كتب الكاتب الفاتح جبرا المتوفرة بمعرض الدوحة
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Re: إنتبهوا أيها السادة ..... طيران + سياسة = كارثة .. FULL STOP (Re: صديق عبد الجبار)
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Quote: FROM: AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT (AFSD) TOULOSE TO: ALL AIRBUS OPERATORS/ ATTN: FLIGHT SAFETY SUBJECT: Sudan Airways SD109 accident in Khartoum, Sudan This AIT is an update of SD109 AIT N 1 regarding the A310 accident during landing on runway 36 at Khartoum, Sudan, which occurred on the 10th of June 2008 at 20:26 local time. The data which follows has been approved for release by the commission of investigation led by the Sudan Investigation Authorities (SIA). The DFDR and CVR have been read-out at the French (Bureau Enquete et Analyse-BEA) in Paris under the leadership of the In-Charge Investigation Authorities from Sudan in the 9th of July 2008. The preliminary review of available data indicates that the following sequence of events: The aircraft was dispatched with thrust reverser (THR REV) of Engine (1)(LH) deactivated. The landing was performed in rainy conditions, runway was wet, latest wind data communicated to the crew was: 320 degrees / 07 Kt. The Captain was PILOT FLYING (PF). The approach was nominal with the aircraft being configured for landing with SLATS & FLAPS fully extended and GROUND SPOILERS armed. The AUTO PILOT was disconnected at 800ft. RADIO-ALTITUDE and the AUTO-THROTTLE were kept engaged till landing.
Bothe Thrust Levers (THR LVRs) were set to IDLE detent for touchdown (T/D). The touchdown (T/D) occurred at a 134Kt indicated air speed (IAS) and a 155Kt ground speed (GS) Initial assessment indicates that the touchdown was smooth and occurred about 900 meters beyond the runway “R/W) threshold (Landing Distance Available (LDA) for runway 36 is 2980 meters”. The ground spoilers (GRD SPLR) normally deployed, except SPOILER #5 which were FAULTY. Upon crew selection of both thrust reversers to MAX REV, the engine 2 reverser deployed normally, while engine 1 thrust reverser normally stowed since it was inhibited prior aircraft dispatch. About 10 seconds after T/D. at 98kt IAS and a 122kts GS, both reversers were deselected and the operative reverser stowed. Both thrust reversers were then kept to IDLE detent. About 20 seconds after T/D, at 90kt IAS and a 107kt GS, the GPWS warnings; TERRAIN~ TERRAIN, followed by continuous PULL UP~PULL UP were triggered. The cause of these spurious warnings has not been determined yet. About 28 seconds after T/D, at 90kt IAS and a 93kt GS, the crew selected again both thrust reversers to MAX REV, this was about 7 seconds prior to aircraft overrun the runway at 76kt Ground Speed. The rollout phase lasted for about 36 seconds. Crew reportedly set the BRK A/SKID switch to ALTN OFF during the rollout. This is consistent with the observed position of the switch during wreckage investigation. The aircraft came to a rest at about 200m after the runway end. On-site investigation has shown that the fire started as the aircraft had stopped. The investigation will now focus at determining the reasons for the followings I. The low deceleration. II. The GPWS spurious warnings. III. The fire ignition. At this stage of the investigation, Airbus has got no specific recommendation to be raised to the operators.
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