تقرير الازمات الدولية الصادر اليوم يرى تأجيل الانتخابات إلى نوفمبر 2010
تقرير مجموعة الازمات الدولية الصادر اليوم بخصوص السودان Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°68 Nairobi/Brussels, 17 December 2009 Sudan: Preventing Implosion I. OVERVIEW Sudan is sliding towards violent breakup. The main mechanisms to end conflicts between the central govern-ment and the peripheries – the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Darfur Peace Agreement and the East Sudan Peace Agreement – all suffer from lack of implementation, largely due to the intransigence of the National Congress Party (NCP). Less than thirteen months remain to ensure that national elections and the South Sudan self-determination referendum lead to democratic transformation and resolution of all the country’s conflicts. Unless the international community, notably the U.S., the UN, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council and the Horn of Africa Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD), coop-erate to support both CPA implementation and vital additional negotiations, return to North-South war and escalation of conflict in Darfur are likely. Democratic transformation should remain a key goal, as ultimately only this can entrench peace and stability. National unity is unattractive to Southerners because the two parties – the NCP and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) – that fought the North-South con-flict ended by the CPA and now form the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Khartoum have failed to advance it. The South’s self-determination referendum, which must be held no later than 9 January 2011, will thus almost certainly result in a decision for separation, despite the enormous difficulties of establishing an in-dependent South Sudan that is economically viable and peaceful. The failure to foster democratic transformation in the North has also undermined the chances for politi-cal settlement in Darfur and exacerbated tensions in both the East and the far North. The recent progress of NCP-SPLM negotiations on the modalities of national and regional elections and the ref-erendum bill is welcome but does not advance far enough on a credible path for all-Sudan peace. Both parties want elections for the wrong reasons. The NCP wants votes in April 2010 that would allow it to regain the political legitimacy it needs both to protect President Bashir against the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant and to be in a stronger position to declare a state of emergency if needed, including in the event of a new war. The SPLM is concerned that derailed elections might jeopardise its overriding goal of holding the referendum on schedule. It threatens to declare uni-lateral independence if pushed to accept a referendum postponement. Opposition parties in both North and South maintain that the current conditions for elections are unconstitutional and undemocratic and seek postponement until a genu-inely inclusive transitional government has been estab-lished that implements reforms needed for free and fair voting. The main Darfur insurgency groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA), continue to fight and contem-plate possible alliances with the SPLM (if the referen-dum is endangered) and with armed tribal groups such as the Baggara in Darfur and Kordofan, the Nuba and Ingesana in Blue Nile and disgruntled constituencies in the East and north of Khartoum. With the NCP and SPLM drifting apart, the role of inter-national actors becomes more essential. The challenge is to craft a process that produces credible and fair elec-tions, an on-schedule referendum and, if its decision is independence, two economically viable and stable democratic states. The CPA provides the overall political framework but does not address the Darfur crisis, the post-2011 arrangements or intra-South issues. Consequently, an additional protocol that addresses these issues, unites the several peace processes and revises the timing of some benchmarks should be negotiated. It is essential to move rapidly on a number of fronts, including to negotiate a Darfur peace agreement that allows all Darfuris to vote in national elections; to im-plement legal reforms necessary for a free and fair national election process; and to agree on the commis-sions for the South’s self-determination referendum and the Abyei referendum. Time is also required to negotiate a framework for the negotiations over how two highly interdependent states will relate to each other, were the South to decide in its referendum for independence, as appears quite certain. This should cover two periods: first, from the day after the referendum to July 2011, when the CPA’s interim period ends; and secondly, for a further several years – perhaps the four-year #####alent of a parliamentary term – to complete implementation of the peaceful transfer of sovereignty and decide numerous practical details. The NCP and SPLM should negotiate this framework as early as possible in 2010. These processes require strong, united international facilitation, as well as support from other major political forces in Sudan. Cooperation can be promoted by pro-viding significant economic and political incentives for the NCP, the SPLM and Darfuri rebel groups and by isolating and sanctioning recalcitrant parties. The current U.S. initiative goes part way toward what is needed but is not comprehensive enough. The U.S., China, other members of the UN Security Council, members of the AU Peace and Security Council and IGAD member states should cut through the welter of multiple facilitators by agreeing to support an individual of international stature to lead the several negotiations with a view to reconciling the paths of the Sudan peace process. The ideal sequence would be along the following lines:  implementation early in 2010 of outstanding major pre-electoral CPA benchmarks: legal reforms guaran-teeing basic freedoms of expression, association and movement; demarcation of the 1956 North-South border, including Abyei; and agreement on the com-missions for the South’s self-determination referen-dum and the Abyei referendum;  completion on the basis of the recommendations of the African Union Panel on Darfur (AUPD) by April 2010 of a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive security arrangments, monitored by the international community;  negotiation of a new CPA protocol by June 2010 to allow fair Darfuri participation in elections; establish post-election transitional arrangements to administer the South’s referendum and the new Darfur cease-fire and security arrangements; decide the process, if necessary, for transfer of sovereignty to an independ-ent South; and create a strong international mecha-nism to monitor and support these terms and other CPA elements; and  postponement of general elections to November 2010, along with adoption of a constitutional amendment by July 2010 to authorise extension of the term of the present GNU through those elections or, in the event that they are further postponed, to July 2011, and in-corporate the terms of the post-referendum transition. The lead mediator should mobilise support for the above by brokering an agreement between the U.S., China, the AU, European Union (EU), UN and the Arab League in particular on incentives (eg, financial aid, lifting of sanctions, deferment of ICC action) and disincentives (eg, further sanctions, increased isolation, national arms embargo) to be applied to the parties depending on their actions. International support for the elections and its results should be conditioned on the credibility of the process. Progress should be monitored closely and a decision taken by July 2010 at the latest whether it has been suf-ficient to maintain the full agenda. If implementation again lags badly, it will be necessary to concentrate on achieving the minimum essential to prevent return to deadly chaos, namely ensuring that the South’s referen-dum is held on schedule, and a day-after arrangement is in place. Elections would consequently have to be post-poned until such time after January 2011 as the Darfur peace process had advanced adequately; delay in other CPA benchmarks such as governance reforms might also have to be accepted reluctantly. II. SUDAN’S SLIDE TOWARDS FRAGMENTATION Since 2005, such political goodwill as the NCP and the SPLM may have had to implement the CPA when they signed it on 9 January 2005 has dwindled, if not totally vanished. The NCP has not created an environment for peaceful democratic transformation throughout Sudan and has in effect done everything possible to discourage SPLM interest in what happens outside the South. As a result, the GNU is no longer a partnership. The little remaining collaboration is tactical, focused on those CPA elements that protect each party’s own interests. A. UNIMPLEMENTED CPA PROVISIONS The SPLM has given up on reform of the centre and concentrated on maintaining a semblance of stability until the referendum. Its disengagement has rendered the GNU ineffective and ceded central government decision-making to the NCP, which uses its national assembly majority to pass the laws it wants and seeks to obstruct both the South’s secession and any meaningful political reforms in the North. As a result, important CPA provi-sions on power and wealth sharing, resolution of the con-flicts in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei, organi-sation of free and fair elections and security arrangements have not been implemented. The extensive list of items that still need to be completed includes: 1. agreement on the Fifth Housing and Population Census results; 2. demarcation of the 1956 North-South border; 3. the commission for the South’s self-determination referendum; 4. reform of the media and National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) laws; 5. national and state civil service commissions to ensure equitable representation of Southerners; 6. a National Human Rights Commission; 7. a national reconciliation process; 8. an effective National Petroleum Commission; 9. a fully functional Fiscal and Financial Monitoring and Allocation Commission and the National and State Reconstruction and Development Fund; 10. the National Land Commission; 11. disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of militias affiliated to the NCP and the SPLM; 12. full integration of the Joint Integrated Units; 13. demarcation of Abyei’s boundaries in accordance with the Abyei Tribunal’s arbitration; 14. financial support for Abyei to operate and proceed with rehabilitation and reconstruction; 15. the commission for the Abyei territory referendum; 16. disbursement of their allocated shares of net Abyei oil revenues to Bahr el Ghazal state (2 per cent); Western [now Southern] Kordofan (2 per cent); Ngok Dinka of Abyei (2 per cent); and the Misseriya (2 per cent); and 17. full disbursement of the National Reconstruction and Development Fund to Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Moreover, the donor community has not fulfilled its 2005 commitments. Only a small fraction of the $4.8 billion assistance pledged has reached infrastructure projects on the ground, as humanitarian assistance for operations in Darfur has absorbed most of the money. Some of this money was supposed to fund the DDR program, elections, and JIU formation. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission has also not been effective and has never able to put sufficient pressure on the parties to keep peace accord implementation on course. B. ELECTIONS AT EXPENSE OF THE PEACE PROCESS? The mid-term national elections mandated by the CPA were intended to widen political representation and thus facilitate implementation of state reforms, improve gov-ernance and ultimately make unity attractive for the South. Originally scheduled for 2008, and no later than July 2009, they were put back to February 2010 and then April 2010. They now have little chance to achieve their original purpose. Only four months remain for the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to organise a process at five levels: presidency of the Government of Sudan; presidency of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS); gubernatorial; national legislative; and state legislative. Elections are not only challenging logistically. Major opposition parties argue that key elements are missing. In September 2009 they collectively declared with the SPLM that they would boycott if the NCP did not satisfy the conditions for free and fair elections. Insecurity in Darfur and in parts of South Sudan would also make it difficult to hold a credible vote these areas. Moreover, several key issues remain to be addressed. 1. The census Organisation of the elections is complicated by the results of the Fifth Housing and Population Census, which the GoSS, Southern Kordofan and JEM reject. They say the results, which are to provide the basis for allocating National Assembly and state assembly seats, have been manipulated to over-represent pro-NCP constituencies. The SPLM questioned the format from the beginning and now calls the results fraudulent, not a credible count of Southerners resident in the North or of Darfur’s popula-tion, including internally displaced persons (IDPs). They believe that the results over-count populations in areas of NCP strength and under-count those in other regions. The NCP says the census was internationally monitored and endorsed. The presidency approved the results on 6 May 2009, but all Southern state legislatures passed rejection motions, and the SPLM has said it will not accept an electoral process that uses the 2009 census to deter-mine constituencies and boundaries. The mechanisms for resolving electoral disputes, particularly the Joint High Executive Political Committee, have been unable to find a solution. 2. Darfuri participation To register, approximately two million Darfur IDPs would need to return to their areas of origin, now often occupied by others. This should have been done by August 2009, since the electoral law requires that voters be resident in an area for three months to be eligible to register. The NEC started registration in November 2009 hoping to include IDP voters, but there is a strong perception among them that by registering in camps they will lose the right to vote in their home areas and may even lose the right to their land. Many also do not want to join a process that could legitimise their enemy. Thus two million Darfuris may be kept from the political process, while occupiers of their lands elect local repre-sentatives. Most Northern political parties, including the Umma and the Popular Congress Party, have announced they will boycott the elections if all Darfuris are not allowed to vote. This is in effect an incentive for the NCP to rush matters, because they do not see the absence from the process of those unlikely to vote for them as undermin-ing it, but elections that excluded the majority of Darfu-ris and opposition parties would be an additional source of instability. 3. Other registration problems The registration process that began in November and ended on 7 December was largely peaceful, but partici-pation was comparatively low in Eastern Sudan, North and South Kordofan, Darfur, and most states of South-ern Sudan. Since the law provides that no one not reg-istered may vote, millions may be disenfranchised. Several irregularities have been noted by the Carter Center, local observers and citizens. The Carter Center said the authorities made too few announcements regarding the starting date. Registration centre locations were an-nounced only the day before the process began and on a middle page of one newspaper. Some centres were difficult to find. The NEC also said each centre would be open for just three or four days. According to many observers, this violated the electoral law, which speci-fies a full month for registration. Furthermore, the NEC failed to give civil society, parties and most inter-national observers proper information, and there have been reports of harassment of parties and civil society representatives trying to ensure registration of their constituencies. The NEC also reportedly allowed military, police and paramilitary groups to register in their areas of work, rather than in their area of residence as required by the electoral law. They were also allowed to register using military identification cards issued by their units and not the registrar, making it impossible to verify their records during the vetting and voting process. Lastly, on 3 November, the NEC published a list of the ten coun-tries where diaspora Sudanese can register and vote. It excludes neighbouring countries (except Egypt) where many, particularly South Sudanese, live. These irregu-larities benefit the much better organised NCP political machine and boost the number of NCP supporters on the voter rolls. 4. The legal framework Over the past two years, the NCP has limited participa-tion in drafting or revising laws necessary for free and fair elections. Many opposition parties claim to have seen only the final versions tabled in the national assembly. The NCP also has used its majority there to adopt laws over strong objections, prompting the SPLM and oppo-sition parties to boycott or withdraw from specific ses-sions. For example, on 18 October 2009, the SPLM withdrew to protest the lack of transparency in how the speaker, Ahmed Ibrahim al-Tahir (an NCP vice chair-man), set the assembly’s agenda. It also insisted that the cabinet adopted the controversial NISS bill over its objec-tion, not unanimously as the spokesperson said. It threat-ened to “take to the streets” if the NCP remained in-transigent, and on 4 November, the NCP withdrew the draft. The lack of cooperation has held up numerous laws, including review or passage of those establishing basic freedoms of expression, association and move-ment and regulating the security services. The NCP appears to have no intention to level the play-ing field for opposition parties or to give up its legal instruments of repression. It is using delays in the legis-lative agenda as justification for postponing reforms indefinitely. The national assembly is scheduled to con-clude its final pre-elections session in December 2009, during which its own regulations require it to focus ex-clusively on the 2010 budget before dissolving itself. 5. The security environment Insecurity has seriously worsened, particularly in the South. Ashraf Qazi, the UN Secretary-General’s special representative to Sudan, reported on 1 June that “n recent months, the death rate in southern Sudan from violent conflict has been higher than in Darfur” and said creating a peaceful environment before elections should be a priority for the authorities and the international community. In October, the UN Secretary-General reported serious deterioration in six of ten South Sudan states – Jonglei, Upper Nile, Lakes, Central Equatoria, Unity and Eastern Equatoria – where more than 350 people died in clashes in four months. As banditry in Central and Eastern Equatoria escalated, the UN was forced to organise armed protection for staff. On 2 October in Unity state, a major oil producing region in the South, elements of the South’s army, the SPLA, attacked the bodyguards of Paulino Matip, the army’s deputy commander and an area native. More than fifteen people died in the incident. Matip accused the South’s leader, Salva Kiir, Chief of General Staff Lt. General James Hoth Mai and Governor Taban Deng of plotting the attack to neutralise his forces and take full control of the state. The Nuer accused the gover-nor, a Dinka, of trying to persuade Nuer commanders loyal to Matip to switch sides before the elections and the referendum, so as to ensure SPLA control in case of new war. The GoSS has been unable to adequately disarm armed groups and militias. Meanwhile, SPLM politicians are increasingly accusing the NCP of fuelling clashes in South Sudan. Inter-tribal conflict is diverting attention and resources from other important activities. The security situation in Darfur remains unstable and unpredictable, despite more and strengthened units of the joint UN/AU mission (UNAMID), whose monitoring data show increasing armed conflicts, abduction of aid workers, armed banditry, sexual violence and attacks be-tween the Sudanese army (SAF) and rebel groups. In September 2009, government forces attacked SLM (Ab-del Wahid) forces in Korma (North Darfur), leaving 22 dead. Fierce clashes early in 2009 in Wada’ah, south of El Fasher, and Muhajeriya (South Darfur) produced many casualties and IDPs. In September, over 100 people were killed in inter-tribal clashes, mainly in South Darfur (Rizeigat against Maaliya, Fellata against Habbaniya and Rizeigat against Saada). In October, at least twelve were killed and twelve injured in clashes between the Zaghawa and Birgid south east of Shangil Tobaya (North Darfur). Violence against UNAMID has dramatically increased in West Darfur since 2008. Abductions of aid workers also continue. A staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was abducted on 22 October. 6. Motivations The NCP and, to a lesser degree, the SPLM both want national elections in 2010, but for different reasons. The NCP has been preparing for three years to win in the North and weaken the SPLM in the South. It sees elec-toral success as an important way to relegitimise Presi-dent Bashir, prevent his prosecution by the ICC and close the door to any genuine political negotiations over power and wealth sharing with other political forces. If it succeeds, it will have the opportunity to revise Sudan’s permanent constitution when the interim version lapses. Unless it joins a coalition with parties there, the SPLM is unlikely to win a significant share of votes in the North, because it has not developed its own constituency in the region and worked for national unity. It will also proba-bly lose some of its CPA-mandated 70 per cent share of Southern institutions in an election, because of growing discontent among other tribes at Dinka dominance. Nevertheless, it will go along with elections because it does not want to risk any delay of the referendum. A fraudulent election process will not bring sustainable peace to Sudan. Illegitimate elections would escalate con-flict and violence, notably from marginalised groups in both North and South. In the present environment, April 2010 elections would not enjoy the conditions for non-violent acceptance of the results or set the stage for a peaceful referendum. NCP and SPLM insistence on rush-ing a vote without accommodating the interests of the country’s other political forces and establishing reason-able stability in Darfur is thus a recipe for further conflict. III. THE SOUTH: A POSSIBLE FAILED STATE After John Garang’s death in 2005, the SPLM was un-able or unwilling to be an effective GNU partner. It slowly disengaged in Khartoum to concentrate on the GoSS. But the distraction of internal divisions, accountability problems, lack of organisational capacity and the diffi-culty of delivering peace dividends to all southern com-munities have meant four years of minimal progres and little incentive for Southerners to vote for unity. The referendum is to be held no later than six months before the end of the CPA’s interim period, that is, by 9 January 2011. Before this, two contentious issues need to be resolved: demarcation of the 1956 North-South border and elections. The border issue, including demarcation of Abyei territory, has proved very conten-tious. The demarcation commission has halted work and is waiting for the presidency to arbitrate a dispute over the border in Upper Nile. The NCP argues elections should come before referendums so that an elected gov-ernment can manage these. It hopes that if the SPLM emerges weaker and more divided from a vote, it will have more influence over the referendum and demarca-tion issues. On 13 December the national cabinet finally agreed at an extraordinary meeting on the South Sudan referen-dum, the Abyei referendum and the popular consulta-tions in South Kordofan and Blue Nile bills. The South Sudan referendum agreement requires that a decision for independence requires participation by at least 60 per cent of registered voters and approval by a majority of those casting ballots. The respective bills are to be presented to the national assembly, but it is not clear whether they will require approval by that body and the GoSS. The SPLM agreed to suspend its boycott of the national assembly. Senior SPLM leaders are increasingly calling for inde-pendence. In November Salva Kiir said Southerners would need to choose between being second-class citi-zens in a united Sudan or first-class citizens in an inde-pendent South Sudan. But the lack of consensus on secession among some parties in the South and transi-tional areas such as the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile is also a problem for the SPLM leadership. Dif-ferences of opinion on whether to secede and over what type of separation increase the risk of splits between separatists and unionists and between Northerners (in-cluding in the transitional areas) and Southerners. Divisions stemming both from splits during the long war and disparities in access to the benefits of the peace also present a serious challenge for the South’s current and future stability. Poor governance and reports of widespread corruption have prompted sharp criticism of SPLM/Dinka dominance of the GoSS. The recent establishment by ex-Foreign Minister Lam Akol of a new political party, SPLM for Democratic Change, is an indication of increasing South-South tensions, especially between the Dinka, Nuer, Shiluk and Equatorians. These are exacerbated by serious treasury deficits (as interna-tional oil prices have dropped), financial mismanage-ment and extensive corruption. If South Sudan wants to avoid becoming a failed state, it cannot afford to rush to complete separation. The ref-erendum and its date is a red line to which the South will accept no change. But many issues, including sharing of oil wealth and trade, land, water and grazing rights need to be negotiated before there can be complete in-dependence. The polarised environment has prevented much discussion of this, and the South is likely to insist on independence becoming a fact no later than the end of the CPA’s interim period in July 2011, but rushed separation would increase border tensions. Even if these did not bring war, the South would risk being over-whelmed by internal divisions, poor governance and bureaucratic deficiencies. A post-referendum transition period is needed so that pre-referendum agreements es-tablishing the terms and modalities of a peaceful seces-sion can be properly implemented. IV. THE NORTH: NCP STRATEGIES The Islamic movement has not abandoned its goal to reshape Sudan as an Arab and Islamic state. Since it came to power in 1989, the Islamic Front’s agenda has been pursued ruthlessly, notably through the takeover and control of all government institutions. The 1999 split between the NCP and Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party (PCP) involved tactics, not objectives. Nor did the CPA change the NCP’s plans for the North. The NCP is still working to block the South’s secession, but with that outcome ever more likely, it is concentrat-ing for the moment on consolidating its power in the North, in particular by investing in the economic devel-opment of the Hamdi triangle, repressing Darfur’s in-surgents and changing the social mix of that region. The plan is to create a new state, whose dominant con-stituencies are Muslims and Arabised Sudanese and in which Darfur, Southern Kordofan and part of the East are subjugated peripheries serving a powerful centre. Their tribal groups would then be gradually assimilated through displacement and social mixing into a new Sudanese identity characterised by Islam and Northern cultural hegemony. The centre would be Khartoum, wealthy and secure thanks to oil and agricultural export revenues and foreign direct investment from Gulf states. The central areas – includ-ing Gezira, East Sudan and the North up to Dongola – that would become economic pillars are currently bene-fiting from massive investment in dams, roads, air and sea ports. Incorporated in this vision is the notion that foreign investors would have an interest in the NCP retaining power and thus would provide a measure of protection against external pressures. Egypt is a key partner, one for whom Sudan’s stability is a national security priority and that is also concerned about food security and access to water. As the Nile diminishes, and less land is available for agriculture, it seeks to use Sudan to supplement its needs. The NCP may lease Egypt six million acres of arable land in the Nubian basin, allegedly to settle Egyptian peasants, after a 2005 agreement on implementing four freedoms (movement, land ownership, business, and settlement). Cairo also supports construction of several Nile dams in Sudan to enhance irrigation and production of wheat and other agricultural products for Egyptian consumption. The Sudanese Nubians of Northern state who will be displaced are organising against this and may resist fur-ther dams violently. V. DARFUR Peace is also elusive in Darfur. The Doha process en-tered a second stage when Khartoum and JEM signed their Good Will Agreement in March 2009, but they are unwilling to negotiate a final settlement. The NCP wants to use elections to choose alternative, theoretically more legitimate Darfur leaders; in reality, it seeks alterna-tives whom it can co-opt into its patronage system. The Darfur rebel groups reject the current electoral process and see the ICC arrest warrant against President Bashir as weakening the NCP’s legitimacy and thus a source of leverage. They have increased their demands beyond what Minni Minawi obtained in Abuja in 2006 with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), saying they want not nominally senior positions but a real share of executive powers and an equitable distribution of wealth. The currently planned elections cannot accommodate the interests of most Darfuris. The NCP intends to win elections in Darfur by isolating major constituencies and co-opting Arab tribes. The drawing of electoral boundaries on the basis of the recent census would give non-Arabs little chance to obtain high-level positions in any of the three states or many seats in the national assembly. Fur, Zaghawa and Massalit leaders would be marginalised. Nor are the Doha talks that are to resume in December promising. JEM’s leader, Khalil Ibrahim, claims to be Darfur’s sole representative, but his attempt to bring other factions into line is failing, and he is los-ing the support of Chadian President Deby. SLM/A leader Abdel Wahid demands that the NCP dis-arm affiliated militias, return displaced people to their homeland and pay individual and collective compensa-tion, but he lacks a coherent political agenda and, be-cause he stays in self-imposed exile in Paris, has been weakened dramatically on the ground. The other rebel factions control small pockets of territory but are frag-mented and unable to unify. Indeed, unification of the many groups has long been a major hurdle to productive political negotiations. U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration is seeking Libyan and Egyptian help to achieve this and persuade them to join the Doha peace process. Darfuri observers believe his aim is to isolate Abdel Wahid and create a new leadership from the field commanders. They point to his attempts to convene meetings with such commanders in rebel-held areas at Dirbat in Jebel Marra without Wahid loyalists. Senior SLM commanders be-lieves Gration wants to replace him with Ahmed Abdel Shafi, who is willing to join the Doha process. Because of their divisions, Khartoum is unlikely to con-clude a serious deal with any of the rebel groups, and the best the Doha process might deliver is yet another temporary cessation of hostilities. However, while Doha has stalled, the African Union High-Level Panel on Dar-fur (AUPD) has presented recommendations on how to achieve peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur. It defined general principles for political settlement, an approach to the negotiations and a process to ensure that justice and reconciliation are pursued in an integrated manner. It also emphasised Doha’s utility; suggested the AU-UN joint mediator, Djibril Bassolé, establish a comprehensive strategy based on its recommendations; urged that a body composed of the AU, the UN and prin-cipal states support and monitor the mediation process within a set timeframe; and called for UNAMID to be strengthened. The recommendations are a good basis for a political settlement. They include immediate negotiation of a sus-pension of hostilities, followed by a permanent cease-fire and creation of a Darfur Consultative Convention – with participation of Darfur administrators, IDPs, civil society, political parties, and the NCP – to support nego-tiations between Khartoum and the rebel groups that would be based on the Declaration of Principles those two sides signed in Abeche in 2005. That document en-visaged possible reunification of the Darfur region and power-sharing arrangements that might include a vice presidency for Darfur in Khartoum. The convention’s first priority should be to identify the minimal conditions for participation of Darfuris in the elections. Its ultimate goal would be a global political agreement on all main issues. The NCP exhibited conflicting reactions to the AUPD recommendations. It was particularly dismayed by those on hybrid courts, an inclusive political approach to Dar-fur and the need for a solution to Khartoum’s govern-ance crisis. But it realised it could not afford to an-tagonise the AU by rejecting everything, so President Bashir formed a committee headed by Vice President Taha to develop a strategy. Taha has privately rejected several of the recommendations, specifically the hybrid court proposal. Of that proposal, the party has said it “needs to be carefully studied to ascertain its compati-bility or lack thereof with the constitution and the prin-ciple of the independence of the Sudanese judiciary”. VI. NEW POLITICAL DYNAMICS? The political situation is evolving rapidly in anticipation of elections. Northern opposition parties have made a number of attempts to form alliances, including with the SPLM. The NCP is trying to counter these moves but is under internal pressure, as members are increasingly unhappy with its senior leadership. A. THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE AND THE ALL PARTY POLITICAL CONFERENCE In May 2009, with the SPLM present as observer, sev-enteen Northern opposition parties formed the National Alliance and announced that their participation in the elec-tions would depend on the NCP amending key laws and reviewing others. They also agreed to choose one person as their presidential candidate to stand against Bashir. Basing itself on the CPA and the interim constitution, the Alliance says the GNU has not been legitimate since 9 July 2009, because national elections were not held by then as the CPA stipulated. It petitioned the Consti-tutional Court to dissolve the GNU and require that a broad-based government serve as a caretaker administra-tion and prepare elections. The NCP’s political bureau secretary general, Mandoor al-Mahdi, dismissed the argument, claiming the parties wanted to destabilise the government and were trying to avoid elections because of “their lack of popularity”. The SPLM agreed with the NCP that the CPA did not envisage a transitional government before elections but added it was open to dialogue with the Alliance. The NCP responded by seeking its own alliance with other GNU parties. The political significance of the National Alliance is unclear. Some analysts have argued that, except for animosity toward the NCP, it lacks ideological and political consensus, so it is unlikely to agree on a presi-dential candidate or otherwise be effective. Key mem-bers, however, have done well in previous elections. The Umma party, the PCP and the Communist party have strong links with elites in the diaspora and capacity to mobilise the large Baggara tribes in Kordofan, Darfur and Central Sudan, as well as potential to forge an alli-ance with Darfuri rebel groups. Facing deadlock over CPA benchmarks, the SPLM invited the main parties, civil society organisations, national personalities and media to Juba for an All Political Party Conference (APPC). Most parties, except the NCP, participated. Open discussions were held, and Northern opposition leaders al-Sadig al-Mahdi, Hassan al-Turabi and Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud heard Southern griev-ances and criticism. They publicly acknowledged mis-takes and reflected on a peaceful Sudan’s future, whether united or separated. Participants signed a declaration calling on the NCP to help forge a national consensus and threatened a collective election boycott unless there is electoral reform. The declaration included constructive recommendations on CPA implementation and promised an effort to reach out to constituencies and form a high-level committee for periodic follow-up but made no men-tion of building a coalition to stand against the NCP. Still, patience had clearly run out. Some political leaders in attendance told Crisis Group that if the NCP remained intransigent, they would start an “intifada” and not rule out alliances with armed tribal groups in Darfur, Kordo-fan, the Blue Nile and East Sudan and the use of force. B. CRACKS IN THE NCP Serious divisions have developed within the NCP since the ICC prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant against President Bashir in 2008. Second and third tier mem-bers, including members of its Shura council and political bureau, openly complain that decision-making is domi-nated by five people: Bashir; Taha, who is vice presi-dent of the party as well as of Sudan; Awad Al-Jaz, the finance minister and head of the NCP’s armed militias; Nafie Ali Nafie, assistant to the president and NCP vice president for organisational affairs; and Ibrahim Omar, head of the Shura council. Reportedly, messages were passed to the leadership that it needs to separate the party from the state and make decisions more inclusively. The militia commanders were said to have told Bashir they were considering three options: not participating in future fighting, because conditions in the country do not warrant a jihad; pressing for changes to save the movement; or undertaking the changes themselves. Bashir has become very cautious. In 2008, he changed army chiefs of staff and named his former office manger, General Nasraldin, to lead the joint chiefs. This year he has replaced the entire police command and appointed another office manager director general of police. In August 2009 he replaced the powerful NISS director, Salah Mohammed Abdallah (Gosh), with his deputy, Mohammed Atta al-Moula. After thus consolidating his control, Bashir agreed to a party convention in early October to address internal dissent. It was much better attended than previous affairs, and expectations on the floor were high. Some participants sought significant changes in the NCP’s vision, structure and leadership and to discuss objectively its challenges and those of the country. The main undeclared agenda of most was how to separate party and state institutions and improve the governance of both. The convention came at a time when some members believe the party’s very existence is in jeopardy. Most delegates from the peripheries doubt it can win free and fair elections. According to senior members from North Darfur, Sinnar, Gezira and Kassala states, “there are many of us who think we must secure our nominees for the regional elections, to serve what is best for us, and not an agenda of a few corrupt leaders who want only to retain power at the cost of our country”. A frustrated senior member said, “the party has become a mixture of middle class people who are only interested in business profits. The principles that used to tie the members to-gether are gone. This conference [is] the last attempt to save the party”. A leader in the opposition to the NCP compared the party’s situation to that of the ruling Socialist Union in the last days of an earlier president, Jaafar Nimeiri: “The moment the NCP loses the elections, the party would disintegrate. … [Nimeiri’s] Union was controlling every-thing, just as the NCP is now. When they lost power through the intifada of 1984, the Union disappeared and could not rise again”. Many convention delegates and members of NCP think tanks went further, warning that without changes in how affairs were managed, the country itself would disintegrate. During the convention, delegates suggested the party’s president should not automatically be its nominee for national president, suggesting that Bashir’s ICC indict-ment makes him a liability. Since Bashir already is the nominee, they urged election of a new NCP president. Similar proposals on governors targeted Ahmed Haroun in South Kordofan, likewise under an ICC arrest warrant. A senior figure said, “two thirds of the states are against their current NCP governors, and this could lead to the disintegration of the party”. However, most proposals were blocked, and their champions were denied the floor in plenary. The convention did compromise on gover-nors, agreeing that each state would convene a conven-tion to nominate three candidates, after which the party leadership would make the final decision. That candi-date would also become the party head in the state. But Bashir remained both president of the party and its nominee for re-election as national president. Bashir blocked interest from the floor for the NCP to open a genuine dialogue with leaders from Darfur and such areas as Southern Kordofan, Sinnar, and Blue Nile. Rebellion flickered. Nafie was identified as the key per-son responsible for manipulating the party’s decision-making process, with Bashir’s support; an effort to defeat Nafie in the vote for the new Shura council and to re-move him from the political bureau failed. On balance, the conference appeared to disappoint most NCP mem-bers. A senior figure in the Shura council said its rules were abused by the top leadership, particularly Bashir, who sought only to protect his position. Because he no longer trusts his aides, the president was said to rely in-creasingly on his immediate family and tribe. VII. THE NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL CPA PROTOCOL Although it is increasingly unlikely that the CPA will preserve the unity of Sudan, the North and South will remain interdependent for the foreseeable future. Insta-bility in either would inevitably spill over into the other. Separation would need to be managed to ensure peace-ful coexistence and improved governance within the North and the South. To address the dual requirements of peace-ful separation and the stability of the two independent states, an additional protocol to the CPA is needed. This should become the priority of the international com-munity, especially the U.S., China, the AU Peace and Se-curity Council and IGAD. A jointly agreed mediator of international stature is required to convince the NCP and SPLM to negotiate an agreement that reviews the time-frame of the remaining CPA benchmarks – including the postponement of elections – brings the Darfur peace process within the agreement’s framework and creates a post-referendum transition period to supervise and complete the transfer of sovereignty to the new southern state, should this be the result of the referendum. But even an agreement between the NCP and SPLM is in-sufficient to guarantee internal stability: the international partners will need to remain engaged throughout the transition period. A. OBJECTIVES Before free and fair elections can be held in Sudan, time is needed to negotiate a Darfur peace agreement, in part to ensure that all Darfuris can take part in the voting. Without that participation, elections would not be seen as legitimate and so would not help stabilise the North. Time is likewise required to implement legal reforms that are likewise essential for a freer and fairer election process. There must also be time after the referendum to secure the implementation of other provisions of the Darfur peace process as well as to complete the transfer of sov-ereignty to the anticipated independent Southern state. The length of this new transition should probably be roughly the #####alent of a full parliamentary term – four years – as it should logically lead to a new electoral cycle in the two separate states of Northern and South-ern Sudan. Strong and consistent international engage-ment will be required. The NCP and SPLM cannot decide alone on delaying elections in order that they can become an important means of peacebuilding. The agreement of all parties in the GNU as well as opposition parties and Darfur rebel groups is also necessary. Without a constitutional amend-ment that reflects a broad-based agreement on the way forward, Sudan would enter a legal vacuum in July 2010, when the interim institutions created by the CPA, including the GNU, formally cease to exist. That would give the NCP a pretext to declare a state of emergency to undergird its rule. Such a step could well trigger conflict in the North, including in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile. To avoid such dangers, the ideal sequence and timing of events for reconciling the paths of the several peace processes and simultaneously stimulating a general im-provement of governance is: 1. within the first months of 2010: implementation of the main outstanding pre-election CPA benchmarks: legal reforms that guarantee basic freedoms of ex-pression, association and movement; and demarcation of the 1956 North-South border; 2. by April 2010: a permanent ceasefire and compre-hensive security arrangements in Darfur on the basis of the AUPD recommendations that are internation-ally monitored and facilitate full Darfuri participation in national elections; 3. by June 2010: adoption of a CPA protocol that pro-vides an electoral framework to confirm fair Darfuri representation; establishes a post-election transitional arrangement to administer the South’s self-deter¬mi¬na¬tion referendum and implement the new Darfur peace agreement, perhaps through December 2014; sets out the process for transferring sovereignty to an independ-ent Southern state if that is the referendum’s decision; and creates a powerful international mechanism to monitor and support its implementation; 4. by July 2010: adoption of a constitutional amend-ment that postpones general elections to November 2010, extends the term of the GNU through those elections or, in the event that they are again postponed, to July 2011 (the end of the CPA interim period), and incorporates the terms of the post-referendum transition; 5. in November 2010: free and fair national elections; 6. in December 2010: formation of a new transitional government on the basis of those elections; 7. by the first week of January 2011: the South’s self-determination referendum; and 8. by December 2014: completion of the transfer of sovereignty to the new Southern state, if that is the referendum’s decision, and completion of implemen-tation of outstanding elements of the Darfur peace agreement. To set this chain of events in motion, the UN Security Council, AU Peace and Security Council and IGAD should agree on the appointment of a joint mediator with inter-national stature and the mandate to support implemen-tation of Sudan’s multiple peace processes and conduct negotiations as necessary. The mediator should imme-diately convene the CPA signatories and initiate nego-tiations on the protocol described above, including the understanding that the key signatories of the DPA, the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement and the Cairo Agree-ment, as well as other Darfur rebel groups and political party representatives, should be consulted on its key ele-ments. An advisory committee composed of representa-tives of these political forces should be established to support the negotiations. Djibril Bassolé, the current UN/AU chief mediator for Darfur, should focus peace negotiations on both what is needed to obtain full Darfuri participation in the general elections and implementation of the AUPD recommen-dations. The cessation of hostilities is needed as soon as possible, followed by a permanent ceasefire so as to improve the general security environment in Darfur and allow IDPs to return to their areas of origin before the rainy season begins in June. Central to the success of a sustainable ceasefire is participation of both main Dar-fur rebel groups and UNAMID in the Darfur state security committees and establishment of an effective joint cease-fire monitoring mechanism on the ground. While their immediate disarmament might be unrealistic, militias and armed groups should be pressured to integrate into rec-ognised and authoritative chains of command. Getting buy-in from the Darfur rebels will be difficult, but it is essential in order to bring stability to the region. They need to be convinced that a negotiated settlement, including the possibility to participate in the electoral process, is their best chance to obtain a fair share of political power. They should be offered positions in the NEC and the state electoral committees to help them gain confidence in that process. The current electoral law does not guarantee fair repre-sentation to minorities. It will have to be reviewed within the framework of the CPA protocol negotiations, so that all Sudanese are allowed to register as voters either from their areas of origin or their current residences. This would give the two million Darfur IDPs an incen-tive to accept the electoral process and an opportunity to determine political representation in their home areas even if they have not returned by the time of elections. Simultaneously UNAMID and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) should participate