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 من الان فصاعداً
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من المؤكد أن المدونة التي كان يدفع بأنها شخصية؛
ستصبح شخصية – جداً - من الان فصاعداً.
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Re: من الان فصاعداً (Re: سفيان بشير نابرى)
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عبد الله كان عمرو كلو بيحلم انو يكون جراح؛ غايتو اجتهد و قدر يدخل كلية الطب؛
و بعد مكابسة قدر يوصل للسنوات النهائية؛ اها الجراحة الكان بيهاتي بيها دي
قدر ما حاول معاها غلبتو .. فصار يردد لنفسه و بصوت مسموع:
- كان مالك و مال الجراحة يا عبد الله!!
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Re: من الان فصاعداً (Re: Hussein Mallasi)
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عزري .. يجب التعديل :-
Quote: ملاسي ...
عيد سعيد
تحياتي للاطفال ...
في العيد ده لو الزول (فركش البوست)
ح تنده ليهو ناس ( U N ) هاهاهاها
والا بالك بقوا مابسمعوا . |
يحذف أخر سطر في الاقتباس لتصبح هكذا:-
والا من الان فصاعداً ياحسين في بالك انهم بقوا
ما بسمعوا .
ــــــــــــــ
قصدت التعديل في مداخلة منفصلة (وشوش بتضحك شديد).
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Re: من الان فصاعداً (Re: سفيان بشير نابرى)
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يبدو أن البصاص مغتاظ
من هذه السيرة الذاتية
Professional
1957 – 1964 Study Economics at Erasmus University, Rotterdam
1964 – 1971 Lecturer/Research fellow Erasmus University and Netherlands Economic Institute,
Rotterdam
1971 – 1973 Member of Parliament, The Netherlands (PvdA, Labour Party)
1973 – 1977 Minister for Development Co-operation, The Netherlands (Cabinet den Uyl)
1978 – 1980 Member of Parliament
1978 – 1980 Professor Theory and Practice of International Development, Institute of Social
Studies (ISS), The Hague
1980 – 1986 Deputy Secretary-General United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD, Assistant Secretary General UN), Geneva
1986 – 1989 Member of Parliament
1988 – 1989 Professor Theory and Practice of Policy Making, University of Amsterdam
1989 – 1992 Minister for Development Co-operation (Cabinet Lubbers III)
1994 – 1998 Idem (Cabinet Kok I)
1998 – 2002 Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (Cabinet Kok II)
2002 – 2004 Professor Theory and Practice of International Development, ISS, The Hague
2004 - Special Representative Secretary General of the United Nations in Sudan, Khartoum
Positions
- Member Evaluation Committee Netherlands Development Assistance, 1966-1969
- Member World Council of Churches Commission on the Participation of Churches in Development (WCC-CCPD), 1969-1973
- Member Board of Editors Wending, 1970-1973
- Deputy Governor World Bank, 1973-1977, 1989-1998
- Member Development Committee of the World Bank, 1974-1977, 1989-1998
- Chairman Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), 1973-1977, 1989-1992)
- Chairman Committee of the Whole, 7th Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1975
- Chairman World Council of Churches Advisory Group on Economic Matters, 1978-1987
- Member Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Brandt Commission), 1979-1983
- Member International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (MacBride Commission), 1978-1980
- Deputy Chairman Labour Party (PvdA), The Netherlands, 1987-1989
- Member Commission on Global Governance (Carlsson/Ramphal Commission), 1991-1995
- Co-Chairman Global Coalition for Africa, 1991-1998
- Member Independent Commission on Population and the Quality of Life (Commission de Lourdes Pintasilgo), 1994-1996
- Chairman 6th Conference of Parties UN Convention on Climate Change, 2000-2001
- Special Envoy Secretary General United Nations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2001-2003
- Chairman of the Board of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London, 2002-2004
- Chairman of Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC), Geneva, 2003-2004
- Chairman Vluchtelingen Organisaties Nederland (VON, Federation of Refugee Organisations in the Netherlands), 2003-2004
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Re: من الان فصاعداً (Re: الصادق اسماعيل)
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ولا يا ربي يكون ما فهم الكلام دا
Weblog nr 36
October 21, 2006
