Why Sudan’s Armed Groups Are Alarmed by a Civilian-Government Petition A new petition circulated b

08:58 PM December, 03 2025

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A new petition circulated by Sudanese civil society calling for a full civilian government has touched a nerve across the country’s armed landscape.
Islamist militias, hybrid forces, armed movements, and political factions within the so-called Democratic Bloc all reacted with sharp criticism—revealing an underlying anxiety about any shift toward civilian rule.

While these groups differ in ideology and regional backing, their concerns converge on one point: a democratic political order would upend the power structures that have sustained them for years.

Below is a closer look at what is driving this reaction.

1. Protecting Privileges Built on Weapons, Not Institutions

For more than a decade, armed groups in Sudan—whether political movements or militia formations—capitalized on the weakness of the state.
Their leverage has depended on:

control of territory,

access to resources through force,

regional sponsorship, and

guaranteed seats at the negotiating table.

A civilian administration governed by law would erode the foundations of this influence.
It would replace armed leverage with institutional legitimacy—a shift many armed actors see as an existential threat.

2. Accountability Is a Red Line

A credible civilian transition would almost certainly reopen long-shelved questions:
Where did revenue from mining and border crossings go؟
Who financed the proliferation of militias؟
How were public funds diverted؟

For groups that have operated in opaque environments, a transparent system is not merely uncomfortable—it is dangerous.
Their reaction to the memorandum reflects this deeper concern: civilian rule would bring scrutiny.

3. A Misreading of the Sudanese Street

The petition is not an attack on any faction.
It reflects a broad national demand for a state without parallel armies or competing centers of power.

Yet many armed groups interpret public criticism as a threat to their survival.
This stems from a long-standing assumption that they are indispensable actors—rather than political entities accountable to the public.

What they are missing is a critical political shift:
Sudanese society no longer accepts armed actors as the natural custodians of national politics.

4. Rising Fear of International Isolation

Across global institutions—whether Western governments, African bodies, or the UN—the consensus is clear:
civilian governance is the only legitimate pathway for Sudan.

Militias and armed groups understand that their diplomatic standing is contingent and volatile.
A successful civilian movement would weaken their international relevance and could potentially expose some to sanctions or legal action.

For these groups, the memo’s call for civilian rule reads like the beginning of a political countdown.

5. No Clear Political Project

The most profound issue is conceptual.
Many armed groups operate with tactical goals—territory, leverage, negotiating power—not long-term political programs.

When the memorandum calls for a rule-based civilian state, it forces an uncomfortable question:
What vision do these groups offer for Sudan’s future؟

Beyond the language of grievances or identity politics, few have articulated plans for governance, economic reform, or national institutions.

A Message to Armed Actors: Civilian Rule Is Not a Threat

Sudan’s armed factions do not need to fear a democratic transition.
What they should fear is the current trajectory: economic collapse, social fragmentation, and the normalization of endless conflict.

A civilian state:

does not exclude them from public life,

does not erase their constituencies,

and does not deny their historical roles.

It simply asks them to operate within a legal order—one in which citizens, not weapons, define political legitimacy.

This is not marginalization; it is modernization.

Conclusion

The civil memorandum is not a rejection of any group.
It is a statement of national exhaustion and a call for a different political future—one grounded in institutional rule rather than armed bargaining.

Those who oppose it are not defending the public interest; they are defending the structure of impunity that has shielded them for years.

If Sudan is to move forward, armed movements and militias must reconsider their reading of the moment.
The country is shifting—socially, politically, and morally—toward a model where civilian authority is the only sustainable foundation for the state.

Sudan’s future will not be written by the strongest militia, but by the strongest institutions.

Arabic Forum