SAVE THE SUDAN An Urgent Cry for International Help (UN – AU – EU) By: Professor Mahdi Amin Eltom

04:39 AM August, 09 2025

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SAVE THE SUDAN
An Urgent Cry for International Help
(UN – AU – EU)
By: Professor Mahdi Amin Eltom

6 August 2025

1: Introduction
Sudan is steadily descending into the abyss. The situation is deteriorating at an alarming and accelerating pace, to the point where the country no longer resembles the promising homeland envisioned by its founding fathers. It is far from the aspirations held by generations that followed independence, and further still from what younger generations hoped to inherit.
For decades, the nation has groaned under the weight of adversity, division, and repeated political, economic, and social failures. Today, its very survival—both land and people—is at stake. This existential crisis demands a serious search for a solution, one that may require breaking with convention and thinking outside the traditional frameworks. What Sudan needs now is a new beginning—a national rebirth free from the old molds that led the country and its people to their current state of disintegration and widespread hardship.
Let us face the truth: we have all failed—civilians, military personnel, technocrats, and politicians alike—in managing the political, economic, and security affairs of our country. Sudan has been ruled by successive oppressive authoritarian regimes and by ineffectual party-based governments. It has fallen under the leadership of figures who, time and again, have betrayed the nation’s hopes—from the independence era until today.
The thirty-year reign of the so-called "Inqaz" (Salvation) regime completed the destructive mission with remarkable efficiency. It was soon followed by the revolution’s technocrats, who proved unable to navigate the nation’s challenges, quickly drowning in indecision, weakness, and a loss of strategic direction.
Thus, power has repeatedly fallen into the hands of those lacking in national spirit and genuine loyalty. Instead, self-interest and individualism have prevailed—where personal agendas took precedence over the nation, even if it meant the destruction of Sudan and its people. Not only have the incompetent persisted in their failure, but they have also recently plunged the country into a catastrophic war—one that threatens Sudan’s unity, the safety of its people, and its long-term stability.
Given this grim reality—and a multitude of other well-documented failures visible to any impartial observer outside Sudan’s insular political class—I argue that the only viable path out of this national crisis lies not in traditional solutions or domestic improvisation. Rather, the total collapse of local avenues for resolution demands serious, radical consideration of an alternative.
This proposal envisions saving Sudan from the recklessness of its own elites and the ambitions of opportunists seeking its land, natural resources, and economic potential. The only way to achieve this, I argue, is by temporarily and voluntarily placing the country under an international trusteeship or administrative mandate for a fixed term, under the direct oversight of the United Nations Security Council.
If implemented, such an arrangement would provide immediate protection against external adversaries seeking to exploit the nation, and internal actors who aim to divide it. It would shield the country from amateur rulers lacking the capacity to govern a nation of Sudan’s size and geopolitical, human, economic, and strategic complexity.
Far from being a surrender of sovereignty, a well-executed period of international trusteeship offers a vital opportunity: a chance for Sudanese society to preserve its territorial integrity, to rebuild modern and effective administrative and economic institutions, and to reintegrate into the global economic system. It would also help halt the accelerating national decline, engage in sustainable development, and train a new generation of youth equipped—intellectually, technically, and practically—to manage the country and ensure its long-term prosperity.
2: Restructuring the State, Constitutional Reform, and the Rationale for Trusteeship
To ensure meaningful change during the proposed short-term period of international trusteeship under the Security Council, it is essential to begin with comprehensive state restructuring. A tightly managed and urgent reordering of national affairs must start with a centralized authority capable of securing the country, restoring stability, and meeting urgent national needs through a centralized system.
It is proposed that Sudan be reorganized into five major administrative regions or states. These would be managed by competent administrators who understand the importance of productive collaboration with traditional leadership structures. This would continue until viable, modern alternatives are developed to replace the outdated tribal and regional concepts that have long hindered Sudan’s development, paralyzed its progress, and now threaten its very survival as a unified state and nation.
Simultaneously, for Sudan to move forward under a secure and internationally anchored foundation, the highest priority must be given to drafting a permanent constitution. This is a task at which every regime since independence has failed. Notably, Sudan’s era of independence in 1956 began with a temporary constitution drafted just prior to independence by a qualified international committee. It was later amended slightly after independence to serve as the governing document of a free, sovereign state.
That revised constitutional document remains one of the best Sudan has seen since independence. Subsequent civilian and military governments tried to draft new constitutions, but these were either flawed or lacked national consensus, and as a result, were never respected—even by those who swore an oath of allegiance to them. These constitutions were, in effect, the symbols of a defeated and disenfranchised nation.
Therefore, the Sudanese people, who yearn for a stable, secure life and genuine, sustainable development, need a strong and lasting constitution—civil in nature, grounded in humanistic values, and enriched by the experiences of more advanced nations. It must be completely free from religious doctrines or legalistic interpretations that, when imposed in Sudan’s past interim constitutions, only deepened social divisions and instability.
The forced imposition of religious texts into constitutional frameworks has resulted in community fragmentation and widespread political unrest, at times culminating in tragic outcomes—such as the secession of the South, and public punishments that humiliated citizens, particularly women, through practices like public floggings under the guise of religion. Others suffered amputations for hunger-driven thefts, sentenced by discredited courts and unqualified judges.
What Sudan needs is a modern, civil constitution where religion is left to personal belief and the nation belongs to all. And given that we have failed—repeatedly—to produce such a document over the 69 years since independence, we must now entrust this responsibility to an international committee, akin to the one assembled before 1956. This committee should be composed of constitutional experts selected internationally, tasked with producing a draft constitution subject to a national referendum.
This constitution should only be ratified if approved by at least two-thirds of Sudanese citizens aged eighteen and above. The draft and referendum process can be completed within the proposed ten-year period of international trusteeship, culminating in national elections based on the new constitution. These elections would return Sudan’s governance to its people, marking a new chapter in the country’s political and administrative history.
3: Central Governance, Federalism, and the Case for a United Sudan
In my view, the country must begin with a strong central government to stabilize political and administrative conditions and provide the nation time to regain its footing and reflect rationally on its political future. During this period, public discourse can take place around different governance systems—specifically centralized vs. federal systems.
For many, federalism may represent the most practical political solution to Sudan’s chronic governance challenges. It could be the necessary antidote to the enduring, ever-intensifying conflict between the central government and the peripheries—a dynamic that has persisted since independence in 1956.
Given the desire for long-term stability and balanced development, it may be appropriate to present two parallel draft governance frameworks near the end of the trusteeship period: one centralist and one federalist. The public could then choose, through a free referendum, which system should define Sudan’s future governance.
Before this referendum, a broad national education campaign must be conducted to ensure that Sudanese citizens make their decision consciously, knowledgeably, and without coercion.
In the search for better governance models, we must also address a major impediment to Sudan’s political progress: the military institution and its deeply entrenched coup mentality. Since independence, the army has been the real threat to national aspirations and a major barrier to achieving stable, civilian democratic rule.
Therefore, the military must be neutralized during the international trusteeship period through a complete restructuring—its doctrine, structure, training, and national identity must be redefined. It must be purged of the tribalism and political partisanship that have compromised its national character and undermined its role as protector of the constitution and the nation.
Given the severe damage inflicted on the army—particularly during the thirty-year rule of the Inqaz regime—it may be necessary to completely disband the existing military and rebuild it as a professional, national institution from the ground up. In the interim, border security could be entrusted to United Nations peacekeeping forces until a new army is fully reconstituted.
This restructuring must also apply to all other military and paramilitary forces—whether regular or irregular—including the Rapid Support Forces and all armed groups covered by the Juba Agreement or other past and future agreements. Only the police force should remain, and even it must be reformed to ensure its functions align with internationally recognized standards for civilian law enforcement.
4: Political Parties, Civil Society, and Rebuilding National Identity
It is not only the military that poses a risk to Sudan’s stability during and after the proposed period of international trusteeship. Political parties and civil society organizations—including trade unions, federations, and associations—have historically possessed tools and activities that obstructed the Sudanese nation’s aspirations for stability and sustainable development.
These groups have long had the capacity to derail any national progress, including efforts during previous brief democratic periods. Many political and syndicalist leaders must now acknowledge that their relevance has run its course. Whether through intent or ignorance, their actions contributed to the disintegration of Sudan. Their illegitimate activities disrupted governance and compromised the nation’s democratic aspirations.
Sudan has endured more than enough under the domination of sectarian right-wing parties, covert and overt leftist factions, and waves of political Islam—elitist, populist, and extremist. Enough is enough. The nation urgently requires a new generation of political and civic organizations—rooted in Sudan’s current reality and conscious of the need to break free from the country’s cyclical failures.
These new entities must aim to build a healthy national identity—one that releases Sudan from the shackles of dysfunction, stagnation, and decline. Traditional leadership across political and syndicalist structures must voluntarily step aside, making space for a new generation of leaders. These younger figures must be capable of reforming or replacing the outdated parties and civic entities with organizations grounded in modern thinking and effective governance.
Let the old guard withdraw. Let the Sudanese people define their future and fulfill their aspirations through new visions and new leadership.
5: Preserving the Homeland and Developing Sudan’s Productive Capacity
All of the above proposals stem from a single foundational goal: preserving Sudan as a homeland and safeguarding the Sudanese people as a culturally rich and historically significant civilization. The objective is to achieve sustainable, balanced development—both political and economic—that can propel the country forward in a healthy, innovative, and unconventional manner.
From an economic perspective, Sudan's renaissance will inevitably revolve around agriculture. Reviving the agricultural sector is key to achieving self-sufficiency, enabling agro-industrialization, and ultimately realizing the long-standing dream of making Sudan the breadbasket of the region.
God has blessed Sudan with arable land, abundant water, and skilled farmers—assets that, if combined with effective administration, modern technologies, fair financing, and social support systems, can yield a highly productive economy and empowered citizens.
In this context, the experience of the Gezira Project during its prime offers valuable lessons. Its former “tripartite partnership” model—between farmers, the government, and operating companies—could be updated and improved, learning from both its strengths and shortcomings.
This tried-and-tested model could be revived during the international trusteeship period and extended to other large-scale agricultural and livestock projects, positioning agro-industrial development as a cornerstone of Sudan’s transformation—targeting both domestic consumption and export markets, and creating substantial added value across the agricultural value chain.
6: Development Acceleration Through Decentralized Mega-Projects
In line with the spirit of innovation and guaranteed return on investment, a ten-year international trusteeship period could also be used to implement an ambitious development acceleration strategy—through regional and interregional mega-projects.
Each of Sudan’s proposed new states would be assigned three major development initiatives in the areas of economic development, education, infrastructure, and services. Internationally renowned consulting firms would be commissioned to conduct feasibility studies for these projects.
Once ready, each state's portfolio would be presented to a friendly foreign country to adopt, support, and compete with others in delivering results. This would create a constructive rivalry among Sudan’s international partners and drive parallel, balanced development across all regions.
Such an approach would help close the developmental gap between the center and periphery, promote voluntary reverse migration to the regions, and reduce the population pressure in overcrowded state capitals where unproductive urban sprawl has become the norm.
Moreover, this initiative would lay the foundation for a profound national transformation: repositioning Sudan’s administrative and political system as a fully functional federal state—tentatively proposed as “The United States of Sudan.”
7: The United States of Sudan — A Vision for Federal Unity
The proposed “United States of Sudan” would represent the second phase of the country's future statehood—building on the anticipated stabilization, constitutional reforms, administrative restructuring, and economic recovery achieved during the international trusteeship period.
In my view, this proposal implicitly addresses many of the political and societal dilemmas that have impeded Sudan’s progress and plunged the country into devastating wars—the most recent and dangerous of which still threatens the nation’s survival.
As previously discussed, our failure to govern Sudan as a unified and cohesive state has led us to a perilous point—standing on the edge of the total collapse of what was once a great nation. Sudan was known for the unity of its people, the integrity of its territory, and its respected image both regionally and internationally.
Yes, Sudan was all that and more. But today, we are far removed from that reality. Now is the time to pause, reflect honestly, and think rationally and unconventionally about building a new Sudan worthy of its name, legacy, and history.
Our current state—mired in divisions, resentment, and negativity, whether real or perceived—has been fueled by a lack of civic education, mismanagement, and distorted or absent development policies. This has plunged the nation into a prolonged state of chaos, marked by a bloody and escalating conflict between the center and the periphery.
As a result, localized and ethnically based identities have overtaken national consciousness, and open calls for disintegration—whether in the name of autonomy or secession—are now heard publicly in the heart of Khartoum and at regional and international negotiation forums.
Following the April war, it is clear that we have reached a point of no return. Maintaining the traditional structure of a united Sudan—unchanged since colonial days—is no longer feasible. The likely alternative is a malicious, externally driven plan to divide Sudan into five separate states, with no common bonds beyond hostility and disputes over borders and resources.
This would only worsen poverty and deepen backwardness, plunging the region into even greater instability and misery.
To avoid such fragmentation—and out of loyalty to a nation we are proud to belong to, and in reverence for our shared historical and civilizational legacy—we must confront a long-denied truth: that the Sudanese people are a fragile collective, composed of culturally and ethnically diverse groups that have coexisted without genuine integration, and without absolute acceptance or trust among themselves.
A logical, pragmatic response to this reality is to consider the creation of a new federal entity: the “United States of Sudan.” This concept is worthy of careful reflection and serious consideration, with room for refinement based on a rigorous evaluation of global federalist experiences—adopting what has worked and avoiding known pitfalls.
8: Objectives and Mechanisms of the Proposed Federal Model
The core objectives of the “United States of Sudan” project are as follows:
A. Preserve Sudan’s geographical unity as a common homeland for all Sudanese.
B. Maintain a unifying national umbrella for Sudan’s ethnically and culturally diverse population.
C. Resolve the center-periphery conflict, ending the drivers of division and hate.
D. Empower each state to manage its resources and determine its own development priorities.
E. Promote the development of local languages and cultures, while maintaining a common administrative language across states and with the central government.
F. Enable localized development planning based on the visions and needs of each region.
G. Establish fair contributions from states to federal or interregional projects, based on rational criteria.
H. Allow direct international engagement for each state within a nationally agreed protocol.
I. Encourage developmental integration among neighboring states.
J. Create employment and reverse migration incentives, encouraging citizens to return to and develop their home states using local resources.
K. Limit central government’s role to symbolic sovereignty and coordination, with one national flag, one currency, and unified diplomatic representation reflecting diversity and balanced appointments.
To implement the “United States of Sudan” model, we must first invest in scientific and practical groundwork. This requires intensive efforts from scholars in public administration, political science, economics, and related fields. Our universities and research centers must help clarify the nature, benefits, and challenges of federal systems and assess their compatibility with Sudan’s socio-political fabric.
They must also explain how center-state and inter-state relations could function, and to what extent individual states may engage directly with international partners. Only through such informed national discourse can Sudan—its government and its people—move together, consciously and confidently, toward realizing this vision as a national objective worthy of our aspirations.

Part 9: Redrawing Sudan’s Internal Map
In parallel, a new administrative map must be drawn to reflect the proposed federal structure. Historically, Sudan was divided by colonial authorities into nine administrative units (provinces), later renamed “regions.” Under the Inqaz regime, these became “states,” increasing in number to 27, and later shrinking to 18 after the secession of South Sudan.
But these 18 states are largely the result of political appeasement, narrow tribal calculations, or arbitrary, non-scientific decisions that have fueled local conflicts and ethnic tensions—some of which remain dangerously unresolved today.
It is time to redraw Sudan’s internal boundaries based on clear, scientific criteria. These include land characteristics, human demographics, natural resources, administrative accessibility, and the use of natural landmarks to define borders where possible.
A precise, rational redistricting process is critical to the success of the “United States of Sudan” model. It will correct historical errors and mitigate the bitterness caused by poorly conceived boundaries—bitterness that has cost lives, displaced communities, and devastated livelihoods.
10: Final Remarks: A Non-Traditional Call for National Salvation
This proposal outlines a roadmap for course correction and future building. It seeks to draw lessons from Sudan’s troubled past, respond urgently to present dangers, and propose a bold, non-traditional new beginning.
It is an attempt to preserve a great nation—one dreamt of by its founding fathers, long missed by generations after independence, and deserved—without question—by the rising generation shaped by the spirit and ideals of the December Revolution.
May God and the homeland guide our intentions.

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