Appendix C
9/11 Air Defense Response
On September 11, 2001 the normal contingent of 14 fighters was on alert to protect the United States. Four of those were responsible for the northeast: two at Otis ANGB on Cape Cod and two at Langley AFB in southern Virginia. Before 9/11 NORAD was responsible for intruders heading to the U.S and Canada from outside our borders, not from within. Air Force planes were available for internal intecepts but did not take a proactive role: the FAA would have to request them to scramble if needed. NORAD and the FAA did run hijacking exercises that involved planes coming from outside the U.S., but as far as I know they did not plan for simultaneous multiple-plane hijackings , or for hijackings starting within the U.S.
From the 9/11 Commission report:
Quote: Before 9/11, it was not unheard of for a commercial aircraft to deviate slightly from its course, or for an FAA controller to lose radio contact with a pilot for a short period of time. A controller could also briefly lose a commercial aircraft's transponder signal, although this happened much less frequently. However, the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal would be a rare and alarming occurrence, and would normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an aircraft crash. In all of these instances, the job of the controller was to reach out to the aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other planes in the vicinity in an attempt to reestablish communications and set the aircraft back on course. Alarm bells would not start ringing until these efforts-which could take five minutes or more-were tried and had failed. |
Would the hijacked planes be easy to find? No. The hijackers turned off the planes' identifying transponders, so that Air Traffic Control would have to sort them out from a few thousand radar blips on screen in the northeast. And NORAD's radar system mostly looked outward from the coast, not inward.
On 9/11 the U.S. air defense system was not "engaged in as many as 15 war games simulating hijacks and attacks." There is specifically no record of hijacking drills being performed. The only military radar "clutter" was on NORAD screens in Colorado, and was eliminated as soon as the real-world alert was issued.
SourceHere is NORAD's timeline of events:
American Airlines Flight 11 Boston enroute to Los AngelesFAA Notification to NEADS 0840*
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis Air National Guard Base, Falmouth, Mass. Two F-15s) 0846**
Fighters Airborne 0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 1) 0846 (estimated)***
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location Aircraft not airborne/153 miles
United Airlines Flight 175 Boston enroute to Los AngelesFAA Notification to NEADS 0843
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis ANGB, Falmouth, Mass.
Same 2 F-15s as Flight 11) 0846
Fighters Airborne 0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 2) 0902 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 8 min****/71 miles
American Flight 77 Dulles enroute to Los AngelesFAA Notification to NEADS 0924
Fighter Scramble Order (Langley AFB, Hampton, Va. 2 F-16s) 0924
Fighters Airborne 0930
Airline Impact Time (Pentagon) 0937(estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 12 min/105 miles
United Flight 93 Newark to San FranciscoFAA Notification to NEADS N/A *****
Fighter Scramble Order (Langley F-16s already airborne for AA Flt 77)
Fighters Airborne (Langley F-16 CAP remains in place to protect DC)
Airline Impact Time (Pennsylvania) 1003 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 11 min/100 miles
(from DC F-16 CAP)