directly in support of the NEC at all stages of election administration, perhaps using as a model the successful support the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) provided to general elections there in 2007. Direct UN participation in organisation of the polls would increase the chance of their success and reduce the risk of rigging at all levels. B. GETTING THE INTERNATIONALS TO COORDINATE Unless the international community re-engages behind the CPA and works together, there will be little chance to obtain the agreements described above. International actors must reach a common vision and coordinate efforts behind a process for the democratic transforma-tion and peace arrangements needed to produce stabil-ity in all parts of Sudan. A joint lead mediator will lack leverage to oblige the NCP, SPLM, Darfur rebels and opposition political forces to make significant concessions unless he/she has active support to carry out a consen-sus strategy. For too long, regional and other international actors have been divided into two camps. One – largely Western – thinks that the best way to achieve stability is to continue the democratic transformation process through strict implementation of the CPA. This strategy is undercut by the NCP’s vested interests and vision for the North. The other – African-, Arab- and Asian-dominated and including Russia – believes that its own interests as well as stability in Sudan can only be maintained by a powerful centre that keeps order and avoids political fragmentation. It thus works to avoid weakening the NCP. Greater awareness that NCP policies are increas-ing the risk of disintegration in the North, however, is affecting the views of some in this group, who are beginning to acknowledge that NCP rule is leading to instability and that the South’s independence is likely unavoidable. China’s concern for stability has been related to the need to secure its $4 billion investment in oil production and the safety of 15,000 Chinese workers in the country. Beijing now recognises that the NCP will have to com-promise, including over Darfur, if there is to be peace in Sudan and the North is to hold together after 2011. On 27 May 2009, special Sudan envoys of the perma-nent members of the Security Council and the EU were briefed by Bassolé on the Darfur talks and clearly expressed their concern that Sudan could implode. For the first time since 2005, there seems to be convergence among them that a new round of NCP-SPLM negotia-tions is essential if there is to be a solution to the politi-cal impasse. Following this meeting, U.S. envoy Gration called for comprehensive meetings on the CPA in Washington, to which 25 countries and international organisations were invited. The forum was important for several reasons. It demonstrated the Obama administration’s engagement; Gration became more aware of the complexities of CPA implementation, including that the absence of mutual trust means that verification measures are essential; and it created a council of the special envoys, including China and Russia, that can contribute technical, economic and political support for the CPA. Trilateral sessions involving the NCP, SPLM and U.S. were subsequently held. At the first, in Khartoum in August, the Sudanese parties promised to implement ten pending issues but failed to agree on the census results and the referendum law. General Oyai Deng, GoSS Min-ister for Regional Co-operation, told a public event in Washington on 9 October that the second meeting, in Juba in September, “ended up as utter failure” and called for IGAD to become more involved in the mediation rather than leave it for the U.S. envoy. The third, in Khartoum in November, achieved no compromises. The key principles and objectives of U.S. Sudan policy, in the recently-completed policy review, are consistent with the above proposed process. The Obama admini-stration recognises that a comprehensive approach is required that addresses all Sudan’s conflicts and en-gages not just the NCP, SPLM and major Darfur rebel groups but also critical regional and other international actors. It acknowledges that the necessary environment for credible elections does not presently exist, that there has been serious backsliding in CPA implementation and that close monitoring and evaluation is required. It focuses on meeting CPA benchmarks, which would require a modified ti####ble; a political agreement in Darfur among the rebels and resettlement and reintegra-tion of IDPs; an end to impunity; and cooperation on counter-terrorism. However, it has not called for the appointment of a lead mediator or new ti####bles with respect to elections, Darfur and governance reforms. In light of the failure of the three rounds of trilateral talks and concern among the SPLM that he has pursued a “softer” approach toward the NCP, U.S. envoy Gra-tion cannot take on the role of lead international media-tor to help fill the CPA’s implementation gaps, organise negotiations on post-referendum arrangements and serve as the main supervisor of the subsequent international engagement that will be necessary to ensure implemen-tation. He and the U.S. are well placed, however, to pro-vide invaluable support to that process, in part because it has been a major NCP goal for a decade to persuade Washington to lift its sanctions and normalise relations. The U.S. had promised movement on sanctions once the CPA was signed, but it suspended that promise when the counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur led to mass displacement, mass atrocities and other human rights vio-lations. With a weaker economy today, the NCP wants U.S. sanctions lifted more than ever. If the SPLM and NCP agree to the above comprehen-sive process, donors should recommit to support an ex-tensive rehabilitation and reconstruction program in the South, Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Blue Nile. If President Bashir gives tangible proof of cooperation in achieving such a solution, including guaranteeing sta-bility through elections and relinquishing his candidacy for re-election, the Security Council should consider a resolution invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statute that would defer ICC prosecution, provided that steps have been taken to address the impunity issues in the manner suggested in the AUPD report. C. IF THE PARTIES CONTINUE TO OBSTRUCT CPA IMPLEMENTATION In the absence of demonstrated goodwill and constructive actions to revamp the peace process, the mediator will need to mobilise international support for dramatically increasing pressure on the parties by deepening and expanding the existing sanctions regime, implementing a comprehensive national arms embargo and completely isolating those responsible for blocking the process. But even with goodwill, it will be difficult to achieve the very ambitious goals in a tight timeframe. Progress should be monitored closely, so that emphasis can be changed as needed. One overriding deadline cannot be postponed: the CPA’s commitment that an internationally monitored referendum for South Sudan be held by the first week of January 2011. If it appears by July 2010 that the larger agenda cannot be achieved, the international community should press the parties to concentrate on an immediate bottom line, namely the negotiation before the end of the year of arrangements for handling the referendum vote and the process of separation, should that be the result. It would serve both North and South well to have in place an arrangement for dealing with everything from border issues, through wealth sharing, to treatment of each other’s citizens. Many in the SPLM recognise the need for a period in which to prepare for the full sovereignty that goes with independence, but this is politically sensitive. Negotiating an arrangement that in effect acknowledged the possible division of the country even before the South voted would be politically difficult for the North, but rationales for such negotiations exist. For example, many issues need to be regulated even should the South choose to stay in the national union with its current high level of autonomy. The agreement could be divided into two periods: from the day after the refer-endum until the CPA interim period expires in July 2011 and another, perhaps through the end of 2014, during which two independent states would cooperate as sov-ereignty is progressively passed to the South. Concentration on this bottom line would have some nega-tive consequences. Elections would have to be postponed until such time after January 2011 as the Darfur peace process had advanced adequately; delay in other CPA benchmarks such as governance reforms might also need to be accepted reluctantly. However, the successful negotiation of transitional North-South arrangements would contribute importantly to maintaining a relatively stable environment on both sides of the border in which an engaged international community could continue to press for full, if delayed implementation of a compre-hensive peace agenda. And it must do so, for it cannot allow itself to be complicit in the rubber-stamp legitimi-sation of an undemocratic regime, or the possible im-plosion of Sudan. VIII. CONCLUSION The experience of the four years since the signing of the CPA has shown that the Sudanese parties lack the political will to achieve its commitments without strong international engagement and sustained pressure. The collapse of the CPA at this point would likely lead to even more disastrous results, including a continuation of the conflict in Darfur, new regional insurgencies and even a return to North-South war. The key challenge for the Sudanese parties and their international partners is to rapidly build consensus over steps needed to implement the accord and promote democratic governance through-out Sudan. Sudan is running out of time. The NCP cannot be allowed to rig the national elections. The South will abide no delay in the holding of a referendum on its independ-ence by the first week of January 2011. Now is the time to refocus the peace process around the organisation of credible elections, the negotiation of a viable peace in Darfur, the redress of grievances of other key regions of the North through participation in a legitimate political process, the holding of the Southern referendum, and the management of the result of that referendum. If either party – most likely the NCP – refuses to compromise, the international community should be ready to take appropriately strong measures, including if necessary isolation of the Khartoum regime. But if the comprehen-sive agenda cannot be achieved rapidly, it must keep the prospect of ultimate peace alive by at least ensuring that North and South regulate the terms of their future interdependence before 2010 ends. Nairobi/Brussels, 17 December 2009 APPENDIX A MAP OF SUDAN APPENDIX B JUBA DECLARATION ON DIALOGUE AND NATIONAL CONSENSUS The preamble of this document states that the SPLM, under the leadership of Salva Kiir, invited all Sudanese political parties, civil society organisations, national personalities and media to national dialogue in Juba on Septem-ber 26-30. The All Political Party Conference (APPC) set up a Leadership Committee comprising the ######### of the political parties and the general assembly. The APPC constituted a Sudan peoples’ parliament in which delegates conducted free, open dialogue in a transparent democratic environment. It further noted that the Leadership Committee met on September 26 to adopt the APPC’s agenda and draw up a set of rules to govern its proceedings. The general assembly met the following day and discussed the views of 28 political parties and five civil society organisations, in addition to an address delivered by the delegation of the Peoples’ Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) of Eritrea. On the third day, the APPC set up five working com-mittees to discuss key national issues, namely implementation of all peace agreements, democratic transformation, the economic situation, national reconciliation and healing, as well as foreign policy. Inspired by the spirit of national-ism, the meeting exhaustively deliberated on the agenda and agreed on a number of points, including the following in the text as provided on the SPLM website: 3. PEACE AGREEMENTS 3.1. Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 3.1.1. Reaffirms commitment to full implementation of CPA which is essential to sustainable peace and confidence building be-tween the North and South Sudan. In this regard, the APPC resolves the following: 3.1.1.1. Holding of referendum on self-determination within the period stipulated in the CPA and Interim National Constitu-tion (INC), 2005; 3.1.1.2. Enactment of Referendum Bill during the prorogation of the current National Assembly, with simple majority vote (50%+1) being threshold for either confirming unity of Sudan or opting for secession and providing for all Southern Sudanese to take part in this process; and 3.1.1.3. Demarcation of North-South borders prior to the holding of general elections. 3.1.2. Emphasizes the importance of bringing all laws in consonance with the INC, 2005 3.1.3. Calls for holding Popular Consultation in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States after the conduct of credible population census to ensure the elected Legislatures truly express the will of the people in the two States. 3.1.4. Adheres to the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on Abyei, and calls for immediate demarcation of Abyei boundary in such a manner that would promote peaceful coexistence, and would uphold traditional rights of the groups, whose interests are inextricably linked to Abyei Area, to passage and grazing. 3.1.5. Adhering to the CPA provisions on making unity attractive, the APPC decides to set up a working group focused on develop-ing political, economic and cultural programs to promote unity during the remainder of the Interim Period while at the same time guaranteeing respect for separation in the event the people of Southern Sudan opt for it. 3.2. Darfur conflict 3.2.1. Urges the full implementation of Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), particularly the powersharing, wealth-sharing and security provisions. 3.2.2. Affirms that negotiation is the best mechanism for resolving the Darfur conflict and appeals to all parties to desist from mili-tary escalation of the conflict. 3.2.3. Upholds the legitimate rights of the people of Darfur, particularly in relation to: 3.2.2.1 Share of the Region in power and civil service at the national level according to its demographic size; 3.2.2.2 Share of the Region in the national wealth in accordance with objective criteria, notably population ratio and princi-ple of affirmative action; 3.2.2.3 Compensation for material and moral damages suffered by the individuals and groups in Darfur; 3.2.2.4 Maintaining Darfur as one Region; and 3.2.2.5 Traditional tribal land ownership (Hawakir), and calls for the restitution of land grabbed during the civil war to its rightful owners and for ensuring the proper utilization of land for the benefit of all the people of Darfur. 3.2.4. Affirms zero-tolerance to impunity from prosecution and stresses that those who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity are brought to book before an independent judiciary. 3.2.5. Calls for immediate cease-fire to create conducive environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to enable the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to their villages. 3.2.6. Calls upon the international community to properly equip the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to fulfill its mandate of protecting civilians in Darfur. 3.2.7. Calls for the expeditious resolution of the Darfur conflict before the upcoming general elections to enable the participation of Darfurians in those elections. 3.2.8. Urges the disarmament of Janjaweed and other tribal militias. 3.2.9. Calls for the holding of the Darfur-Darfur dialogue conference with the participation of all stakeholders with the view to sort-ing out Darfuri internal relations and repairing the social fabric destroyed by the civil war. The conference shall be guided by agreed Declaration of Principles (DOP), resulting in comprehensive agreement that shall be acceptable to all Darfurians and endorsed nationally by an all-party conference. 3.3. Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) 3.3.1. The APPC reaffirms its commitment to full implementation of ESPA and to the lifting of state of emergency. 3.3.2. The APPC further reiterates its commitment to address the shortcomings of ESPA through the undertaking of complementary political, developmental and remedial measures to resolve the underlying grievances of the people of Eastern Sudan. 3.4. Cairo Peace Agreement 3.4.1. The APPC resolves to expedite the implementation of all provisions of Cairo Peace Agreement, particularly those related to democratic transformation, economic reforms and redress for dismissed employees on political grounds as well as to combat-ing corruption. APPENDIX C ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde¬pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing prac¬tical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct reg¬u¬lar update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made avail¬able simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who in¬fluence them, in¬cluding the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Exe¬cutive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Com¬mis¬sioner for Human Rights and Chief Pro¬secutor for the Inter¬national Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugo¬slavia and for Rwanda. Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently operates nine regional offices (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istan¬bul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field repre¬sen¬tation in eighteen additional locations (Abuja, Baku, Bang¬¬kok, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damas¬cus, Dili, Jeru¬sa¬lem, Kabul, Kath¬man¬du, Kinshasa, Oua¬gadougou, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo, Seoul and Tehran). Crisis Group cur¬rent¬ly covers some 60 areas of actual or poten¬tial conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Came¬roon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Dem¬o¬crat¬ic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangla¬desh, Burma/Myanmar, Indo¬ne¬sia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz¬stan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thai¬land, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbe¬kistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herze¬govina, Cyp¬rus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russia (North Cau¬ca¬sus), Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela. Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The fol¬low¬ing governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: Australian Agency for International De¬vel¬op¬ment, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development Agency, Cana¬dian International Development and Re¬search Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Dan¬ish Ministry of For¬¬¬eign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of For¬eign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Principality of Liech¬ten¬stein, Luxem¬bourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Nor¬wegian Min¬is¬try of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for For¬eign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Af¬fairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United King¬dom Department for International Develop¬ment, United King¬dom Economic and Social Research Coun¬cil, U.S. Agency for International Development. Foundation and private sector donors, providing annual support and/or contributing to Crisis Group’s Securing the Future Fund, include the Better World Fund, Carne¬gie Corporation of New York, William & Flora Hewlett Foun¬da¬tion, Hu¬man¬ity United, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Jewish World Watch, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foun¬da¬tion, Open Society In¬sti¬tute, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Radcliffe Foun¬da¬tion, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and VIVA Trust. December 2009 APPENDIX D CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2006 CENTRAL AFRICA Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis, Africa Report N°103, 9 January 2006 (also available in French) A Strategy for Ending Northern Uganda’s Crisis, Africa Brief-ing N°35, 11 January 2006 Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report N°104, 13 February 2006 (also available in French) Congo’s Elections: Making or Breaking the Peace, Africa Re-port N°108, 27 April 2006 Chad: Back towards War?, Africa Report N°111, 1 June 2006 (only available in French) Beyond Victimhood: Women’s Peacebuilding in Sudan, Congo and Uganda, Africa Report N°112, 28 June 2006 Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good Governance in the Congo, Africa Report N°114, 20 July 2006 (also available in French) Peace in Northern Uganda?, Africa Briefing N°41, 13 Septem-ber 2006 Securing Congo’s Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Showdown, Africa Briefing N°42, 2 October 2006 (also avail-able in French) Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk, Africa Report N°120, 30 November 2006 (also available in French) Congo: Staying Engaged after the Election, Africa Briefing N°44, 9 January 2007 (also available in French) Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace, Africa Report N°124, 26 April 2007 Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report N°128, 5 July 2007 (also available in French) Burundi: Finalising Peace with the FNL, Africa Report N°131, 28 August 2007 (also available in French) Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Mo-mentum, Africa Briefing N°46, 14 September 2007 Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report N°133, 31 October 2007 (also available in French) Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State, Af-rica Report N°136, 13 December 2007 (also available in French) Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri, Africa Report N°140, 13 May 2008 (also available in French) Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue, Africa Briefing N°53, 19 August 2008 (also available in French) Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework, Africa Report N°144, 24 September 2008 (also available in French) Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue, Africa Briefing N°55, 9 December 2008 (also available in French) Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace, with or without Kony, Africa Report N°146, 10 December 2008 Chad: Powder Keg in the East, Africa Report N°149, 15 April 2009 (also available in French) Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, Africa Report N°150, 11 May 2009 (also available in French) Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, Af-rica Report N°151, 9 July 2009 (also available in French) Burundi: réussir l'intégration des FNL, Africa Briefing N°63, 30 July 2009 Chad : Escaping from the Oil Trap, Africa Briefing N°65, 26 August 2009 (also available in French) HORN OF AFRICA Sudan: Saving Peace in the East, Africa Report N°102, 5 Janu-ary 2006 To Save Darfur, Africa Report N°105, 17 March 2006 Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership, Africa Re-port Nº110, 23 May 2006 (also available in French) Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement, Africa Briefing N°39, 20 June 2006 (also available in Arabic) Beyond Victimhood: Women’s Peacebuilding in Sudan, Congo and Uganda, Africa Report N°112, 28 June 2006 Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?, Africa Report N°116, 10 August 2006 Getting the UN into Darfur, Africa Briefing N°43, 12 October 2006 Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead, Africa Briefing N°45, 26 January 2007 Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process, Africa Report N°125, 30 April 2007 (also available in Arabic) A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan, Africa Report N°130, 26 July 2007 (also available in Arabic) Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock, Africa Briefing N°47, 12 October 2007 (also available in Arabic) Ethiopia and Eritrea: Stopping the Slide to War, Africa Brief-ing N°48, 5 November 2007 Darfur’s New Security Reality, Africa Report N°134, 26 No-vember 2007 (also available in Arabic) Kenya in Crisis, Africa Report N°137, 21 February 2008 Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis, Africa Briefing N°50, 13 March 2008 (also available in Arabic) Beyond the Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War, Africa Report N°141, 17 June 2008 Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?, Af-rica Report N°145, 21 October 2008 (also available in Arabic) Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, Africa Report N°147, 23 December 2008 Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC, Africa Report N°152, 17 July 2009 Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland, Africa Briefing N°64, 12 August 2009 Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents, Africa Re-port N°153 Somaliland: A Way out of the Electoral Crisis, Africa Briefing N°67, 7 December 2009 SOUTHERN AFRICA Zimbabwe’s Continuing Self-Destruction, Africa Briefing N°38, 6 June 2006 Zimbabwe: An Opposition Strategy, Africa Report N°117, 24 August 2006 Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?, Africa Report N°122, 5 March 2007 Zimbabwe: A Regional Solution?, Africa Report N°132, 18 September 2007 Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election, Africa Report N°138, 20 March 2008 Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition, Africa Briefing N°51, 21 May 2008 Ending Zimbabwe’s Nightmare: A Possible Way Forward, Af-rica Briefing N°56, 16 December 2008 Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government, Africa Brief-ing N°59, 20 April 2009 WEST AFRICA Liberia: Staying Focused, Africa Briefing N°36, 13 January 2006 Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System, Africa Report N°107, 6 April 2006 Guinea in Transition, Africa Briefing N°37, 11 April 2006 (also available in French) Côte d’Ivoire: Peace as an Option, Africa Report N°109, 17 May 2006 (only available in French) Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty, Africa Report N°113, 19 July 2006 The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest, Africa Report N°115, 3 August 2006 Côte d’Ivoire: Stepping up the pressure, Africa Briefing N°40, 7 September 2006 (only available in French) Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis, Africa Report N°118, 28 Sep-tember 2006 Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, Africa Report N°119, 25 October 2006 Guinea: Change or Chaos, Africa Report N°121, 14 February 2007 (also available in French) Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis, Africa Report N°123, 28 March 2007 Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State?, Africa Report N°126, 30 May 2007 Côte d’Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace?, Africa Report N°127, 27 June 2007 (also available in French) Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity, Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Guinea: Change on Hold, Africa Briefing N°49, 8 November 2007 (also available in French) Nigeria: Ending Unrest in the Niger Delta, Africa Report N°135, 5 December 2007 Côte d’Ivoire: Ensuring Credible Elections, Africa Report N°139, 22 April 2008 (only available in French) Guinea: Ensuring Democratic Reforms, Africa Briefing N°52, 24 June 2008 (also available in French) Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State, Africa Report N°142, 2 July 2008 (also available in French) Sierra Leone: A New Era of Reform?, Africa Report N°143, 31 July 2008 Nigeria: Ogoni Land after Shell, Africa Briefing N°54, 18 Sep-tember 2008 Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, Africa Report N°148, 13 January 2009 Guinea-Bissau: Building a Real Stability Pact, Africa Briefing N°57, 29 January 2009 (also available in French) Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun, Africa Briefing N°58, 5 March 2009 (also available in French) Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta, Africa Brief-ing N°60, 30 April 2009 Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun, Africa Briefing N°61, 25 June 2009 (also available in Portuguese) Côte d'Ivoire: What's Needed to End the Crisis, Africa Briefing N°62, 2 July 2009 (also available in French) Guinea: Military Rule Must End, Africa Briefing N°66, 16 Oc-tober 2009 (also available in French) OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on: • Africa • Asia • Europe • Latin America and Caribbean • Middle East and North Africa • Thematic Issues • CrisisWatch please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org International Headquarters 149 Avenue Louise, 1050 Brussels, Belgium • Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 • Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 Email: [email protected] New York Office 420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2640, New York 10170 • Tel: +1 212 813 0820 • Fax: +1 212 813 0825 Email: [email protected] Washington Office 1629 K Street, Suite 450, Washington DC 20006 • Tel: +1 202 785 1601 • Fax: +1 202 785 1630 Email: [email protected] London Office 48 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT • Tel: +44 20 7831 1436 • Fax: +44 20 7242 8135 Email: [email protected] Moscow Office Belomorskaya st., 14-1 – Moscow 125195 Russia • Tel/Fax: +7-495-455-9798 Email: [email protected] Regional Offices and Field Representation Crisis Group also operates out of over 25 different locations in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. See www.crisisgroup.org for details. www.crisisgroup.org

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