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دعواتكم لزميلنا المفكر د.الباقر العفيف بالشفاء العاجل
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 Re: أعرف أنت وأهل السودان عن السلفية الجهادية (Re: زهير عثمان حمد)
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Sudan, ISIS and radical Islam: examining a contradictory approach – Muhammed Osman
Posted on May 18, 2015 by AfricanArgumentsEditor
SudanISIS
The 9 British-Sudanese medical students now reported to be in ISIS-controlled Syria.
When Sudan’s Vice-President Hassabo Abdul Rahman declared on 22nd March 2015 the “non-existence of any signs of extremism or [related] terrorism” in his country, the irony could not have been greater. Just a day earlier a group of nine Sudanese university students, four women and five men, had traveled in secret to Turkey and then into ISIS-controlled territory in Syria.
Most of the students, who are all in their early twenties, were born and raised in the UK and returned to Sudan to attend university. They all studied at, or recently graduated from, the University of Medical Studies and Technology (UMST) in the capital Khartoum.
UMST is the country’s top private university for rich kids. Political activities there are strictly prohibited. However, Ahmad Babikir, the dean of student affairs at UMST, acknowledged that some radical Sheikhs were allowed to give speeches and lectures at the university under the auspices of the Islamic Civilization Association (ICA), an extracurricular student body.
Regardless of whether these students went to Syria to fight with ISIS or not, the fact that UMST, which is owned by a member of the ruling party, Mamoun Hummidah, who is also the Khartoum State Minister of Health, allowed only an Islamist group to operate in the campus with little oversight while banning all other political groups, is a microcosm of a wider problem underlying the rise of radical Islam in Sudan. This problem is the internal contradiction of the country’s Islamist government which, on the one hand plays a role in the spreading of this ideology, while on the other tries to contain it.
To understand these contradictions and their effects, a little contextual background is required. Sudan, being a peripheral political entity in its relations to the Islamic World, has traditionally been a haven for religious ideologies with a tolerant version of Sufism being the dominant form. Religious ideologies ranging from the revolutionary style of Al-Mahhdiya to the reform-minded ideology of Mahmoud Mohammed Taha, functioned as a vehicle of attachment to the outside world and as a basis for political action.
In recent decades Sudan has witnessed the rise of fundamentalist and radical versions of political Islam. This was influenced by the mass migration of Sudanese to Gulf Countries, especially Saudi Arabia, which promotes a literalist interpretation of Islam known as “˜Salafism’.
Another factor in this change was the rise to power in 1989 of the current Islamist government which, in its early years, introduced its ambitious “˜civilizational project’ – a social re-engineering program aimed at transforming Sudanese society to bring it into line with their puritanical Islamist vision. A distinction should, however, be made between the Islamist government and Salafist and other fundamentalist groups in terms of organizational style. While the traditional Muslim Brotherhood of Sudan has historically been top-down in structure, Salafist groups preach a grassroots, bottom-up approach.
This bottom-up method to Islamisizing society lends itself to a variety of different positions and standpoints. Most Salafist groups in Sudan do not condone violence, claiming to focus exclusively on theology while preaching obedience to the government. At the same time, some radical offshoots have been responsible for the bulk of Islamist-related violence in the country.
The advent of violence committed by radical Islamists in Sudan can be traced back to the early 1990s, in the first decade of the current government. At that time, Sudan was effectively a pariah state that harbored exiled Islamists and jihadists, including Usama Bin Laden. Following a divisive internal split in the ruling party in 1999, the government sought to break its isolation by repairing its foreign relations.
In 1993 a group of ultra-extremists led by a Yemeni man named Abdullah al-Khulaifi stormed a mosque in Omdurman and opened fire on worshippers, killing twenty five. Seven years later, in 2000, a similar incident occurred when an Islamist extremist attacked a mosque in northern Omdurman killing 27 and injuring 10 others. Both incidents were labeled as acts of Takfiris (radical Salafist groups who brand other Muslims as infidels).
In 2007, the authorities discovered that an Islamist cell was planning to launch attacks on Westerners in Sudan when a bomb they were constructing exploded by mistake at their house in Al-Salama neighborhood in southern Khartoum. On the eve of 2008, a group of extremists assassinated John Granville, a US citizen and employee of USAID, and his driver Abdul Rahman Abbas in the heart of Khartoum.
Following a firefight, in November 2012, security authorities arrested thirty members of a radical Islamist cell which had set up a camp in the Al-Dinder forest in the central state of Sennar in order to train Jihadists and send them to join the war against French forces in Mali. Twenty three of them were released in June 2014 after they “renounced” their views.
The truth is that radical Islam in Sudan has been on the rise, and there’s a link between this phenomenon and the internal contradictions of a regime struggling to preserve its Islamism-based legitimacy in the face of the widespread domestic perception of its corruption.
The prevailing complaints about government corruption have allowed radical and Salafist groups to campaign successfully using the argument that the problem is not in Islam itself but in the government’s imperfect implementation of it. In recent years, these groups managed to attract an increasingly significant following in universities. One reason for this is the fact that the government has drastically eroded political life in universities, in particular by cracking down on the activities of the secular opposition.
When it comes to dealing with radical Islam, the government has found itself in a bind. Due to its Islamist nature, the government cannot afford to be seen cracking down on the groups that represent the extreme interpretations of the same ideology it adheres to for fear of being further viewed as compromising on the principles of political Islam.
But at the same time, the government cannot risk giving radical Islamists too much space, and so it seeks to contain them. Radical actions by islamists in Sudan would negatively affect the moderate image that the regime has been trying to project to the outside world and could even allow violent splinter groups to carry out further attacks inside the country.
The government may sometimes detain a radical Sheikh or two, for example if they were to go public about their support for ISIS or are seen to be encouraging violence. However, the relationship between the government and radical Islamist groups is also symbiotic – both sides being useful to each other’s agendas.
For the government, radical Islamist groups serve as a scaremongering tool to prevent the West from contemplating regime change in Sudan, for fear that it might produce a more Islamist replacement.
For radical and fundamentalist Islamist groups, the government’s Islamist nature allows them to advance their own agendas by exploiting its weakness such as corruption and the public discontent with worsening economic conditions. One example of this is how Islamist groups and individuals lobbied inside the parliament in 2009 to have an article banning female genital cutting dropped from the draft Child Protection Act.
More recently, Islamist groups and political parties forged a coalition called the Islamic Constitution Front with the single goal of making the government adopt an “˜Islamic’ Constitution to replace the current interim one which was adopted in 2005.
The ruling party may have concluded its farcical elections in April with the expected outcome of President Bashir being re-elected and its MPs winning a large majority in the parliament, but this does not change realities on the ground – including the compromises the government has to make in dealing with radical Islam.
Muhammad Osman is a Sudanese freelance journalist and researcher based in Khartoum. He can be reached at [email protected] and @Meltilib on Twitter.
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2 thoughts on “Sudan, ISIS and radical Islam: examining a contradictory approach – Muhammed Osman”
Sarah says:
May 19, 2015 at 12:47 am
Interesting article, but one must remember that there are differing factions even within the Islamists who originally founded the gov, some of whom from the outset condemned the vicious corruption within the party. Best to not oversimplify – Mahmoud Mohamed Taha has been held up as a paragon after his death, but in life he was just as commonly seen as a madman, the same as the Mahdi – both of them on missions of “reforming Islam” that were doomed, just on different extremes. I would say Sudan would do best with a type of ‘neutral’ Islamist government, that allows for sharia to be practiced (as this is what most of the population sincerely scripturally believe in, Sufi or Salafi or Sunni or otherwise), hence taking away from the attraction of radical cells, whilst taking into account the multiculturalism (and multi-religionism) of the country (and the need for toleration and lack of persecution) instead of basically pretending to be Arab.
cordonedsudan says:
May 20, 2015 at 11:08 am
the problem with that Sarah, is that I am an atheist Sudanese. Where am I to fit in this suggested neutral Islamist nation؟
If I am regarded as an equal member of society, then why should my neighbor’s religion be put on a pedestal above my non-belief؟
And how will my rights be guaranteed؟ Will the state identify my religion on ID cards؟ How would that impact federal budget allocation؟
And what matrix of beliefs will be inferred by the governing establishment؟ My neighbor’s Islam؟ Or the other neighbor؟
And what about those practicing Sudanese who do not support a political Islam-oriented state؟ What of them؟ Are they to subscribe to arbitrary state decrees on what does and doesn’t constitute Islam؟
There is no good that can come from having reason give way to an irrational state apparatus. The data is very clear on that (our understanding of that data, not so much).
The tragedy with cursory wishes for a political Islam reboot is the willful denial that we are living in the best possible one. That is the story of Sudan.
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Re: أعرف أنت وأهل السودان عن السلفية الجهادية (Re: زهير عثمان حمد)
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Salafist Jihadist group denies deal with Sudanese security services
February 23, 2016 (KHARTOUM) - The Salafist Jihadist Jama’at al-I’tisam bil-Quran wal-Sunna group Monday denied that it has struck a deal with the Sudan National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) to release its leaders as it was claimed by some media reports.
Last August, NISS arrested six group leaders including Masa’ad al-Sidairah, Omer Abdel-Khalig, Salah al-Din Ibrahim, Mohamed Jamal al-Din, Ayman al-Misbah and al-Obied Ibrahim. The last batch of the detainees was released last January.
In a statement extended to Sudan Tribune Monday, the Salafist Jihadist group said they were pleased by the release of its leaders particularly as it came after the prosecutor general dismissed the criminal charges filed against them.
The statement pointed that the charges against the group leaders were filed under article (65) of the Criminal Code and articles (5) and (6) of the Anti-Terrorism Act.
It pointed to the merits of the prosecutor general’s decision, saying he pointed that the defendants were arrested and kept in detention for a period of nearly six months on “flimsy grounds”.
The statement added that the prosecutor general found no evidence to continue the legal procedures against the defendants and accordingly he decided to cancel the case and release them.
The Salfaist Jihadist group further criticized some media outlets which claimed that the six leaders were released after they struck a deal with the NISS.
Expert on the Jihadist groups, Al-Hadi Mohamed Al-Amin told Sudan Tribune that the decision of the prosecutor general to cancel the charges against the leaders of the Salafist Jihadist group reveals that legislation and laws don’t keep abreast of the developments associated with the activities of those groups.
He said the laws fall short of indicting those religious leaders on recruiting and sending college students and young people to Iraq, Syria and Libya to join the Islamic State (ISIS).
Al-Amin stressed the need to introduce new legislations and laws to meet the developments associated with the activities of the Salafist Jihadist groups, calling for drafting a legal and constitutional framework to accommodate the changes in the activities of those groups.
He underscored that NISS and the Salafist Jihadist groups continued to strike deals which secure the release of the latter’s leaders, pointing to the release of several Jihadists who were detained while making bombs in Al-Salama neighbourhood in Khartoum in 2010.
Al-Amin also pointed that Mubarak Mustafa who was convicted for being an accomplice in the escape operation from a prison of four prison inmates convicted of killing an American diplomat and his driver was released upon a presidential pardon.
John Granville, 33, who worked for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and his 40-year-old Sudanese driver Abdel-Rahman Abbas were hit in their car by a hail of bullets before dawn on 2008 New Year’s Day.
Sudanese authorities eventually managed to capture five men believed to be belonging to the Islamic militant group Ansar al-Tawhid, and charged them with the assassination.
Al-Amin added that no clear charges were filed against those Salafist Jihadist in most of those incidents due to the shortfall in the legislations, noting the arrest of those leaders was intended to break their will in order to force them to strike the deals to secure their release.
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Re: أعرف أنت وأهل السودان عن السلفية الجهادية (Re: زهير عثمان حمد)
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Sudan’s Islamists:
From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 March 2016
I. Overview
There is an ideological vacuum at the heart of Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party
(NCP), its leaders no longer interested in a radical or reforming Islamist project yet
offering no alternative political vision. President Omar al-Bashir’s 2015 re-election signalled
a strengthening of the political centre around its long-time leader, neutralising
opposition and forcing an empty “national dialogue” process with little prospect of significant
outcomes. The March 2016 death of Hassan al-Turabi, the Islamist “salvation”
regime’s original architect, highlighted the absence of younger, credible figures to revive
a project in terminal decline since he left government in the late 1990s. Bashir’s
strengthening of power around a small coterie of senior politicians, the military and security
services has accompanied development of a more pragmatic government focused
on regime survival. This change should encourage the West to explore ways to induce a
more constructive approach by Khartoum to settling the internal wars that block normal
relations with an increasingly active player in the turbulent Middle East.
While the president and his allies have progressively strengthened their position
within the NCP, suppressing the political and armed opposition through control over
the machinery of state, they have weakened the party’s attachment to the country’s fractured
community of Islamists – formerly its ideological centre. Many are now competing
over its legacy, including reformists eager to reverse Sudan’s decline into a corrupt
patronage-based system, conservative supporters of a populist “Islamic Arabism” and
more radical groups, including those professing support for the Islamic State (IS). The
latter are a small, vocal minority, with some traction in the large student and graduate
population but for now at least not a major domestic threat.
The decision to involve Sudan in major regional disputes, particularly those associated
with Saudi Arabia and Iran, further demonstrates a shift from pursuit of a radical,
reformist Islamist project to pragmatic use of the country’s strategic location and narrowly-defined
Sunni-Arab Islamic identity for short-term diplomatic and material gains.
The pivot to the Gulf emphasises the wide range of diplomatic partnerships now available
to the leadership in a Middle East in which political upheaval, civil war and transnational
extremism have engendered a fluid and opportunistic brand of alliance-making.
The regime feels able to leverage its equities so as to strengthen itself without needing
to seriously seek solutions to the several conflicts it is fighting in the country’s peripheral
areas. This recourse to an internationalised Arab nationalism, historically adopted
by the riverine elite but rejected by many others, however, further reduces the vestiges
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 2
of a political and ethnic pluralism already severely tested by the South’s secession and
those conflicts.
The NCP’s shift from the radical Islamism of its earliest days in power to more
pragmatic politics has not been matched by normalisation of relations with Western
countries. This is the consequence of Sudan’s failure to deal effectively with its internal
conflicts, including the war in Darfur, rather than the recent trajectory of its international
relations. Since the late 1990s, Khartoum has sought alternative partners, notably
China and India for the development of its oil industry, but now also a security
compact with the Gulf states. Its increasing integration into regional alliance-building
and latterly more constructive relations with South Sudan (and Uganda), however,
should provide a stimulus for countries such as the U.S. and UK to assess what incentives
are available (and engage with Sudan’s new allies) to more effectively influence
Khartoum to end its internal conflicts.
II. The NCP: From Secession to Re-election
Sudan’s “Al-Ingaz” (Salvation) regime came to power in 1989, led by the National Islamic
Front (NIF), as a revolutionary Islamist project seeking to transform society.1
Internationally isolated, economically paralysed and unable to defeat the long rebellion
in the South, it survived barely a decade. The fate of its radical project was finally sealed
when Turabi, its leading ideologue, left to form the Popular Congress Party (PCP) in
1999. Al-Ingaz transformed itself into the NCP, and a more pragmatic approach became
evident as it engaged with international mediation that helped end the civil war in 2005
and allowed South Sudan to secede in 2011. Nevertheless, post-secession Sudan was
economically diminished, still unable to normalise Western ties and wracked by new
(and old) conflicts in its peripheries.2
Despite this, President Bashir’s first post-secession
election buttressed his personal control and led to a new government that underlined
the marginalisation of both reformists and Islamists and further entrenched the central
role of the military and security agencies.3
A. Elections Without Opposition
The 2015 polls were torpid and a hollow victory for the NCP.4
The government’s refusal
to accede to domestic and international demands – including from the African Union
(AU) – to postpone them until a substantive national dialogue had taken place brought
1
It sought to impose Sharia (Islamic law) nationwide; turned the war in the south into a jihad against
the Christian rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA); and hosted radical Islamist
groups, including Osama bin Laden’s nascent al-Qaeda, thus demonstrating its credentials as major
Islamic force in the Arab world.
2
Crisis Group Africa Report N°198, Sudan’s Spreading Conflict: War in South Kordofan, 14 February
2013; Crisis Group Africa Report N°204, Sudan’s Spreading Conflict: War in Blue Nile, 18
June 2013.
3
Crisis Group interviewed Sudanese based in Khartoum and in the diaspora in person, via Skype
and in email correspondence, including meetings in Nairobi, Kampala, Addis Ababa, Doha, Dubai
and London, April to December 2015. The government denied requests for in-country research.
4
Opposition supporters circulated social media images of empty polling stations with sleeping
officials. Crisis Group email correspondence, Sudanese journalist, Khartoum, 27 April 2015.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 3
an almost total opposition boycott.5
A markedly low turnout even among NCP members
– estimated by the National Elections Commission (NEC) at a certainly exaggerated 46
per cent – prompted an election day extension to allow the emergency mobilisation of
regime cadres.6
The major election-related developments were inside the party: especially the preelection
nomination of candidates and the post-election government appointments.7
Bashir’s candidacy for president, though never really in doubt, was not the usual shoo-in
and at least occasioned intense intra-party debate over leadership renewal.8
Many party
members stayed away or voted for alternative candidates during its October 2014
National Convention. Bashir’s nomination was already decided by then, having been
forwarded by the more senior Leadership Council and subsequently approved by a small
majority in the NCP Shura Council.9
The National Convention was also notable for the appearance of Turabi, reportedly
to great acclaim from nostalgic NCP supporters. This was part of a broader public reconciliation
with Bashir, despite the PCP’s election boycott, which prompted speculation
that he might merge his party with the NCP following a moderately inclusive National
Dialogue process.10
B. A Party of Functionaries, not Islamists
Despite an unconvincing internal mandate, and against a backdrop of convulsions in the
Middle East and North Africa, Bashir’s control over party and state has been strengthened
since late 2013. There was a leadership renewal at that time in response to
5
Reportedly some senior NCP members were open to a postponement, but Bashir was adamant
that he obtain a clear mandate to continue as president. Crisis Group email correspondence, senior
dissident NCP members, Khartoum, May 2015.
6
The AU estimated turnout was 30-35 per cent, while Yasir Arman, chair of the armed opposition
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), claimed it was no more than 15 per cent.
“African Union confirms low turnout in Sudan elections”, Sudan Tribune, 16 April 2015; “‘Sudan’s
low voter turnout means a vote for change’: rebel leader”, Radio Dabanga, 20 April 2015. Photos
were circulated of long queues of police and soldiers (some in uniform) waiting to vote. Crisis Group
email correspondence, Sudanese journalist, Khartoum, 20 June 2015. The NEC reported Bashir
received 94.05 per cent of the vote, and the NCP won 323 of 426 National Assembly seats. The NCP
did not contest 30 per cent of seats, which were mostly won by the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) and some independent candidates. “Omer al-Bashir declared winner of Sudan’s elections”,
Sudan Now, 27 April 2015.
7
Crisis Group interview, senior European diplomat, Addis Ababa, 25 August 2015.
8
Even the president hinted that the people needed “fresh blood and a new impetus to continue
their march”, as autocratic regimes fell to popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa.
“Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s president, intends to step down In 2015”, The World Post, 20 March 2013.
9
The Leadership Council – approximately 100 individuals including the president and his executive
office, federal ministers, state representatives and nominated NCP members – holds real power
in the party. It nominates a list for the Shura Council – a 600-strong body elected from within NCP
membership – to consider for the leadership (in this case Ali Osman Taha, Nafie Ali Nafie, Hasan
Bakri Saleh, Ibrahim Ghandour and President Bashir). The NCP’s 6,000-member National Convention
is then expected to approve this decision. Only 396 of a possible 522 members attended, prompting
speculation that many were asked to stay away, as they were not expected to vote for Bashir. Crisis
Group interview, Sudan analyst, Nairobi, 9 July 2015.
10 Crisis Group interview, leading Islamist intellectual, London, 13 October 2015. Turabi also appeared
keen to secure his own political legacy, much tarnished by the descent of his original Islamist project
into civil war, economic malaise and international isolation. Crisis Group interview, Sudanese
intellectual, Kampala, 11 February 2016.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 4
September-October urban riots in Khartoum and other cities and internal party disquiet.11
The president’s longer-term civilian lieutenants, Nafie Ali Nafie and Ali Osman
Taha, often touted as possible successors, were replaced in a process now cited internally
as showing the possibilities of advancement for younger NCP cadres.12 A
loyal military aide, Bakri Hassan Saleh, was appointed vice president, which ostensibly
centralised power around Bashir and offered him protection against a trial at the
International Criminal Court (ICC), should he choose to leave power.13
Yet, Bashir’s consolidation of his own position did not mean autocratic decisionmaking;
intense intra-party negotiations over post-election appointments to the new
government were drawn out over two months and required three high-level Leadership
Council meetings.14 The most contested appointment, for NCP deputy president
and presidential assistant, finally went to the former Kassala state governor and interior
minister, Ibrahim Mahmoud, although party members preferred the former
oil minister, Awad al-Jaz.15 To get his candidate, Bashir was reportedly forced to jettison
one of his closest allies, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, long-time defence
minister (moved to the profitable Khartoum state governor sinecure).16
Other significant appointments placating internal and external constituencies
were Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour, a loyal and competent official also popular
among (especially Western) diplomats and in their capitals;17 and National
Assembly Speaker Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, in an apparent concession to the party’s
remaining Islamist constituency.18
Lower-level appointments were aimed at maintaining a bloated and expensive,
though not intrinsically inefficient, government patronage network, via creation of many
11 The period following South Sudan’s separation also saw regional turmoil; the president sprinkled
campaign speeches with the rhetorical question: “Do you want [Sudan] to be like Yemen؟” (often
substituted with Somalia, Libya or Iraq) – a question also implicitly addressed to the international
community. “President Bashir’s elections: victory by default”, StillSudan (http://stillsudan.bloghttp://stillsudan.blog
spot.co.uk), 16 April, 2015. 12 Both departed in a leadership reshuffle after the September 2013 Khartoum riots. Nafie and Taha
competed with Bashir for the NCP presidential candidacy in 2014 and won significant dissident
support, outpolling Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour.
Crisis Group interviews, Sudanese political observers, Nairobi, 14-15 July 2015.
13 Bakri’s appointment as vice president raised expectations Bashir might retire, but his performance
– largely judged by his ability to manage the complex personal and patrimonial relationships central
to government under the NCP system – is said to have fallen well short of expectations, and any
tentative transition plan was scrapped. Crisis Group interviews, Sudanese political observers, London,
25 November 2015. The president’s indictment by the ICC in March 2009 for alleged crimes against
humanity, war crimes and genocide in Darfur left him vulnerable to a trial in The Hague, if his successor
were to decide to cooperate with the court.
14 Crisis Group email correspondence, NCP dissident member, Khartoum, 16 June 2015.
15 He is a popular NCP member who played a key role in the 1990s-early 2000s oil boom.
16 Crisis Group email correspondence, Sudanese political analyst, 24 June 2015. Abdelrahim’s administration
of Khartoum state has been unimpressive. Crisis Group interview, former senior NCP
politician, London, 17 November 2015.
17 Ghandour represents “newer and better thinking … than the older generation of leaders”, but his
move to foreign minister “while welcome in our day-to-day relations, virtually removes him from a
central role on internal developments”. Crisis Group email correspondence, former senior Western
diplomat, Washington, 15 October 2015.
18 Former Vice President Ali Osman Taha reportedly declined the speaker position. Crisis Group email
correspondence, Sudanese political observer, Khartoum, 24 June 2015.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 5
more state ministers (subordinate to ministers).19 Just before the 2 June 2015 presidential
inauguration, Bashir also reshuffled senior and middle-ranking army posts, which
favoured Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) officers considered loyal, as well as those well
connected to the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).20 The internal party
and regime manoeuvres before and after the election revealed the growing influence
within the presidency of regime and party functionaries and security personnel, though
with an increasingly moribund internal NCP base and an absence of major Islamist representation
at the highest level of the party. After a tumultuous period that included
secession, renewed rebellion and regional upheaval, Bashir’s immediate political future
seems secure.
III. The Fractured Islamist Landscape
The NCP has over the years purged itself of major Islamist figures and ideological baggage.
This began with the splitting of the National Islamist Front (NIF) in 1999,
when Turabi departed, which allowed Bashir to establish a more politically flexible
administration, particularly for foreign relations.21 Since then, the more principled
Islamist figures have left to enter an ineffectual opposition with little prospect of
electoral success, while other activists (often outside formal politics) have seized control
of the vestiges of the Islamist political narrative. Small populist opposition parties
and religious groups, unchecked by broad-based movements, have produced more
extremist offshoots.
19 There are 74 ministers and state ministers, eighteen governors and seven presidential advisers,
assistants and vice presidents. “All the president’s men: on al-Bashir’s new presidency”, Sudan Democracy
First Group, 17 July 2015. Upward mobility is possible for loyal cadres, and the elevation of
a younger generation is used as evidence for the NCP’s internal dynamism, particularly in the context
of the dismissal of former leaders, such as Nafie Ali Nafie and Ali Osman Taha. 20 The defence minister position remained officially vacant until the August 2015 appointment of
Lieutenant General Awad Mohamed Ahmed bin Awaf (former military intelligence head). A further
reshuffle in February 2016 replaced Chief of Staff Mustafa Obaid with respected professional soldier
Emad Al-Din Mustafa Adawi and also elevated commanders with field experience in readiness
for “dry season” campaigns in the Two Areas – South Kordofan and Blue Nile States, where the
government is fighting an insurgency against the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North
(SPLM-N), which fought with the SPLM, now the government of South Sudan, during the second
civil war (1983-2005). Crisis Group email exchanges, Khartoum-based Western diplomat; Sudanese
journalist, 10 February 2016. Competition between the SAF and NISS is generally overstated.
The responsibility given to the NISS following formation of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces
(RSF) in 2013, which was converted into a regular element under NISS command in 2014 and used
to fight rebels in Darfur and the Two Areas, has not detracted from the SAF’s overwhelming military
power. Crisis Group Skype interview, Western diplomat, Khartoum, 26 October 2015; email
correspondence, Sudanese political analyst, 26 February 2016.
21 See Crisis Group Africa Report N°174, Divisions in Sudan’s Ruling Party and the Threat to the
Country’s Stability, 4 May 2011, pp. 11-12.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 6
A. Reformists and Wanderers
Reformist Islamist groups in and outside the NCP and Sudan Islamic Movement (SIM)
are weak.22 Even their association with significant figures – notably Dr Ghazi Salah alDin
al-Atabani and General Mohamed “Wad” Ibrahim Abd al-Jalil (popular among
Islamist SAF officers) – has not resulted in a major new political force.23
Throughout 2012-2013, Dr Ghazi, supported by ex-Popular Defence Force (PDF)
and SAF members known as Al-Saihoun (The Wanderers), tried but failed to exert
reformist pressure on the NCP.24 They first circulated the “Memorandum of the One
Thousand”, calling for unification of Islamic groups, political and party reform and an
end to widespread corruption, patronage and nepotism within state institutions. Despite
gaining popular interest in a country unused to such public disagreement within
the ruling party, it was roundly ignored by the leadership.25 A November 2012 attempt
to win back SIM leadership from the ruling party was also blocked.26
In September 2013, partly due to the draconian government reaction to the antiausterity
riots prompted by the removal of the fuel subsidy, Dr Ghazi and a group of
former NCP luminaries were pushed to resign from the party. They then founded the
Reform Now Movement (RNM). Both it and Al-Saihoun are popular in the opposition
(RNM has a formal party structure), but they remain unable to exert effective pressure
for reform on the NCP from the outside and boycotted the 2015 elections.27
B. Conservatives and Salafis
A more conservative grouping exists but has weak formal representation. It was briefly
organised within the short-lived Islamic Constitutional Front (ICF), which combined
Salafis (theological reformists within Sunni Islam, often known by their Saudi Arabian
variant Wahhabi and preaching against perceived innovations from the early years
of Islam), the vestiges of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood (a NIF precursor) and
conservative Arab nationalists (generally former NCP members). Founded in 2012,
22 The SIM is a coalition of groups and individuals seen as influential in defining the NCP’s ideological
direction, but without a formal political role. Its leadership under ex-Secretary General Ali Osman
Taha and now al-Zubair Mohamed al-Hassan has been considered pro-government.
23 Dr Ghazi is a former NCP secretary general, state minister for foreign affairs and presidential adviser.
“Wad” Ibrahim allegedly was involved with some NISS officers, including the former chief, Salah
Gosh, in a November 2012 attempted coup. They were arrested but released. The alleged plotters’
motives are unclear, though they may have been based as much on professional dissatisfaction with
military leadership (particularly the performance of Defence Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein)
as ideological disillusionment. Crisis Group interview, Sudan analyst, Nairobi, 8 July 2015.
24 The PDF is a paramilitary “volunteer” force initially recruited by the NIF in the late 1980s to fight
a jihad against rebels in the Christian South. Al-Saihoun is associated with younger disaffected
NCP members but is mostly “virtual”, via social media, and without a clear structure. Some nonIslamists
also identify as Al-Saihoun because of its “progressive” politics. Crisis Group interviews,
Al-Saihoun members and sympathisers, London and Doha, November-December 2015.
25 The president dismissed the demands as “premature”. “Sudan’s Bashir politely brushed aside reform
demands: source”, Sudan Tribune, 17 January 2012. For a more detailed discussion, see Crisis Group
Africa Report N°194, Sudan: Major Reform or More War, 29 November 2012, pp. 9-12.
26 The NCP has sought to maintain government control over the SIM by appointing senior party
members as its leaders.
27 The Ghazi group also released a memorandum to the president describing the suppression of protestors
as “a betrayal” of the NCP’s Islamic foundations, and urged a government response to its economic
grievances. Dr Ghazi’s critics accuse him of staying too long in the NCP. Crisis Group interviews,
Sudan civil society and opposition, Doha, December 2015.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 7
the ICF campaigned ineffectively to have the “transitional” constitution, in force
since the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the civil war, replaced
by a Sharia (Islamic law) version – something Bashir vaguely promised prior to
South Sudan’s secession. Some ICF members warned the president that he would be
“overthrown” or “replaced” if he did not fulfil these demands.28
Al-Tayyib Mustafa’s Just Peace Forum (JPF) is a high-profile player in the conservative
grouping, largely due to his former ownership of the populist private newspaper
Al-Intibaha.
29 A former NCP member and Bashir’s maternal uncle, Al-Tayyib enjoys
some general popularity, as does JPF. Most support comes from a politically and religiously
conservative constituency that previously focused on facilitating the secession
of mostly Christian South Sudan (contrary to the stated position of the NCP, which was
to “make unity attractive”) and now champions a Sunni-Arab identity for Sudan’s
many peoples.30 He claims that JPF represents a “silent majority” that is focused on the
ever-present external threat from South Sudan and the SPLM-N.31
While the ICF was partly identified with Salafism, most Sudanese Salafis are quietist,
apolitical and prefer accommodation with the government, the better to pursue
dawa (mission), often with large, mainly youthful audiences, particularly in the big
university sector.32 Ansar al-Sunna, the largest and longest-established Salafi grouping,
is broadly apolitical and non-confrontational with the Sufi Islamic traditions usually
dominant in the country. However, some members have been accused of attacking
Sufi shrines and the annual celebrations of the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday, acts
the formal leadership does not condone.33 A notable political offshoot from Ansar alSunna
is the Al-Wasat (Centrist) Islamic Party, which has taken an anti-government
position in the past.34
C. The Extremist Fringe
In the 1990s, Sudan hosted major radical figures, including Osama bin Laden, who
lived in and operated businesses from Khartoum from 1991 until his expulsion in 1996.
Several well-known radical Islamist groups received support from Khartoum, including
the Egyptian Al-Gama’a-Islamia, which attempted to assassinate President Hosni
28 “Sudan Islamists warn Bashir over Shariah constitution”, Sudan Tribune, 28 February 2012.
29 Al-Tayyib no longer controls Al-Intibaha, which was taken over by an NCP loyalist in 2013. Al-Tayyib
founded a new paper, al-Sayha.
30 A key tenet of the 2005 CPA that ended the civil war was that both the North and South should seek
to “make unity attractive”.
31 Al-Tayyib’s antipathy is in part personal – his son was killed fighting the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA) during the civil war in then southern Sudan. In a recent move, Al-Tayyib and Ghazi,
plus a grouping of individuals mostly with origins in the NCP and Islamic Movement, formed Future
Forces for Change, a political grouping united largely by the fact that all dropped out of the National
Dialogue process. Crisis Group email correspondence, Sudanese political analyst, 26 February 2016.
32 Einas Ahmed, “Militant Salafism in Sudan”, Islamic Africa, vol. 6, no. 1-2 (2015), p. 171.
33 Crisis Group Skype interview, Sudanese academic expert on radicalisation, 13 October 2015. Many
Salafis disapprove of shrine worship and Mawlid (the celebration of the Prophet Mohammed’s
birthday) as idolatry and opposed to their purist interpretation of Islam. This includes the wish to return
to conservative values of the early days of the religion and the rejection of theological innovations.
34 Its leader, Dr Yusuf al-Kudah – a popular presenter of Islamic television programs – signed the
“New Dawn Charter” of opposition political parties and armed rebel groups in Kampala in January 2013.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 8
Mubarak during a visit to Ethiopia in 1995; Sudan’s alleged complicity in the attempt
resulted in U.S. sanctions the next year.35
It is unclear, and the subject of academic debate, whether the NIF’s early association
with groups that went on to undertake extremist actions outside Sudan was part of a
deliberate policy, or inadvertently resulted from cultivation of external Islamist groups
(including “diaspora” Sudanese), with the intention of underpinning the uncertain
domestic Islamist constituency.36 However, it is apparent that the greater part of the
NIF’s religious energy went into pursuing the internal Islamic transformation of Sudanese
society, and the jihad against the SPLA in the South. Radical elements – including
Sudanese who gained Islamic education and activism abroad – returned to Sudan in
the 1990s with the intention of working with the new regime. However, the post-Turabi
leadership’s desire to re-engage with Western powers, moving away from the deliberate
cultivation of foreign radical groups, coupled with the generally pacific nature of Islam
in the country, goes some way to explaining the sporadic and apparently contradictory
examples of extremist-inspired violence domestically.
The radical Islamist Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra group was blamed for two attacks in 1994
and 2000 on the Al-Jaraffa Mosque in Omdurman favoured by the reformist and
Salafi-inclined Ansar al-Sunnah.37 In 2008, a U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) employee, John Granville, and his Sudanese driver were shot dead
outside the U.S. embassy. The four perpetrators, who claimed to be members of Ansar
al-Tawhid (a local militant Islamic group) were captured and imprisoned but escaped
in 2010; only one was recaptured; another was reported to have died in Somalia
fighting with Al-Shabaab in December 2015.38 In December 2012, the government
announced it had destroyed a camp of some 30 “extremists” in the Al-Dindir national
park in Sennar state (near the Ethiopian border).39
The International University of Africa (IUA) in Khartoum, established with Gulfstate
funding in 1970 to educate students on the theory and practices of Salafi Islam,
is often blamed for propagation of extremist views.40 In 2014, the Nigerian Boko Haram
bomber Aminu Sadig Ogwuche was arrested while studying Arabic at IUA and
35 NIF facilitation of export of regional and global Islamic jihad became a major Western policy preoccupation,
reaching its high-point in 1998 with the U.S. bombing of the Al-Shifa factory in Khartoum
(falsely believed to be producing chemical weapons), as a response to al-Qaeda’s East Africa embassy
bombings. Concerns declined following the 11 September 2001 attacks and Sudan’s renewed willingness
to cooperate with the U.S. on intelligence sharing. Crisis Group email correspondence, retired
Western diplomat, Washington, 15 October 2015.
36 Roland Marchal, “Epilogue: A New Sudan؟”, in Barbara Casciarri, Munzoul A.M. Assal and Francois
Ireton (eds.), Multidimensional Change in Sudan (1989-2011): Reshaping Livelihoods, Conflict
and Identities (New York, 2015), p. 324.
37 Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra was a loosely affiliated takfiri – broadly those who denounce other Muslims as
unbelievers – extremist group with a small cell operating from Sudan. A group of its fighters twice
attempted to kill Osama bin Laden in Khartoum and Omdurman in early 1994. In 1995, the Sudanese
government executed the group’s founder, a Libyan national, who had fought in the “Afghan jihad”.
38 Granville’s killers produced a video showing how they escaped, suggesting some level of official
complicity, since the government feared a violent reaction if it carried out their death sentences.
Crisis Group interview, Sudanese academic expert on the case, Doha, 2 December 2015. See also,
“Sudanese jihadist media front releases video detailing prison escape of convicted militants”, The
Long War Journal, 30 December 2012.
39 “Captured Islamist extremists planned assassination of officials – Sudan’s security chief says”,
Sudan Tribune, 4 December 2012.
40 Its curriculum has since become substantially diversified. “When worlds collide: Sudan’s Islamist
divisions”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 15 September 2014, p. 5.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 9
extradited to Nigeria for trial.41 IUA is one of several state-run or private institutions
which have been linked to the operations of radical Islamic groups. For example, an alQaeda
offshoot announced in 2013 that it had set up a “student wing” at the University
of Khartoum.42 In January 2016, NISS briefly detained five individuals after
they distributed a questionnaire in Khartoum universities asking students whether
they support a unified Umma (Islamic community) and Islamic caliphate.43
During 2015, students from the University of Medical Studies and Technology
(UMST) – including some with dual British-Sudanese nationality – left to fight or work
with the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq.44 The interior minister estimates that
70 Sudanese have left to join IS, and there were sporadic reports of Sudanese deaths in
Syria, Iraq and Libya during 2015.45 Recruits have often been from wealthy families,
well educated and comfortable interacting with globalised social media networks.46
Sudan is also reportedly a transit hub for IS recruits bound for Libya, or for Turkey
from where many go on to Syria.47
A handful of clerics have professed public support for IS, most notably Mohammed
al-Gizouli and Musa’ad al-Sidira (both Khartoum-based).48 The former is the leader of
the One Nation Group, a non-violent radical Salafi organisation active in Khartoum
since the early 2000s which has some popularity, particularly among disaffected students.
It gained increased attention when Gizouli publicly came out for IS in June 2014
and was arrested and held by the NISS for eight months.49
Arguably, the NCP’s retreat from Turabi’s Islamist vision created space for dissident
religious voices to develop outside the mainstream and weakened Islamist political
formations (NCP and SIM). Trying not to make martyrs of individuals with
populist appeal, the government has shown restraint in managing such groups and
41 “British-born man arrested in Sudan after bomb blasts killed 105 in Nigeria”, The Guardian,
17 May 2014.
42 “Al-Qaeda announces formation of its student wing in top Sudan university”, Sudan Tribune,
10 January 2013.
43 Crisis Group email correspondence, Sudanese journalist with knowledge of radical activity,
26 January 2016.
44 UMST is a medical school owned by Mamoun Hummidah, a prominent NCP member and
Khartoum state health minister. The dean of student affairs acknowledged that while political activities
are prohibited, groups supporting IS’s aims may have had access to students under the aegis of
the Islamic Civilization Association, which operated freely. Mohammed Osman, “Sudan, ISIS and
radical Islam: examining a contradictory approach”, African Arguments, 18 May 2015.
45 “70 Sudanese have joined ISIS in total: minister”, Al Arabiya, 13 October 2015. The official numbers
are relatively low compared to other countries. “Sudanese jihadist killed in a suicide attack in Iraq”,
Sudan Tribune, 11 December 2015; “Student from group of British-Sudanese Isis recruits killed in
Syria”, The Guardian, 22 July 2015.
46 Messages posted online by Sudanese in Syria (notably Mohammed Fakhri, a British-Sudanese
medical student) indicate acute political frustration with both the Western countries in which they
were brought up and the corrupted Islamic Sudanese society to which they relocated. Mohammed
Fakhri, “A message to the hesitant one from hijrah and jihad – Part 2”, JustPaste.it, 26 October 2015,
http://justpaste.it/okmehttp://justpaste.it/okme.
47 Indian national Mohammad Nasir (who had been living in Dubai) was deported in December 2015
after travelling to Khartoum to reportedly meet with an IS recruiter based in the country. An unsubstantiated
claim is that he received “combat training” in Sudan. “Indian youth told parents of his
intention to join IS”, The Hindu, 13 December 2015.
48 “Sudanese cleric calls for attacks on U.S. embassies, planes, restaurants in support of ISIS”, video,
YouTube, 19 June 2014, http://bit.ly/1nCEySahttp://bit.ly/1nCEySa.
49 Released in June 2015, Gizouli reaffirmed his support for IS. “Sudanese security re-arrests ISIS
sympathizer”, Sudan Tribune, 30 June 2015.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 10
has sought to engage them in debate through pro-government clerics.50 This careful
approach is also manifest in NCP willingness to tolerate radical Islamist groups
within limited, non-violent, parameters – with some suggestions of official support
when deemed politically advantageous.51 It has, however, raised fears from some
commentators that this is “a dangerous game”, in which a marginal constituency has
been permitted a foothold and could have the capacity to expand in a more febrile
political environment.52 But Sudan’s own radical constituency, as detailed, has rarely
engaged in domestic terrorism, and association with IS so far has been reserved to
rhetorical support and departure of small numbers of individuals to fight outside the
country.
IV. The NCP’s New “Sunni-Arabism” and Its Implications
The NCP’s drift away from a transformational domestic Islamist project that was partly
inspired by the 1979 Iranian Revolution toward a less ideologically-rooted form of
government enabled Sudan’s rehabilitation with the more conservative Gulf monarchies,
especially Saudi Arabia.53 It consequently has found itself well placed to exploit
the recent intensification of Saudi-Iranian (with elements of Sunni-Shia) antagonism
in the Middle East. The result has been a new Gulf security partnership with Saudi
Arabia that brings financial and diplomatic rewards for Khartoum.
A. Pivot to the Gulf
The NIF’s decisions not to denounce Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and to host
radical foreign Islamists during the decade brought a close relationship with Iran but
otherwise isolation.54 The Iranian links and Islamist sympathies, particularly with
the Muslim Brotherhood, were viewed with deep suspicion in Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and Libya.55 As recently as 2014, Saudi Arabia imposed financial restrictions on Sudan’s
50 Crisis Group interview, Dr Ghazi Salah al-Din al-Atabani, London, 17 November 2015.
51 An example of this was the mostly passive behaviour of security forces when thousands of people
marched on the U.S., British, and German embassies in Khartoum on 14 September 2012 to protest
a video denigrating the Prophet Mohammed. The U.S. and German embassies were stormed and
vandalised after police either retreated or stood by idly. The government had called for the protests
but said they should be peaceful.
52 Crisis Group interview, senior Sudanese civil society activist, Kampala, 10 September 2015.
53 Turabi himself, who initially shunned a formal political position and conducted business from his
house in Khartoum, implicitly impersonated the role of the Iranian Supreme Leader at the time of the
revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini.
54 Iran was particularly significant as a supplier of arms needed to fight the war in the South. Sudan
is also accused of being a conduit for arms transfers to the radical Palestinian group Hamas. This
relationship has provoked occasional military responses from Israel, notably in October 2012,
when its planes were accused of bombing the Yarmouk weapons factory in Port Sudan, associated
with Sudan’s domestic arms industry. “Sudan blames Israel for Khartoum arms factory blast”, BBC,
24 October 2012.
55 After the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi was deposed as his country’s
president in July 2013, many members sought refuge in Khartoum or travelled through Sudan en
route to a more permanent sanctuary in Qatar. The Qadhafi regime in Libya had a long history of
attempts to destabilise Sudan, including support for Darfuri rebels, most notably the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM).
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 11
banking sector, threatened to deport thousands of migrant workers and prevented a
Tehran-bound plane carrying President Bashir from transiting its airspace, as Khartoum
continued to pursue a close alliance with Tehran.56
However, changing dynamics in the Gulf region, especially Saudi-Iranian antagonism,
saw Sudan deliberately pivot from Tehran, when it became clear a closer
relationship with Riyadh would bring more diplomatic and financial advantages. In
2012, Sudan reportedly rejected Iranian requests to build a naval base at Port Sudan
(although Iranian ships regularly docked there until 2014), and in September 2014,
the government closed Iranian cultural centres, which it stated were spreading
Shiism.57
In October 2015, Sudan committed troops to the Saudi-led coalition fighting the
Huthi rebels (loosely backed by Iran) in Yemen, a major signal that the diplomatic
shift to the Gulf went beyond rhetoric to include strategic realignment.58 In December,
Khartoum joined the Saudi-led “Islamic Group”, meant to demonstrate how Riyadh
and other Sunni Arab powers were fighting Islamic extremism in the region (notably
the campaign against IS in Syria and Iraq).59 In January 2016, Sudan was one of the
first countries to break diplomatic relations with Iran, in solidarity with Riyadh after
its embassy in Tehran was attacked following the Saudi execution of the Shia cleric
Nimr al-Nimr.60
B. Reasserting Sunni-Arab Identity at Home and Abroad
Sudan’s growing assertion of its Sunni-Arab identity is likely to reap a variety of material
benefits domestically as well as regionally. Most immediately, the expected cash
payments and investments, particularly in agricultural, irrigation and hydroelectric
schemes, by Gulf partners will be a welcome stimulus to an economy chronically
short of foreign exchange due to Western banking restrictions (as well as the NCP’s
inclination for government through patronage).61 Saudi investment in the SAF, with
funds reportedly diverted from a previous alliance with Lebanon, is likely to further
strengthen the position of military’s position in the country.62
Sudan’s Yemen involvement has made it a player in a conflict in which the U.S. has
significant interests, including major counterterrorism priorities targeting al- Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This contributes to a wider foreign policy narrative,
assiduously pursued for over a decade (primarily through post-9/11 intelligence sharing),
that it is a partner in combatting, not creating, Islamic extremism, despite the
accusations of detractors.63
56 “300,000 Sudanese expat workers could face deportation from Saudi Arabia: report”, Sudan
Tribune, 5 November 2015; “Saudi Arabia bars Sudan’s Bashir from entering airspace”, Reuters,
4 August 2013.
57 “Sudan closes Iranian cultural centres and expels diplomats: source”, Reuters, 2 September 2014.
58 “Sudan sends ground troops to Yemen to boost Saudi-led coalition”, Al Arabiya, 18 October 2015.
59 “Joint statement on formation of Islamic military alliance to fight terrorism”, Saudi Press Agency,
14 December 2015.
60 “Iranian protesters ransack Saudi embassy after execution of Shiite cleric”, BBC News,2 January 2015.
61 “Saudi Arabia to provide 1.7 billion dollars for Sudan’s dam projects”, Sudan Tribune, 5 November
2015. Alex de Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of
Power (Hoboken, 2015), pp. 69-73.
62 “Saudi Diverts Military Aid from Lebanon to Sudan”, The New Arab, 23 February 2016.
63 Crisis Group interviews, high-level European diplomat, 26 November 2015; high-level African
diplomat, New York, 24 September 2015.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 12
At the least, the progressive sidelining of the NCP’s own Islamists over the past
decade allowed the leadership to pursue a more flexible foreign policy. In Libya, as
more capable regional powers competed for influence in the post- Qadhafi political
disarray, Sudan was alleged to have facilitated arms supplies to the Qatari-backed
Islamist “Dawn” coalition, only subsequently offering vocal support to the anti-IS
operations there of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).64 The NCP’s admittedly
mild opposition to politically and socially radical Islamism – from the Muslim
Brotherhood to the puritanical Salafism – nevertheless puts the government at odds
with a number of former Islamist fellow travellers.65 Young, often middle class, Sudanese
who sympathise with IS will find the increasingly pragmatic foreign policy
difficult to swallow.
Tapping into the long-held pretensions of a self-proclaimed Arab identity, focused
on a small ruling class with its origins in the twin cities of Khartoum and Omdurman,
the NCP has often sought to reinforce its conservative support by stoking antiSouthern
(and Christian) xenophobia, historically focused on the government in Juba.
This was notable after the SPLA’s invasion of the disputed Heglig oil region in April
2012, but in the context of a more recent rapprochement with Juba, engendered by the
strategic necessities of the civil war in South Sudan, this became increasingly focused
on the ongoing war with the SPLM-N.66
The NCP’s willingness to leverage Arab identity, playing to the domestic chauvinism
of the country’s ruling elite, strikes further at the roots of Sudanese pluralism. During
the first decade of Islamist rule, this was eroded by the regime’s explicit intention to
focus investment in a small, central area known as the Hamdi Triangle.67 Following
South Sudan’s secession, the northern rump of the SPLA, the SPLM-N in South Kordofan
and Blue Nile states, sought common cause with the Darfuri rebel groups.
They formed the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), which conceives of the new insurgency
as a product of the “New South”, that is, Sudan’s new peripheries fighting the
centralised dictatorship of the Arab elites.68 The NCP’s current recourse to an internationalised
Arabism gives credence to this framing of Sudanese politics, allowing little
space for an inclusive negotiated settlement with the armed opposition.
64 “Is Libya a proxy war؟”, Monkey Cage Blog (washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage), 24 October
2014; Crisis Group email correspondence, Libya analysts, 6 November 2015.
65 In May 2015, Sudanese Islamists, including Al-Tayyib Mustafa, demonstrated in Khartoum
against the death sentence handed to Mohamed Morsi, the former Egyptian president and leader of
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. “Sudanese Islamists protest against Morsi’s death sentence”,
Sudan Tribune, 22 May 2015.
66 See Crisis Group Africa Reports N°228, South Sudan: Keeping Faith with The IGAD Peace Process,
27 July 2015, pp. 10-11; and Sudan: Major Reform or More War, op. cit., p. 14.
67 Named after then Minister of Finance Abdel Rahim Hamdi and said to be within a day’s journey
by car from the capital.
68 See “Yasir Arman and the war in Sudan’s new south: ‘We cannot sit idly and wait for Khartoum
to kill us’”, Daily Maverick, 30 October 2012. This also borrows from the rhetoric of former
SPLM/A leader John Garang, who saw the ultimate objective of the South’s insurgency as being to
win power in Khartoum, rather than simply independence for South Sudan.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 13
V. Conclusion: New Circumstances and Opportunities
The NCP’s retreat from the deeply-held Islamist project of its predecessor, the NIF, is
not new. However, developments in Sudan’s northern Arab neighbourhood coinciding
with the partial resolution of its own existential crisis (the South’s secession) left the
regime exposed domestically and internationally, along with a serious economic crisis.
