
politics and it is reasonable, "that is the way the political
game is played whether in Sudan or America." He would like
to see monthly meetings with the Charge because "this is very
useful to speak honestly and clearly to each other."
Ghosh and VP Taha Meet with SLM/Minawi Representatives
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶6. (C) Ghosh said that he and VP Ali Osman Taha had just met
with SLM/Minawi representative (and head of DPA
implementation) Mohammed el Tijane to discuss ways of
bringing Minawi back to Khartoum and implement the DPA.
Ghosh requested the help of the US "to convince Minawi to
return to Khartoum" and said that Taha might even travel to
El Fasher to meet with Minawi to discuss DPA implementation.
(Note: Separately, Tijane passed the same information to CDA
and polchief at the CDA's Ramadan Iftar at the Rotana Hotel
in Khartoum September 17 and to AF/SPG TDYoff later that
evening. Tijane complained of continued attacks September 17
by GOS forces in north Darfur outside of Khazan Tunjur but
said that the fighting had stopped by 6:30 pm. Minawi
himself confirmed this information to poloff in Darfur by
satphone late the evening of September 17 and claimed that
SLM forces routed the GOS forces and took 40 of their
vehicles. Minawi confirmed the meetings of his
representatives with Ghosh and Taha and questioned why Nafie
was not involved. He also questioned the sincerity of Ghosh
and Taha given the ongoing GOS attacks even while the regime
was meeting with SLM officials in Khartoum. At noon on
September 18, CDA Fernandez spoke to Minawi by satphone.
Minnawi reported no ground fighting but a "SAF Antonov" had
bombed near Tabit (30 miles SW of El Fasher) killing 5
civilians working in their fields. Minawi said that he feared
the "not only the NCP, but SAF has its factions and you agree
with one and the other does this." He was not opposed to
meeting Taha on Friday, September 19 but wanted tangible
results from the meeting and guarantees against further
attacks, and asked rhetorically "is he reaching out because
he is going to New York and has to look like a peacemaker?"
End note.)
¶7. (C) Ghosh said that the problem of Minawi "was not a deep
one." He cheerfully admitted that some of the problems were
created by the NCP, some were of Minawi's own creation and
had to do with corruption, lack of capacity and ethnic
problems between Zaghawa and non-Zaghawa. The death in a car
accident of Darfur negotiator Magzoub al-Khalifa in July 2007
had left a gap in relations with Minawi that the toxic Nafie
Ali Nafie, Al-Khalifa's successor with the Darfur file, had
not even bothered to try to fill.
Overland Deployment of Ethiopian and Egyptian UNAMID Troops
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶8. (C) CDA Fernandez suggested to Ghosh that the regime could
improve its image and relations with the West by allowing and
KHARTOUM 00001417 003 OF 003
encouraging Ethiopian and Egyptian UNAMID peacekeeping troops
to deploy overland to Darfur (as discussed with AF/SPG
Shortley via SVTC September 16). CDA noted that this would be
both a tangible and a symbolic change that would enhance
Western confidence that the regime wants to change its ways.
Ghosh promised to consider the proposal and discuss it with
others in the regime. CDA also noted that "if we look at
tangible results since July, we seem to be going backwards in
Darfur." The current military campaign, actions against IDP
camps, such as the Kalma massacre and harassment of NGOs
continues unabated, especially in South Darfur. Ghosh
responded that "the problem is that South Darfur state is in
the hands of the janjaweed," and is the stronghold of
Darfur's Arab tribes, unlike North and West Darfur states
where Africans serve as governor and there is less NGO
harassment and less pressure on IDP camps. CDA Fernandez
noted that there are Arab tribes, such as the Baggara
Rizeigat, who refused to join in the fighting, "there has to
be a way of ensuring order, without falling into brutality
such as we saw in Kalma." If there was a vote today on ICC
deferral today at the Security Council, "we would veto,
although there is still time to change. Ghosh readily
admitted that "we need to change."
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Friendly and eminently open to engagement with the US
throughout the meeting (never more so than in this particular
meeting), Ghosh was meticulously careful to present the
potential actions of Sudanese extremists in response to an
ICC arrest warrant as a risk, rather than as a threat by the
regime. The NCP is no doubt worried about keeping a lid on
extremists, but its primary concern at the moment is
convincing the West to help it avoid an ICC arrest warrant
against Bashir by any means necessary. The meeting of Ghosh
and Taha with SLM rep Tijane is a positive sign, but only if
the regime is serious about making tangible concessions to
Minawi in implementing more of the DPA in order to ensure his
return to Khartoum. The continued attacks on Minawi
simultaneous to the talks in Khartoum could be a sign that
the regime hopes to convince Minawi by all means necessary,
that it is entirely duplicitous, or - perhaps most alarming -
not completely in control of events. Unfortunately it is
likely the latter, as the regime has thus far proven itself
incapable even of presenting the basic outlines of a possible
solution to Darfur in its much touted Darfur People's
Initiative (which remains an empty shell weeks after being
announced). However the regime is under increasing pressure
to do something on Darfur in advance of the UNGA next week
and possible discussions of an article 16 ICC deferral in the
following weeks, and may yet present a proposal on Darfur in
advance of or at the UNGA, as VP Taha himself will head the
GOS delegation in NY next week (as predicted by FM Alor in
reftel).
FERNANDEZ
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
جزء كبير من الوثائق يتعلق بدارفور وما قرأته منها جعلني أشعر بالأسف الشديد لأن حركات دارفور المسلحة أعطت انطباعا سلبيا وأسهمت في قتل قضية دارفور وفقدت الاحترام الدولي، وأرجو أن يدرس إخوتنا في هذه الحركات هذه الوثائق جيدا، هنا وثيقة مثيرة للاهتمام: شكوى من رؤساء مفوضية التعويضات والسلطة القبلية (أحدهما ينتمي لقبيلة الميما) ضد قبيلة الزغاوة!
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001449
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C, NEA
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: TDRA OFFICIALS FEAR ZAGHAWA DOMINANCE IN
SLM/MINNAWI AND DARFUR AS A WHOLE
REF: KHARTOUM 1383
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 23, the leaders of both the
Compensation and Land Commissions in the Transitional Darfur
Regional Authority (TDRA) told poloff that they fear the
Zaghawa tribe's dominance in Darfur and the Sudan Liberation
Movement of Minni Minnawi (SLM/MM). Head of the Land
Commission, Adam Abdulrahman Adam, emphasized that Minnawi
lacks control over many unruly Zaghawa commanders, who
regularly pillage non-Zaghawa villages, steal livestock
throughout Darfur, and kill civilians attempting to defend
themselves against these attacks. Meanwhile, Chairman of the
Compensation Committee, Abulgasim Ahmed Abulgasim, stated
that the Zaghawa lead all of the most active rebel movements,
and will therefore dominate future negotiations on Darfur, a
prospect that is unacceptable to the majority of Darfuris.
END SUMMARY.
ZAGHAWA AND SLM/MM RAIDING NEIGHBORING TRIBES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (SBU) On September 22, TDRA Land Commissioner Adam
called poloff and reported that on September 19 and 20,
SLM/MM supported Zaghawa raids on Gusa Jemed (near Wad'a)
stealing animals, destroying homes, and killing four people
of the Mima tribe (of which Adam is a member.) Adam added
that on September 21, another SLM force of approximately
twenty vehicles gathered near Id Al-Beida (outside of Dar Es
Salaam) and conducted raids on Om Shajar, burning three
villages, and allegedly displacing 1,500 people. Adam stated
that this form of raiding has intensified in the last three
months, and that "all of Darfur is slowly starting to turn
against the Zaghawa." Adam claimed that this is the 26th
raid since he started to document this form of activity
following the signing of the DPA. Adam also claimed that
the SLM/Zaghawa have killed over 150 people in such raids in
the last two years. Presidential Advisor Abdullah Masar told
CDA Fernandez that he had just received a delegation from the
Mima, a small African tribe, on September 24 complaining
about their defenselessness before such depredations.
"THIS IS OUT OF MINNI'S CONTROL"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C) In a separate meeting with both Abulgasim and Adam
on September 23, Adam again focused on SLM/MM's lawlessness
and raiding. Adam stated that during his hiatus in Khartoum,
Minnawi "was in denial about what his commanders and soldiers
were doing." Since his return to the field and following
multiple heated conversations with the TDRA Land
Commissioner, Minnawi has "finally realized what is
happening, but this is now out of his control." Adam
admitted that the identity of the raiders is not always
clear, as sometimes Zaghawa loosely affiliated with SLM/MM
initiate the first raid, and are later protected by SLM/MM.
In other instances, SLM/MM fighters have been directly
responsible for the attacks. Adam said that SLM has been
keen to entirely disarm populations in areas of their
control, tax the local population, and take total control
over all functions normally played by a government.
Abulgasim emphasized that it is unacceptable that Darfur has
become more dangerous since the signing of the DPA and that
SLM/MM and the Zaghawa are largely responsible for this.
TAHA-MINNAWI AGREEMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - -
¶4. (C) Abulgasim and Adam characterized the Taha-Minnawi
agreement on September 19 as "a good first step," but
criticized SLM/MM as unable to bring peace and stability to
Darfur. Both TDRA leaders stated that once a diverse,
multi-ethnic movement, SLM/MM has returned to its Zaghawa
base, and is no longer representative of the people of
Darfur. Unlike Muhammad Tijani (ref b,) these TDRA
representatives stated that Taha's renewed interest in Darfur
is part of a greater power struggle within the NCP. "Taha is
trying to find a diplomatic solution to Darfur, and if he
succeeds, Nafie's influence will decline, as Nafie has
advocated for a military solution to Darfur," stated
Abulgasim. Minni Minnawi and Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali
Nafie are on opposite sides of a scale, "if one is going up,
the other goes down," asserted Abulgasim.
PEACE PROCESS
KHARTOUM 00001449 002 OF 002
- - - - - - -
¶5. (C) Both Abulgasim and Adam were most pessimistic when
discussing the peace process. Abulgasim stated that he
recently met with the Qatari Ambassador in Khartoum to
discuss the Qatari-French initiative. According to
Abulgasim, the Qatari Ambassador is "simplistic, afraid of
the NCP, and very unimpressive" (Note: CDA Fernandez met with
the Qatari Ambassador the same week and can confirm that
analysis. Whatever views the Qataris have to date on Darfur
seem to be filtering from UN/AU Mediator Bassole, or less
helpfully, from the NCP or Arab League. End note). Abulgasim
noted that the Qatari Ambassador had no understanding of
Darfur or how to conduct negotiations. Abulgasim also stated
that he met with the Arab League's Amr Musa on September 22
in Cairo. Musa reportedly told Abulgasim that he was
confused by the Qatari initiative and apologized for the Arab
League's distant, slow, and largely indifferent response to
Darfur for the last five years. (Note: This assessment of
the Qatari plan tracks with that of the Egyptian embassy in
Khartoum. On September 22, Egyptian political officer Tamr
Azzam told poloff that the GoE was "surprised" by the Qatari
initiative, and that Egyptian poloffs in Khartoum have not
been able to get "anything specific about the Qatari plan"
from their Qatari counterparts in Khartoum. End Note.)
According to Abulgasim, Musa also heavily criticized
Presidential Advisor and former Foreign Minister, Mustafa
Osman Ismail, saying, "he is stupid and has just been telling
lies all of this time." Both Abulgasim and Adam acknowledged
that the GoS is feverishly trying to formulate its Sudan
People's Initiative and may be able to "come up with
something like a general framework, but when it comes to the
issue of participation, it will become a dogfight."
¶6. (C) Both Adam and Abulgasim expressed fear that as the
Zaghawa dominate the most active rebel groups (i.e. JEM,
SLM/MM, Unity, and elements of the dissolved URF,) this small
but aggressive ethnic group will control future negotiations
about Darfur. Although Abdul Wahid Al-Nur has support among
the Fur and IDPs, "without an effective military presence,
his significance is diminished." Adam and Abulgasim
described this Zaghawa dominance as "a disaster," and
suggested that the participation of non-military actors (i.e.
civil society representatives, traditional and tribal
leaders, etc.) should be the focus or future negotiations.
"No one will accept Zaghawa rule after the last couple of
years," asserted Adam.
¶7. (C) At the end of the meeting, Adam passed poloff the
latest work of the Land Commission, including a lengthy
"Terms of Reference" for the commission's future research
that Adam estimates will cost approximately 20 million USD.
Abulgasim also stated that the Compensation Committee's work
is proceeding well, and promised to deliver a
"groundbreaking" report to poloff. Adam and Abulgasim ended
the meeting requesting support for a small group of Darfur's
leaders to travel to Washington. When asked about which
leaders would travel, Adam and Abulgasim disagreed, but
concurred that, "the group should be small and help inform
policy makers and the U.S. presidential candidates about
Darfur during this difficult period."
¶8. (C) COMMENT: Abulgasim and Adam appeared to be speaking
"off the cuff" while proposing a trip to Washington, and we
do not believe that a visit at this time will further U.S.
goals in Darfur or Sudan. We share Abulgasim's and Adam's
concern about disproportionate Zaghawa influence in Darfur
and within SLM/MM. There is widespread suspicion and dislike
among both Darfur's African and Arab tribes about Zaghawa
hegemony, mirroring Zaghawa control of neighboring Chad. This
small, tough and smart tribe punches way above its weight in
Darfur. The question remains, however, how to empower
multi-ethnic civil society leaders without creating a new
artificial political class or providing a new target for the
NCP's infiltration and manipulation. Tribalism was always
important in Darfur but the past five years' violence seems
to have only intensified this feeling. END COMMENT.
FERNANDEZ
التعديل لإضافة رابط الوثيقة
(عدل بواسطة محمد عثمان الحاج on 09-05-2011, 09:10 PM)
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وثيقة تتضمن تصريحات مدهشة أدلى بها موسى هلال للقائم بالأعمال الأمريكي في مأدبة إفطار رمضاني كان الداعي إليه دكتور مادبو السوداني الأمريكي وحضره عدد من زعماء بطون الرزيقات، وانفرد هلال بالقائم بالأعمال في غرفة جانبية ليبرئ نفسه ويضع اللوم في مارتكب من جرائم على الأصوليين الإسلاميين ويقول أن ينتمي للصوفية وأن ولاء عائلته التقليدي للحزب الاتحادي الديمقراطي! ياللعجب!
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001450
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C,
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AU UN SU
SUBJECT: IFTAR WITH THE "JANJAWEED"
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1391
¶B. KHARTOUM 1343
¶C. KHARTOUM 1108
¶D. KHARTOUM 1009
¶E. KHARTOUM 463
¶F. KHARTOUM 267
¶G. KHARTOUM 80
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: In a surprise meeting, notorious janjaweed
leader Musa Hilal told CDA that he was duped by Khartoum in
his actions during the worst years of 2003-2005 in Darfur, he
regrets his past, and has apologized in several tribal venues
to Darfur's African tribes. He blamed Darfur's "excesses" on
the NCP's Islamists and suggested President Al-Bashir should
break with them and rule as military dictator. He claimed a
close relation with Chadian President Deby and asked how he
can advance the American agenda in Darfur. End summary.
A MYSTERY GUEST
---------------
¶2. (C) On September 23, CDA Fernandez and poloff attended the
Ramadan Iftar held by Darfuri-American activist and prominent
Arab tribal leader Dr. Walid Madibo (also attending was the
Qatari Charge). Madibo, a USAID implementing partner, is a
leader of the Baggara (cattle-herding) or Southern Rizeigat,
one of Darfur's most numerous and powerful Arab tribes but
also the most notable Arab tribe to sit out the bitter ethnic
fighting of the past five years in Darfur (the Southern
Rizeigat were deeply involved in the war between Khartoum and
South Sudan though, and were notorious raiders of Southern
cattle and people before that war ended) and resisted the
temptation to serve as tribal shock troops for the Khartoum
regime.
¶3. (C) As the time for breaking the fast and prayer
approached, the Southern Rizeigat were joined by a strong
representation from their camel-herding, Northern cousins -
the Abbala Rizeigat and tribal leaders of the Ireiqat,
Etafat, Mahariyya, Awlad Rashid and Mahamid tribes. Among the
dignitaries was Sheikh Hammad Gibriel of the Ireiqat, and the
paramount sheikh of the Mahariyya, Mohamadeen Al-Doud. But
chief among them was Musa Hilal, hereditary sheikh of the
Mahamid, and the most infamous of all Janjaweed warlords.
Although Hilal, was one of the younger tribal leaders
present, he stood out by his height and by the deference he
received from many of the elder sheikhs. Hilal was appointed
an Advisor to the Ministry of Federal Rule in January 2008, a
move widely criticized in the West but one seemingly intended
to keep him on a short leash after he flirted with joining
the SPLM in Juba in late 2007 during the SPLM "cabinet
crisis".
¶4. (C) After prayer and eating, Madibo gave a short
presentation on the work of his NGO which tries to promote
reconciliation between various tribes in Darfur, using
traditional mediation methods. He made a strong case that all
Darfuris are "Africans" of mixed Arab and African origin and
that they need to overcome together the grim history of the
past and renew the traditionally tolerant social fabric of
Darfur as it existed over centuries. He noted that Darfur's
Arab tribes have to do a better job explaining themselves and
their concerns to the world, especially the West. He formally
invited the Amir of Qatar to visit the Arab tribes of Darfur
and hear their complaints and see their marginalization.
RELUCTANT KILLERS
-----------------
¶5. (C) Hilal then met one on one with CDA in a side-room.
This is the third meeting between Hilal and USG officials. In
2004, he met with CDA Galluci at the height of the violence.
In late 2006, he met with Special Envoy Natsios in Nyala.
Hilal began by recalling those meetings and recounting the
details of his infamous career. He said that the U.S. had a
superficial and inaccurate understanding of those worst years
(2003-2005) of Darfur bloodletting. The Arab tribes were
manipulated by a hysterical Khartoum afraid that SPLM leader
John Garang was seeking to open a new front just as
negotiations reached their final stage on the CPA. "I was let
out of prison (Hilal had been arrested for manslaughter) and
was angry at the world. My tribe had been attacked. Khartoum
armed me and pushed tribal vengeance into something worse."
He noted that the region was, and is, awash in weapons,
supplied by Libya in the years of its many Chadian
interventions. "We don't feel we had a choice as our tribal
enemies were with the rebels." The Arab tribes couldn't
KHARTOUM 00001450 002 OF 003
disarm unilaterally in the face of heavily armed rebel groups
aching for revenge.
¶6. (C) Hilal said he regretted much about those years and has
apologized to Fur and other leaders for his actions and those
of the Mahamid. "Someone said that President Bush wanted the
######### of two people: Bin Ladin and Musa Hilal." But I am not
as you think I am, "the political leader I am closest to and
admire is President Deby of Chad." We have family ties going
back to our grandfathers. He snorted appreciatively when CDA
described the NCP earlier as experts in "deception, delay and
false promises," commenting that "you know them well then."
BLAME IT ON THE ISLAMISTS
-------------------------
¶7. (C) Sheikh Hilal blamed Khartoum's Islamists for Darfur's
carnage. "I am not a member of the NCP, my family has always
been Unionists (DUP members). We are Sufis and not
fundamentalists." He said that President Bashir had been led
astray by the likes of Islamic fundamentalists (VP) Ali Osman
Taha and party leader Nafie Ali Nafie. Hilal would like to
see Bashir arrest the NCPers, hold them responsible for their
crimes and rule Sudan with the help of the Northern
opposition parties (Umma and DUP) and the SPLM. He noted
that whatever government rules in Khartoum, "I will remain
what I am, sheikh of my tribe, a free man."
¶8. (C) He sarcastically noted his ostensible role as a
ministerial advisor, "we advise them on nothing. We have no
power, everything, every killing is decided in Khartoum. You
call us 'janjaweed' but that is not a word we use, those are
bandits, thieves and robbers." He complained that the Arab
tribes have not been consulted about a constellation of
recent Darfur initiatives in the news, "the Qatari, Arab
League and Sudan People's (this is Bashir's initiative), we
don't know them or any details about them." Warming up to the
topic, Hilal described Darfur's Arab militias as "disloyal to
Khartoum. We found out that we have more in common with the
Africans of Darfur than with these Nile Valley Arabs." Hilal
added that the Arab tribes of Darfur were constantly told by
Khartoum officials that the Americans were "out to get them."
There is a rumor that you are taking Zaghawa tribesmen for
training in Afghanistan (the fierce Zaghawa make up the bulk
of Darfur's rebels and are bitter enemies of the camel
herding Arabs) but we know that is not true. "If we had a
choice, we would be with America against the NCP."
PART OF AMERICA'S PLAN FOR DARFUR
---------------------------------
¶9. (C) Despite the ferocity of the Zaghawa's reputation,
Hilal dismissed the power of the various Zaghawa-dominated
rebel groups. JEM is strong only because of lavish Chadian
support and the heavy use of Chadian mercenaries. JEM leader
Khalil Ibrahim recruits lesser tribes along the border as
cannon fodder, "there aren't that many Zaghawa that are still
fighters" as the upwardly mobile tribe moves to the cities to
become successful traders and businessmen. Hilal
characterized the Fur people of Darfur, often seen as the
conflict's (and Hilal's) greatest victims, as much more
formidable. "They are smarter and fight better, but they lack
the weapons, vehicles and preparation." He added that "the
Fur should lead" in Darfur - a far cry from the days of Arab
supremacy in Darfur - as they are "wiser, better educated and
moderate".
¶10. (C) Hilal asked for understanding: "we want a place in
the American agenda for Darfur." We want to see your policy
goals succeed there. He said that he wanted to find "whatever
way I can to be helpful to the Americans." Hilal added that
he wanted nothing for himself except the opportunity to
travel freely (evidently Hilal feels that he may well be
arrested if he travels too far afield). Hilal added that "we
don't understand what is your goal in Darfur, we want to
understand and be helpful." He repeatedly emphasized that
the loyalty of Darfur's Arab tribes , and presumably his own,
is up for grabs, if the West is interested.
¶11. (C) Comment: Like a large tawny cat, Hilal is a
compelling and surprisingly articulate figure (in Arabic) who
seems eager to break with Khartoum and find some sort of
accommodation from the West for himself and his band of
rogues. He longs for contact and recognition and was not shy
about his contempt for the Islamist politicians in Khartoum
(he was silent, however, about his likely paymasters in the
Sudanese military/security apparatus). He does feel, and is
probably right, that tribesmen like himself are in danger of
being made scapegoats at war crimes tribunals for policy
KHARTOUM 00001450 003 OF 003
decisions made in the capital. Although Hilal was only one of
many ruthless Arab militia field commanders in Darfur, his
media exposure during the worse years of the genocide will
always make him a marked man. He is smart and aware enough to
know that and to look for a way out without comprehending
that none is likely to exist for him. If anything, this
meeting also underscores the shallow, mercurial nature of
Khartoum's relationship with their most trusted allies in the
field in Darfur. End comment.
FERNANDEZ
(عدل بواسطة محمد عثمان الحاج on 09-05-2011, 09:22 PM)
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وثيقة مدهشة أخرى يتطوع فيها قياديون في الحركة الشعبية بنقل معلومة أن حزب المؤتمر يريد نقل السلطة من البشير لشخص آخر على أساس أن يذهب البشير للمنفى في السعودية، وأن البديل سيكون عسكري يكون مقبولا لجميع الأطراف لأن المؤسسة العسكرية لن تقبل بانتقال الرئاسة لملكي مثل علي عثمان، وتلخص الوثيقة إلى أن إيجاد خليفة للبشير يحفظ التوزان المعقد لهو أمر في غاية الصعوبة!
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001777
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, NSC
FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: PLOTTING FOR BASHIR EXIT INTENSIFIES
REF: KHARTOUM 1657
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: According to senior SPLM officials, Sudan's
NCP is trying to broker a quick and graceful removal of
President Al-Bashir within the next few months, with the
President going into exile in Saudi Arabia. Discussions on a
transition, which should take place before an ICC arrest
warrant could be issued, have stalled over who would replace
Al-Bashir and under what conditions. The SPLM would like to
see aggressive action by the P-3 over the next month to shape
such a transition and ensure that Western (and SPLM) concerns
are taken into account by the regime's future leaders. End
summary.
THE IDI AMIN OPTION
-------------------
¶2. (C) Foreign Minister Deng Alor and SPLM Deputy Secretary
General Yassir Arman told CDA Fernandez on December 13 that
plotting and deal-making within the National Congress Party
(NCP) for a transition of President Omar al-Bashir from power
has intensified in recent days but has now hit a predictable
snag on the key issues of sequencing and personalities. They
outlined how there seems to be consensus within the regime
that Al-Bashir "should go soon, preferably before an ICC
arrest warrant is issued," to a gilded exile in Saudi Arabia
from where, presumably, he could not be extradited to The
Hague. Alor said that Al-Bashir has agreed in principle to
go. The logical replacement, VP Ali Osman Taha, is hesitant
to move forward because of fears of bitter opposition from
the Sudanese Army (SAF) which distrusts civilians generally
and Taha in particular because of his close ties to NISS
chief Salah Ghosh, who has built up Sudan's national security
apparatus as a rival to the SAF.
A REPLACEMENT WORSE THAN BASHIR?
--------------------------------
¶3. (C) Because of Taha's caution, the search has switched now
to identifying an acceptable army general who would be
agreeable to the different factions within the Islamist
elite. The SPLM fears that the NCP could agree on a "younger,
more radical version" of Al-Bashir, such as SAF Deputy Chief
of Staff Awad Ibn Auf (sanctioned in May 2007 by the USG
because of his actions in Darfur while serving as head of
Military Intelligence) who would prolong the war in Darfur
and play hardball against the SPLM on CPA implementation.
"This would be a disaster for us, we would miss Al-Bashir,"
remarked Arman. Alor also noted that former NCP guru Hassan
al-Turabi is still a factor, "he still has some level of
support in SAF and the NCP" and continues to plot. The SPLM
is convinced that Al-Turabi maintains his ties with the JEM
rebel movement in Darfur and Alor related NCP fears of a
possible JEM-inspired assassination campaign against regime
leaders.
P-3 SHOULD SHAPE THE OUTCOME
----------------------------
¶4. (C) The SPLM's preference is that the NCP be pressed by
the international community, especially the P-3, in the
coming weeks to identify a transitional senior (preferably
elderly, "someone who is near his expiry date," Arman noted)
general who is acceptable to all three members of Sudan's
presidency (Al-Bashir, Taha, and First Vice President Salva
Kiir) and would serve as a figurehead to take the country to
elections in 2009. The SPLM has begun scouring the list of
SAF generals trying to see if it can identify appropriate
officers who fit the bill and will share its findings with
the US Embassy. Alor said his information is that the
Egyptians are doing the same thing as they fear a civilian
Islamist taking over in Sudan (reftel). He added that this is
an idea Salva Kiir will explore with President Bush in early
January in Washington and, hopefully, with Obama transition
staff.
¶5. (C) In such a scenario, P-3 reps would go to the NCP and
urge them to pick a figure committed to full implementation
of the CPA, a quick end to the Darfur conflict, and an early
transition to democracy. This is something like what happened
in 1985 when General Nimeiry was overthrown and a military
caretaker government oversaw the country's transition back to
democracy. Arman noted that because the NCP has reached this
internal impasse, the situation remains fluid and could
deteriorate within the coming couple of months with the
intense jockeying for position and advantage of different
factions within the NCP intensifying. Alor said that he hoped
KHARTOUM 00001777 002 OF 002
that French envoy Bruno Joubert would begin to bring a
credible and detailed "endgame message" to Khartoum when he
visits on December 15.
PLAYING A DOUBLE GAME IN ABYEI
------------------------------
¶6. (C) Alor said that the NCP had used the JEM/Turabi factor
to explain recent fighting in Abyei on December 12-13. His
own deputy, NCP insider Mutriff Siddiq, had told him that the
NCP fears that JEM plants within SAF may have triggered the
fighting in Abyei on purpose to draw SAF south towards the
SPLA thereby clearing a path for the much rumored JEM march
on the capital, from Darfur through South Kordofan and then
across the Nile, or merely for JEM to secure or destroy the
oil distribution network in South Kordofan which pumps the
crude from Southern oil fields to Port Sudan. Siddiq told
Alor that the notorious 31st SAF Brigade, some of whose
troops are part of the Abyei JIU, may have been penetrated by
JEM.
¶7. (C) Alor noted that while the fighting in Abyei between
SAF soldiers in the Abyei JIU and Abyei police seemed to now
be contained, he was livid about the role of UN SRSG Ashraf
Qazi in trying to quell the violence. "Ashraf is a nice
person, but weak and incompetent," he scoffed. Qazi had
refused to order UN troops on the ground to secure the Abyei
market, focusing instead on the JIU. "He should secure the
market and then push for the entire JIU to leave town." Alor
did reluctantly acknowledge UN efforts to keep SAF units in
Difra and SPLA units in Agok from moving towards the
fighting, steps that could ignite a wider conflagration. He
asked that CDA Fernandez urge Qazi to be more pro-active (CDA
spoke to Qazi on December 13 and urged more aggressive UNMIS
moves to contain the violence. Qazi responded that UNMIS is
"doing exactly that").
COMMENT
-------
¶8. (C) Khartoum has been rife with possible transition
scenarios for weeks (reftel) and this latest information is
in sync with Al-Bashir's recent declaration that he is
willing to step down "if asked by the Sudanese people, not
foreigners." Given the internal divisions within the NCP and
the rivalry between NISS and SAF, the SPLM factor, and the
machinations of JEM and Al-Turabi, it will be quite difficult
to find a candidate acceptable to all sides (although Sudan's
abounds with inoffensive former SAF generals). Despite the
repeated and well-documented brutality of the regime in
Darfur, President Al-Bashir has been exquisitely tuned to an
inclusive and congenial form of rule quite comfortable to
Sudan's tiny Northern Arab elite. Finding that sort of
balance once again, one that gives full rein to the regime's
greed and impunity, may not be easy.
FERNANDEZ
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وثيقة مثيرة للاهتمام تحمل درجة سرية أعلى وتتضمن استدعاء رئيس قسم أمريكا بالخارجية السودانية للقائم بالأعمال للاحتجاج على الغارة الجوية الأولى في ولاية البحر الأحمر! أي أنهم اتهموا الأمريكان بتلك الغارة!
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000249
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, NEA/IPA, ISN/CATR,
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
EO 12958 DECL: 02/24/2019
TAGS ETTC, MASS, PARM, PGOV, PREL, SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN COMPLAINS OF “PROBABLY AMERICAN” BOMBING
ATTACKS IN EASTERN SUDAN
REF: A. KHARTOUM 120 B. KHARTOUM 107 C. KHARTOUM 82 D. KHARTOUM 59
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) CDA Fernandez was summoned to the Foreign Ministry on the morning of February 24 by Americas Department head Ambassador Nasreddin Wali. Wali said that he had sensitive and worrisome information to relate to the Charge. Reading from hand-written notes in Arabic and referring to a large dog-eared map brought in for the occasion, Wali said that there had been two air attacks on Eastern Sudan in January and February. In the January attack, 43 people were killed and 17 vehicles destroyed. This occurred near Magd, in the Gebeit region of Red Sea state, “the Northern part of an area known as Oku” (phonetic). It is roughly at the latitude of 17 degrees and longitude of 33.5, according to Wali.
¶2. (S) The second attack occurred on February 20 at Bir al-Mansurab (latitude of 17 degrees and longitude of 34, according to Wali). The second attack was 15 kilometers from the site of the January attack. In the February attack, 45 Sudanese were kalled and 14 vehicles destroyed. Both attacks occurred 150 kilometers deep inside Sudan, not near any international border.
¶3. (S) Wali said that “we assume that the planes that attacked us are your planes.” He said that Sudan has had “tight cooperation” with the United States on security matters and any concerns that the USG has about security related issues can be raised within the context of bilateral diplomatic and intelligence relations between the two countries. He added that “Sudan would like to have clarification about this matter. We protest this act and we condemn it. Sudan reserves the right to respond appropriately, at the right time, in a legal manner consistent with protecting its sovereignty.”
¶4. (S) Comment: This complaint by Sudan comes on the heels of the Embassy being tasked by Washington to demarche Khartoum on weapons smuggling issues possibly involving Iran and Hamas (reftels a-c). So it is easy for the regime to assume that the demarches and these kinetic incidents are somehow connected. The initial attack is already the object of gossip by elements of Sudan’s political elite, even outside the tight confines of the regime’s inner circle (reftel d). CDA had already scheduled an Emergency Action Committee meeting on February 24 to discuss the Embassy’s security posture in the runup to the March 4 ICC announcement and this latest news is an additional concern in a very volatile political environment. Embassy requests Washington guidance on what - if any - formal response should be given to the Sudanese. And should this potentially explosive story somehow leak to the sensationalistic Sudanese press, it could very well turn our security situation here from bad to worse. End comment.
FERNANDEZ
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: Abobakr Shadad)
|
لك الشكر دكتور شداد، وياليت لو كان لنا الوقت لترجمة كل هذه الوثائق ليقرأها رجل الشارع قبل الدبلوماسي أو السياسي على الأقل ليزول الكثير من الغموض وسوأ الفهم وسوء الظن!
هاهنا وثيقة رائعة بحق تفضح استراتيجية وتكتيكات حكومة البشير:
و هي هدية رائعة للحزبين الكبيرين وحركات دارفور وجميعهم فاوضوا السلطة حتى بح صوتهم ثم ضاع، فيها تحليل رائع، تؤكد أن المؤتمر الوطني يعتبر المفاوضات مع أي طرف يفاوضه غاية وليست وسيلة للوصول إلى حل، فالمفاوضات في نظرهم أفضل من القتال فهي تسغرق وقتا طويلا يظلون هم فيه في السلطة، وبعد الوصول لاتفاق بعد ذلك الوقت الطويل لاينفذون ما اتفقوا عليه وحين يصل الأمر لمرحلة حرجة بسبب عدم تطبيق الاتفاق يسعون لفتح باب التفاوض من جديد، أي المماطلة والتسويف!
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000288
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATING FOR ITS OWN SURVIVAL: HOW THE NCP USES
NEGOTIATION TO MAINTAIN ITS HOLD ON POWER
REF: A. KHARTOUM 185
¶B. KHARTOUM 166
¶C. KHARTOUM 150
¶D. KHARTOUM 50
¶E. 08 KHARTOUM 338
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) As the new U.S. Administration considers options on
how best to engage with the Sudanese regime and considers the
possibility of discussing with the regime on our key foreign
policy objectives in Sudan, it is important to keep in mind
that the National Congress Party (NCP) regime never saw a
negotiation it didn't like. A pack of compulsive
negotiators, the regime is in a constant state of negotiation
with friends and foes alike, and has no qualms about making
or breaking agreements if circumstances change, and the
regime can subsequently broker a better deal. It is also
important to remember that the regime often strikes deals it
never intends to implement, purely as a delaying tactic or to
pursue other options even while engaged in the process of
negotiating. Embassy Khartoum submitted a cable about the
regime's tactics in 2008 entitled "The NCP: Sudan's Brutal
Pragmatists" (Ref E).
¶2. (C) What is the NCP's rationale for this approach to
negotiations? It uses them as a means of holding onto power,
to level the playing field against stronger opponents, and to
co-opt and disarm opponents. The NCP also uses negotiation
to assert that it is the principal partner for any and all
deals in Sudan ) thus legitimizing itself and extending its
time in power as the key player. The reason the NCP needs
to rely on negotiations is that it is not powerful enough to
enforce its will on all of Sudan's other factions all the
time, but is strong enough to hold onto political and
economic power at the center. In the end, negotiations are
cheaper than fighting. The NCP also negotiates and makes
deals that can be implemented over time (or partially ones
that are partially implemented, only to be renegotiated,)
because this strategy allows the regime to hedge its bets.
If circumstances change, the regime can always renegotiate
based on the new reality. The NCP's reasons for negotiating
with the U.S. are different from its reasons for negotiating
with the SPLM in that it actually fears the United States
more than any other counterpart and sees "a deal" with the
Americans as its ultimate guarantee for regime survival. It
also negotiates with the U.S. because it wants to tie us into
a process of engagement to avoid additional punitive actions
on our part, and because it doesn't trust that we will do
what we say, given past broken promises by the Bush
Administration. Negotiations on Darfur are a different story
) Darfur has become intractable in many ways, and the regime
is negotiating merely to show a modicum of good will to the
international community, especially in contrast to the
rejectionism of various rebel factions. However, the regime
recognizes that it may not be possible to solve Darfur's
problems even if it truly wanted to do so.
¶3. (C) How does the NCP view negotiations on Darfur? The GOS
is frustrated by the current negotiating process on Darfur
because it doesn't have anyone it can make a deal with.
(Abdelwahid al Nur won't negotiate. Another Zaghawa
minority-based agreement won't solve the problem, but rather
just anger the Arabs and the Fur). The NCP is very
frustrated that from their perspective we won't put more
pressure on Abdelwahid al Nur and other rebels. The regime
believes that, despite its duplicity, it is more ready and
more sincere in seeking a way out on Darfur than anyone else.
They believe that the different Darfuri movements are more
interested in power than in the people of Darfur. They also
believe that America could obtain an agreement with the NCP
that would tangibly improve the situation in Darfur but the
United States Government is a prisoner of an aggressive,
activist community (such as "Save Darfur" and ENOUGH) that
will not allow it to "make a deal with the devil" in Sudan
even if that deal was to lead to improving the lives of the
very people the activists are supposed to be fighting for.
¶4. (C) How does the NCP view the incomplete negotiation of
the CPA and DPA? The NCP would argue that it has delivered a
lot on CPA, but that the SPLM hasn't been up to the task of
being a full partner. They can point to a massive transfer of
cash to the SPLM since 2005 (over $4 billion dollars in oil
revenues) as part of the success of the CPA's wealth-sharing
KHARTOUM 00000288 002 OF 003
provisions and to a GOSS which is independent in all but name
and to power-sharing within the Government of National Unity
and other national institutions in Khartoum. It can also
point to a massive SPLA, which absorbs the bulk of South
Sudan's budget. It would further maintain that the parts of
the agreement that haven't been implemented are too costly
politically or economically (e.g. Abyei, border demarcation,
land rights issues etc.) In their more honest moments, they
would admit that their implementation of the CPA waxes and
wanes according to objective factors such as international
attention and pressure, their own internal stability and
strength and the SPLM's capacity to exact concessions and to
follow up on agreements. The NCP believes, and they are
right, that especially for the first two years of the CPA
(2005-2007), the agreement was largely ignored by the
international community in the furor about Darfur. The NCP
doesn't take the DPA seriously because Minni Minawi doesn't
have much, if any, popular legitimacy in Darfur, and because
the NCP sees that Minni Minawi and SLM don't have the
capacity to implement the agreement on their side. As for
the road ahead, the NCP hopes the international community
will be able to "deliver" Abdelwahid al Nur and others to an
agreement - anyone who can deliver a deal and serve as their
counterpart will be welcomed but why give concessions to
Minni which will be needed in the future for someone else?
The NCP would willingly accept a deal in Darfur that doesn't
strip it of essential power at a national level, and that
doesn't disenfranchise Arab tribes that have supported it.
This is not based on any remorse or sense of guilt for its
many crimes in Darfur but rather on a pragmatic fear that
Darfur could sooner or later drag NCP rule in Sudan down with
it.
¶5. (C) How does the NCP view previous promises and
engagement by the U.S.? The GOS believes the U.S. reneged on
its explicit promises at Naivasha during the negotiation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (removal from the State
Sponsors of Terrorism List, full diplomatic relations and
lifting of economic sanctions.) The GOS believes that the
U.S. will constantly raise the bar for what we will require
the regime to do in order to achieve these goals, because we
never intended to implement the deal anyway. From their
perspective, our goal is to get the regime to do what we
want, offer as little as possible, and if this is not
possible we will pursue a policy of regime-change. The
regime was frustrated by the negotiations with former Special
Envoy Williamson because he presented himself as a practical
negotiator who had been empowered by the U.S. Administration,
but when the Sudanese agreed to all of the short-term
procedural demands outlined by SE Williamson, the Special
Envoy backed away from a formalized agreement. The Sudanese
still talk about their confusion over what caused SE
Williamson to back away from such an agreement with some
believing that he was ordered not to come to a deal and
others thinking that there was never a deal on the table,
only an attempt at personal grandstanding. They also recall a
notorious earlier incident in 2004 when then S/CT and AF
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa personally told VP
Ali Osman Taha that "once Sudan signed the CPA" it would be
removed from the Terrorism List "within days."
¶6. (C) Despite what they view as our broken promises, the
regime is still extremely eager to negotiate with us, and
will likely implement most parts of any bilateral agreement
as long as it allows the regime to hold onto power. Just the
fact of entering into a substantive negotiation with the U.S.
legitimizes the regime, and a deal with the U.S. would cement
the regime's legitimacy, especially if combined with a
probable election victory by the NCP. The appearance of
American goodwill is almost as important to the regime as
that reality. They seek a deal with the Americans that they
can present as a "victory" for the regime which preserves
"Sudan's dignity."
¶7. (C) Embassy Khartoum has advocated a policy of engagement
leading to a roadmap on U.S.-Sudan relations (Ref C), but
cautions that we must be very clear on what our core
objectives are in Darfur, and what we expect Darfur and the
rest of Sudan to look like when this process is over - i.e.
what is the "end game" - so that we will be able to measure
progress toward these objectives. We must do this while
enhancing our focus on the CPA and South Sudan, which are
actually in a much more fragile state than Darfur's miserable
stasis (reftels A and D).
KHARTOUM 00000288 003 OF 003
¶8. (C) The initial hurdle is almost upon us as the regime
will be watching closely to see what sort of message
Washington will be sending in a response to a possible ICC
arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir on March 4. Will this
be a repackaging of past calls for regime change or will
there be enough space and hope in the official American
position for a possible regime soft-landing from a tangled
skein of crises, mostly of its own making (Darfur, CPA
implementation, ICC)? The NCP will certainly be ready to use
diplomacy, politics, concessions and (if needed) violence, to
prevent the emergence of an international/national consensus
that threatens its hold on power. Such a consensus would ally
the West with some coalition of Darfuri rebels, Northern
oppositionists and the SPLM plus regional players. To avoid
such a formidable and potentially fatal lineup, it will do
almost anything -- whether that involves making concessions
or escalating an already volatile and dangerous situation in
Sudan.
FERNANDEZ
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وثيقة أخرى تتناول تقنية "الفزاعة" التي يستعملها النظام مع الغرب: التلويح بإطلاق كلابهم المسعورة التي هي المتطرفين الإرهابيين الإسلامويين ضد الغرب فيما لو ضغط الغرب عليهموفي نفس الوقت التأكيد بأنه مادام الغرب يتعامل معهم ويفتح لهم الأبواب فهم قادرون على كبح جماح هؤلاء الإرهابيون وحماية الغرب منهم! المعلومة المثيرة في هذه الوثيقة أن صحيفة آخر لحظة هي واحدة من صحيفتين يملكهما جهاز مخابرات البشير ويستعملهما لنشر الأخبار، ترى ما هي الصحيفة الأخرى؟
الجماعة الليبية المقاتلة تعلمت الدرس الإنقاذي الإسلاموي جيدا وتمكنت به من ترويض حلف الناتو واستعماله في تحقيق هدفها في إسقاط القذافي والله أعلم كم سنشهد من عجائب مماثلة في المستقبل!
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000343
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, AF/C
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPAO KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
RRU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE JIHADIST RHETORIC HEATS UP, THEN COOLS
DOWN
REF: A. A) KHARTOUM 339
¶B. B) KHARTOUM 324
¶C. C) KHARTOUM 315
¶D. D) 08 KHARTOUM 1450
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: There has been a significant rise in public
anti-Western rhetoric from both regime figures and extremist
groups since the International Criminal Court (ICC)'s March 4
announcement of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar
Al-Bashir. Whether the remarks are a start of a renewed
Jihadist tendency, flames fanned by Al-Bashir and others, or
rather part of a cyclical trend remains to be seen, but the
statements and published declarations are decidedly chilling.
END SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) On March 10, the virulently anti-West "Akhir Lahza"newpaper (one of two popular dailies supposedly directly
controlled by Sudanese Intelligence) reported that an
alliance of Jihadist movements had "announced their intention
to commit 250 suicide attacks on supporters of the ICC." In
a copy of the statement obtained from the newspaper, a group
called the "Coalition for Allied Jihadi Suicide Movements"
has apparently warned those supporting the ICC decision "both
in their own countries and in Sudan" that "international
imperialists and CIA agents from France, Britain, and the
U.S." will experience "another September 11."
¶3. (SBU) Apparently not content with the blood of just
foreigners, the statement also rallies against certain
Sudanese that the Coalition does not deem Islamist enough.
The group describes Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
leader Khalil Ibrahim as a "sinner" and Sudan Liberation
Movement (SLM)/Abdul Wahid faction leader Abdul Wahid Nur as
a "Zionist agent" who needs "God's verdict executed on them
wherever they are." According to the document, the Coalition
apparently convened following the International Court "of
Injustice" decision to issue an arrest warrant against
President Al-Bashir and has "formed a common mechanism for
cleansing Darfur from the filth of the neo-colonialists,"
while simultaneously collaborating with other "global Jihadi
movements."
¶4. (SBU) The statement was signed by the Abu Gusaisa Martyr
Suicide Group (Mohammed Abu Gusaisa), the Ansar Allah Salaf
Jihadis Group (Abu Madeen Ali Al-Shaikh), the Quest for
Martyrdom Group (Al-Turabi Abdul Rahman), the Brigade for
Martyrdom (Ali Abdul Fatah), and the Black Darfur Brigade
(Musa Hilal). CDA Fernandez attempted to contact notorious
janjaweed leader Hilal, whom he has met before (reftel d), to
ascertain if this is a real or bogus organization, but
Hilal's phone is now turned off.
¶5. (SBU) Meanwhile, London's Saudi-owned "Al-Sharq al-Awsat"
also warned on March 10 that "paramilitary forces" supposedly
under the command of the Sudanese Armed Forces "have been
given permission to launch attacks on anybody who supports
the ICC's decision." According to the paper, this group of
"volunteers" call themselves "the Mujahideen and the
Mujahidat" (male and female Jihadi fighters,) indicating it
"will be difficult to predict what these forces might do to
express their anger" as a result of "current events in Sudan."
¶6. (SBU) While certainly more violent than what most members
of the National Congress Party (NCP) have said since the
March 4 ICC arrest warrant announcement, recent public
statements by President Al-Bashir and others do echo and did
predate the more extremist communiqus. "We are ready to
resist colonialism" and "we are ready to defend our country"
were Al-Bashir's words outside the Presidential Palace in
Khartoum on March 5, as were "we kneel only to God."
Likewise, the head of Sudan's National Intelligence and
Security Service, Salah Gosh, warned in mid-February that ICC
supporters inside Sudan would "have their hands, limbs, and
######### chopped off."
¶7. (SBU) On March 11, perhaps sensing they had moved too
quickly in exciting extremist elements, the NCP pushed
Khartoum's pro-government "Al-Ra'y al-Amm" newspaper to
publish an editorial which proclaimed that "one of the most
dangerous things that could hurt Sudan's position on the ICC
is the call for carrying out martyrdom operations and
KHARTOUM 00000343 002 OF 002
spilling of the blood of certain persons for involvement in
the scheme against Sudan." While the commentary had "no
doubt at all the intentions and sincerity" of the Coalition
for Allied Jihadi Suicide Movements, it called on the "250
glorious youths" to "head to Darfur" and "fill the gap in
relief and humanitarian field work" following the expulsion
of the "suspect" non-govermental organizations.
¶8. (C) COMMENT: Once again, the regime in Khartoum is
simultaneously trying to use Islamist fervor to its advantage
while doing its best to make sure extremists don't go too far
or operate outside the government's control. Just as NISS DG
Salah Gosh informs us that he'll do "whatever he can" to
protect foreign missions from terrorists, he caveats that he
"can't be responsible for the actions of some" in the wake of
the ICC announcement. The regime's whipping up of public
sentiment and announcing Jihad against the West when the
Government of Sudan did not want a UN Mission in Darfur
contributed to the motives of the five Islamic extremists
accused in the murders of two USAID employees in 2008.
Hopefully the NCP will now cease its dangerous stoking of
this extremist fire; the March 11 government-sponsored
editorial seemed to indicate that the rhetoric might finally
cool down in the second week after the ICC indictment of
President Bashir.
FERNANDEZ
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وثائق تخص الحزب الاتحادي الديمقراطي ولقاء مع المرحوم السيد أحمد الميرغني يشهد له بالذكاء والمعرفة والخبرة والبراعة حقا لقد فقد السودان فيه رجلا غابت حقيقته عن معظم الشعب السوداني بسبب أكاذيب وتشويهات ما يسمى الآن بالحركة الإسلامية، ولقاء مع السيد محمد عثمان الميرغني:
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08KHARTOUM325.html
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000325
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KDEM SU
SUBJECT: DUP PARTY SPLINTERS DUE TO POOR LEADERSHIP AND NCP
POACHING
REF: KHARTOUM 128
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Recent defectors to the NCP describe the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) as lacking effective, democratic
leadership and a vision for the future. They see the NCP as an
attractive alternative and contend that the NCP has changed for the
better since Al-Turabi's departure. They are less attracted by the
SPLM, viewing it as an armed rebel movement rather than a political
party. Some observers accuse the NCP of poaching across party lines
in order to weaken the DUP and guarantee an NCP victory in the 2009
elections. End Summary.
Democratic Unionist Party Splinters Again
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (U) Several prominent members of the DUP recently announced
their defection to the National Congress Party (NCP) shortly after
the start of a DUP-NCP dialogue. Meanwhile preparations are under
way for the expected return of elderly DUP leader Mohamed Othman
Al-Mirghani after almost 18 years of self-imposed exile in Egypt.
Like most other Sudanese political parties in recent years, the DUP
has suffered several internal splits, but the most recent resulted
in the loss of prominent DUP members who have provided financial
support over the years.
¶3. (U) Five factions now carry the name Democratic Unionist Party
moniker: the original DUP led by El-Sayed Mohamad Othman
Al-Mirghani, DUP Hindi Faction, DUP Haj Mudawi Faction, DUP Mohamed
Al-Azhari Faction, and the DUP Mirghani Abdel-Rahman Faction. Each
group claims to legitimately carry the DUP name.
DUP "Without Political Leadership"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶4. (SBU) Poloff met separately with two of the most recent prominent
defectors, wealthy businessmen Ali Abbarsi and Hisham Al-Brair.
Abbrasi and Al-Brair share common reasons for leaving the DUP for
the NCP. They complained about Al-Mirghani's long absences from
Sudan as well as his autocratic management style, pointing to
failures to consult others in the party leadership, control of party
members' activities, lack of transparent and democratic decision
making, failure to nurture a successor generation in the party, and
treating party members as Al-Khatmia Sufi sect followers. (Note:
Although technically separate organizations -- one religious, the
other political - most members of the Al-Khatmia Sufi religious sect
also belong to the DUP. End Note).
¶5. (SBU) Ali Abbarsi charged that Al-Mirghani "is managing the party
by phone from outside the country." He claimed the A-Mirghani is
not available most of the time and spends three months in Sudan and
the rest of the year in London or Alexandria. Al-Brair asked
rhetorically "how can we serve the country's causes without
political leadership?" According to Hisham Al-Brair, disagreements
within DUP have been on the rise in the last eighteen months.
NCP Has Changed, SPLM Has Not
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶6. (SBU) Asked about why they joined the NCP rather than form a new
DUP faction as have other DUP defectors, Abbarsi and Al-Brair
asserted that NCP has changed dramatically after the departure of
Hassan Al-Turabi in 2000. "My disagreements with the NCP ended when
Al-Turabi left, which was a shift from the iron fist policy and
since then the NCP has headed in a different direction," said
Al-Brair. "The policy the NCP is following now represents 60% of the
original DUP policy" he added. Abbarsi echoed the comment about
Turabi's departure and pointed to his need to protect his interests
as a businessman. "I cannot afford to stay away from the economic
decision-making circles and allow others to control my business
decisions."
¶7. (SBU) Abbarsi and Al-Brair said they did not consider joining
SPLM when they decided to leave the DUP for two main reasons.
First, according to Al-Brair "We do not trust them especially after
the late John Garang decided to negotiate the peace agreement with
the NCP without discussing the idea or even informing the DUP
leadership, his partners in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)."
Second, according to Al-Brair and Abbarsi, although the SPLM now is
the NCP's partner in the Government of National Unity, "they need to
transform themselves into a political party before the elections."
(Note: The SPLM obviously is a political movement, though it is
notable that these DUP defectors share a perception of the SPLM as
an armed rebel movement, a view shared by many northerners. End
note.)
¶8. (SBU) Regarding elections, Al-Brair opined "they must be held in
the whole country - no exceptions for Darfur or the South."
Al-Brair noted that the NCP is ready to form alliances with other
parties including the Umma party, the DUP, and the Communist party.
However Al-Brair indicated that he is against an alliance with the
Communist Party "because it has been closed on itself for many years
and has nothing new to offer."
DUP: We're Reaching Out Too
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶9. (SBU) In an earlier meeting with Poloff, DUP-Al-Mirghani Deputy
Secretary General Tag Elsir Mohamed Saleh said that his party
SIPDIS
"continues conversations with all stakeholders in Sudan." Saleh
said the DUP's dialogue with the NCP is limited to election
arrangements and national reconciliation. He noted that the DUP is
represented on the Elections Laws Committee. "We support the
mixed-electoral system based on a 50-50 percentage" as advocated by
the SPLM "and could even accept 55-45, but not the 60-40 proposed by
the NCP, because this is going to maintain the status quo."
Comment
- - - -
¶10. (SBU) While Al-Mirghani clings to the DUP leadership and
frustrates members with his management style, the NCP is all too
eager to poach prominent defectors like Abbarsi and Al-Brair,
possibly obviating the need for an alliance with DUP Al-Mirhgani.
The NCP would also like to break up the moribund (pre-CPA) National
Democratic Alliance - which was chaired by Al-Mirghani and included
the DUP, the Umma, and the SPLM - in favor of an all northern
alliance confronting the SPLM and cornering it as only a "Southern"
party with limited appeal. Both of these actions strengthen the
hand of the NCP heading into elections, should they ever actually
occur.
FERNANDEZ
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08KHARTOUM605.html
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000605
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO KDEM SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: CDA MEETS WITH FORMER PRESIDENT MIRGHANI
Refs: A. Khartoum 509
¶B. Khartoum 325
¶1. (U) On 17 April, CDA Fernandez met with former Sudanese President
(1986-89) and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Deputy Ahmed
Al-Mirghani, brother of DUP leader Mohamed Othman Al-Mirghani who
remains in self-imposed exile in Cairo. Ahmed Al-Mirghani stated
that the DUP (Mirghani faction) is keen to maintain strong relations
with the West, especially the United States. He emphasized the DUP's
roots in Sufi Islam (out of the Khatimiyya Order) as promoting a
tolerant, inclusive, and pro-Western form of Islamic politics.
¶2. (SBU) Mirghani, a trained economist, described the ruling
National Congress Party (NCP) as a colossus that has tremendous
power but is actually weak. He noted that Khartoum's surface flash
and growth masks a grimmer reality, the gap between the center and
the regions, the capital and the countryside. Despite the regime
being awash in money because of oil revenues, ordinary Sudanese feel
more and more squeezed by inflation and deteriorating services
provided by a kleptocratic state.
¶3. (SBU) The former President (who was overthrown in the coup that
brought Omar al-Bashir to power) noted that Northern opposition
parties should be able to confront the NCP but are constrained by a
lack of a financial base to challenge them, after almost 20 years of
NCP rule. He described the SPLM (who were the DUP's allies in the
"National Democratic Alliance" before 2005) as having finally "woken
up" in late 2007, after having ignored Northern opposition parties
for over two years after the signing of the CPA. He thanked Charge
Fernandez for pushing the message publicly that to transform Sudan,
to help in Darfur or South Sudan, the heart of the problem - and the
solution - is in Khartoum and reaching out to Northern opposition
parties much more than before.
¶4. (SBU) CDA Fernandez told Al-Mirghani that the USG will encourage
a level-playing field ahead of the elections. He urged Al-Mirghani
to ensure that the DUP keeps distance from the NCP and not fall prey
to its destructive "divide and conquer" tactics prior to the
elections. Responding to recent DUP member defections to NCP which
received considerable press coverage in the pro-regime media,
Al-Mirghani said, "these were not important people at all," noting
that one "leader" was 84 years old and almost unknown, and "it's
[the amount of press coverage] a bit of a joke." (Reftels) The CDA
agreed that because the NCP controls the media, among other
important resources, it has the ability to publicly play up such
things to its advantage. As a way of encouraging democracy in
Sudan, the CDA offered support to the DUP through continuous
dialogue. Al-Mirghani was grateful for this offer of support. It
was agreed that DUP would set up an event for the CDA to meet and
speak with a larger number of DUP members in the coming weeks.
¶5. (SBU) COMMENT: Divided now into three or four factions, the DUP
is probably the most fractured of Sudan's traditional parties but
probably still has adherents, especially in Sudan's East and North.
Any real electoral strategy for fully democratic polls in Sudan must
indeed seek to give historically Northern, Arab, Muslim opposition
parties a real chance to participate fully, speak out and challenge
the NCP's false claim to represent what is actually a heterogeneous
Arabic-speaking "Northern Sudan," not at all in NCP lock-step
against an also illusory, united anti-Arab, Southern Sudan. Africa's
largest country is much more complex than that. END COMMENT.
FERNANDEZ
http://wikileaks.org/origin/124_41.html
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000735
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C, AF/E
NSC FOR MGAVIN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID SOCI ASEC KDEM AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: CDA'S COURTESY CALL ON DUP LEADER AL MIRGHANI
¶1. SUMMARY. Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) leader Mohammed Osman
al Mirghani complained to Charge Whitehead that the two CPA partners
are ignoring the concerns of Sudan's other political groups.
Despite this, Mirgahani seemed unable to articulate a clear strategy
of how the DUP might compete in the coming elections. This
indecision appears common to all of Sudan's opposition parties.
Only the NCP seems confident it can win through patronage and
partnerships. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) On June 7, CDA Whitehead paid a courtesy call on DUP
leader Mirghani at the latter's residence. Charge Whitehead asked
for Mirghani's assessment of the current political situation in
Sudan and the DUP's plans for the scheduled 2010 elections and
afterwards. In response, Mirghani expressed disappointment that the
DUP and other traditional Sudanese parties are not included in
Sudan's Government of National Unity (GNU). He complained the DUP
is largely ignored by both the National Congress Party (NCP) and
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Sudan "now has two
masters, one in Khartoum and one in Juba," he stated.
¶3. (SBU) According to Mirghani, the late SPLM leader John Garang had
consulted with Mirghani during the Naivasha peace negotiations in
¶2004. Mirghani said that he had argued for a GNU in which all
parties equally participated, but that in the end, the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) had been negotiated bilaterally between the
NCP and SPLM, to the exclusion of the other parities. Mirghani also
referred to the inter-party "Framework Agreement" negotiated in
Cairo in 2005 under the sponsorship of Egypt. Mirghani complained
that Egypt failed to follow-up after the Agreement was signed, and
that it too was never implemented. Since then, the DUP has been
ignored by the two CPA partners.
¶4. (SBU) Mirghani is also the hereditary leader of the Khatmiyya
Sufi order. Asked about the relationship between the DUP and
Khatimiyya, Mirghani explained they are separate entities. He
emphasized that the Khatimiyya embody "moderate Islam," reflecting
the Sufi dedication to tolerance and nonviolence. While reflecting
these same ideals, the DUP, he maintained, is broader than the
Khatimiyya order and includes many Sudanese Christians. Mirghani
argued that the DUP is the majority party in Sudan, noting that it
had won the popular vote in every election from Sudan's 1956
independence until a coup brought the National Islamic Front to
power in 1989.
¶5. (SBU) Asked by the Charge for his views on the DUP's future
electoral prospects, Mirghani replied that while the DUP is not
afraid of the 2010 elections, preparations are starting from the
wrong point. The DUP has submitted its recommendations to the
National Election Commission. He complained that the rules being
drafted for the elections will unfairly favor the NCP. For example,
he said that many potential voters will be discouraged from voting
by having to pay for the required identity card. He added the NCP
plans to pay the cost of ID cards for its supporters, giving it an
advantage. The NCP is unilaterally pushing through rules such as
this that favor it, he charged. If they are to be kept honest, all
of Sudan's parties need to be included in planning the elections.
He emphasized that the DUP had spurned the NCP's proposal to partner
with the DUP in the coming elections. He said that the people of
Sudan deserve a clear choice of who will govern them, rather than
having this decided over their #########. Asked if the DUP would join
the NCP in a coalition after the election, Mirghani replied that it
expects to win the elections outright.
¶6. (SBU) COMMENT: Mirghani seemed much more comfortable describing
the DUP's history and past achievements than in articulating a clear
vision of its goals or future role. Based on his responses, the DUP
appears to lack any clear strategy on how it will compete in the
national elections, now scheduled for April 2010. The party instead
appears stuck in a rut, complaining that it does not have a seat at
the existing table. Unfortunately, the DUP is by no means alone in
this. Even the SPLM is undecided about whether it will seriously
contest next year's elections or focus instead on the 2011
referendum on southern independence. Only the NCP appears to be
focused on the elections and confident that it can win, largely by
controlling constituencies through patronage and partnering with
elements of the political opposition.
WHITEHEAD
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re: مراسلات السفارة الامريكية فى الخرطوم دون تنقيح فى وثائق ويكيليكس (Re: محمد عثمان الحاج)
|
وأختم استعراضي للوثائق التي رأيت أنها مثيرة للاهتمام: على ضوء هذه الوثائق أعتقد أن السيد اسانج مؤسس ويكيليكس يستحق جائزة نوبل للسلام لأنه بنشرها قد أسهم إسهاما كبيرا في إزالة سوء الظن والارتياب بين الشعوب! حالما قرأت خبر ظهور هذه الوثائق في هذا البوست الذي صادف نهاية الأسبوع مع عطلة عيد العمال الكندية، فقد أجلت مشاريع قراءاتي الأخرى وتصفحتها وأنا أتوقع العثور على البراهين الساطعة على المؤامرات الصهيوإمبريالية على السودان ولدهشتي الشديدة لم أجد سوى ما يدل على كل خير وعون لشعب السودان يجعل كل سوداني يشعر بالامتنان لهذه الدولة العظمى التي تعمل على خير وتقدم السودان.
هناك عدة مستويات للسرية (يزعم أصحاب نظرية المؤامرة أن أعلاها هو تصنيف ما فوق سري للغاية) وأعلى تصنيف في هذه الوثائق هو سري فقط. وذلك ليس بغريب فالسودان ليس الصين أو روسيا! وأرجو أن يطلع عليها الجميع وخاصة الزاعمين بوجود مؤامرة أمريكية ضد الإسلام وضد السودان وليخرجو لنا منها الأدلة على تلك المؤامرة فأنا شخصيا لم أجد أيا منها!
وختاما لك الشكر أخي دكتور شداد وفي انتظار إسهامات بقية أعضاء المنبر!
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Abobakr Shadad
SAIF MUstafa
motaz ali
أحمد أمين
قلقو
بريمة محمد
Kostawi
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست