|
|
 Nuclear deals traced to Sudan
|
Clandestine nuclear deals traced to Sudan
The Guardian
Thursday 5 January 2006.
By Ian Traynor and Ian Cobain
Jan 5, 2005 (LONDON) - International investigators and western intelligence
have for the first time named Sudan as a major conduit for sophisticated
engineering equipment that could be used in nuclear weapons programmes.
Hundreds of millions of pounds of equipment was imported into the African
country over a three-year period before the 9/11 attacks in New York and
Washington in 2001 and has since disappeared, according to Guardian sources.
Western governments, UN detectives and international analysts trying to stem
the illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction technology are alarmed by
the black market trade.
A European intelligence assessment obtained by the Guardian says Sudan has
been using front companies and third countries to import machine tools,
gauges and hi-tech processing equipment from western Europe for its military
industries in recent years. But it says that Sudan is also being used as a
conduit, as much of the equipment is too sophisticated for use in the
country itself.
"The suspicion arises that at least some of the machinery was not destined
for or not only destined for Sudan," the assessment says. "Among the
equipment purchased by Sudan there are dual-use goods whose use in Sudan
appears implausible because of their high technological standard."
Western analysts and intelligence agencies suspect the equipment has been or
is being traded by the nuclear proliferation racket headed by the Pakistani
scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who admitted nuclear trading two years ago and
is under house arrest in Islamabad.
Khan is known to have visited Sudan at least once between 1998 and 2002, and
the suspicion is he may have used the country as a warehouse for the hi-tech
engineering equipment he was selling to Libya, Iran and North Korea for the
assembly of centrifuges for enriching uranium, the most common way of
building a nuclear bomb.
Sudan has been ravaged by internal conflicts for decades, and has until
recently been governed by an Islamist regime.
Analysts point out that a "failing state" such as Sudan is an ideal
candidate for the illicit trading.
David Albright, who is investigating the various players in the Khan network
and tracks nuclear proliferation for the Washington-based Institute for
Science and International Security, said about £20m worth of dual-use
engineering equipment was imported by Sudan between 1999 and 2001.
The purchases were denominated in German marks (before the introduction of
the euro), suggesting that at least some of the equipment came from Germany.
Investigators say the machinery has not been found in Sudan. Nor has it been
found in Libya, since Tripoli gave up its secret nuclear bomb project in
December 2003. Given Osama bin Laden's long relationship with Sudan, where
he lived before moving to Afghanistan, there had been suspicions of al-Qaida
involvement. But the goods have not been found in Afghanistan either.
"A huge amount of dual-use equipment was bought by Sudan and people don't
know where it went to," Mr Albright said. "It's a big mystery. The equipment
has not been found anywhere."
A senior international investigator confirmed that Sudan had been importing
the material and that the transports had ceased in 2001.
"No one now seems to be buying to that extent," he said. "Perhaps the
activity stopped because they got all that they needed."
While the Khan operation is a main suspect, Iran is also suspected of being
behind the Sudanese dealings.
"There is the Khan network and then there is a much bigger network in this,
and that is the Iranian network," the investigator said.
Yesterday, the Guardian reported that the same European intelligence
assessment - which draws on material gathered by British, French, German and
Belgian agencies - concluded that the Iranian government had been
successfully scouring Europe for the sophisticated equipment needed to build
a nuclear bomb.
Western intelligence and Mr Albright identified a state-owned firm in
Khartoum as a "pivotal organisation" in Sudan's procurement of weapons and
dual-use technology in eastern and western Europe and Russia.
The named company has offices in Tehran, Moscow, Sofia, Istanbul and
Beijing. According to the European intelligence assessment, the company "is
cooperating intensively with Iran".
"It is striking," says the document, "that [the company's] partners are
enterprises subordinate to Iran's Defence Industries Organisation.
Technology transfer between these two states and links between their
programmes cannot be ruled out."
While the machinery was dual-use, meaning that it could be used in civil or
military applications, Mr Albright said he understood the equipment was
"nuclear-related".
"For the people following this, the interest is whether it's nuclear. The
assumption is it is."
The likelihood that the machinery was for Sudan is slim, say experts and
investigators.
"The idea that Sudan could buy and make use of extremely sophisticated
nuclear technology is obviously a question mark," said Jon Wolfsthal, a
nuclear proliferation expert at Washington's Centre for Strategic and
International Studies.
Sudan is known to have a small civilian nuclear programme, researching
nuclear medicine, radiological safety and food irradiation techniques.
Never before has it been suspected of involvement in nuclear weapons
research, however. It signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 2004.
(The Guardian )
|
|
 
|
|
|
|
Kostawi
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست