|
|
 Articulation of Cultural Discourses and Political Dominance in Sudan
|
وصلتني من د . صلاح الزين مع طلب بأن أنشرها لكم بعد أن لمناه في موضوع سابق علي عدم مشاركته الفعالة معنا في البورد ..
Articulation of Cultural Discourses and Political
Dominance in Sudan.
SALAH EL-ZAIN
"There is no better starting point for thought than laughter" Walter
Benjamin, " The Author as A producer"
Sudan, as a multi-cultural society, figures, among other African states as a sparkling example where one cultural strand was in a position to retain hegemony and dominance, politically and economically, through peaceful and other means. Configuration of geographical factors may, certainly, not be hold, alone, accountable for the present articulation of economic and political dominance of Arab Islamic culture.
Grasped in actual events, the basic political philosophy of the Arabic-Islamic political discourse towards the South and other underprivileged regions of the Sudan is to retain the country united and integrated without jeopardizing the triangle of Khartoum-Medani -Portsudan Northern monopoly of political and economic power. In its extreme, the policy entails the exclusion, even damage, of Southern Sudanese and other backward regions of the country from sharing political and economic power. Politicians, and to some extent, scholars of Arab origin, merge to argue that “ ...the African past of the Sudanese was not regarded as an object of glorification or seen as a source of self-gratification by politically conscious Sudanese” 1.
The scholar vigorously followed suit the political. During the euphoria of independence of Sudan, Ali Abdel Rahman, then Minister of Interior of the first independent government had this to say in the parliament, “Sudan is an Arab country and whoever does not feel Arab should quit” 2.
One year before, the south was being ravaged by Equatorial military mutiny of 1955, which is the first military reaction to counteract the immanent process of cultural homogenization. Successive governments, both multi-party and military, dominated by Arab-Muslim sectarian political parties failed, for conceivable ideological reasons, to address themselves to the issues involved. Instead, “Assimilation and cultural domination were assumed to be the only ways of achieving national unity “ 3.
The participation of southern politicians in the national political spectrum was underscored, if not non- existing. Historically, but not to be taken as a justifying counter-argument for the subsequent politics of Arabic-Islamic cultural domination, nationalist movements in Sudan were of Northern character, i.e., they originated and flourished in the northern part of the country and were dominated by Northern Islamic Arabic-speaking “elite”. The crux of that nationalist ideology was strongly advocating Islamic- Arabic orientation through the assimilation of the entire non-Arab nationalities into the Arab national group. Spread of Islam and Arabic education was envisaged as instrumental and instructive. In fact, since July 1939 the leading members of the Sudan Graduates Congress, the latter on political parties leader, presented to the Government with the proposals “ that education should be oriented towards the Arab and Islamic, but not African, culture, because the Sudan had much in common with the Arabic countries of Islamic Orient. They were in the opinion that the proselytizing missionaries were incapable of improving education in the South. Only “through the opening of government schools, similar to those in the North, and where the Arabic language would provide the Lingua Franca “ 4., could real development of education takes place in the South.
Independence of the country was a mere episode in this process. These policies were pursued and activated by the dominant Arabic-Islamic discourse in power since independence. The first military regime (1958-64) launched an unprecedented campaign of diffusing Arabic language and Islamic religion. Missionaries’ activities were banned, mosques were built in the South, and Friday was repealed. It goes without saying that nascent discourse of cultural assimilation necessitates the economic and political power of the state, which was dominated by the Arab-Islamic political parties. Even when, in 1968 elections, William Deng had won the election as representative of Sudan African National Union (SANU), it was beyond his political capacity to assume whatsoever role in the ascending assimilation discourse. Instead he was “assimilated” into the Coalition Government of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Imam wing of the Umma Party. It was common practice for Northern political leaders, in their efforts to display unanimity and national legitimacy, to recruit Southern politicians in their government, often as ministers without portfolio and representative capacities. Being no potential force for pressing Southern demands, is a prerequisite for their involvement.
Unraveling the controversy entangled in the intricate relation between the state and the Islamic religion would set the argument in the right track of declothing the intransigent efforts of the dominant Arabic-Islamic discourse in its thrust to assimilate, culturally, non-Arabic groups. Islamisation process, albeit unsaid, is the spearhead of assimilative policies. This could be pushed further back to the heyday of Mahadyya movement in the 19th century.
Across history, the nationalist movement, in the 30s, led by the Graduates Congress, was, undoubtedly, a kaleidoscope of Mahadyya ideological discourse. Equally indicative were the maneuvers at Juba Conference m 1947. Though the subject of the Conference is to debate whether southerners should have representatives to the legislative body in Khartoum, to reinforce the unity of the Sudan, in “reality the issue at the Juba Conference was whether the unity between the South and the North, decided upon by British administrators in the Sudan in 1946, should be confirmed by Southerners with or without safeguards for the people of southern Sudan” 5.
Safeguards visualized by Southerner were nothing than the cultural identity of the Southern people and the necessity to preserve it through equal socio-economic development of the region, promotion of education, commitment to equality of citizens in the future united Sudan and the participation of Southerners in the administration of the country coupled with self-rule in the South.
It was not difficult for Northern Sudanese representatives to endorse these safeguards and never put them in practice. No efforts were reserved to make successful fruition of the cultural assimilation targets. The same game was played in December 1955 when preparations for independence were being debated. The Southerners were firmly demanding, time again and again, a reaffirmation regarding safeguard for their pledge to have federal system of government stipulated in the constitution and acceleration of socio-economic development and promotion of education in the South. Repeatedly, reaffirmations were given and the independence was attained in Jan 1995. Following independence, the political scene was pigmented with visions and policies that do not differ from the age-old aspiration for the Islamization of the country; rather they were overtly spoken. The commitment to federal pledge came by the southerners proved to be illusive and shadowy, no other than tactics to pass declaration of independence. Instead, federation pledge came to be equated with separation and was severely rejected and debilitated.
Having dominated the state, the dominant Arabic-Islamic political discourse was on solid grounds to furnish the political space with claims regarding the Islamic constitutionality of Sudanese society and culture. To its detriment, and because of its myopia, national unity was perceived tantamount to Arabicisation and Islamization. Culture backed by politics was in a full sway and any claims for cultural promotion and development was continuously contemplated and interrelated. Claims for Islamic constitution would have been realized but due to the squabble among the dominant political parties leaders coupled with the ravaging war in the south it was handicapped. It re-figured again during 1967-69 to be battled along the acute difference about whether it should be parliamentary or presidential. Complete disregard of socio-economic issues of development regarding the south and other underprivileged region was sacked by a dominant political center engulfed in issue of Islamic legitimacy and accommodation. Nor were the non-Arab groups in the north immune from the encroaching cultural assimilation policy.
Following the 1964 popular outbreak, regional movements started to appear on the scene, assuming recognized in roles in political, economic and cultural affairs. Claims were asserted by the Beja Congress (BC) from Eastern Sudan, Nuba Mountain (NMU) in the western part of the country, and Dar Fur Development Front (DDF). The DDF aim was to create a multi-racial movement to channel people’s political, ethnic, social and religious aspiration into the right direction in the Sudan and Darfur Province in particular. 6.
The difference between North-South and North-North counteraction to the encroaching cultural assimilation is one of a kind rather than degree. While the one is military confrontation, the other is a political one. This could be attributed to the fact that, in the first case, the degree of inequality and non-participation in national administrative institutions, coupled with cultural difference is greater, comparatively to the second case. But the fact in both case remain; those regions suffers from the sterile policies of the dominant political parties and the ensuing inequalities since independence. The fact that some of these regions, particularly Darfur and Eastern Sudan, were the traditional electoral stands for Umma and the Democratic Unionist religious parties, respectively, is an onslaught on the two parties’ discourse regarding their policies and orientations toward non-Arab groups.
Common appeals for non-discriminatory policies and assertiveness regarding equitable apportionment of economic and political resources were factors that stimulates regional movements to merge their efforts with Southerners to act, in post 1964 politics. More than two decades elapsed by when the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) was outstandingly conscious, thanks to cultural assimilation policies, to articulate the regional movement aspiration with national problems. The problem is not one of North-South strife but that of the whole country; the battle was brought to an altogether new-sophisticated stretch.
Destined to be ridden by seventeen years of war (1955-72), the country was for the first time and, a fact to be restated, during Nimeri’s regime (1969-85), harbored the North-South conflict to peaceful grounds by the conclusion of Addis Ababa Accord in 1972. It was for the first time, in the political history of the country, that Sudan cultural diversity was publicly and politically recognized. The fact that Sudan is a multi-cultural and multi-religious society was taken, by the Accord, as not a factor for national disunity, but rather, when perceived broadly, an stimuli and enrichment to the national integrity of the country. It provided the political and institutional devices through which cultural diversity could be a springboard to unity.
In addition to the establishment of a regional government in the South, Addis Ababa Agreement contained provisions addressing the cultural diversity issues. This comprises articles that recognized minority’s local languages, customs, freedom of religious opinions, development of local cultures, equality of opportunities in education, employment, commerce etc., irrespective of race, tribal, origin, place of birth or #######. The fact that for the first time political power was to be shared with that large non-Arab minority, could not be realized without being protested, overtly or covertly, by some in a cultural milieu historically dominated by Arab-Islamic ideological prejudice. It was that the President “ could not have had more than limited support for his new policy.. Among either Islamists or the pan-Arabists; and even the Arab Sudanese in general were still opposed to sharing power with the “ rest”, while the civil service was known to be strongly against regionalism” 7.
However, the background scene for the Agreement was a such miserable and fuzzy, “ for it would be difficult to find elsewhere in black Africa a population of about five million, occupying over a quarter of a million square miles, who 15 years after independence could boast of only two secondary schools, and neither a permanent secretary nor a director of a department in the public service” 8.
Factors pertinent to the south militate, among other factors, against the
full- fledged realization of the political autonomy and cultural
self-determination of the South. Central among them, is the all-embracing
economic and political destitute of the South. This is not to argue that
backward economic and political structures were eternally destined to
inherent and structural mechanisms of self-destruction and fragility, but
rather, to argue that, and in the case of Sudan, “ the Southerners have not
only ceased to have faith in promises any more, they do actually believe
that these promises are stratagems with which to destroy the legitimate
rights of the citizens in the South “9
Promises for safeguards in Juba Conference 1974, and Declaration Resolution, December 1955, were not yet washed out off the South memory. Another factor, pertaining to May regime, that of strong emphasis and recognition of Pan-Arabism was too devastating and sweeping to allow for amicable conciliatory political and cultural atmosphere to grapple with. It was the new Prime Minister, Babiker Awaddala, who, from the outset epitomized the new regime mission “ the Revolutionary Government, with complete understanding of the bond of destiny and forces of Arab Revolution, will work for the creation of economic, military and cultural reactions with brothers Arab Nations to strengthen the Arab Nation in its fight against new-colonialism and Zionism” 10 . No seats were reserved in that show of drama for neither pan-Africanists nor Sudanese citizens of African origins; no convincing reasons to be bothered with such concerns for “ the Sudanese... turned their backs on Africa and became passionately attached to the glorious past of Islam, which, together with the richness of classical Arabic culture and thought, provided the necessary psychological prod” for “ instead of helping them to regain their lost self-confidence, Africa would have the effect of accentuating their ( southerners) feeling of inferiority...” 11. But the road from March 1972 to June 1983 guarantees no safety for whatever margins of free interplay. Host of structurally inherent factors in the unfolding processes of Sudan political history persuade, rather force, the very regime, i.e. which initiate and proclaimed the policy of “ Sudanese for all Sudanese”, to the threshold of propagating the Agreement which retained a spacious room for the Regime’s credibility and devotion in the memory of both Southerners and Northerners.
The 1977-78 policy of “ National Reconciliation” in which the regime reconciled his major political opponents, i.e. Muslim Brothers and Umma party, was dictated by an interplaying host of economic and political forces following the 1971 plan of “ open door policy “. Thematically based on the thesis that the political process in Sudan are best grappled with through the articulation of Arabic-Islamic ideological discourse and political dominance, the paper assumes that economic forces, among others, were the back bench energizers of the unfolding political scene. Rather, a dialectical interplay between economic and politico-cultural and social factors was recommended theoretically instructive instead of the mechanical economistic approaches. Accordingly, the National Reconciliation is looked upon within this perspective. Ultimately, it is an episode, distinctively important, whereby the politically dominant Arabic-Islamic discourse is sparing no effort towards the fruition of its cultural assimilation thrusts. The fact that “throughout the years of nationalist agitation and early independence there had been a persistent assumption that the Sudan was an Arab nation whose culture was exclusively Arab and its language predominantly Arabic” 12, provides for no margin of cultural tolerance in a political and cultural space exclusively dominated by Arabic-Islamic ideological discourse.
In the strict sense of the word, the declaration of Sharia law (Islamic law) by the regime in September of 1983 pre-necessitated the repeal of Addis Ababa Accord of 1972. The former should be read upon the background of the later, and both of them should be tested against the general tendencies of Sudan politics since the thirties. Furthermore, neither military regimes nor multi-party system of post-independent Sudan differ in their orientations regarding the dominance of Arabic-Islamic culture, equitable apportionment of economic and political resources, promotion of education, etc.. Some parts of the North i.e. Eastern and Western regions were not exception. To the later the charitable sectarian partisan cadres were sent for missions of mobilizing the destitute population for “ national “ election and patronage. To the Southerners military troops were sent to crush the “racialist conspirators”. The South is a “ cultural vacuum” to be filled by Arabic culture under an Islamic revival is a contention for both the junta and the sectarian politicians. Succinctly Arnold Toynbee put it, “ the Northern Sudan Arabs seem to me to be flagrant colonialists trying to impose themselves, their religion, their language and culture on a non-Arab African people that want to be itself and does not want to be dominated” 13.
(عدل بواسطة Modic on 02-20-2003, 04:19 PM)
|
|
 
|
|
|
|
Modic
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست