مقال ثمين اهداء لتبارك (توجد ترجمة لمن لف لفه)

Quote: The power struggle between Political and Action Islam The first few years after the success of the coup witnessed the internal struggle for power between the political and action Islamists. The latter won and Turabi and his followers were brutally thrown out of the ruling party. Theories abound to explain the split up. I sincerely do not believe that personal likes and dislikes played a big role in this very serious conflict. The way that Turabi and his followers went out of their way to convince public opinion in and outside the Sudan that they will henceforth abide by democratic rules and seek power only through the ballot box has strengthened my conviction that the division was mainly about strategy, not tactics. Political Islam, as traditionally understood in the Sudan, had lost the battle to the young adventurous Jihadists, who want change through action, not words. Neither Ben Laden nor Taha are thinkers. They do not write books to persuade. They organise and carry out actions. There in lies the strength and weakness of Action Islam. Ben Laden is not in power, Taha is. The status quo necessitated that Taha had to tackle the practical problems of ruling a rather unwieldy people. He had to learn to make compromises, a course of actions and attitudes that run against his deep-rooted jihadist convictions. What is the lesson to draw from this fact of political life in the Sudan? The conclusion to draw is very important indeed. The ruling group in Khartoum will yield some, but only under forceful internal and external pressure. The pressure must be exerted at all levels, at the political, economic, social and moral levels. It must also be unyielding and if possible concerted. I will repeat myself. The ruling group in Khartoum will yield concessions but only under continuous pressure. They will try everything possible to stay their course and will only deviate from it if forced to do so. We have seen them time and again resort to all the tricks and lists in their repertoire to dissipate the pressure and later, when forced to accept the inevitable, to dilute their obligations and commitments, even if they are legally bound by them. It took them more than 10 years to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the CPR. Since then they are trying very hard to re-interpret its terms and reduce their burden of obligations. They will never give up attempts to manoeuvre themselves out of commitments. We should, therefore, never discontinue the pressure for peace, democracy and development in the Sudan. We owe it to ourselves and to the suffering Sudanese peoples.