A very positive development this week: on 14 October the Government of Sudan and the Eastern Front signed a peace agreement in Asmara. The negotiations had not taken much time: about four months, less than the talks in Abuja which led to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and which had lasted one and a half year. Earlier I wrote about the conflict in the East in my weblog nr 8. The parties had decided that the negotiations should not take place in the presence of international observers. They were to be facilitated by Eritrea, Sudan’s neighbor in the East. Not everybody had welcomed this. Some people felt that the absence of international observers would not help making the negotiations transparent. Others feared that Eritrea might unduly influence the talks in order to meet its own interests. However, the Darfur peace talks, which had been held under supervision of the international community, had not been all that successful. Both the Government and the Front had declared that they did not want to repeat the mistakes made during the process that had produced the DPA. In my view, with the benefit of hindsight, the international community cannot be very proud about the outcome of the talks in Abuja. So, at the beginning of the talks in Asmara I wrote “Let us give the parties a chance to reach peace in the East all by themselves” (see my weblog nr 2. That is more or less what they did.
The signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) brings an end to a decade old armed conflict in Eastern Sudan. The structure of the agreement is similar to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and the South and the Darfur Peace Agreement: a set of principles, followed by arrangements concerning the sharing of power and wealth and a chapter on security. The principles are similar to those in the other peace agreements and in accordance with the Constitution: recognition and respect of multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-racial diversity; citizenship as the basis for civil and political rights; protection of human rights and freedoms; political pluralism; free elections; a federal system of government; poverty eradication and an equitable distribution of wealth; free and compulsory primary education for every citizen; free primary health care to all citizens; affirmative action to the benefit of the victims of underdevelopment and deprivation; the right of every citizen to acquire or own property, without expropriation, except by law for the public interest and with fair compensation. This is a selection of the main principles. They are impeccable and show a high ambition.
Whether these principles can be ensured in practice remains to be seen. This will depend on three conditions. First: the achievement of real peace throughout Sudan. If the war continues in Darfur, there will not be enough resources to ensure poverty eradication, free education and health care. The continuation of the war also will be an excuse to postpone the lifting of the national security laws that endanger the principles of political freedom and human rights. The second condition is a lasting political will of the ruling elite to implement the commitments made in the agreement and sufficient strength and quality of the national and regional institutions to enforce their compliance.
The first condition, peace in Darfur, has not yet been met. I have written extensively about the complications, which arose since the signing of the Agreement in Abuja, last May. Often it has the appearance of an Echternach procession: one step forward, two steps backward, and sometimes also steps aside, in order to weld a new coalition. However, this week a new step forward has been made. I traveled to North Darfur and met, amongst others, commanders belonging to the G19 (which presently prefer to be called by a new name: “SLM Classic”), closely related to the National Redemption Front. In July the latter Front had launched the first major attack since the signing of the DPA (on Hamrath al Sheikh, in North Kordofan). This was the beginning of a series of attacks and counter attacks. The authorities in Khartoum always declare - not without justification - that the NRF had initiated all this. They consider this as legitimate grounds to continue fighting the NRF and the G19. The UN had condemned the attack on Hamrath al Sheikh. In all our contacts with the parties, the Government as well as the rebels, we have called for restraint, for a halt to the escalation, for talks instead of fights. We did so mainly in bilateral contacts, because the joint institution where violations of the cease fire had to be addressed did not function. I wrote about the recent escalation in these combats last week. (see my weblog nr 35). This week I got a positive answer from the G19. In a mass meeting with them - I counted about three hundred military commanders and political officials - they promised not to attack the Sudanese Armed Forces. They declared that they would defend themselves, if attacked, but promised to stop attacking. I demanded more: stop considering AMIS, the African Union Peace Keeping Force, as you enemy. Guarantee that bandits and rogue commanders no longer harass aid workers and steal their vehicles. Start, together with all other non-signatory parties, peace talks, with both the SLA Minnie Minnawi faction and the Government of Sudan. Do not reject the Darfur Peace Agreement, but consider this text as a basis for peace, as a starting point for further talks and present proposals for further improvement.
The G19/SlM Classic/NRF promised me to sit together and send me the answer to all this in writing. In anticipation of a full answer, they reaffirmed that they would not launch further attacks. I informed the official authorities in Khartoum and Al Fashr and requested them to consider this as a positive gesture, which could be the beginning of a new approach: talks that are not accompanied by violations of earlier agreements. There is still a long way to go. However, if all parties are reasonable and able to control internal forces that continue to seek a military solution, some light at the end of the tunnel could emerge..
Let me return to the East. As I wrote above, peace in Darfur, or at least some progress towards peace in Darfur, is a first condition to be met in order to ensure sustained peace in the East, on the basis of the new Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. A second condition is that the ruling elite in Sudan have the political will to fully implement this new agreement and that the national and regional institutions are strong enough to enforce the principles underlying the agreement. The regional institutions that will be established on the basis of this agreement cannot be considered as a victory of the Eastern Front, but they certainly will have the capacity to ensure a more equitable sharing of power. The Eastern Front had demanded that a separate Eastern region would be established, with powers to deal with regional affairs. The Government had rejected this, fearing the splitting up of the state of Sudan into more or less autonomous regions, not only the South – its rights have been enshrined in the CPA – but also Darfur, the East and, later, the North. Instead an Eastern Sudan States’ Coordinating Council will be established, with a fair representation of the Eastern Front. Moreover, the agreement calls for a nationwide conference to revise the administrative structure of Sudan - “without prejudice to the status of Southern Sudan as enshrined in the Constitution” - to be held in 2007, before the elections.
At the national level a Presidential Assistant ad a Presidential Adviser will be appointed from a list of nominees to be provided by the Eastern Front. The Front will also get a number of other ministerial positions, seats in the National Assembly, representatives in the Courts as well as the posts of Deputy Governor of two of the three states in the East: Kassala and Gedaref State. A special Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund will be established, with official financial transfers from Khartoum.
The security arrangements in the agreement include the establishment of a number of institutions with the task to ensure the ceasefire, the assembling of Front combatants in camps and the categorization of these combatants into groups to be integrated into the armed forces and others, who will return to civilian life. Unlike the DPA, which was contested right from the beginning, there is presently no reason to expect that the ceasefire in the East will not hold.
Many elements of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement resemble those in the Darfur Peace Agreement. It is up to the parties to the latter agreement, in particular those who have refused to sign, to compare the two agreements and to judge whether their refusal was justified. They claim that the DPA does not meet their expectations. Would they have been able to reach a very different agreement under other circumstances, such as facilitation by Eritrea or another country as chair, without international observers? The ESPA may well become the norm. In one respect it is the norm already: the Eastern Front has been able to stay united. That is a precondition for success at the negotiations table.
President Al-Bashir of Sudan, President Salve Kiir of Southern Sudan, Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki and the Chairman of the Eastern Front, Mustapha Osman Ismail, were present during the signing of the agreement. So were many other leaders from this part of Africa. Government spokesmen have said the Sudanese delegation, led by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mustafa Osman Ismail, has made substantial concessions in order to achieve a sustainable peace. There is no reason to doubt that the negotiators were sincere. A lot still has to be done. However, the Sudanese people and their leaders can be congratulated.
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Hussein Mallasi
معتصم دفع الله
abuguta
سفيان بشير نابرى
الصادق اسماعيل
القلب النابض
شهاب الفاتح عثمان
Bakhaf
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست