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Re: تلخيص: From war to peace and reconciliation in Darfur منتدى عماد الأمين (Re: Elmuiz Haggaz)
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The ICTR concerned itself with what was come to be referred to as Class One criminals, namely those who were allegedly implicated at the organisational level of the genocide. Altogether, 400 suspected genocidaires were identified, many of whom fled and remained in western countries with little or no chance of repatriation. The dubiously slow pace of ICTR trials provided another problem. Almost one decade of work ending in 2005, produced 81 indictments, 17 convictions and one acquittal. Different sources credit the ICTR with a mere 33 cases after 14 years of investigation, ending in 2008. However, the restricted mandate of the ICC relegates the institution to a limited role in the overall post conflict justice system (Lawson, 2005; Gusongoiyre 2008). According to some critiques, the ICTR was plagued with corruption, nepotism, mismanagement and malfunctioning (See Power, 2003:495; Shawn, 2006).
As for the Rwandan national legal system, it is certainly more efficient in comparison to the ICTR but equally hopeless in the face of the genocide. From 1996 to 2006, the national courts were able to handle a mere 10,000 trials. With that rate, the national courts would require over 100 years to prosecute all prisoners (see Gusongoirye, 2008). Rwanda has been most unfortunate with regard to near decimation of its legal system during the genocide. It experienced a loss of over 80% of its legal officials and many legal facilities were damaged during the genocide. For example only 244 judges survived the genocide from a total number of 750 (Hansen 2005,:2). Darfur fares much better in this regard. There is no summary execution of judges in Darfur and the region can draw on legal officials from outside Darfur if need be. But the Rwandan case is different. The country simply had no choice but search into its traditional system for a solution. Gacaca seemed to be a logical path for the country to follow.
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