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 Re: خـمسـون عـامـاً .. ومـازال مجهـولاً ... السـودان - جعفـر سـورج (منقول) (Re: Shalabi)
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Dear Shalabi
In 1956, we missed an opportunity to become the greatest and the strongest nation on the map of the African continent. Since then, our leaders never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity. Just before independence by four months, Sudan Denfece Force (southern units) rose up in arms for reasons that could have been avoided .It was immediately after the Sudanization in which 800 military, police, civil servant positions held by the colonialists were to be by filled by Sudanese. The North arrogated to itself 794 positions, leaving the South with only six junior positions. The Torit muntineers took that process as a replacement of the British by the Jallaba. Period. Nevertheless, southerners were able to put those events behind them, when the British intervened and put down the Torit Mutiny.
The Agereement that was signed in Cairo in 1953 between the Northern political parties and the Egyptian government providing for the independence of the Sudan in referendum in which the Sudanese population would express their opinion whether to become independet or come under the Egyption Crown (the unity of the Nile Valley)was ignored by the North major political parties. No Southern representation in the Cairo meeting was found necessary by the North political players. Azhari had second thoughts that Sudan should become independent instead of his original call for the unity of the Nile Valley. As such, Azhari, supported by the Umma Party, wanted the vote for the declaration of the independence to be done inside parliament. In doing so ,Azhari and the northern political parties needed the votes of the southern members of parliament. Southerners would not vote except the north agreed that the country should be ruled as a "federal state". Northerners agreed and southerners voted for independence on December 19, 1955.
One month from that agreement the North reneged from their obligation and began calling southerners as separatists. Federation had suddenly become equal to separation. Azhari threatened each and every southern member of parliament who insisted talking about federation with "force of steel". When in 1958, the final draft of the constitution was put before parliament, there were no provisions talking about federation in the draft. Southerners raised the issue, but were told by the majority of the northern members that they could table an amendment to the draft of the consitution about the federation, provided that it would be subject to the majority vote. However, when Azhari and his cohorts needed a consensus on the issue of independence because it was an issue that required national consensus the unanimity of parliament was absolutely necessary and southern vote was part of that unanimity. When southerners insisted on federation, which one assumes to be also an issue of national consensus, southerners were told they would have to passed that through parliament by a mojority vote if they had the majority. What standard did our "founding fathers" have in mind when they ruled that the issue of federation was not as important or did not require a national consus, and therefore a unanimity, as was required for the declaration of independence? In our view, federation was as inmportant as the declaration of independence because it was about the first few bricks in the nation building. The great Chinese leader, Mao was reported to have said that a jouney of one thousand miles begins with one step. After fifty years that one missed step is still haunting and costing us the Sudan. With that missed step, the first military stepped in in November 1958.
Abboud dictatorship was an enlightened one. He tolerated some freedom in the North, but used the most repressive form of government in relation to the South. Abboud thought that the best short cut to national integaration, based on arabiszation and islamiztion of the South, was repression. From that time human right abuses became prevalent. The immediate reaction of the South to Abboud's policy was the formation of Anyanya, to resist what they correctly perceived as a northern colonization, an attempt to turn them into Arabs and Muslim, when they were not created by God to be so. When Abboud lost power in 1964 South was more defiant than before.
The October gpovernment attempted to reversed some of the Abboud's harsh policies, and a round table conference was convened to look into the issue of the southern protest. Once again Southern parties attending the conference and representing the South called for federation, sel-determination or outright separation, while the northern parties insisted on centralization. The conference concluded without any agreement, except the formation of a twelve men committee to look into some of the recommendations made by the conference.
In June 1965, the northern political parties were in a hurry and were not ready to find a solution to the issue of war and wanted elections at all cost. The election brought into power a coalition governemrnt of Umma and the National Uniionist parties, with Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoub as the prime minister. Mahjoub had no vision of a Sudan that could accommodate the ethnic, cultural and religious diversities of which the Sudan is made of. He thought the best solution to those dichotomies was islamization and arabization, just as Abboud did. Mahjoub policy was a policy of a military solution. He carried out mass murders of southerners, particularly of the Southern elite which he saw as the source of the problem.
