نعي وتضامن مع أسر الزملاء محمد خاطر ومحمد حسين ومدثر خميس ..

Quote: Overview of Rebel groups Seleka The rebel groups in the coalition — Seleka means "alliance" in the country's Sango language — were signatories to the 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the government. The alliance is made up of factions of the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Guma tribe), the Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CJCP Runga). The fighters of these groups are ex-mutineers and former militiamen from earlier rebel movements hailing mainly from the north of CAR. Seleka numbers between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters and does include elements of Chadian rebels who aim to overthrow Deby’s regime which in turn prompts Deby’s support of Bozizé. Area of control and operation: All of North and North Eastern CAR and nearly the rest of the country with the exception of the capital and some other southern regions. Current status – posturing between Government of Bozize and Seleka elements and peace talks to start in Libreville imminently at the time of writing. There is a growing perception of Sudan support to the Seleka given the souring of the relationship between N’Djamena and Khartoum. The fact that the Seleka are supported is lent credence by the fact that there is very limited #####ng in their areas of operations. Justice Equality Movement Leadership is Zaghawa (Bideyat) with close religious and political ties to opposition groups in Khartoum. Military elements comprise Zaghawa but also many other Darfuri tribes. Have rejected the Doha peace document signed by Liberty and Justice Movement in Doha 2011. Currently operating out of Kordofan and Southern Sudan with SPLM support, Eastern Chad and North Eastern CAR and Uganda. 1 – 3000 fighters. Sudan Liberation Movement Mini-Minawi (SLM MM) Former signatory of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. Opted out in 2011 and operating as rebel movement. Good fighters but few (max 500) Primarily Zaghawa fighters. Operating out of South Kordofan, South Darfur and South Sudan. Sudan Liberation Movement Abdul Wahid (SLM AW) Led by Abdul Wahid, a Fur diaspora from Zalengi. Very few fighters all located in Jebel Marra (max 300) and in control of most of the IDP camps in Darfur and three refugee camps in south eastern Chad (Goz Beida, Koukou, Goz Amir areas). Emerging trends The general lack of state authority across the quadrant and its hinterlands continues to fuel a serious and chronic security vacuum across the region that in turn is exploited in a number of ways by a variety of state and non-state actors on all sides of the borders. In the quadrant, the pattern of rebellion-reintegration-defection is the norm. Most of the military are former rebels, while many rebels are former soldiers. Often coupeurs de routes/bandits are either ex-rebels, rebels, underpaid government military compensating for arrears, or opportunistic pastoralists. In the event that a rebellion does seize power the norm is to continue to alienate the national army in favor of a presidential guard comprising members of the ruling elite’s own ethnicity and even a neighboring country’s military elements (viz Chad and the Zaghawa Bideyat, CAR and Chadian military elements). In many cases rebels who have signed onto a peace and are either awaiting or undergoing DDR desert the process and reclaim their previous role as rebel and/or bandit due to delays in the DDR programs or governments not addressing the core grievances. The shifting loyalties of fighters reflect the volatility of the security situation and the telling absence of alternative economic opportunities. This three-step cyclical movement of rebellion-reintegration-defection is a reflection of the shortcomings of efforts to address this structural conflict pattern at the local level. Security and development at the national and regional levels continue to be affected adversely as result of this. Even in the event that there is progress in DDR initiatives there are still important factors to bear in mind that was well reflected in a 2009 survey in CAR which indicated that three out of four respondents felt uncomfortable interacting with former combatants when sharing a drink or living as neighbors even sharing the same household. The current Seleka in CAR comprise many former rebel groups who mounted the current rebellion because they were unhappy with the lack of progress of the implementation of the 2008 Libreville peace accords that they were party of. Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006 none of the rebel signatories were effectively demobilized and integrated into the armed forces or for that matter into their communities. This was also the case with the armed SPLM groups in the Nuba Mountains following during the North and South Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s implementation period which ended in 2010. The result is the current conflict in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan in Sudan between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM friendly Nuba and Blue Nile population groups. Recommendations • Need to launch studies to improve understandings of local level management systems with regard to security in urban, rural and border areas. This needs to be prioritized since there is no realistic hope of building up state security forces to deploy these areas in the foreseeable future. Including the community in addressing their security needs will also help improve the image of the security services in the quadrant. • Insecurity does not affect all groups equally. There is a general trend indicating that sedentary groups are more likely to be susceptible to violence and displacement than pastoralists. Need to engage local population groups in identifying collective ways of improving security and mitigating threats through dialogue but also through community related security initiatives. These options could include using communities in community policing, community level anti-poaching initiatives, cross-border patrol consisting jointly of pastoralists and sedentary farmers. At these community levels, former combatants can be used to fill in the ranks. This is already done with regard to anti-poachers so taking it a step further to include community policing is plausible. • Once these various options for community level security have been researched then attempts at sensitizing donors and governments to secure their support and participation should be undertaken. • Identify the routes of the forest elephant and to share that with the communities who could be affected by poachers including the LRA who are known to poach elephants. Indeed the incidence of violence of the LRA in the quadrant regions are all well within known ranges of the forest elephant in CAR and South Sudan. • Identify the routes of the pastoralists and their seasonality in order to ready the population for their arrival and ensure that appropriate mechanism are in place to tackle disputes. This will require the stationing of neutral armed forces to implement decisions and deter violence. • Conduct research to better understand the linkages between natural resource extraction and rebel and criminal groups financing. A few of the available reports on CAR surprisingly indicated that there is no direct correlation between the activities of rebel movements and natural resources extraction sites (viz. conflict mapping report 2009, and UNEP CAR report among others). This is incorrect. There is generally an indirect correlation between the mining sector and criminal and rebel groups as more than well documented in Darfur and DRC. A plausible situation in CAR could be that mining companies pay groups off to ensure that access to the mines by workers and movement of resources are not obstructed. • Build all weather roads across the quadrant in order to ensure that security service have the mobility to respond to the many threats to civilians and wildlife all year round. • Conduct market surveys in urban and rural settings to help inform reintegration schemes for combatants. With that said, there is very big need for an effective locally respected response to security threats so this should be a priority.