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محمد عبدالله ابراهيم
محمد عبدالله ابراهيم
Registered: 12-21-2015
Total Posts: 117
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The Sudanese Crisis: Between the Absence of Will and the Denial of Leaders-The Illusion of Sovereig
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00:16 AM December, 08 2025 Sudanese Online محمد عبدالله ابراهيم-الخرطوم-السودان My Library Short URL
The Sudanese crisis, which has devolved into a devastating existential war, transcends the framework of a conventional military conflict. It delves into the profound conceptual entanglement between sovereignty and responsibility. While the escalating toll of death and waves of displacement sweep across the entire Sudanese landscape, a question that haunts the global conscience echoes in the chambers of international diplomacy: "Has the resolution of this crisis truly become intractable for the global will, or is the absence of seriousness merely a mask concealing a web of conflicting interests, compounded by the moral lapse and the erosion of ethical commitment؟" A careful reading clearly indicates that the tragedy was not born of an unsolvable complexity, but rather from those who internally entrenched the narrative of denial and externally fostered the paralysis of will. In the midst of this humanitarian catastrophe and political vacuum, the position adopted by the command of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) stands out. It has met all regional and international initiatives with an outright rejection, entrenching itself behind the primacy of the military institution-a sacred, unquestionable destiny. This stance is not merely a reflection of a difference in vision; it embodies a stark denial of historical facts and ground realities that the land can no longer tolerate. This unyielding insistence is manifest in the demand that the military leadership of the SAF be a precondition for talks: the complete disarmament and assembly of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This condition, which is not a door to a solution but a firmly closed one, transforms the political process into an intractable equation that prolongs the conflict instead of ending it. This demand, even if it appears logical within the theory of a centralized state, is entirely devoid of any historical or logical basis in the context of Sudanese conflicts. It is a spurious claim lacking political, military, or realistic support. Sudan's track record in peace processes, from the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement to the 2020 Juba Agreement, shows that no armed faction has ever been required to disarm or disband as a precondition for entering political dialogue or negotiations. This condition is merely a maneuver to prolong the war, as it demands that the other party relinquish its sole leverage before sitting at the negotiating table. This fundamentally contradicts the fundamentals of negotiation in post-state conflicts and turns political dialogue into a hollow political charade, proving the failure of the military rationale to achieve genuine peace and revealing a profound conflict between power and self-interest at the expense of the state and its citizens. The tragic irony of this conflict lies in the fact that, unlike its predecessors, this war has forced the government itself to operate from outside the capital and to rely on displacement. This undermines the legitimacy of its rationale and reveals that the weapon is no longer an instrument of protection but an instrument of self-destruction. Conversely, the RSF's repeated declarations of welcoming all regional and international initiatives, and its readiness to negotiate without preconditions, grants it a clear political and moral high ground in the diplomatic arena. This places the other party, clinging to the narrative of denial and the illusion that the solution can only be military, in the position of the obstructing party. The assertion that the Sudanese crisis is intractable is nothing more than a grand illusion propagated to justify the paralysis of will within the regional and international community. If the international community were truly serious, the resolution of this crisis would not be impossible, especially since the international community is fully aware of all the details of the war and the Sudanese crisis. It does not require additional information about the parties to the conflict or the external entities supporting them-even those parties that seek to prolong the war and obstruct all peace initiatives. What the regional and international community lacks is absolute seriousness and a decisive resolution to transform humanitarian concern into a deterrent political action capable of imposing change and halting the war and the spiral of suffering. Herein lies the major paradox in the profound conceptual entanglement between sovereignty and responsibility. While some invoke the sanctity of national sovereignty to justify non-intervention, the catastrophic humanitarian crisis and the grave human rights violations necessitate the activation of the Responsibility to Protect principle. This principle affirms that sovereignty is not an absolute privilege but a responsibility incumbent upon the state toward its citizens. When the state fails to protect its people, this responsibility automatically transfers to the international community, obligating it to intervene to protect civilians and impose limits on the cycle of continuous violence and tragedy. The hesitation to use maximum pressure tools, including comprehensive and rigorous international sanctions and accountability, grants the warring parties-especially those fighting to prolong the war-a license to continue the killing and the destruction of the state. The international discourse, which is content with statements of condemnation and intermittent humanitarian aid, does not play a political role but rather contents itself with the role of a witness to the largest humanitarian tragedy in the world. The required seriousness, however, transcends this formal framework to reach the level of imposing peace and protecting civilians as an unpostponable priority. This seriousness may ultimately necessitate resorting to force within the framework of international law to impose no-fly zones or establish safe areas, all under the legal and ethical umbrella of the Responsibility to Protect. When a state is unable to protect its people or becomes complicit in targeting them, international intervention is not merely a political option but a legal and ethical obligation aimed at breaking the cycle of impunity and ending the architecture of destruction that governs the course of the war. The myth of the Sudanese crisis's complexity is nothing more than a misleading and deceptive mask that conceals a conflict of international and regional interests. Sudan, which has been transformed into an arena for a proxy conflict, has become an opportunity for every external party to invest in the continuation of the war for geopolitical or economic gains. Herein lies the real reason for the failure of a solution, not in the apparent complexity of the crisis itself, which is exploited as a pretext to justify the international inertia and the failure to take decisive actions or resolutions. The international community possesses all the necessary tools for action, starting from full information about the identity of the parties to the conflict and their supporting entities, all the way to the available legal instruments, including mechanisms for international accountability and sanctions. This is further supported by the firm ethical foundation justified by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, which confirms the legitimacy of intervention and the necessity of taking urgent measures to stop the war and the suffering of the citizens. The essence of the solution does not lie in the repetition of formal meetings, conferences, or gatherings that do not lead to real action. Rather, it lies in a serious and decisive will that transcends the limits of traditional diplomacy and moves to the stage of effective enforcement. Therefore, the regional and international community must free itself from the circle of hesitation and deal with all parties with a greater degree of firmness and seriousness, including the use of organized force within the framework of international law to impose peace and protect civilians, if that becomes the only option to break the cycle of violence and halt the continuous collapse of the state. The path to peace in Sudan begins with dismantling the narrative of denial among the internal parties and overcoming the paralysis of will within the international community. It requires transforming global concern into a political resolution with no turning back on ending the war, even if that requires using radical tools that transcend traditional diplomacy. In the balance of history, the world will not be asked about the extent of the crisis's difficulty, but about the seriousness of its will to end the tragedy and its readiness to sacrifice its narrow interests for the sake of protecting innocent lives. The solution is not impossible, and international complacency only perpetuates the suffering. The will is what is absent.
Mohammed Abdallah Ibrahim [email protected]
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