In 1966, the coalition Mahjoub led was unstable. A young ambitious grandson of al-Mahdi became a thorn on his side. Al-sadig al-Mahdi was not ready to allow his senior party colleague a chance to continue lead the Umma Party and the government. In that year, al-sadig forged an alliance with al-Azhari's NUP and and deposed al-Mahjoub in a vote of no-confidence in parliament and became a prime ministert at a young age of 30. Al-Sadig could not survive another alliance between al-Mahjoub and the same Azhari. These unholy alliance became the rule of the day, until al-Mahjou and Azhari colluded and unconstitutionally desolved the parliament to block the way between al-Sadig and the premiership. Earlier, al-Sadig had conspired with a young law professor and brother-in-law, Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, who had become the leader of the notorius and extremist Muslim Brotherhood, dissolved and expelled the elected members of parliament of the Sudan Communist Party; and declared communism as "atheissm"--Ilhad
From that time, the second period of democracy had decended into chaos, and the Army took the initiative. On May 25, 1969, dictator Niumeeiri cam to power, and the second Sudanese experience with military rule began. Nimeiri began with extreme Arab nationalism, using communists and other left winger elements. However, as early 1971, he came into conflict with the communists. In July, 1971, the communist officers in the army briefly took power. The communists were crushed with vengence, and Nimeiri returned to power in two days. Nimeiri with survival instincts surrounded himself with centre-right elements of technocrats. Nimeiri attempted to pursue an ambitious economic development plan, but found he needed the west and stability. He send out the correct signals to the Southern rebels, and his intention of ending the war in the South. His technocrats were of great help to him. They suceeded to restore rrelations between Niumeiri and the west, and negotiated the Addis Ababa peace that ended the war in the South. Addis Ababa gave the
Sudan a peace of mind for almost eleven years, but dictators are fond of alliances. Nimeiri chose the northern political parties he had earlier disbanded and brought some of them into his government. These political parties had never accepted the Addis accord, especially the Umma of al-Sadig al-Mahdi and the Muslim Brotherhood of al-Turabi. This two politicians had been for an islamic system of governemnt and had called for an Islamic consitution during the second democratic period. With his new friends, Nimeiri worked therefore to undermine the Addis Ababa Accord. In June 1983, Nimeiri abrogated the Accord, and in september declared Shari'a law. Consequently, the war resumed in the South. A visionary young colonel called Dr. John Garang de Mabior formed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. He avowed to unite the Sudan under a new political dispensation that is cognizant of the historical and contemporary diversities of the Sudan; he called it the "New Sudan". The idea caught the imagination of the non-Arab Sudan, and became a general protest, not this time by Southerners only but by the non-Arab Sudan. SPLM/A was joined by the marginalized people of Sudan, the Ingessana, the Nuba and some northewrn intellectuals, who bought into the ideaof the New Sudan.
SPLM/A initiated many peace proposals. It called for a constitutional conference to be attended by all political forces, including the Sudan Armed Forces. This was followed by the Koka Dam declaration 1986, charting the road to the constitutional conference. This time al-Sadig al-Mahdi had become the prime minister for the second time, becoming the first Sudanese to rule the Sudan twice. However, al-Sadig had other ideas, and the opportunity was squandered, and the war intensified. Mawlana al-Mirghani, the head of the Khatmyia religious sect and the leader of the DUP, waded into and began his initiative that resulted into Mirghani-Garang Peace Initiative 1988. This time, al-Sadig was forced to act, but it was too little too late. His brother-in-law saw the the Mirghani-Garnag Peace Initiative as a threat to his party's existence because it was going to separate state and religion. Al-Turabi staged a coup on the morning of June 30, 1989. Al-Turabi established the most bloodiest repressive theocratic regime Sudan had ever witnessed. All political parties, trade unions, press or anything that smells freedom was disbanded and suppressed. The military, police, civil services were purged of its competent personnel. Islamists, selling Sudanese "sari tobs" in the Gulf markets, were brought in to become the governors of the banks, ministers, undersecretaries of the ministeries, police and military officers; the Natioanl Islamic Front (NIF) security appartus replaced the non-partician national secrity organ. Secret houses euphmistically called "Ghost houses" were established and a helish torture squads were trained in Iran, and possibly Afghanistan, were unleashed on whoever disagreed with the "Figiha", the scholar. The war in the South became a holly war "jihad", and the jihadists were awarded with licence to take slaves. rape, mass killing,torture, induced starvation were used as the weaopons of war. as a result over more than two millions Southern sudanese perished in less than five years (191-1996).
In spite of that devastation in the South, the international community, especially the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, IGAD, never tired of mediating and negotiate peace beteween SPLM/A and the NIF theocratic regime of Khartoum. In 1999, the NIF split over power, and al-Turabi lost in the fight for power to his pupil Ali Osmn Mohd, Taha. He languished in detention for almost five years, until the signature of the Naivasha Peace Agrement in January 2005.
Again, the Sudan, with leaders characterized by short memories and capable of undermining agreements, is dragging its feet in implementing the only deal that could give it peace for a long time. The sudden death of the author of peace, Dr. John Garang de Mabior in July 2005, has given the NCP/NIF another opportunity to work against peace.
(عدل بواسطة charles deng on 02-04-2006, 06:12 AM)
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