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Re: ما ناقصنا الا انت يا (هاني ارسلان )يالمدعي بمصريه حلايب عشان تفتي كمان؟؟!! (Re: Tragie Mustafa)
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Issue19 : 25 august 2004 International intervention in Darfur; its dimensions and prospects
Hani Raslan
The two armed rebel movements in Darfur have issued repeated pleas for international intervention in the province. To them, the UN Security Council resolution on Darfur was insufficient and the 30 day ultimatum too lenient. The Darfur rebels are unhappy with the Arab League which, they believe, is trying to alleviate pressure on the Sudanese government and spare it international condemnation. Even mediation by the African Union, AU, did not sit well with the rebels. The deployment of African observers to monitor the ceasefire in the region is neither sufficient nor effective, the rebels claimed. It was only with reluctance that rebel representatives went to the Abuja talks that started on 21 August.
Direct international intervention in the crisis is what the two rebel movements want. If anything, this only raises questions about the credibility of these movements and their genuine representation of the social and tribal strata on whose names they speak. The two movements claim to demand justice in development and a fair share of power, quite legitimate objectives. But the Darfur rebels seem to have lost sight of their own demands in the midst of the media uproar about genocide and ethnic cleansing. The rebels seem less interested in attaining their goals as in bringing about international intervention. It is as if they seek international intervention for its own sake, not as a means of pressure or a path to higher strategic goals.
But how did the idea of international intervention in the crisis emerge? And, can intervention resolve the problem, or will it make things worse?
The idea of intervention is based on the claim that genocide and ethnic cleansing are taking place in Darfur. This is what prompted the US congress to pass a decision on the crisis. The congress decision recalled the tragic memories of Rwanda and Buruni, where a million people perished a decade ago without the world lifting a finger to defend them.
The issue of genocide fueled a massive media campaign, which in turn put further pressure on the US administration and EU countries to act. The Bush administration could let the Democrats take the initiative a matter that is of considerable interest to the African American community.
Across the Atlantic, Tony Blair found in Darfur a chance to rehabilitate his image, which has received a blow over the Iraqi debacle. The intervention in Iraq has been detrimental to the UK prime minister. The UK public now sees the Iraqi campaign as deceptive and motivated by the sheer desire to please the Americans. The UK chief of staff has announced that 5,000 British troops are ready and willing to intervene in Darfur if necessary. This is how serious the crisis has become.
The case for international intervention is quite fragile. It is based on the assumption that genocide has taken place, a matter which has been denied by all credible and specialized agencies. A UN committee that went to Darfur denied any sign of genocide or ethnic cleaning. The AU denied genocide, so did an EU fact finding committee, so did several impartial international organizations, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres. Oddly, even US officials agree. Colin Powell, following a visit to Darfur, stated that the events in that province do not resemble those of Rwanda or constitute genocide. Two weeks following the UN Security Council resolution on Darfur, a spokesman for the US state department said that the US has no evidence of genocide so far.
International intervention has lost some of its initial appeal, although the UN Security Council has described the Darfur crisis as a threat to international peace and security. Under chapter VII of the UN charter, the UN Security Council has the right to sanction international intervention, or send peace keeping forces to vulnerable areas. The Council's resolution notes that certain measures could be taken against Sudan unless the government shows commitment to resolving the crisis, disarming the Janjaweed militia, provide security and protection to the displaced, and return the displaced to their homes. These measures are in line with article 41 of chapter VII, which allows the use of partial or full economic and diplomatic sanctions under such circumstances. But military sanctions have not been ruled out, for the resolution's preamble refers to chapter VII. As it stands, the resolution straddles the fence on military intervention, leaving all possibilities open.
However, military intervention remains a remote possibility, because of several reasons.
1. The dispatch of military forces to Darfur would be involve significant military and political cost. Darfur is a large province (about 0.5 million square km) with a difficult terrain. A credible military intervention would involve large number of troops with long supply lines and complicated logistics. 2. The goal of military intervention, despite all the uproar, remains unclear. If the aim is to protect the refugees, this is can be done through a commitment by the Sudanese government. Alternatively, a partial and limited intervention could be undertaken, with AU forces, to monitor the ceasefire. If, however, the goal is to disarm the Janjaweed, difficulties would arise. Any foreign force trying to disarm the Janjaweed may find itself locked a costly and futile guerilla war. The Janjaweed have no known bases, no clear organizational structure, no hierarchical command, and no tangible presence on the ground. The Janjaweed are not a tangible force, but a collection of fighters who form and disband on short notice. They are drawn from various groups and various tribes. They become Janjaweed only in the instant they are assembled and on the march. As soon as their operations end, they disappear among their tribes and become indistinguishable from ordinary people. It will be hard to disarm them, because they bury their weapons in the desert and extract them when necessary. Finding the weapons would not be easy. In a nutshell, these militia are a ghost that is hard to defeat. Any invading troops may find themselves chasing a mirage, just as is the case with Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. And the failure in accomplishing the mission could be detrimental on more than one level. 3. The United States does not want to be a part of a new conflict, not with the presidential elections around the corner and Iraq turning into an ongoing debacle. Going to Darfur at this timing would involve incalculable risks for the President Bush, and may help the Democrat candidate John Kerry. 4. A US or western presence in Darfur may turn will make that area attractive for anti-US militants across the world, just as was the case in Iraq. Darfur has open borders with various countries, including Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic. It would be hard to secure these borders in view of the increased resentment, in the Arab and Islamic world, of the US and its policies. 5. Military intervention may weaken the Khartoum government, or even lead to its downfall. This is not what the US administration wants. The latter has spent the past two years sponsoring a peace deal for the south. It cannot risk bringing down the very government that signed the agreement. The chaos that could follow the fall of the Sudanese government is clearly not in Washington's interest. 6. The US, with its immense international leverage, is in a position to decide whether Darfur is heading toward peace or further conflict. Washington can achieve its goals and protect its interest through political pressure. It does not need to engage in costly and risky military intervention.
The threat to use military intervention has created a new set of problems and even complicated the search for peaceful solution. The Darfur rebels, politically and organizationally inexperienced as they are, are beginning to demand something close to secession. They want to have their own military forces, full-fledged autonomy, and a limited share of Sudanese oil revenues. They demand a withdrawal of government forces from their region. Such demands have been granted to the South in the six Naivasha protocols. The government have accepted such settlement in the South, but it cannot do the same in Darfur. If a federal formula is adopted in western Sudan, it would only be a matter of time before similar measures are introduced in eastern Sudan. Before you know it, the entire northern part of the country would be divided. And the south is only 6 years away from voting on session. The end result could be a fragmented country, a group of cantons linked at most by the formalities of a federation.
What the Darfur rebels forget is that direct international intervention is unlikely. Even if such intervention takes place, this would only turn the entire province into a war zone, a theatre of military operations that no one knows when and how it would end. The ones to pay the price will be the refugees, the same people whose basic rights have been violated and who have been deprived of security and food due to the mistakes of both the Sudanese government and the rebels. Hopefully, the Abuja talks would be a first step to a political solution of the crisis. So far, all the debate, even that which has taken place in the corridors of the Security Council, was focused on the immediate needs of security and relief. These needs are the symptoms of the crisis, not the cause.
The Sudanese government has said it was fully prepared to negotiate with an open mind and seek a new division of power and wealth with Darfur. It is now up to the West to persuade the Darfur rebels, as well as their allies in the Sudanese People Liberation Movement, that the only way ahead is through talks, not military action.
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