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 نص مذكرة حزب الأمة لمجلس الأمن 3 يونيو2008
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Memorandum to the UN Security Council
Special Session in Khartoum
3rd June 2008
Respectable International Statesmen
The Umma Party (UP) welcomes your extraordinary
concern for Peace, Democratisation, and Stability in
Sudan.
The root causes of present troubles are like many
"Third World" countries suffered from: Civil strife,
economic underdevelopment, national imbalances, the
problems of modernisation and identity, power
struggles, and so on.
The three agreements, the CPA, the DPA, and the EPA
and other minor agreements are attempts to resolve
Sudan's problems and hopefully build comprehensive and
just peace, and effect democratic transformation.
Those agreements failed to reach their targets:
1. The CPA was reached after a marathon effort by the
GOS and SPLM. It contained a large element of
expatriate participation and received massive internal
and International blessings. Umma Party supported the
agreement especially the gains for the South. But we
maintained the position that; the agreement is
necessary but not sufficient, and in order to achieve
a comprehensive and just peace and genuine democratic
transformation, we said that the Agreement contained
certain contradictions which should be ironed out,
that many of its items were ambivalent and need to be
further elucidated, that some important causes of
conflict have not been addressed, and finally that to
give it legitimacy and national acceptability it
should be endorsed by a national all party forum.
After three plus years, there are many reasons why the
CPA is in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The following
reasons are most relevant to explain the present
crisis:
• The settlement was conceived in bipartisan terms,
which confirmed for each party that the national
interest is co terminus with their partisan interest.
• Wealth sharing was confined to revenue sharing
between the two parties, without any directive as to
how it is spent in terms of the national development
interest.
• In the security protocol, all other armed groups
were forced to join either SAF or SPLA without their
consent. This was unrealistic.
• The agreement was described as comprehensive at a
time where there were other active war fronts. Power
and wealth were divided by two leaving no room for any
further deals.
• Historic controversial fault lines were considered
the sole responsibility of the two parties without
reference to the local population or to other national
stake holders. For example, the ABC report. In reality
Abyei issue will not be resolved, even if the two
signatories to the Abyei protocol continue in
agreement, so long as the other national stake holders
and the local inhabitant are not seriously involved.
• To make things worse, the main international
mediator, USA, makes lip service support for the
agreement, and proceeds to weaken the agreement by
supporting one side in the agreement and seeking to
destabilize the other side.
• The fact that gains were directly the result of
military protest without a mechanism to legitimise the
gains convinced the beneficences to keep and enhance
their military powers to the determent of civilian and
developmental targets.
• Finally, the CPA laid a precedent for wealth and
power gains, and blocked avenues for any further
analogous settlements.
2. The DPA was born dead
• In procedural terms; DPA was planned to be signed by
the GoS and the two armed parties, it was ultimately
and after unwarranted pressure signed by GoS and half
of an armed party.
• DPA has three main weaknesses:
• Failed to restore some benefits for Darfur in the
status quo ceuo ante June 1989, namely, the one
region, the distribution and ownership of the
traditional land tenure, the representation of Darfur
in the Presidency, and the 1956 regional boundaries of
Darfur.
• Failed to resolve the legitimate demands of the IDPs
and the refugees in terms of individual and collective
compensation, secure their repatriation to their
villages without addressing the security challenges
from the very elements which caused the displacement.
• Failed to offer gains in terms of wealth and power
consistent with the CPA precedent (according to the
population percentage).
• Such drawbacks allowed the groups which refused to
sign the DPA to capitalise on these drawbacks, and
create a wide based constituency of rejection.
Therefore, since the DPA was signed on May 2006;
things in terms of security, humanitarian relief, and
cross boarder conflicts have deteriorated markedly.
• International keenness to introduce UNAMID to Darfur
led to uncritical support for DPA. Unless there is an
updated and universal cease fire agreement, the UNAMID
will be a sitting duck for attacks. There will be no
peace for them to keep. The fact that the peace
process has come to a dead end, would open the windows
for all types of adventurism.
3. Instead of finding a break through for Darfur,
authorities in Khartoum sought to besiege the armed
groups by spreading their wings westwards to Chad.
Some regional and international elements support the
status quo in Chad. This set the stage for the events
of 10th May 2008 that took place in Omdurman and else
where.
Unless the Darfur crisis is resolved, such scenarios
will be repeated endlessly spreading chaos within the
Sudan and in the neighbourhood.
4. The Eastern front agreement reflects most of the
drawbacks of the DPA. Its signatories represent the
groups which were operating from Eritrea. Other
political groups were excluded. Therefore, there are
numerous reservations to the agreement.
5. On the basis of this diagnosis, it is necessary to
espouse a strategy of a comprehensive and just peace,
robust democratic transformation, reached by an
all-party national forum.
That forum has basically to discuss and agree upon a
four points national agenda, namely:
• To confirm the basic gains of the South, to deal
with the CPA draw backs, and to involve all stake
holders in its support.
• To resolve to respond positively to the legitimate
demands of the people of Darfur.
• To guarantee Human Rights and basic freedoms and
implement the necessary legislation.
• To run free and fair and internally and
internationally observed elections.
This forum should be convened in Sudan within 3
months. It should be all inclusive.
It should be preceded by the all Darfurian conference,
to act as a feeder conduit to the National Forum on
the issue of Darfur.
The National forum should discuss and endorse this
national agenda, and decide upon the means of
implementing the national agenda.
6. What do we require of the international community?
A. To take stock of the CPA, DPA, and Eastern Front
agreements and engage in a serious self-criticism
about the roles of the three parties to the
agreements, namely; the Sudanese signatories, the
regional, and the international mediators.
B. To reach a realistic diagnosis of the situation in
Sudan.
C. To support the Sudanese National Agenda putting the
horse before the cart.
D. To help the Sudanese help themselves in terms of a
comprehensive just peace, and democratic
transformation.
Finally, any attempts to resolve the present problems
which eschews the national, comprehensive, and radical
approach and tries to pump blood into the present
agreements without resolving their drawbacks is a
waste of time, and worst, is perpetuating tensions
which will drive the country down the abyss.
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Nazar Yousif
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست