منتديات سودانيزاونلاين    مكتبة الفساد    ابحث    اخبار و بيانات    مواضيع توثيقية    منبر الشعبية    اراء حرة و مقالات   
News and Press Releases    اتصل بنا    Articles and Views    English Forum    ناس الزقازيق   

Home Search

Board Laws

Articles

Refresh

المنبر العام
Sudanese Videos

Archives

News in English

News in Arabic

Welcome Guest [Login]
Your last visit: 05-19-2022, 06:02 AM Home

Articles and ViewsWhat Happens in Darfur Doesn't Stay in Darfur Written by: Suliman Baldo
Printable Version   Forward   Threaded View « Previous Topic | Next Topic »
Jump to newest reply in thread »

What Happens in Darfur Doesn't Stay in Darfur Written by: Suliman Baldo

05-09-2022, 04:24 PM
سليمان بلدو
<aسليمان بلدو
Registered: 09-01-2014
Total Posts: 3





What Happens in Darfur Doesn't Stay in Darfur Written by: Suliman Baldo

    04:24 PM May, 09 2022

    Sudanese Online
    سليمان بلدو-USA
    My Library
    Short URL

    9 May 2022
    Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker
    Cover photo: Enaam Alnour�
    3
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    1 THE ACTORS AND DRIVERS OF THE VIOLENCE ....................................................... 3
    2 WHAT THE EVENTS TELL US ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE JUBA PEACE
    AGREEMENT............................................................................................................................ 5
    3 WHAT THE VIOLENCE MEANS FOR THE JUNTA AND THE RELATIONSHIPS
    AMONG ITS COMPONENTS.................................................................................................... 7
    4 POLICIES THAT KILL........................................................................................................... 9
    5. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE .......................................................................................... 10
    6. CONCLUDING REMARKS and RECOMMENDATIONS....................................................... 11
    The wave of recent violence in West Darfur State has left many shocked observers asking: who was
    involved in the mass atrocities that occurred, and what are the drivers of the violence and its root
    causes؟ In what ways does the violence relate to the October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement that
    should have brought peace to Darfur and other conflict areas in Sudan but is obviously failing to do
    so؟ Finally, what does the violence mean for the junta and the relationships between the different
    components؟
    In its inaugural policy brief, the recently established Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker (STPT)
    attempts to provide elements of answers to these questions, with the aim of encouraging informed
    policy decisions both at home and internationally on approaches to bring about stability and
    sustainable peace to Darfur and to Sudan.
    1 The Actors and Drivers of the Violence
    Yet another week of bloodletting has left West Darfur and the rest of Sudan in deep shock. Attacks on
    the town of Kreinik and some sixteen villages surrounding it on Friday 22 and Sunday 24 April by
    militiamen left nearly 200 civilians dead and scores seriously injured and led to the displacement of an
    estimated 85,000 to 115,000 people.
    1,
    2
    ,
    3 The attackers looted valuables, burned homes and markets
    to the ground, and destroyed infrastructure essential to civilians such as the local hospital and its
    1 See advancing columns of the attackers in a Twitter video verified by the BBC, here:
    twitter.com/TaqwaAhmed83/status/1518462266357788675؟s=20andt=vrC44hdLkJBVJFy-tw0ZaA.
    2 See also: BBC, “Darfur: Why are Sudan's Janjaweed on the attack again؟,” 27 April, 2022, available at:
    bbc.com/news/world-africa-61217999
    3 Reliefweb, “Sudan: Inter-communal conflict - Kereneik and Ag Geneina, West Darfur Flash Update No. 01 (25
    Apr 2022) [EN/AR],” 25 April, 2022, available at:
    reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-inter-communalconflict-kereneik-ag-geneina-west-darfur-flash-update-no-01-25-apr
    4
    pharmacy.4 Scores of women, children, teachers, and health workers were among those killed. On
    Sunday 24 and the following days, the violence spread to El-Geneina, the capital of the state, forcing
    thousands of residents to flee their homes. Beyond what the pogrom in Kreinik and its area revealed
    about how fraught ethnic relationships remain in greater Darfur, it exposed the complicity or
    incompetence of local security agencies as some in their ranks joined their ethnic kin during the attack
    and others failed to intervene due mainly to their lack of military capacity to confront the number of
    attackers. It is arguable that the formal state security forces can longer be viewed as professionals
    with a sense of responsibility and neutrality, but rather a part of the ethnic fabric of the conflict. Worse,
    they are using their formal status as a façade to legitimize their actions.
    Beyond Darfur, ripples of the deadly events have shed a harsh light on the national scene. The
    incident added to existing evidence of the fragility of the opportunistic alliance behind the October
    2021 coup among the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the rival parallel army that the Rapid Support
    Forces (RSF) have become, and armed movements signatory to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement
    (JPA). With no credible political base supporting their claim to power, the coup leaders revived a
    cohort of loyalists of the former regime of deposed president Omar al-Bashir who remained hopeful of
    returning to power. The generals, who claimed they had a national duty to prevent Sudan’s
    breakdown and improve its security when they overthrew the civilian-led transitional government,
    were exposed as incapable of assuming their responsibilities to protect their citizens’ right to life.
    Worse, the Darfur movements who tied their political fate to the coup were shown to be incapable of
    influencing events in the region beyond condemnations of the regular forces’ inability or reluctance to
    protect civilians and secure the peace.
    Most of the 200 killed in the attacks on Kreinik belonged to the Masalit ethnic group and others settled
    with them from the Tama, Bargo and Arab minority groups, many of them displaced from earlier
    phases of the conflict in West Darfur since 2003. The media and eyewitnesses interviewed by STPT
    described the attackers as herders of Arab descent backed up by RSF soldiers.
    In an all too familiar scenario, this conflict was triggered by an individual incident of an alleged killing
    of two herders near the town and a deadly ambush of the search party that traced the suspected
    perpetrators of that killing to the outskirts of Kreinik.5 The series of massive and indiscriminate
    revengeful attacks that followed represented collective punishment of an entire group based on its
    ethnicity. If this image sounds familiar, it is because it conjures the image of Janjaweed attackers
    unleashed on thousands of villages and settlements inhabited by the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa
    peoples during the different phases of the conflict between the Bashir government and Darfur armed
    movements that began in 2003-2004. Nearly two decades later, defenseless civilians continue to die,
    blamed collectively for the actions of their brethren.
    The security response from the local joint forces of the SAF, RSF, police, and Central Reserve Police
    was totally inadequate, even when a small reinforcement convoy of joint forces arrived from ElGeniena after the first wave of attacks on Friday. According to an eyewitness interviewed for this brief,
    the deployment and an overflight of the area by a SAF Air Force helicopter on Saturday managed to
    deter the attackers for a day and gave the locals a false sense of security. However, the attackers
    returned in overwhelming numbers on Sunday in an estimated 150 technicals, motorcycles, and on
    horseback, overwhelming the town’s defenses. The latter consisted of a joint force of the SAF, RSF,
    police, and Central Reserve Police, with 20 militarized vehicles. According to a statement by the
    4 Darfur 24, “MSF: Two health workers killed in Kreinik hospital and the looting of the pharmacy,” 26 April 2022,
    in Arabic, available at: https://www.darfur24.com/2022/04/26/https://www.darfur24.com/2022/04/26/ رك - ىفشتسم - يف - نیلماع - لتقم - دودح - لاب - ءابطأ/
    5 France 24, “Hundreds killed in tribal clashes in Sudan's West Darfur,” 27 April 2022, available at:
    france24.com/en/africa/20220427-hundreds-killed-in-tribal-clashes-in-sudan-s-west-darfur
    5
    governor of West Darfur Khamis Abdullah Abakar, government regular forces withdrew to the local
    garrison and did nothing as the attackers massacred scores of civilians and laid the town to waste.6
    ,
    7
    The governor denied that the Coalition of Sudanese Forces, the JPA signatory group which he chairs,
    participated in the events in Kreinik.8
    The events of the week of 22 April 2022 were a replay of similar interethnic strife a year ago.
    Beginning on 3 April 2021, six months to the day after the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement
    (JPA), local violence took hold in El-Geneina. At least 145 had been killed and 230 wounded by the
    time calm returned about a week later.9 Then as now, the fighting pitted militia of herders of Arab
    origin and RSF fighters spearheading them against self-defense groups that the local Masalit people
    have set up following repeated attacks on the war-displaced from their community in December 2019-
    January 2020 and January 2021.10
    2 What the Events Tell Us About the Future
    of the Juba Peace Agreement
    There is a misconception that delays in the implementation of the JPA’s security arrangements since
    the days of the toppled civilian-led government of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and particularly
    after the October 2021 military takeover represent a major factor in the deteriorating security in
    Sudan’s conflict areas. In particular, the continued failure of the parties to establish the joint Darfur
    Security Force after appropriate training of the movements’ integrated fighters “within 90 days of the
    signing of the agreement” is seen as a lapse in the protection of civilians.
    11,
    12 However, it is unclear
    how effective the JPA security arrangements would be in addressing the security threats and civilian
    protection needs in Darfur if implemented. The ceasefire, integration, demobilization, disarmament,
    and reintegration processes, and other related provisions only cover the JPA signatory groups, but do
    not address the plethora of ethnically based militias that are roaming Darfur’s countryside and
    terrorizing its cities. Since signatory groups were not involved in the 2019-2022 violence in West
    Darfur, the JPA provisions may have limited or no value in addressing this violence. Furthermore,
    although the joint Darfur Security Force was intended to provide security more broadly, it was
    envisaged to have only 6,000 troops to deploy across Darfur, with questionable capacity, human
    6 STPT telephone interview, 28 April, 2022.
    7 See also: Radio Dabanga, “West Darfur violence leaves 200+ dead – ‘cautious calm’ as hospitals, markets
    stay closed,” 27 April, 2022, available at:
    dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/west-darfurviolence-leaves-200-dead-cautious-calm-as-hospitals-markets-stay-closed
    8 El-Geneina News, “Statement of General Khamis Abdulla Abakar Governor of West Darfur on Events in
    Kreinik and al-Geneina Localities,” 26 April, 2022, in Arabic, available at: https://fb.watch/cPOwdOIwf9/https://fb.watch/cPOwdOIwf9/
    9 Associated Press, “Sudan’s leader visits Darfur after tribal clashes killed 144,” April 12, available at:
    apnews.com/article/sudan-a2ee9a4e3e51e4e5776a070b3c5f542f
    10 Interviews with local sources, 2021, and 2022.
    11 As mandated under in the JPA, Darfur Track, Chapter 8: “Permanent Ceasefire and Final Security
    Arrangements Protocol, Art. 29.1.1.
    12 IDEA, “The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan, Summary and Analysis,” 2021, available at:
    idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/the-juba-agreement-for-peace-in-sudan-en.pdf
    6
    rights standards, trust from communities and command and control. Why would this force be any
    more effective than the RSF and Central Reserve Police forces already present in Darfur؟
    Like many previous peace agreements in Sudan, the JPA was more of an elite deal than a
    comprehensive program. The JPA promised to realize power and wealth sharing by appointing
    leaders of the armed opposition groups to key ministerial and public service positions. This was
    implemented in a cabinet reshuffle that took place after the JPA, awarding the ministries of Finance,
    Mining, Energy, Social Development, and Livestock in addition to federal state governorships to
    leaders of the Darfur signatory movements. However, the provisions addressing the root causes of
    the conflicts and extending peace dividends to the millions whose lives and livelihoods were uprooted
    by the two-decade conflicts remain locked in written texts. By joining the political campaign that paved
    the way for the coup, the armed movements sought to consolidate their narrow gains in senior
    government positions but risked distancing themselves both from local communities and the prodemocracy movement at the national level.
    The JPA ministers from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement faction led by Malik Agar and from
    the signatory Darfur movements remained in their positions following the October 2021 coup despite
    the coup leaders’ decision to dissolve the civilian-led cabinet in which they sat. The events in Kreinik
    underscored how removed from the constituencies they claim to represent, these leaders are in
    Khartoum or at federal state capitals as their inability to influence events became clear.
    The JPA appears to have exacerbated ethnic polarizations across Darfur and not only in its Western
    state. This is in part because the agreement includes strong provisions on the return of the displaced
    to their home areas which is seen to require the removal of secondary occupants, who
    understandably are resistant to moving. On 26 April 26, 2021, militiamen hailing from the Tarjam
    community attacked several villages inhabited by Fur community members in the Wadi Bulbul area,
    near Nyala in South Darfur.13 Confidential information received from the area tended to indicate links
    to the forthcoming implementation of the JPA with rising tensions leading to the attacks, like what
    happened in El-Geneina earlier in that month. In a fiery speech in March, Nazir Mohamed Yagoub of
    the Tarjam was heard telling his followers that he welcomed peace but would resist any claims by the
    JPA signatories to consider his people as “new settlers”.14 The rally coincided with the visit of some
    JPA signatories to the area to promote and explain the JPA to local communities.15
    The JPA may not be adequate to respond effectively to the recurrent episodes of collective violence in
    its current form. The question remains on the political conditions that ensure that the implementation
    of the JPA provisions will contribute to peace and stability rather than fueling tensions among
    communities on the ground.
    13 Radio Dabanga, “Protests over violence in South Darfur,” 30 April 2021, available at:
    dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/protests-over-violence-in-south-darfur
    14 See: facebook.com/ibrahim.bakar.3139/videos/2813179475677525/
    15 STPT interviews.
    7
    3 What the Violence Means for the Junta
    and the Relationships among its
    Components
    The condemnations of the attack on Kreinik from members of the ruling junta offer evidence of the
    fragility of the opportunistic alliance among its constituents and the dereliction of their collective
    responsibility to provide security to Sudanese citizens. Minni Arko Minawi, governor general of the yet
    to be legally established Darfur region, denounced the inadequacy and incompetence of the security
    response both at the local and national levels in a statement on Sunday 24. The governor, who is
    head of the JPA signatory movement Sudan Liberation Movement/Minni Minawi faction, charged that
    in the face of interethnic fighting, security agencies present in Darfur were “either slow to intervene, or
    complicit and participants in the events.”16 Worse, Minawi stated that security forces often asked to be
    paid to secure the movement of commercial convoys among Darfur cities.17 For his part, El-Hadi Idris,
    head of the JPA signatory Sudan Revolutionary Forces and member of the Sovereignty Council under
    the coup leadership, stated that the events demonstrated how Sudan was a “failed state.”18
    Minnawi’s denunciation of the inaction of the SAF, the RSF, national police, and the Central Reserve
    Police, albeit without naming them, echoes that of the governor of West Darfur State at the time of the
    April 2021 violence. He and local community leaders publicly decried the failure of regular security
    forces stationed in West Darfur to intervene to protect civilians and said it was a major contributing
    factor in the devastating toll of the violence. In response, the National Security Council ordered an
    investigation of the reported inaction of security forces stationed in El-Geneina and promised to hold
    accountable those found responsible for failing to assume their duties.19 The results of that
    investigation were not made public.
    In a repeat of what it did in the wake of April 2021 violence in El-Geneina, the National Security
    Council convened in Khartoum on 25 April 2022. After expressing its condolences to families of the
    victims, it ordered the deployment of additional forces to West Darfur to deter violence. Noticeably
    absent from the meeting were the RSF top commander Lt.-Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ‘Hemeti’,
    16 See a video of Minnawi speech posted to his personal page on FaceBook at: https://fb.watch/cDHojgsDTp/https://fb.watch/cDHojgsDTp/
    17 Radio Dabanga, “Sudan: Darfur Governor Lambasts Poor Security Measures in Wake of Tribal Massacre,” 26
    April, 2022, available at: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-gove...e-of-tribal-massacre
    18 Al-Rakoba, “A Member of the Sovereignty Council: Sudan is a failed state – we are investigating the
    involvement of the RSF in the events,” 27 April 2022, in Arabic, available at:
    / وضع - سلجمب - ةدایسلا - نادوسلا - ةلود - لشاف /31711745/net.alrakoba.www://https
    19 Tag Press, “Decisions and procedures from the security and defense council chaired by Burhan – and
    directives to hold to account the inaction of security agencies,” 16 April 2021, in Arabic, available at:
    tagpress.net/61159/
    8
    who was abroad at the time, and his brother Abdel-Rahim, the RSF second in command.20 Hemeti
    declared days later that “all those implicated in the events in Kreinik and West Darfur are victims,” in
    an apparent reference to the rhetoric of grievance of pastoralist groups, and acknowledged that “the
    state came short in containing the events of West Darfur.”21
    The RSF commander Hemeti is engaged in systematic efforts to leverage the military and political
    clout of the RSF and the considerable wealth its commanders are amassing through their private
    businesses to acquire the loyalty of local traditional chiefs and to entice local youth to join the force.22
    However, the latter respond primarily to local challenges, obeying overriding ethnic motivations. While
    it is known that RSF fighters have joined successive attacks on civilians in West Darfur since 2019,
    the RSF has been proven time and again unwilling and unable to discipline its members that commit
    atrocity crimes against unarmed civilians. The senior command of the SAF and the national police
    have shown even less inclination to discipline troops that took part in localized clashes on the side of
    their ethnic groups, using the government’s weapons, ordnance, and logistics to that end.
    By taking a lead role in the negotiations that led to the JPA, Hemeti sought to build bridges with the
    armed movements his forces had defeated on the battlefield and chased out of Darfur during the
    period 2014-2017. A new alliance emerged from the JPA process between the RSF and the Darfuri
    rebel movements both of whom saw an opportunity to assert the entitlement of Sudan’s historically
    marginalized groups and regions for more representation in the national and state-level institutions
    and a larger share in the national wealth and the management of Sudan’s national resources.
    Darfur is also the central piece in Hemeti’s family trading business which grew over time to cover
    other sectors, including the gold industry. The region serves as a springboard for the RSF
    commander’s political ambitions in neighboring Libya, Chad, and the Sahel region.23
    A breakdown of law and order involving RSF fighters on the scale witnessed in Kreinik and ElGeneina could only have a negative impact on Hemeti’s image by demonstrating the weak command
    and control within the RSF and the tolerance of widespread violations by its members. Contributing to
    weak discipline of the RSF is the fact that many local commanders were integrated from the
    predecessor paramilitary force, the Border Guards, and remained loyal to Musa Hilal, former Border
    Guard commander and tribal chief of the Mahameed clan of the camel herding Rezeigat Arabs.24
    Against a backdrop of increasing scrutiny of the weaknesses of his control of RSF forces in Darfur,
    Hemeti insinuated in public comments in early May that de facto Head of State Burhan’s national
    leadership was weak and that security forces have been complicit in the emergence of violent criminal
    gangs that have terrorized the population in recent months.25
    20 Darfur 24, “Absence of Hemeti and Abdel-Rahim form an urgent meeting about Kreinik,” 25 April, 2022, in
    Arabic, available at: https://www.darfur24.com/2022/04/26/https://www.darfur24.com/2022/04/26/ راط - عامتجا - نع - میحرلا - دبعو - يتدیمح- بُ
    /تغی
    21 Al-Sudani al-Youm, “Hemeti: the state failed to contain the West Darfur events,” 28 April 2022, in Arabic.
    22 BBC, “Sudan crisis: The ruthless mercenaries who run the country for gold,” 20 July 2019,
    https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48987901
    23 Jerome Tubiana, “Darfur after Bashir: Implications for Sudan’s Transition and for the Region,” a Special
    Report of the US Institute of Peace, April 2022, available at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR508-
    Darfur-after-Bashir.pdf
    24 Mohamed Badawi, “The events of West Darfur; Triggers and Motivation,” unpublished paper shared by the
    author, in Arabic, received on 29 April 2022.
    25 El-Sudani, “Were there ‘Tisa’a Taweela’ (violent criminal gangs) during Bashir’s time,” 3 May 2022, in Arabic,
    available at: alsudaninews.com/ar/؟p=150240
    9
    Lacking both in constitutional legitimacy and a political or ideological project, the junta also lacks a
    coherent social base. It is cemented only by its members’ desires to capture Sudan’s resources, and
    protect privileges acquired from the Bashir era. In lieu of a genuine political incubator, the junta hastily
    reappointed scores of loyalists of the former regime to public service positions from which they had
    been purged by an anti-graft panel during the period of Prime Minister Hamdok of the transition and
    returned to leading former regime oligarchs’ assets and accounts seized or frozen by the panel.
    Now in its seventh month, the political stalemate triggered by the October 2021 coup is anchored in a
    deep leadership crisis. The Sudanese political opposition, while opposed to the junta, has failed to
    agree on a joint platform and program that would strengthen the movement resisting the coup which
    is spearheaded by youth. At the same time, the events in West Darfur bring to light the bankruptcy of
    the junta and its lack of legitimacy. Contrary to claims by some of its international and regional
    backers that the junta is a better guarantor of Sudan’s stability and more unified than civilians and
    represents a bulwark against the collapse of the state, it has been exposed as incapable of managing
    the economy, unwilling and unable to act in ways that would encourage a political resolution to the
    crisis their coup has created, and failing in its primary responsibility of maintaining law and order and
    protecting civilians.
    The perpetuation of the political stalemate in Khartoum, and the serious tensions weakening both the
    coup leaders and their civilian opposition, also represent main factors in the depletion of state
    authority and institutions in the peripheries. A return to constitutional order, with a clear path to civilian
    leadership of the transition to democracy, are essential to the restoration of peace and the upholding
    of rights protections across Sudan.
    4 Policies That Kill
    At the root of recent violence in West Darfur is the longstanding competition among local communities
    over access to resources. Previously such conflict revolved around water and pasture but more
    recently, competing traditional ownership claims on areas believed or known to have gold or oil
    reserves have emerged as an added driver of violence.26 The greater Darfur region had centuries-old
    solid mechanisms of conflict prevention, resolution and compensation for victims which contained
    such conflicts. These mechanisms had proven effective in maintaining social peace and stability in the
    region for generations. It wasn’t until the 1990s when the Bashir regime engaged in the systematic
    manipulation of these mechanisms for its political and security interests that the traditional conflict
    mitigation became less effective in assuming their historic roles.
    The latest violence in West Darfur played out against a background of conflicting claims of land
    ownership and entitlements in the region, just as the previous violence in and around El-Geneina in
    December 2019, January 2020, January 2021 and April 2021 did. The demise of the Bashir regime in
    2019, followed by the ascendancy of civilian leadership both at the national and state levels
    encouraged victims of the prior massive, forced displacements, primarily the Masalit, to renew claims
    of the right to return. Groups of Arab origin deployed as proxies by the military, some of whose
    26 The 2013 conflict between Beni Husein and Arab Aba’ala clans was triggered by dispute on the ownership of
    the gold rich jebel Amer, see Suliman Baldo, “Musa Hilal’s “Awakening”: Khartoum’s worst nightmare؟,” a report
    for Sudan Democracy First Group, 22 April 2015, available at: Sudan Tribune,
    sudantribune.com/article53303/
    10
    members settled in these lands after being encouraged to lay claim to these lands and clear them of
    their inhabitants, felt they risked losing the political and security clout they gained in reward for their
    services. The JPA entry in force in late 2020 was seen as a zero-sum game, with winners taking all
    the benefits. However, none of the JPA provisions aiming to deliver peace dividends to those
    victimized by the conflict have been implemented, including the land commission and provisions for
    the resettlement and compensation of the internally displaced and the refugees. Likewise, the land
    commission envisaged to address land claims nationwide under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
    Agreement that ended the civil war with South Sudan was also never implemented.
    Neither the coup leaders nor the previous civilian-led executive have done much to address the
    concerns of pastoralist groups, leaving them to their own devices to assert claims to power through
    the barrel of the gun. All along, the military establishment maintained and sought to expand the policy
    of arming allied ethnic groups (often pastoralists) across Sudan that was applied during the three
    decades of Bashir’s regime. Under their watch and at their hands, Sudan presents all the trappings of
    a “militia state”: one in which a process of deinstitutionalization occurs that suppresses military
    standards, regulations, hierarchy, and discipline as militias take greater roles in operations against
    rebel groups and their community leaders acquire greater political and administrative influence at the
    state and national levels. Groups rival to the government’s allies, including the Masalit in recent years,
    also sought to arm themselves for self-protection, leading to an escalation in the frequency and levels
    of violence. As the instrumentalization of ethnicity was the main basis for their recruitment, militias
    owe their loyalty not to the state, but primarily to their narrow interests and to their communities.
    Following the peak of the violence in Darfur during the years 2003-2006, characterized by the
    wholesale targeting of entire communities suspected of loyalty to the rebels on the sole basis of their
    ethnicity, the conflict gradually metamorphosed into a low intensity protracted state of insecurity with
    repetitive spikes of extreme violence, with state and security officials refusing to assume responsibility
    for the outcomes of their policies in the peripheral regions of Sudan.
    In many instances militias became “entrepreneurs of violence,” levying their pay from the public by the
    collection of tolls at toll gates in Darfur and smuggling to Sudan thousands of undocumented vehicles
    from Libya, the Central African Republic, and the Sahel region. Worryingly, fighters of the joint forces
    deployed to Darfur to protect the “super camps” of the hybrid African Union-United Nations
    peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID) were prominently seen among the looters of the sites after
    UNAMID’s withdrawal. The peacekeeping force provided a measure of limited protection to civilians in
    areas of its presence by deterring blatant attacks of the type that occurred in Kreinik on 22 April. Its
    withdrawal before the establishment of a credible national civilian protection force left civilians
    exposed.
    5. International Response
    The international community swiftly condemned the killings and pressed the government of Sudan
    and the armed movements to assume their responsibility to protect citizens from mass atrocities.
    Calls to the government to launch independent investigations to identify perpetrators and hold them
    accountable, and to grant humanitarian access to victims and secure their rights to remedies were
    also made.27 U.N. Secretary General Guterres underscored that the primary responsibility for civilian
    27 The UN Special Representative Volker Perthes called for "an in-depth and transparent investigation, the
    results of which should be made public and help to identify the perpetrators of violence and bring them to
    justice."UNITAMS, “SRSG @volkerperthes deplores heinous killings of civilians in Kereneik, West Darfur, and
    11
    protections rests with the government of Sudan and the High Commissioner for Human Rights also
    deplored the killings and called for investigations.28,
    29 Members of the Security Council joined his call
    on 29 April for an expedited implementation of the JPA and pledged to support that process, in
    particular the deployment of the Joint Security Keeping Force, and of the National Action Plan for
    Civilian Protection.30 For inexplicable reasons, the African Union was absent from the chorus of
    condemnations of mass killings targeting civilians.
    Calls by some advocacy groups in the wake of the Kreinik tragedy for the deployment of an
    international peacekeeping force in Darfur appear unrealistic in view of the rejection of the national
    government of such a measure and its slim chances of adoption in the current extremely polarized
    international environment. In view of the JPA’s weaknesses in addressing localized violence in Darfur
    explained above, the international community must insist that government forces deployed in Darfur
    to curb the current escalation in violence should have the appropriate training on civilian protection
    and the highest standards of training on human rights protections. Elements of government forces in
    the area should be ethnically neutral and placed under tight command and control safeguards. Those
    security elements who violate the law should be subjected to the full force of the legal consequences
    of their actions.
    6. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations
    Attempts to brush aside the wave of killings in Kreinik this last week as another episode of “communal
    violence,” as did the Minister of Defense Lt.-Gen. Yassin Ibrahim Yassin in comments following the
    meeting of the National Security Council, can barely disguise the failure of leadership that is behind
    Sudan’s protracted crises.31 Ethnic strife is a man-made disaster in Darfur, and the government needs
    to assume its share of responsibility in creating its root causes.
    Recommendations:
    The government:
    • Immediately direct all regular state security agencies to stop the practice of recruiting and
    arming militias and other forces based on ethnicity, or on ideological and political grounds.
    • Carefully prepare and incrementally implement a program of voluntary disarmament of
    existing tribal militias in Darfur and across Sudan after wide consultation and public outreach
    in areas of militia presence.
    calls for immediate end to violence and in-depth investigation,” 24 April, 2022, available at:
    twitter.com/UNITAMS/status/1518340659853377542؟s=20andt=GA-wZB3AhSqeU0aLWDDbiQ
    28 The UN “Secretary-General Deplores Killings of Civilians in West Darfur,” 25 April, SG/SM/21249, available
    at: un.org/press/en/2022/sgsm21249.doc.htm
    29 The UN, “Sudan: Bachelet appalled by Darfur killings, warns against escalation,” 27 April, 2022, available at:
    ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/04/sudan-bachelet-appalled-darfur-killings-warns-againstescalation
    30 The UN, “Security Council Press Statement on Darfur, Sudan,” SC/14878, 29 April, 2022, available at:
    un.org/press/en/2022/sc14878.doc.htm
    31 Baj News, “Defense and Security Council decision to send forces to separate fighting parties in West Darfur,”
    25 April, 2022, in Arabic, available at: https://sahafahn.com/show13552049.htmlhttps://sahafahn.com/show13552049.html
    12
    • Urgently respond to the acute humanitarian and health crisis in Kreinik and West Darfur by
    providing relief and medical supplies.
    • Grant national and international humanitarian organizations unfettered access to the
    internally displaced and other war affected populations.
    • Assume responsibility for the rehabilitation of the public infrastructure destroyed during the
    2020, 2021, and 2022 violence in El-Geneina, Kreinik, and elsewhere in Darfur including
    hospitals, schools, and markets.
    • Investigate the alleged participation of elements of the RSF in the attacks against Kreinik,
    the killing of civilians, and destruction of their property and hold accountable those found to
    have participated.
    • Investigate the reported failure of security forces present Kreinik and El-Geneina to intervene
    to protect civilians during recurrent incidents of violence since December 2019 and hold to
    account members of regular forces found to have failed in assuming their responsibilities.
    • Prioritize the implementation of the JPA provisions addressing the root causes of conflicts
    there through transitional justice mechanisms, genuine devolution of power to local
    governments, and land reforms.
    • Address the concerns of communities feeling threatened by the implementation of the JPA
    by explaining the provisions addressing their concerns and begin the serious implementation
    of these provisions.
    The Political Opposition:
    • Develop a comprehensive vision about the country’s path towards democracy, including
    practical instruments for resisting the coup.
    • Coordinate efforts to build a mechanism to manage diversity among the pro-democracy
    groups to maintain cooperation rather than trying to unify them into a coalition
    • Avoid the infighting and accusations and focus on building a vision for a new social contract
    that brings Sudanese people together.
    • Articulate an alternative process for Darfur that allows for resolution of the root causes of
    violence.
    The Signatories of the JPA:
    • Investigate the alleged participation of fighters from your movements in recent clashes in
    Darfur and hold accountable perpetrators of violence and rights violations in the ranks of
    your movements.
    • Work together in disseminating information at the community level about the JPA and its
    provisions to address their problems and their priorities.
    The International Community:
    • Demand that the government of Sudan take full responsibility for civilian protection
    throughout the country and in particular in regions such as Darfur affected by civic strife.
    • Insist that the government improve its command and control of its security forces and hold to
    account elements that violate the law and attack civilians.
    • Press the government to establish an independent and transparent investigative commission
    of the recent killings in Darfur and to commit to make findings of the commission public.
    • Provide technical assistance to such a commission if established in accordance with the
    requisite technical standards and demonstrable independence.
    • Press regional backers of Sudan’s coup to change course and align their interests with the
    pro-democracy groups as the only strategic way for Sudan to be stable and unified.
                  

Arabic Forum

[Post A Reply] Page 1 of 1:   <<  1  >>

Comments of SudaneseOnline.com readers on that topic:

What Happens in Darfur Doesn't Stay in Darfur Written by: Suliman Baldo
at FaceBook
Report any abusive and or inappropriate material



Articles and Views
اراء حرة و مقالات
News and Press Releases
اخبار و بيانات
اخر المواضيع فى المنبر العام
Latest Posts in English Forum



فيس بوك جوجل بلس تويتر انستقرام يوتيوب بنتيريست Google News
الرسائل والمقالات و الآراء المنشورة في المنتدى بأسماء أصحابها أو بأسماء مستعارة لا تمثل بالضرورة الرأي الرسمي لصاحب الموقع أو سودانيز اون لاين بل تمثل وجهة نظر كاتبها
لا يمكنك نقل أو اقتباس اى مواد أعلامية من هذا الموقع الا بعد الحصول على اذن من الادارة
About Us
Contact Us
About Sudanese Online
اخبار و بيانات
اراء حرة و مقالات
صور سودانيزاونلاين
فيديوهات سودانيزاونلاين
ويكيبيديا سودانيز اون لاين
منتديات سودانيزاونلاين
News and Press Releases
Articles and Views
SudaneseOnline Images
Sudanese Online Videos
Sudanese Online Wikipedia
Sudanese Online Forums
If you're looking to submit News,Video,a Press Release or or Article please feel free to send it to [email protected]

© 2014 SudaneseOnline.com


Software Version 1.3.0 © 2N-com.de