The party shifted all its resources into survival mode, making tactical decisions that
nevertheless seemed in line with a deeper shift from the former Islamist orientation.
The short-term success of its timely ideological and diplomatic shifts, just before
divisions in North Africa and the Middle East became deeper and more deadly, is
clear. Initial rhetorical support has become more meaningful, including the military
deployment in Yemen. For a government that has committed to support a SunniArab
intervention in a sectarian war while reasserting its own brand of nationalism
at the centre, the remnants of its grand Islamist project look increasingly peripheral.
The dynamics discussed in this briefing, including the well-established decline of a
radical Islamist project at the heart of the NCP, point to major shifts in Sudan’s relations
within the Middle East and with its immediate east African neighbours.69 This
should also change the context in which many other international actors, including
the U.S. and UK, relate to Khartoum.70 The progressive inclusion of Sudan in Gulf
states’ political alliances and more constructive behaviour in relations with Juba and
Kampala, coupled with the apparent durability of President Bashir and the NCP,
should engender a more pragmatic approach from Western countries. This should be
developed with the understanding that major diplomatic shifts in the region can have a
significant impact on the capacity of both government and rebel groups to wage open
conflict. Policy toward Sudan should become more forward-looking in line with the
changing strategic realities in the region.
Western countries seeking to engage more effectively with Khartoum should,
however, be mindful of the continuing inability of the government to deal effectively
with its internal conflicts (particularly in Darfur and the Two Areas), despite concerted
mediation efforts led by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP).
Sudan’s behaviour in the international sphere, in line with the historical evolution
of the Islamist regime, has improved significantly, but domestic policy failures still
demand attention from concerned international actors. Diplomatic shifts in the region
should be viewed as opportunities to incentivise conflict resolution and peacemaking
in Sudan, not as justification merely to normalise relations.
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 March 2016
69 Notably, this includes South Sudan and Uganda, whose improving relations with Sudan, in the
context of the former’s civil war, will be covered in an upcoming Crisis Group Briefing.
70 The U.S. applies economic sanctions on Sudan and retains it on a list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 14
Appendix A: Map of Sudan
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016 Page 15
Appendix B: Glossary
AU African Union
AUHIP African Union High-Level Implementation Panel
AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DUP Democratic Unionist Party
ICC International Criminal Court
IUA International University of Africa
ICF Islamic Constitutional Front
IS Islamic State
JEM Justice and Equality Movement
JPF Just Peace Forum
NCP National Congress Party
NEC National Elections Commission
NIF National Islamic Front
NISS National Intelligence and Security Service
PCP Popular Congress Party
PDF Popular Defence Force
RNM Reform Now Movement
RSF Rapid Support Forces
SAF Sudanese Armed Forces
SIM Sudan Islamic Movement
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-N Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North
SRF Sudan Revolutionary Front
UAE United Arab Emirates
UMST University of Medical Studies and Technology
USAID United States Agency for International Developmen
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Re: أعرف أنت وأهل السودان عن السلفية الجهادية (Re: زهير عثمان حمد)
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What are ISIS' plans at the moment؟ What territories is it on now, what territory does it plan to takeover next؟
1 Answer
Mustafe Abdullahi
ISIS's goal is to take over the world but it focus on the 54 Muslim Majority countries especially the ones that are in the Arab world.
ISIS is most likely trying to get groups like Al Qaeda, Taliban and their allies to pledge allegiance so they can be a united Salafi jihadist front. Given the Taliban frictions with their new leader, ISIS's poaching of Al Qaeda affiliates like Boko Haram, plus the fact their collective Tarfiki ideologies being extremely similar and they have sympathizers in their collective ranks it will eventually merge but the manner which they will do is anyone's guess but I guess these five countries.
Somalia- ISIS has been courting Al Shabaab for over a year now. Al Shabaab is a extremely powerful terrorist group so powerful in fact they maintain control 20% of Somalia even with 22,000 strong African Union forces (Almost 50,000 if you include the Somali army). They have presence in Kenya and to lesser extent Ethiopia. Al Shabaab isn't like most Al qaeda Affiliates it governs terrority it had been doing so for more than five years before ISIS came into existence and it's ties Al Qaeda is shaky. Al Qaeda's brass has been very critical of Al Shabaab leadership ( However they maintain close relations with AQAP). And with African Union forces slated to leave in 2016 only time will tell whether Al Shabaab switched sides.
Palestine- Reportedly Jaysh Al Islam the most powerful Salafi jihadist group in Palestine pledge alligence to ISIS. We can obviously see Israel as a big reason but we can but some blame can be on Palestinian governmental authorities for corruption as well as poor governance. ISIS already has a presence in Sinai which is in close proximity to the already Islamist control Gaza Strip (However Hamas advocates the Muslim Brotherhood Islamism which pro democracy and more tolerant of other religions). And Israel might prefer ISIS over groups like Hamas because it gives them free rein in Palestine because they are hated everyone including states that want wipe Israel off the map *cough* Iran *cough*
Sudan- Now this country is not talk about a lot when it comes to ISIS but this truly is ISIS's dreamland it has extreme poverty, extreme corruption, ethnic discrimination (Bedouin Muslims against African Muslims). Salafism has respectable presence and Sudan's top dog Omar Al Bashar has no appointed successor even though he is very old which put the Sudanese government in tough spot. With no successor his regime might fall or be considerably weaken without their seasoned strongman and the opposition parties don't have a strong charismatic leader like Omar Al Bashar (which main reason why he hasn't been overthrown). The ingredients for ISIS rise are present and Sudan has jihadists groups who are gaining ground amongst some fed up youth some of them already pledge alligence to ISIS.
Lebanon- When it comes religious tolerance Lebanon is a prime example not only for the Middle East but the entire world. However ISIS does have a presence. ISIS and Al Nursa have joined forces even captured the town of Arsal at one point but it was liberated by the Lebanese army shortly after. Given it's close proximity to ISIS terrority and it will have to face spillover of Syrian civil war. If that confrontation does come to pass Hezbollah a Shiite paramilitary group will be the Vanguard of defense considering it is stronger than the Lebanese military but ISIS can use it that it's advantage just like with Assad religious minorities will flee to under protection of Hezbollah but Sunnis are untrusting of Hezbollah and some may claim that Sunnis are discriminated against in Lebanon due to Hezbollah hegemony this may bode true in some ways. Given that winning Sunni support will be difficult most Sunnis are against Salafism but ISIS might use a fearmongering campaign as it's predecessor AQI did in Iraq.
Pakistan- Pakistan can be referred to the birthplace of Present day Salafi Terrorism. Pakistani has maintain close ties to groups like the Taliban and some speculate Al Qaeda but even with that It has it's own terror problem the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistani Taliban isn't like the Afghan Taliban for one it is not a cohesive entity it is a coalition of Dozens like minded groups who have their own political motives and even though they share the same name the Afghan Taliban has no control over them and there is little evidence they even cooperate militarily. The Taliban claims them out of ideological sympathy. They do have strong bonds with Al Qaeda but their biggest loyalty lies within their own respective groups. ISIS's "Khorsan province" (they're in Afpak/Parts of India) was founded by dissident Pakistani Taliban commanders and is made mostly Pakistani nationals. It will be easier for ISIS to gain the loyalty of small factions than entire a Jihadist organization.
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