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 Re: أنا ضد محاكمة الجنجويد بهذه الطريقة (Re: Amjad ibrahim)
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الأخ امجد ابراهيم ..
أنت موفق في أختيار العنوان ..
وذلك لعدة أسباب :
الأول ..
سوء القوانين التي يحكم بها هؤلاء ..
مهما فعلوا .
الثاني ..
الذين يتم محاكمتهم هناك ليسوا
الجناة الأصليين ، فهم مجرد فاعلين
مأمورين ، ويجب محاكمة (ولي الأمر)
علي حسب تصريح كرادتش دارفور موسي هلال
في جريدة الصحافة .
الثالث ..
هو أن يحاكم المسؤلون الكبار الذين
أمروا بسطاء الجانجويد لأرتكاب المجازر
في حق القرويين ، أن يحاكموا في محكمة
الجزاء الدولية ،وليس في السودان.
واليك بعض مما جاء من أدلة في تقرير
منظمة (هيومن رايت وتش ) ..
Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support
A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, July 20, 2004
Summary
.pdf version
The documents described in this paper confirm the Government of Sudan’s policy of official support to the Janjaweed militia. They illustrate patterns of official recruitment and military support to the militias by officials from a variety of levels in the Sudanese government, a pattern that cannot be dismissed as arbitrary or as the actions of individuals over-reaching their authority. The directives issued by government officials illustrate the extent to which the government-backed militias are used as auxiliaries in the military campaign and a fundamental tool and instrument of government policy and military strategy.
If genuinely concerned with bringing peace and stability to Darfur and ending the cycle of violence and impunity in the region, the Sudanese government should suspend key government officials who bear responsibility for recruiting, arming or otherwise supporting the Janjaweed militias from official duties, pending official investigation of their responsibility for abuses.
In addition, the international community must recognize that the government-backed militias and government forces are clearly indivisible—they are utilized as one entity. Those officials for whom there is evidence of implication in the policy of militia support should be included in any forthcoming international measures, including international travel sanctions, arms embargoes, and investigation by any future international commission of inquiry.
This international commission of inquiry should be established by the U.N. Security Council and dispatched to examine the evidence concerning crimes against humanity, war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties in Darfur in 2003-2004, including the nature of the crimes, the identity of the perpetrators, and the role of authorities in the commission of crimes; collect and preserve evidence of the crimes; and, make recommendations on appropriate action to ensure accountability for the crimes.32
Finally, given the continuing abuses and the allegation that Janjaweed members are being incorporated into police forces, the disarmament and removal from rural areas of the government-backed militias must be closely monitored by international monitors such as the African Union mission, and its capacity increased and supported commensurately.
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1. See among others, Human Rights Watch reports: Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan, Vol.16, No.5 (A), April 2004; Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, Vol.16, No. 6(A), May 2004; Report of the High Commissioner on the Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur region of the Sudan, E/CN.4/2005/3, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, May 3, 2004; Darfur: Too Many People Killed for No Reason, Amnesty International, February 3, 2004.
2. “Presidential Political Decree to Resolve the Darfur Conflict,” June 20, 2004, Embassy of the Republic of Sudan website at http://www.sudanembassy.org/default.asp?page=viewstory&id=280, and Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on the occasion of the visit of the UNSG to Sudan, July 3, 2004.
3. The term “Janjaweed” has become the source of increasing controversy, with different actors using the term in very different ways. Literally, the term is reported to be an amalgamation of three Arabic words for ghost, gun, and horse that historically referred to criminals, bandits or outlaws. In the wake of the conflict in Darfur, many “African” victims of attacks have used the term to refer to the government-backed militias attacking their villages, many of whom are drawn from nomadic groups of Arab ethnic origin. Victims have also used other terms, such as “fursan” and “peshmarga” to describe these government-backed militias. The Sudanese government and members of the government-backed militias themselves reject the name “janjaweed” and appear to use the term “janjaweed” to refer to criminals and outlaws, see “Sudan Arabs Reject Marauding ‘Janjaweed’ Image,” Reuters, July 12, 2004. Other terms used by the Sudanese government include the terms “outlaws” and “Tora Bora,” to refer to the rebels, and the terms “knights,” “mujaheeden” or “horsemen” which appear to refer to members of its own militias.
4. Darfur has been the site of intermittent inter-communal conflict between groups of nomadic camel and cattle-herders and sedentary agriculturalists due to desertification and increasing competition for land and water resources. The Janjaweed are clearly also stakeholders in the Darfur conflict. Many of the members of the Janjaweed have been recruited from specific nomadic groups of Arab ethnic origin who have been involved in clashes with the so-called African farmers in previous years. The willingness of some members of the nomadic groups to take part in the conflict as an auxiliary force is no doubt linked to their interest in acquiring land and livestock. See also HRW, Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan, at footnote 1.
5. The Sudanese government’s use of militias or proxy forces is not new. Numerous ethnic militias have been supported and used as proxy forces in southern Sudan throughout the conflict of the past two decades.
6. A Human Rights Watch report on recent attacks and violations of the ceasefire in Darfur and Chad is forthcoming.
7. IRIN, “Interview with Government Humanitarian Aid Commissioner on the Darfur Crisis,” April 7, 2004 at www.sudan.net.
8. Agence France Presse, “Sudan will not disarm militias while rebellion rages: foreign minister,” May 14, 2004.
9. “We will not appease the Americans by capturing tribal leaders,” Al Wan, July 5, 2004.
10. See footnote 2.
11. On file with Human Rights Watch. These documents cannot be reproduced in full due to security concerns, however all of the documents bear official stamps, seals and/or letterhead of the respective offices of origin that correspond with those seen on other documents from the same sources. Human Rights Watch has reproduced parts of these documents exactly as they are written in the original.
12. العمل علي تمرير سياسات المجاهد ين و المتطوعين للقتال والذين يعملون تحت آمره المجاهد الشيخ موسي هلال بمناطق <بشمال دارفور> و تأمين الاحتياجات الضروية لهم.
13. The presence of PDF among the Sudanese government forces in Darfur has been noted by several sources. Some of the Janjaweed militia were alleged trained at PDF camps in 2003. See for instance, ”Militias ravage Darfur in gangs of hundreds,” IRIN, March 10, 2004, at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c12...027080d?OpenDocument
14. كذلك نوصي بأهمية عدم التدخل في تحجيم صلا حياتهم وغض الطرف عن تجاوزاتهم الطفيفة التي يقوم بها بعض الجانحين من المجاهد ين بحق المدنيين المشكوك في إنتمائهم للتمرد
15. . وكذلك لضمان عدم تكرار ما حدث في منطقة كتم من عكس مشوة للأحداث يشكك في صدق نوايا المجاهدين و يعمل على الترويج الإعلامي الكاذب لها.
16. “Sudan rebels accuse pro-government militias of killing 300 in Darfur,” Agence France Presse, August 11, 2004.
17. “Immediate Steps to Protect Civilians and Internally Displaced Persons in Darfur,” Amnesty International, August 29. 2003. A survivor of the Kutum massacre has stated that over 60 individuals were killed.
18. Ibid.
19. لقرارات السيد/ رئيش الجمهوريه التي اعلنت بحمد الله انتهاء العمليات العسكريه بمناطق العمليات الرئيسية في دارفور وا نسحاب كل الفيئات الخارجة عن القانون من المناطق التي تسيطرعليها بشمال المحافظه ولضمان عدم تكرار ذلك نوصى بالاتى:
1/ تكثيف عمليات الحمد والتعبئة للموالين من القبائل وضمان التسليح الكافى لهم لتامين المناطق.
20. “Sudan-Chad: Cross-border conflict escalates,” IRIN, March 16, 2004, at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c12...069c777?OpenDocument
21. Human Rights Watch interview, June 2004. Further details are confidential in order to protect the security of this witness.
22. The new governor of South Darfur is Alhaj Atta el-Mannan Idris, a former commissioner of South Darfur state and currently Secretary General of the National Congress Party for Khartoum state. He is reputed to have close links to Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha.
23. Agence France Presse, “Sudan turns down request for aid agencies to extend operations,” March 15, 2004.
24. (5) وضع تصور اعميبات لعادة توطين الرحل بالمناطق التى انسحب منها الخارجين عن القانون بناءا على الزيارة الميدانية وعمليات التقييم.
25. (2) اعادة تاهيل مصادر المياه وفتح المدارس بتلك المناطق.
26. Agence France Presse, “Sudan to set up 18 “settlements” for million Darfur refugees: report,” July 2, 2004.
27. ( 4) فتح معسكرات جديده للمتطوعين لحماية المدن الرئيسية والقيام بالاعباً الا منية فى اوساط المواطنيين.
28. See HRW, Darfur Destroyed, May 2004; “UN Agencies Report Mixed Progress on Enhancing Humanitarian Access,” UN News Service, July 12, 2004.
29. See Human Rights Watch report on ceasefire violations and other abuses, forthcoming July 2004.
30. “Presidential Political Decree to Resolve the Darfur Conflict,” June 20, 2004, see footnote 2.
31. “Sudan: Threat of forced return looming in Darfur,” IRIN, July 12, 2004.
32. As noted in the recommendations of the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, May 7, 2004, and the conclusions of the E.U. General Affairs Council, July 12, 2004.
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hamid hajer
هاشم نوريت
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست